November 24, 2008 Stathis N. Kalyvas // Department of Politics, New York University
Two related, but distinct, phenomena have been attracting increasing attention: ethnic violence
and civil war. This interest is driven by two political developments: first, the decline of interstate
wars and the concomitant rise of internal or civil wars (David 1997); and second, the decline of
civil wars that are classified as “ideological” or class-based and the concomitant rise of conflicts
classified as ethnic (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Most research has focused on the causes of
ethnic civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 1999). We know far less about the dynamics of civil war
violence per se.
First, I introduce three conceptual distinctions: (a) between “violence” and “(violent) conflict,” (b)
between “violence in times of peace” and “violence in times of war,” and (c) between different
types of violence based on the intersection of two criteria: the purpose and the production of
violence. Second, I sketch a simple model of violence in civil war based on a corresponding
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. Third, I present preliminary systematic empirical
evidence from Greece. Because the data come from a civil war which lacked the kind of deep
ethnic, religious, and even class, cleavages deemed necessary for the eruption of large-scale
violence, this paper provides a warning against making attractive but problematic connections
between ethnic cleavages and high levels of violence. Likewise, this paper suggests that the
widespread perception of civil war violence as a random, chaotic, and anarchical process (first
suggested by Thucydides and Hobbes) or a phenomenon better (or even exclusively) approached
from the perspective of passions and emotions are not warranted....
In this paper a particular strand of collaboration in occupied Greece is explored:
military or armed collaboration. The available evidence is reviewed and several
puzzles raised by armed collaboration in Greece are discussed: its geographical
distribution, size, timing, relation to prewar politics and cleavages, and the motivations
of officers and rank-and-file who served in collaborationist militias. A statistical
analysis is then presented using data from a regional study conducted in Greece by the
author. The article concludes with some general points about the theoretical framework
that best helps the analysis of the phenomenon and three key theoretical concepts are
underlined: indirect rule, civil war, and endogenous dynamics....
This paper draws on newspaper reviews and preliminary elite interviews to analyze how the various forms of EU influence directed at the Turkish elite have influenced their decision-making with respect to Turkey's relations with Greece. The author is specifically interested in how coercive, inductive, and persuasive forms of EU influence have interacted in shaping elite decision-making in Turkey. The complementary research on how EU influence has shaped Greek foreign policy making towards Turkey will be conducted at a later stage....
This Saban Center analysis paper analyzes the vexing issue of passive support for terrorism by looking at four countries that have passively supported, or at least tolerated, terrorism: Saudi Arabia's backing of radical Islamist causes and organizations, Pakistan's indirect links to al-Qa'ida, Greece's tolerance of the 17 November Organization, and the United States' blind eye for Provisional Irish Republican Army fundraising. In each of these instances, the government allowed terrorists to operate, and at times flourish, despite being aware of their activities....
September 7, 2010 Combating Terrorism Center // West Point
This issue includes the following articles: AQAP’s Growing Security Threat to Saudi Arabia, by Caryle Murphy; Assessing AQI’s Resilience After April’s Leadership Decapitations, by Myriam Benraad; The Return of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Revival of the Mahdi Army, by Babak Rahimi; Indoctrinating Children: The Making of Pakistan’s Suicide Bombers, by Kalsoom Lakhani; The Third Way: A Paradigm for Influence in the Marketplace of Ideas, by Scott Helfstein; Still Fighting for Revolution: Greece’s New Generation of Terrorists, by George Kassimeris....
The United States of America finds that neither the classic instruments of criminal law and procedure, nor the framework of the laws of war (including respect for the Geneva Conventions) has been apt to address the terrorist threat. As a result it has introduced new legal concepts, such as "enemy combatant" and "rendition", which were previously unheard of in international law and stand contrary to the basic legal principles that prevail on our continent. Thus, across the world, the United States has progressively woven a clandestine "spider's web" of disappearances, secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers, often encompassing countries notorious for their use of torture. Hundreds of persons have become entrapped in this web, in some cases merely suspected of sympathising with a presumed terrorist organisation....
The Greek civil war of 1945-1947 was really a continuation of struggles born during the Second World War. In 1936 General Ioannis Metaxas dissolved the Greek parliament and established himself as dictator under the restored monarch of Giorgios II. During the Second World War the Balkans was a secondary theater of operations. Organized resistance in Greece was broken and the country suborned to a combined German, Italian, and Bulgarian occupation. The Greek and Yugoslav Communist parties,in particular, succeeded in mobilizing large-scale partisan resistance and placing real military pressure on occupation forces....
December 7, 2004 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed shortly after the end of the Second World War to counter the threat of Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The treaty setting up the alliance was signed in 1949 by 10 Western European nations as well as Canada and the United States. NATO's mandate is to provide a common defence for the European and Atlantic areas, and to address common issues faced by the member countries.
December 3, 2004 Minorities at Risk Project // Center for International Development and Conflict Management // University of Maryland
Under the treaty of Lausanne, which ended the Greco-Turkish war in 1923, ethnic Greeks in Turkey and ethnic Turks in Greece were exchanged to be reunited with their kinsmen. However, an exception was made for Turks living in the area of Thrace and Greeks living in Istanbul. As a result the Turk minority is concentrated in this area of Greece. While not considered to be racially different from the Greek population, the group does speak Turkish, not Greek, and they have different traditions and customs and what has been historically most important, they are Muslim, not Greek Orthodox. Due to their concentration and the history of animosity between Greeks and Turks, the group is highly cohesive. It should be noted that there are other Muslims in Greece, found mainly in the Dedocanese Islands, but they have assimilated into Greek culture, with only their religion being different from the majority.
The Turks have endured and continue to endure discrimination and prejudice in most aspects of life in Greece from both the government and the population as a whole.
It is unlikely that the Turks in Greece will begin to use militant strategies in attempting to improve their position in the Greek society. This has n#ot been a strategy that has been used in the past, and the group lacks the organization to plan such a strategy. Additionally, there has been an improvement in relations between both the Turks and Greeks inside Greece, and between the Greek and Turkish government. As a result of the mutual cooperation between the two countries after each was hit by earthquakes have opened a new dialog between the two countries. This 'earthquake diplomacy' has not removed the prejudice that exists in the populations, but there is a new willingness to consider some change.
The group does possess the risk factors that tend to lead to protest: repression, political and economic discrimination, support from organized kindred groups, and a fairly new democracy. It is therefore likely that protests will continue, and possibly escalate. If the Turks in Greece organize to greater degree, then the possibility of further protests is enhanced. Of course, none of these statements apply to Muslims outside of Thrace, or non-Turkish Muslims in the general population. While they are still forced to identify their religion on their identity cards, the way other Muslims do, and are subject to the same forms of discrimination, they do not enjoy the same protections under the Treaty of Lausanne. For them, there has been no improvement whatsoever....
December 3, 2004 Minorities at Risk Project // Center for International Development and Conflict Management // University of Maryland
The Roma began arriving in Greece in the Middle Ages, and have spread throughout the country in search of better economic opportunities. Due to their nomadic lifestyle, and lack of concentration within Greece, the Roma as a group are not cohesive and organized. Although the Roma in Greece speak the same language as the rest of the population, they have a different culture and some, but not all have a different religion. The Roma are easily identifiable due to their physical appearance, and this had lead to discrimination and repression by both the Greek government and the citizens of the country. As is the case elsewhere there is considerable prejudice against the Roma in Greece. They are considered lazy, dirty and prone to crime. Also, their refusal to assimilate is not well received in Greece's nationalistic society.
It is hard to imagine that the Roma in Greece will begin to engage in militant activity in the near future. They are small in number, unorganized, and have been repressed in the past and have not acted in such a manner, so it is unlikely that they will begin to do so.
It is difficult to determine if the Roma will begin to engage in other, non-militant forms of collective action. They do have the risk factors associated with protest, such as government repression, and cultural and political restrictions, but they have had these factors for a while and no protest has occurred. With Greece hosting the 2004 Olympics, it is likely that the crack-down on the Roma will continue in advance of the Games, and that may be an opportunity to raise awareness to the rest of the world of their situation. When confronted with repression in the past, the Roma from around Europe have preferred to move to a new location rather than to protest their situation. It is clear that prejudice and discrimination against the Roma remains a problem in Greece. As is the case elsewhere, it is this very prejudice and discrimination that is one of the causes for the economic, social and political situation that perpetuates the prejudice and discrimination....
ELIAMEP is an independent, non-profit and policy-oriented research and training institute. ELIAMEP neither expresses, nor represents, any specific political party view. It is only devoted to the right of free and well-documented discourse.
ELIAMEP can trace its origins to informal meetings in the mid-1980s among academics, diplomats, military officials and journalists. That group's goal was to introduce an independent and scholarly approach to policy options regarding European integration, transatlantic relations as well as the Mediterranean, South-eastern Europe, the Black Sea and other regions of particular interest to Greece. In April 1988 these meetings were institutionalized and became the Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (Greek acronym, ELIAMEP).
Since its official establishment, ELIAMEP has experienced significant growth and has attracted the attention of scholars, government officials and corporate entities in Greece and abroad. As developments in the wider region moved rapidly, the focus of the institute was enlarged to include more policy-relevant research projects assisting post-communist democracies in the creation of a civil society, providing training and networking services and acting as a contact point to public and private sector bodies on politico-economic and security matters, as well as on European affairs. This was reflected in the 1993 amendment of ELIAMEP's statutes to include a change of name (without abandoning its original acronym), which would illustrate the Foundation's wider scope of concerns and activities: Hellenic Found#ation for European and Foreign Policy. The message is clear: in the context of the EU and shared sovereignties, a distinction needs to be drawn between European policy and traditional foreign policy.
Over the years, ELIAMEP expanded its activities with a view to having a greater impact on the public through the dissemination of information and of policy proposals, the organisation of training and conflict management seminars and international conferences, the publication of books, journals and monographs. ELIAMEP is frequently visited by journalists from various parts of the world requesting the Foundation's help for information, analysis and interviews. It is now generally recognised as one of the leading think-tanks in the region. ...
The Human Security Network (HSN) is a group of like-minded countries from all regions of the world that, at the level of Foreign Ministers, maintains dialogue on questions pertaining to human security. The Network includes Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand and South Africa as an observer. The Network has a unique inter-regional and multiple agenda perspective with strong links to civil society and academia. The Network emerged from the landmines campaign and was formally launched at a Ministerial meeting in Norway in 1999....
Normalisation between Greece and Turkey has come far
since tensions in the Aegean Sea threatened war three times
between the NATO allies. Trade, investments and mutual
cooperation and tourism have taken off, sidelining issues
like the Cyprus problem, which first stirred up the Aegean
dispute in the early 1970s. Frequent bilateral talks and Turkey’s
unofficial 2011 suspension of military over-flights of
Greek islands suggest that the time may be ripe for a solution
to that dispute. Turkey’s strong new government elected
in June is interested in further asserting itself as a responsible
regional power, solving problems in its neighbourhood
and clearing obstacles to its European Union accession.
With Athens in the midst of a financial crisis and needing
any economic lift and increased security it can find, this
unnecessary and still potentially dangerous conflict should
be resolved. A good strategy would be a synchronised set of
steps to prepare public opinion on both sides, leading to a
bilateral agreement and including, if needed, eventual recourse
to international adjudication....
April 27, 2011 International Peace Research Institute
The political transitions in Egypt and Tunisia have rekindled
the interest in how states and societies have moved from authoritarian
regimes to democracy after overthrowing old regimes.
This report responds to that interest by providing a factual
overview of transitions to democracy of nine European states
between 1974 and 1991.
The states covered fall into two geographical regions:
Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe. The context
of transition in each of these regions was different. The transitions
in Southern Europe took place as mainly discrete events
with little influence of one country over another. In contrast,
there was a strong regional dynamic in Central and Eastern
Europe, where all transitions were influenced by Gorbachev’s
policies of perestroika and glasnost and the loosening of the
Soviet Union’s grip on its satellite states....
April 27, 2011 European Centre for Minority Issues
Ban Ki Moon’s long awaited progress report on the negotiations in Cyprus did not come up with a final recommendation on how long the United Nations will be committed to engage in Cyprus. However, he warned that the UN would not continue indefinitely to spend efforts and money on a process that does not seem to render any progress. The underlying question is why so much time has been spent on a process that does not seem to be leading toward a successful conclusion.
In order to assess this question this ECMI Issue Brief #25 addresses a couple of interrelated questions, such as how a desired future solution should be devised for the respective communities. Is there a real desire to change the current political system on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community? Does the Turkish Cypriot community really wish to enter a multi-cultural political set-up in which it shall play a minority role albeit one that will include extensive participation rights? What are the interests of external actors, notably Turkey, the European Union and the United States of America? Finally, are there push factors that would make a solution possible or might there be an overarching interest that unites various actors in the secret desire to perpetuate the situation and preserve the so called “Cyprus Problem”?...
• The protection of asylum-seekers in Europe is dealt with under three principal bodies of law: the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, the law of the European Union and the soft law developed by the Council of Europe.
• Member states of the Council of Europe are also bound by the judgments of the European Convention on Human Rights; although the convention makes no reference to refugee protection, its provisions and the judgments of its court in Strasbourg impose important obligations on states in respect of asylum.
• The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 initiated the first phase of the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which aimed to harmonize refugee protection among member states while enabling them to meet their international obligations in that respect.
• The harmonizing measures adopted by the EU have been subject to severe criticism and the practices of member states reveal a systemic failure to comply with international refugee protection obligations.
• While there have been improvements in European refugee policy, significant challenges must be addressed before Europe can regain its reputation as a champion of the rights of the refugee. This is given particular urgency by recent events in North Africa, which may lead to large numbers of persons fleeing violence and disorder....
With the Cyprus reunification negotiations under way since 2008 at an impasse, dramatic steps are needed. As the stalemate continues, the costs for Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and the European Union (EU) are growing. Neither Greek Cypriots nor Turkish Cypriots can fulfil their potential on an island whose future is divided, uncertain, militarised and facing new economic difficulties. Time is making it ever harder to reunify the island, divided politically since Greek Cypriots seized control of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963 and militarily since a Turkish invasion in 1974 created a Turkish Cypriot zone on its northern third. After nearly four decades, the sides remain far apart even on the meaning of the talks’ agreed goal, a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. While there has long been peace, and relative freedom to interact since 2003, trade and visits between the two communities across the Green Line are decreasing.
Lack of a settlement damages everyone’s interests and keeps frustrations high. More than 200,000 Cypriots are still internally displaced persons (IDPs), and Turkish troops remain in overwhelming force. Few outside the military command in Ankara know if there are 21,000 soldiers, as Turkey says, or 43,000, as Greek Cypriots claim – a dispute that is one indication among many of the distrust and lack of information. Crisis Group has detailed in four reports since 2006 how the interests of the 1.1 million Cypriots and outside parties would be best met with a comprehensive political settlement. This remains the ideal, but as it is unrealistic in the coming months, ICG proposes interim unilateral steps....