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Abstract: While the world’s attention often gravitates to the latest emergency situation, we are acutely aware that
most of the world’s internally displaced persons (IDPs) live in protracted displacement. Displacement
drags on, sometimes for years or decades, because of continuing conflict, because peace processes are
stalled, or because political settlements fail to provide the necessary security and support for the displaced to find solutions.
The 2nd Expert Seminar on Protracted Internal Displacement was held in Geneva from 19-20 January 2011 on the theme of “IDPs in protracted displacement: Is local integration a solution?” Around 100 participants discussed challenges and possibilities of local integration in diverse protracted displacement situations over the course of the two days.
This publication includes the six case studies commissioned for the seminar as well as an introductory essay which
explores the common themes emerging from the studies on protracted displacement and local integration. By focusing on the possibilities and challenges of local integration in protracted displacement, we hope that these
six case studies lead to better understanding—and to concrete actions—which will bring an end to internal displacement
which has gone on for far too long in these six countries and in many others.
Abstract: The troublesome question of how and whether to consider
what are commonly referred to as Lone Wolf terrorists within
the broader roster of terrorist groups is something that has
regularly confounded security analysts for a variety of
reasons. This article attempts to create some sort of
typology to start to define the group, with specific reference
to the instances of Lone Wolves (or Lone Wolf Packs, an
admittedly paradoxical choice of words that is defined in the
article as small, isolated groups of individuals involved in
terrorism) who claim to adhere to an extremist Islamist
ideology. The article offers four subsets to the definition,
drawing upon a detailed analysis of a variety of different plots
in Europe and North America: Loner, Lone Wolf, Lone Wolf
Pack, and Lone Attacker. The purpose of the article is to offer
some preliminary thoughts on the issue of Lone Wolves, and
start a process towards deeper understanding and closer
analysis of the phenomenon. This is of particular salience
given the frequency with which security analysts cite the
phenomenon as a threat and the increasing way in which
Al Qaeda ideologues refer to it.
Abstract: The big-picture issues at the crossroads of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding were taken up by the Security Council in September 2010, under the presidency of Turkey. Leading up to that discussion, Turkey held numerous bilateral consultations, and, with the support of IPI, organized an expert meeting on these issues in New York in May 2010 and an informal retreat in Istanbul for members of the Council in June 2010.
This publication is intended to document some of that process, and includes the Statement by the President of the Security Council, the outcome summary of the June retreat, and the set of papers that were presented there. Three of these papers draw lessons from the UN’s experiences in different areas of the world (Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the Great Lakes region of Africa), and one paper analyzes cross-cutting themes.
Table of Contents:
Introduction, Francesco Mancini
Security Council Istanbul Retreat: At The Crossroads of Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding
Adam C. Smith and Vanessa Wyeth, Rapporteurs
Peacemaking In Afghanistan: A Role For The United Nations?
The Security Council And Peacekeeping In The Balkans, 1992-2010
Richard Gowan and Daniel Korski
The Great Lakes of Africa (Burundi, The Drc, And The LRA-Affected Areas)
Composite Paper on Cross-Cutting Themes
International Peace Institute
Statement by the President of the Security Council
Abstract: Colombia currently accounts for the vast bulk of cocaine produced in
Latin America. In 2009, the country produced 270 metric tons (MT)
of cocaine, making it the principal supplier for both the United States
and the worldwide market. Besides Colombia, Peru and Bolivia constitute
two additional important sources of cocaine in Latin America.
In 2009, these two countries generated enough base material to respectively
yield 225 and 195 MT of refined product.
Between 60 and 65 percent of all Latin American cocaine is trafficked
to the United States, the bulk of which is smuggled via the eastern
Pacific/Central American corridor. The remainder is sent through
the Caribbean island chain, with the Dominican Republic, Puerto
Rico, and Haiti acting as the main transshipment hubs. In both cases,
Mexico serves as the main point of entry to mainland America, presently
accounting for the vast majority of all illicit drug imports to the
Abstract: Russia’s political leaders are currently pushing a state- and society-wide process of modernization. The Russian military, a deeply conservative institution, is being asked to accept fundamental changes that threaten the very livelihoods of those being asked to implement them. New structures can be created and new equipment and technologies procured, but the crucial element is the degree to which such changes are accepted by the human element. This is often the most difficult aspect in any process of organizational change. It is no wonder that the military modernization process is progressing slowly in Russia. The Russian ground forces will not be very different in the next few years than they are now. Time and future investment will eventually produce the more refined army that a host of Russian politicians have wished to see. But it will take time and investment.
Abstract: The UK faces a range of terrorist threats. The most serious is from Al Qa’ida, its affiliates and like-minded organisations. All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. But the percentage of people who are prepared to support violent extremism in this country is very small. It is significantly greater amongst young people. We now have more information about the factors which encourage people to support terrorism and then to engage in terrorism-related activity. It is important to understand these factors if we are to prevent radicalisation and minimise the risks it poses to our national security. We judge that radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling. There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values. Terrorist groups can take up and exploit ideas which have been developed and sometimes popularised by extremist organisations which operate legally in this country. This has significant implications for the scope of our Prevent strategy. Evidence also suggests that some (but by no means all) of those who have been radicalised in the UK had previously participated in extremist organisations.
Prevent is part of our counter-terrorism strategy. Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Prevent will address all forms of terrorism but continue to prioritise according to the threat they pose to our national security. At present, the majority of our resources and efforts will continue to be devoted to preventing people from joining or supporting Al Qa’ida, its affiliates or related groups.
Abstract: Most of the world’s 27.5 million internally displaced people
(IDPs) live in protracted displacement. These are
situations where the process for finding durable solutions
is stalled, and/or where IDPs are marginalised
as a consequence of violations or a lack of protection
of their human rights, including economic, social and
cultural rights.1 Solutions are absent or have failed and
IDPs remain disadvantaged and unable to fully enjoy
The seminar brought together about 100 participants
from around the world, from a range of backgrounds
and organisations. They included representatives of
governments and civil society organisations in countries
with protracted internal displacement, international
humanitarian and development organisations (including
UN agencies) donors, research organisations, academics
and other experts. The Chatham House Rule was in
effect during the meeting to allow participants to speak
The seminar focused on the experiences of six countries
with protracted internal displacement – Burundi,
Colombia, Georgia, Serbia, southern Sudan and Uganda.
For each country field research was commissioned and
the resulting case studies were distributed before the
seminar. Other background materials circulated to participants
included an overview of local integration of
IDPs in protracted displacement and reference materials
relating to durable solutions.
Abstract: Although Chechnya no longer makes international headlines, instability persists and has actually spread within the wider North Caucasus region. Degrading socio-economic conditions, an unstable political situation, and increasing religious tension have made the North Caucasus susceptible to Islamist insurgency and terrorist activity. The modernisation strategy for the North Caucasus launched by Moscow in 2008 has failed to reverse the situation so far. Turning into an arc of insecurity, the region poses a growing challenge to stability within Russia and beyond.
Abstract: Women in Chechnya and Palestine do not become suicide bombers because they are Muslim.
Women in Chechnya and Palestine become suicide bombers because human security levels decrease
during long-term conflict and allow rogue collectives to gain power in the absence of authority. This
research explores how the experience of female suicide bombing is constructed as a response to
foreign occupation, how gender and religion are secondary concerns to supporters of violent
resistance, and how the history of human insecurity in Chechnya and Palestine has resulted in an
‘economy of conflict’ that has little stake in peace.
Abstract: The Examples from the Ground are concrete illustrations of ways in which a gender perspective has been integrated in different security sector institutions around the world. They range from measures to counter human trafficking in Kosovo, to women’s organisations’ involvement with security institutions in Nepal, to female parliamentarians’ contribution to post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda. These examples can help policymakers, trainers and educators better understand and demonstrate the linkages between gender and SSR.
The examples are organised around the following nine themes, for which a short introduction is provided:
• Police Reform and Gender
• Defence Reform and Gender
• Justice Reform and Gender
• Penal Reform and Gender
• Border Management and Gender
• Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender
• National Security Policy-Making and Gender
• Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender
• SSR Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation and Gender
Individual examples can also be downloaded individually, in English or in French, at: http://gssrtraining.ch/index.php?option=com_content&view;=article&id;=4&Itemid;=131〈=en
Abstract: The death of Osama bin Laden has once again flooded the media with images of Islamic terrorism, while a recent bomb threat from Irish dissidents in London has heightened the fear of new terrorist attacks in the UK. In this context, and ahead of the publication of the review of the ‘Prevent’ strand of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), this paper analyses the main Islamic terrorist attacks in the UK since 9/11. The conclusions made from this analysis aim to challenge commonly held assumptions and provide a background for an assessment of the current ‘Prevent’ strategy. Drawing on common criticisms and positive lessons gained from the strategy implemented in Bristol, this paper makes six recommendations:
1. The difference between extremism and violent extremism must be defined to ensure that the policy is not viewed as a government attempt to shape religious ideology.
2. The sense that Prevent is a general intelligence-gathering mission must be removed to gain trust and acceptance from Muslim communities.
3. The drivers of violent extremism must be addressed directly by discussing the impact of and justification for British foreign policy in the Middle East.
4. Local authorities must understand the make-up of the different Muslim communities in the area so as to tailor the strategy to each.
5. Muslim communities must be engaged with local authorities while the strategy is being formulated at the operational local authority level to ensure it is appropriate and accepted.
6. Events need to be focused on the discussion and demystification of violent extremism framed within a wider religious and cultural context.
Abstract: The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 changed the situation in the South Caucasus fundamentally. Russia‘s invasion of Georgia‘s territory made it clear that the conflicts over Georgia‘s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not merely domestic issues, but had been absorbed into a larger conflict between Russia and Georgia. Moreover, it highlighted the essential differences in Russian and Western foreign policy objectives in the region, and the limited mechanisms for challenging Russia‘s policies in what Moscow considers its exclusive sphere of influence.
In the post-war era, Western powers have largely failed to establish a policy towards Georgia‘s conflicts that takes these new realities into account. This is problematic for several reasons. The post-war status quo is not only unsus-tainable, but also conflicts directly with Western interests in the region. Rus-sia‘s significant military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains a violation of fundamental principles of international law, and thus, threatens the upholding of internationally recognized norms and standards in the re-gion. This, in turn, sets dangerous precedents with implications beyond Georgia and the South Caucasus. Secondly, Russia‘s military buildup on Georgian territory, coupled with continued tensions along the Administra-tive Boundary Lines, suggest that the situation in the region is far from sta-ble. This is a direct concern for the West, as the security deficit in the South Caucasus continues to delay reform processes, hamper economic develop-ment, and prevent the West from helping develop this vital transport corri-dor to Central Asia.
This paper examines these key issues from the perspective of international law.
Abstract: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks gave new momentum to European Union (EU)
initiatives to combat terrorism and improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation among
its member states. Since the 2001 attacks, the EU has sought to speed up its efforts to harmonize
national laws and bring down barriers among member states’ law enforcement authorities so that
information can be meaningfully shared and suspects apprehended expeditiously. Among other
steps, the EU has established a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist
groups, an EU arrest warrant, enhanced tools to stem terrorist financing, and new measures to
strengthen external EU border controls and improve aviation security.
As part of its drive to improve its counterterrorism capabilities, the EU has also made improving
cooperation with the United States a top priority. Washington has largely welcomed these efforts,
recognizing that they may help root out terrorist cells and prevent future attacks against the
United States or its interests abroad. U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new
dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security
issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Contacts between U.S. and EU officials on
police, judicial, and border control policy matters have increased substantially since 2001.
This report features a historical overview of EU efforts against terrorism within the context of EU-US counterterrorism cooperation. The report acknowledges a revival of the EU's momentum to improve law enforcement cooperation against terrorism in cooperation with the US. It concludes, however, that despite closer collaboration, the US and EU continue to face challenges as they seek to promote closer cooperation in police, judicial, and border control fields.
Abstract: An increase in asylum applications and refugee populations from conflict zones since
the late 1980s has led to considerable public, political and policy concern within the
European Union. Somalia has been one of the top refugee-producing countries in the
world for more than twenty years given the protracted nature of its conflict. Around
245,000 Somali asylum applications have been lodged in Europe since 1990, after
civil war began affecting large parts of country. Estimates of the remaining
population vary, but one World Bank estimate put this at 8.9m in 2008. There were
approximately 1.5m internally displaced persons in 2009, in addition to a total
estimated refugee population of nearly 700,000.
Based upon qualitative research with Somali refugees in two European host
countries – the UK and the Netherlands - this paper explores the micro-level
experiences and ongoing effects of the Somali conflict on their lives in exile.
Challenging predominant macro-level framings of refugees in these settings, it
supports a micro-level analysis of their experiences and lives. It analyses their
ongoing connections with the conflict in Somalia, and reveals how this can affect
aspects of their integration and emotional health while in exile, alongside social
problems such as poverty, drug use and divorce.
Abstract: Crisis Watch summarises briefly developments during the previous month in some 70 situations of current or potential conflict, listed alphabetically by region, providing references and links to more detailed information sources (all references mentioned are hyperlinked in the electronic version of this bulletin); assesses whether the overall situation in each case has, during the previous month, significantly deteriorated, significantly improved, or on balance remained more or less unchanged; alerts readers to situations where, in the coming month, there is a particular risk of new or significantly escalated conflict, or a particular conflict resolution opportunity (noting that in some instances there may in fact be both); and summarises Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers that have been published in the last month.
Amid mounting tensions between North and South Sudan over the disputed border area of Abyei, clashes broke out between the two sides at the beginning of the month. Northern Sudanese forces invaded Abyei on 20 May and asserted control in breach of existing peace agreements. Tens of thousands are reported to have fled south. The attacks threaten renewed conflict and weaken confidence between North and South as critical post-referendum arrangements remain unresolved.
Tensions also increased over military control and the presence of armed forces in the transitional areas of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, and CrisisWatch identifies a conflict risk alert for North Sudan for the coming month.
Violence escalated further in Yemen, where military forces loyal to President Saleh battled on several fronts, renewing fears that the continued political stalemate could erupt into civil war.
President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria continued to use troops and tanks to violently suppress the ongoing revolt, with hundreds of protesters feared killed, thousands detained, and widespread reports of torture.
In Pakistan, the U.S. killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad at the beginning of the month again raised questions about the military's possible involvement with jihadist groups.
Local elections in Albania on 8 May proved even more troubled than anticipated as the race for the Tirana mayor's seat ended deep within the margin of error.
In Guatemala, the Mexican Los Zetas cartel killed and decapitated 27 farm workers in the northern Petén department.
In Serbia, war crimes fugitive Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military leader accused of commanding the Srebrenica massacre and the siege of Sarajevo during the 1992-95 Bosnian war, was arrested after 16 years on the run. He was extradited to The Hague, where he will stand trial for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Abstract: Russia and Mexico, two of the world’s most murderous countries for the press, are heading in different directions in combating deadly anti-press violence, the Committee to Protect Journalists has found in its newly updated Impunity Index. The index, which calculates unsolved journalist murders as a percentage of each country’s population, found improvement in Russia as journalist murders ebbed and prosecutors obtained two high-profile convictions. But deadly anti-press violence continued to climb in Mexico, where authorities appear powerless in bringing killers to justice.
Colombia continued a years-long pattern of improvement, CPJ’s index found, while conditions in Bangladesh reflected a slight upturn. But the countries at the top of the index—Iraq, Somalia, and the Philippines—showed either no improvement or even worsening records. Iraq, with an impunity rating three times worse than that of any other nation, is ranked first for the fourth straight year. Although crossfire and other conflict-related deaths have dropped in Iraq in recent years, the targeted killings of journalists spiked in 2010.
“The findings of the 2011 Impunity Index lay bare the stark choices that governments face: Either address the issue of violence against journalists head-on or see murders continue and self-censorship spread,” said CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon. “Convictions in Russia are a hopeful sign after years of indifference and denial. But Mexico’s situation is deeply troubling, with violence spiking as the government promises action but fails to deliver.”
CPJ’s annual Impunity Index, first published in 2008, identifies countries where journalists are murdered regularly and governments fail to solve the crimes. For this latest index, CPJ examined journalist murders that occurred between January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2010, and that remain unsolved. Only the 13 nations with five or more unsolved cases are included on the index. Cases are considered unsolved when no convictions have been obtained.
Impunity is a key indicator in assessing levels of press freedom and free expression in nations worldwide. CPJ research shows that deadly, unpunished violence against journalists often leads to vast self-censorship in the rest of the press corps. From Somalia to Mexico, CPJ has found that journalists avoid sensitive topics, leave the profession, or flee their homeland to escape violent retribution.
Abstract: The United States is at a strategic inflection point in South and Central Asia. The death of Osama bin Laden, together with the projected transition to a smaller U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, presents a new opportunity for the United States to protect its enduring interests in the region. In Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia, CNAS authors Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.), Andrew Exum and Matthew Irvine identify key priorities for the United States and the key components of a regional strategy in light of fast-changing current events.
This report culminates a year-long project examining the future of U.S. strategy in South and Central Asia given the pending drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Barno, Exum and Irvine examine U.S. relationships with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and offer immediate and long-term policy recommendations for protecting U.S. interests in the region.
Abstract: The mostly Armenian-populated Javakheti region, along the southern border with Armenia and Turkey, has been a potential flashpoint since Georgia’s 1991 independence, when a paramilitary group practically ran it, and physical links with the rest of the country were weak. After the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, many outside observers, recalling that there had been violent demonstrations in Javakheti in 2005 and 2006, predicted it would be the next to seek autonomy – or more. But the situation has stabilised. Tbilisi has successfully implemented programs to increase the region’s ties to the rest of the country, stopped projects that were seen as discriminatory and reduced the influence of the few remaining radical groups. It should maintain this momentum and take additional steps to guarantee that Javakheti and its 95,000 mainly Armenian speakers feel fully integrated in Georgia and provide an example of respect for minority rights in a region where minorities who feel discriminated against have all too often been attracted to secession, such as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Lack of knowledge of the state language (Georgian) and poverty encourages migration from the region to Armenia and Russia. A paucity of media reporting on the isolated area helps reinforce feelings of marginalisation. Many Javakheti residents do not feel like full-fledged citizens, so prefer to become involved in the political and cultural life of neighbouring Armenia, whose nationalist groups are quick to argue that they are the victims of ethnic discrimination due to Georgian government policies and to amplify their grievances over poverty, unemployment, education and the lack of formal laws recognising Armenian as a “regional language” in Javakheti.
Although Javakheti poses no immediate threat to Georgia’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi needs to continue to increase its focus on the region, so as to build confidence with local leaders and engender a sense of loyalty towards the state. This would help to avoid interpretations that the local aspects of nationwide problems, such as the economy, reflect ethnic discrimination.
Abstract: The phrase “Cherkessian Factor” usually refers to the influence exerted by the ethnic solidarity of the Cherkessian (Abkhaz-Adyg) peoples, both those located in the Russian Federation and the Cherkessian diaspora in Turkey, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt. This influence is felt on political, social, and cultural processes in the Caucasus and in countries with a large Cherkessian population. It is increasingly likely that this Cherkessian factor will lead to further destabilization in the North Caucasus.
The Carnegie Moscow Center, as part of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network, hosted a discussion on the Cherkessian factor. Alexander Skakov of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Nikolay Silaev of the Center for Caucasian Studies, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, spoke on this factor and its potential influence. Carnegie’s Andrei Ryabov moderated.
The speakers concluded by discussing possible avenues for resolving the tensions created by the Cherkessian factor in the North Caucasus, including full-scale privatization of land ownership; implementation of the provisions of federal law for municipalities; and effective action against corruption. They argued that such reforms would “permit a significant portion of the population to return to normal economic activity, which is currently impossible, and would thus automatically reduce the unhealthy interest in politically charged questions of ethnic identity … and in radical Islamism.” However, they warned the Russian government does not seem to recognize the necessity of such reforms to help stem the increasing violence in the region.
Abstract: Popularised as a result of the so-called surge in Iraq, the concept of counterinsurgency has since experienced a marked decline, mostly due to the difficulties of implementing its core principles in Afghanistan. Across the United States and Europe, counterinsurgency now seems to be on its way out, as a concept to be studied and as a priority to inform policy.
This article examines the value of retaining counterinsurgency as a concept, along with its associated principles and theory. Much depends on what is expected from this term, which lacks both definition and clear substance. Counterinsurgency provides neither a strategy for military intervention nor a campaign plan for deployed soldiers and will fail if mistaken for more than what it is. Counterinsurgency does offer a collection of insights, which, if used in a manner sensitive to local context, can help in the design and execution of expeditionary campaigns. These insights are often largely commonsensical but have nonetheless played an important role in challenging previously dominant misconceptions about the nature of war and peace, both in Europe and the United States.
Abstract: Comments in this testimony are largely derived from a compilation of studies that the author commissioned in previous years looking at how key countries in Europe (the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Spain) were addressing the threat of Islamist terrorism domestically. I then analyzed those studies and set out to compare their respective findings with the post-9/11 counterterrorism regime here in the United States. The result was a volume published last summer by the American Enterprise Institute entitled Safety, Liberty and Islamist Terrorism: American and European Approaches to Domestic Counterterrorism. The author provides context to United States counterterrorism policy by comparing it with the policies and practices of our European allies
Abstract: Ensuring the physical security and
proper management of national
inventories and surplus stocks is key
to minimizing potential hazardous
effects on populations and environments
Many factors create stockpiles of
small arms and ammunition in surplus
to a state’s requirements. Examples
include changes in the security environment,
reductions in the number of security
forces, procurement programmes,
and the influx of confiscated illicit or
unauthorized arms. This surplus
materiel needs to be properly addressed.
This Issue Brief profiles the policies
and procedures put in place by the
South-east European countries operating
within the RASR Initiative to
address their surplus small arms and
Abstract: The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)
was established in the aftermath of the 11 September
2001 attacks in the United States of America (US), as a
reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Working Party
(TWP) of the Council of the EU to the European Parliament.
The content of the TE-SAT reports is based on
information supplied by EU Member States, some third
states (Colombia, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland,
Turkey, and the United States of America) and third
organisations (Eurojust and Interpol), as well as information
gained from open sources.
In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT
is produced annually to provide an overview of the terrorism
phenomenon in the EU, from a law enforcement
perspective. It seeks to record basic facts and assemble
figures regarding terrorist attacks and arrests in the European
Union. The report also aims to present trends and
new developments from the information available to
The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and analyses
the outward manifestations of terrorism, i.e. terrorist
attacks and activities. It does not seek to analyse the
root causes of terrorism, neither does it attempt to assess
the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies
and law enforcement measures taken, although it can
serve to illustrate some of these. The methodology for
producing this annual report was developed by Europol
five years ago and was endorsed by the Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June 2006.
This edition of the TE-SAT has been produced by Europol
in consultation with the 2011 TE-SAT Advisory Board,
composed of representatives of the past, present, and
future EU Presidencies, i.e. Belgium, Hungary and Poland
(the ‘Troika’), along with permanent members, representatives
of France and Spain, the EU Situation Centre
(EU SITCEN),1 Eurojust and Europol staff.
Abstract: Over the course of 2010 plans have been put in place to strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces, with a view to transitioning security responsibility so that Coalition military forces can begin to draw down from mid-2011 onwards.
As part of that new counterinsurgency strategy, a surge of 30,000 US and 10,000 additional Coalition forces were deployed to the country in the first half of 2010, which brought the total ISAF force in Afghanistan to approximately 132,000 personnel by year end.
The timetable for drawing down ISAF forces was endorsed at the NATO Heads of State and Government Summit in Lisbon in November 2010.
This note examines the timetable for transferring security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces; the current commitment of contributing nations, and any plans for withdrawal.
Abstract: This report reviews the challenges facing returning refugees
and internally displaced persons after protracted conflict,
questioning the common wisdom that the solution to
displacement is, in almost all cases, to bring those uprooted
to their places of origin, regardless of changes in the political,
economic, psychological, and physical landscapes. While
affirming the right to return, the report underscores insecurity,
lack of economic opportunities, and poor services generally
available in areas of recent conflict where people are expected
to rebuild their lives, documenting cases of seriously flawed
return efforts. Greater flexibility in determining the best
solutions to displacement and more investment in
alternative forms of reintegration for those who
have been displaced is needed.