Searched the resource database for : All Results AND Topic=Humanitarian Intervention
Haven't found what you are looking for? To further refine your search: Click on the 'advanced search' menu to filter by title, abstract, source, and/or publication date; to include or exclude multiple resource categories, regions or topics.
Abstract: This paper examines the challenges facing the protracted crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo as they relate to the international response in eastern DRC, with a particular focus on the relationship between humanitarian assistance, early recovery and stabilisation.
It argues that supporting recovery in DRC requires flexible, risk-tolerant programming. All actors involved need to carefully consider the relationship between assistance, security and recovery, and move beyond simplistic assumptions about how peace and stability can be fostered and encouraged. For humanitarians, there is no time like the present to discuss how to pursue principled humanitarian action and advocate for the protection of civilians, amidst the complex interaction of aid, politics and security.
Abstract: Yemen has suffered from internal conflicts and clashes for several years, resulting in severe disruptions of services, lack of security for the population and a large number of internally displaced people. The internal security threats include three distinct elements: a conflict in the north; a secessionist movement in the south; and the threat posed by terrorist elements.
Abstract: In February the conflict was sparked by anti-Government protests which drew a Government of Libya response. Since then, the
conflict has moved back and forth across Libya. The humanitarian and protection situation remains of utmost concern to the
humanitarian community. Over 686,422 migrants have fled the violence, including 261,118 third-country nationals. Hundreds of thousands of Libyans are internally displaced. At least 40,000 are refugees in neighbouring
Tunisia. Humanitarian partners have provided over 5,180 metric tons of aid including food, medical supplies, shelter
and non-food items. Over 12,800 people have been evacuated from Misrata so far. The humanitarian community is in
contact with all parties to carry out assistance. By far the greatest impact has been wrought on Misrata, a city of 300,000
people, which has seen the bloodiest fighting with thousands of casualties. Precise numbers of civilians killed or injured are unknown.
Abstract: Scores were killed in Syria as security forces backed by tanks launched an assault on the restive central city of Hama and other towns and cities, at the end of a month which saw hundreds of thousands take to the streets as daily anti-regime protests continued to spread. Syrian rights groups reported that more than 1,600 people have been killed and at least 12,000 arrested since the unrest began in March.
In Yemen violence escalated in Arhab, a mountainous area northeast of the capital Sanaa, where at least 40 were killed at the end of the month in clashes between government forces and armed tribesmen loyal to the opposition.
The UN declared a state of famine in Somalia's Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions, both controlled by Islamist militant group Al-Shabaab, following the worst drought in half a century and protracted instability.
There were hopes for political reconciliation in Burundi, as opposition parties welcomed President Pierre Nkurunziza's 30 June Independence Day speech inviting opposition leaders to return from exile and resume talks with the government.
In Malawi security forces used live ammunition to disperse thousands of anti-government protesters from 20-21 July, leaving at least eighteen people dead.
At least one presidential guard was killed on 19 July during two separate attacks on the home of Guinea's President Alpha Condé. Security forces arrested 38 people in connection with the attacks, including 25 military personnel. Most of those arrested have links with former junta leader Sekouba Konaté.
Ethnic violence flared in Pakistan's second city and commercial hub Karachi, leaving more than 200 people dead. July was the deadliest month in decades for clashes between supporters of the mainly Pashtun Awami National Party and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, representing the Urdu-speaking majority.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban stepped up their assassination campaign against government officials and key allies of President Hamid Karzai. Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president's half-brother and influential governor of volatile Kandahar province, was killed by his own bodyguard on 12 July, while the mayor of Kandahar city and a top adviser to the president died in separate suicide attacks later in the month.
Tensions soared in Kosovo late month after Kosovo special police attempted to take control of two customs posts in the north to enforce a new ban on imports from Serbia, triggering a violent response from Kosovo Serbs.
Abstract: The principle of Responsibility to Protect has made considerable progress in recent years. The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty laid down convincing arguments that sovereign states and the international community have the responsibility to intervene to protect civilians at risk of grave human rights violations, to rebuild war affected societies and to prevent severe violations and deadly conflict. Focusing on the responsibility to protect, and not the right to intervene, the Commission outlined a framework for international actors to intervene when a state fails to live up to the responsibility to protect its citizens. The report set a high threshold for when force/military intervention can be used. The criteria for prompt military response include large scale violence and ethnic cleansing.
Africa has hosted some of the world’s most brutal violent conflicts and civil wars. The continent is currently at a crossroads where policy makers, civil society and the international community all concede that the past atrocities such as in Rwanda, or intra-state wars like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Burundi must serve as a learning curve for preventing recurrence in the future.
However, implementing the doctrine of R2P is proving difficult. African States irrespective of their political configuration, wealth or stability adhere to the principle of sovereignty. For a long time this was a sacred understanding among African States. However, the conversion of the Organisation for African Unity to the African Union chipped away at the invincibility of the sovereignty principle. Though one of the AU’s core objectives is to Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States, the organization in a attempt to redress the weakness of the OAU gives the Union the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
Abstract: This paper documents the opinions of victims of human rights violations in Kenya about the country’s unfolding transitional justice process. The first section gives background into the human rights violations; the second section presents victims ideas about reparative justice. The report recommends implementing an urgent reparations program to address the needs of the most vulnerable victims, as well as establishing a process to lead to a more comprehensive reparations program in the future.
Abstract: The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has witnessed
unprecedented civil unrest since 16 February
2011. As the security situation deteriorated and
casualties mounted, many countries called on
their citizens to leave the country.
Before the crisis, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
reportedly hosted over 2.5 million migrant workers
from neighbouring countries, as well as Africa and
Asia. Thousands of these workers have fled the
country since the outbreak of violence, and many
governments have requested assistance from the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) to
ensure the safe and timely return home of their
nationals. As of 28 May, over 885,600 persons,
including Libyans, have crossed the Libyan border,
with thousands more waiting to cross the border
or stranded at sea and in airports.
The purpose of this report is to provide a cumulative
overview of the evacuation operations of IOM and
its partners over the past three months through
28 May, supplemented with graphs and photos to
provide more detail. In addition to the macro-level
information, highlights of activities and caseload at
the country level are also presented in subsequent
sections. The report’s final section gives a human
face to the crisis through the personal accounts
of migrants and TCNs who benefited from IOM
Abstract: East Africa is facing the worst food crisis of the 21st Century. Across Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, 12 million people are in dire need of food, clean water, and basic sanitation. Loss of life on a massive scale is a very real risk, and the crisis is set to worsen over the coming months, particularly for pastoralist communities.
The overall international donor response to this humanitarian crisis has been slow and inadequate. According to UN figures, $1bn is required to meet immediate needs. So far donors have committed less than $200m, leaving an $800m black hole.
While severe drought has undoubtedly led to the huge scale of the disaster, this crisis has been caused by people and policies, as much as by weather patterns. If more action had been taken earlier it could have helped mitigate the severity of the current crisis. It is no coincidence that the worst affected areas are those suffering from entrenched poverty due to marginalisation and lack of investment.
A rapid increase in emergency aid is needed right now to save lives and protect livelihoods, so that people can rebuild once the crisis is over. National governments and donors must prioritise addressing the issues that make people vulnerable in the first place.
There’s no time to waste. We must not stand by and watch this tragedy unfold.
Abstract: Critical voices in the NGO and academic worlds increasingly argue that there is a danger that northern security priorities might securitize the humanitarian and development agendas, particularly in post conflict environments. While these dangers are real, nevertheless one should not stereotype all international actors as northern or as promoting northern security, e.g. anti terrorist agendas. Rather than caricaturizing all the international actors that intervene in post conflict situations with the global label of Northener , it is instead more fruitful to view such actors as diverse players with conflicting interests that operate according to different policy logics.
Indeed, post conflict environments involve an ever increasing range of international actors. The first category of actors includes agents deployed by northern states, while the second category constitutes the agents deployed by multilateral organizations. A third set of international stakeholders include non states actors, such as NGOs, private companies and media organizations. These various actors are driven by very differing normative agendas. While they engage in the same fields of study and reform, their logics of action refer to standards, norms or procedures that are often hardly compatible one with each other.
It is thus possible to identify five logics of action that can explain the failures or limited successes of interventions in post conflict environments:
- the security field is both embedded in a military and a constabulary logic of action
- in the humanitarian field, the charity logic of action often clashes with a political approach to humanitarian assistance
- in the field of peace building, institutional engineering is often torn between different national approaches to public service
- in the reconstruction field, a profit logic may be in opposition with a solidarity logic
- the field of media finds it difficult to combine the communication and the audience rating logic
Finally, some post conflict policies, particularly those of great powers, are primarily driven by the transformation of their internal security structures rather than by needs on the ground.
Abstract: Mass atrocities are organized crimes. Those who commit
genocide and crimes against humanity depend on third
parties for the goods and services—money, matériel,
political support, and a host of other resources—that
sustain large-scale violence against civilians. Third parties
have supplied military aircraft used by the Sudan Armed
Forces against civilians, refined gold and other minerals
coming out of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and ensured a steady flow of arms into Rwanda.
Governments seeking to prevent atrocities cannot afford a
narrow and uncoordinated focus on the perpetrators of
such violence. Rather, an effective strategy must include
identifying and pressuring third-party enablers—
individuals, commercial entities, and countries—in order to
interrupt the supply chains that fuel mass violence against
The first-ever Director of War Crimes, Atrocities, and
Civilian Protection on the National Security Staff recently
convened a meeting that appears to initiate an
interagency structure to coordinate atrocities-prevention
initiatives across the government. The Administration has
an opportunity in the newly initiated structure to activate all
of the U.S. government’s resources to institute an
atrocities-prevention policy that goes beyond responding
to individual crises. This structure should incorporate a
systematic approach to disrupting enablers and should
ensure that all possible tools are developed and used to
counter these complex crimes. The intelligence
community and the Department of the Treasury, along
with the Departments of State and Defense, are key to
successfully tackling third-party enablers of atrocities.
Abstract: The Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) organised a one-day roundtable meeting to consider the role of stabilisation in relation to the protection of civilians. The roundtable brought together key stabilisation and humanitarian actors to explore several related questions: how and to what extent is the protection of civilians a stabilisation objective; how have stabilisation strategies contributed to enhanced protection of civilians in specific contexts; and what engagement is desirable between stabilisation and humanitarian actors on protection of civilians at global and country levels. This roundtable was the last in a short series of events on stabilisation held by HPG between October 2010 and March 2011. In order to promote an open and frank debate, the meeting was held under the Chatham House rule and participation was by invitation only. What follows is a summary of the discussions.
Abstract: On June 2, 2011, Peacebuild, with the financial support of the International Development
Research Centre, convened a day-long discussion on the tumultuous changes taking place in the
Middle East and North Africa.
Objectives for the roundtable were to share up-to-date information on current and longer-term
political issues and dynamics, to assess areas for possible support for democratic transitions in
the region, identify areas of relevant Canadian expertise – diaspora, NGO, academic, business
sector, governmental -- and, based on the discussion, generate a set of policy options and/or
recommendations for people-to-people support, NGOs, academics and the Government of
Participants in Cairo, Ottawa and Montreal were linked into a wide-ranging discussion, which
first focused on hearing activist and expert views from the epicentre of regional change – Egypt.
Among the questions explored with human rights activist Hossam Baghat, strategic analyst
Mustafa El-Labbad, activist author May Telmissany and IDRC regional expert Roula El-Rifai were
the makeup of the reform movements in the region and their objectives, what is the real extent
of political Islam’s influence in the Middle East and what has been the role of the armed forces
in the transitions?
Abstract: The Obama administration prepared this report for Congress regarding the U.S.' military activity in Libya. In response to complaints from members of Congress that Obama needed Congressional authorization to engage militarily in Libya, the report states that, "Given the important U.S. interests served by U.S. military operations in Libya and the limited nature, scope and duration of the anticipated actions, the President had constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, to direct such limited military operations abroad. The President is of the view that the current U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent with the War Powers Resolution and do not under that law require further congressional authorization, because U.S. military operations are distinct from the kind of “hostilities” contemplated by the Resolution’s 60 day termination provision."
Abstract: Progress in Afghanistan has been achieved on a number of fronts at the national, provincial,
district and local levels. The pace of change in Afghanistan however has been slow and not
without setbacks. Sustaining progress—whether political, economic or social—will depend on
continuing Afghan leadership, within government and in particular throughout Afghan society.
While much remains to be done, Canada continues to be inspired by those Afghans who are
fighting for change, for peace, for greater rights and freedoms for women and girls, and for
improved quality of life for all Afghans.
This quarterly report, covering the period of January 1 to March 31, 2011, describes the progress
made on Canada’s six priorities and three signature projects in Afghanistan, through a lens of
how our priorities, projects and partnerships have worked to support Afghan leadership and
ownership of their future. This report also provides insight into some of the progress that has
been made in Afghanistan through the experiences and thoughts of the Afghan people
Abstract: Professor Mary Kaldor is Director of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance
at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is a founding
member of European Nuclear Disarmament and founder and Co-Chair of the
Helsinki Citizens Assembly. A prolific writer, she is author of Global Civil Society:
An Answer to War (2003), New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era
(1999 and 2006) and edits the annual Global Civil Society Yearbook. Her most recent
book is Human Security: Reflections on Globalisation and Intervention (2007).
At the request of Javier Solana, The EU’s High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy, she convened the Study Group on European Security
Capabilities, which produced the influential report, A Human Security Doctrine for
Europe. A follow-on report, The European Way of Security, was presented to Javier
Solana in Madrid on 8 November, 2007. The interview took place on July 3, 2007.
Abstract: This is a transcript of an event on Libya held at Chatham House on 8 June 2011. The panel discussed the challenges and prospects facing the Libyan regime, the opposition and the international community.
Abstract: The character of the Libyan crisis today arises from the complex but so far evidently indecisive impact of the UN-authorised military intervention, now formally led by NATO, in what had already become a civil war. NATO’s intervention saved the anti-Qaddafi side from immediate defeat but has not yet resolved the conflict in its favour. Although the declared rationale of this intervention was to protect civilians, civilians are figuring in large numbers as victims of the war, both as casualties and refugees, while the leading Western governments supporting NATO’s campaign make no secret of the fact that their goal is regime change. The country is de facto being partitioned, as divisions between the predominantly opposition-held east and the predominantly regime-controlled west harden into distinct political, social and economic spheres. As a result, it is virtually impossible for the pro-democracy current of urban public opinion in most of western Libya (and Tripoli in particular) to express itself and weigh in the political balance.
At the same time, the prolonged military campaign and attendant instability present strategic threats to Libya’s neighbours. Besides fuelling a large-scale refugee crisis, they are raising the risk of infiltration by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, whose networks of activists are present in Algeria, Mali and Niger. All this, together with mounting bitterness on both sides, will constitute a heavy legacy for any post-Qaddafi government.
The present conflict clearly represents the death agony of the Jamahiriya. Whether what comes after it fulfils Libyans’ hopes for freedom and legitimate government very much depends on how and when Qaddafi goes. This in turn depends on how – and how soon – the armed conflict gives way to political negotiation allowing Libya’s political actors, including Libyan public opinion as a whole, to address the crucial questions involved in defining the constitutive principles of a post-Jamahiriya state and agreeing on the modalities and interim institutions of the transition phase. Instead of stubbornly maintaining the present policy and running the risk that its consequence will be dangerous chaos, the international community should act now to facilitate a negotiated end to the civil war and a new beginning for Libya’s political life.
Abstract: Brief Description [Project Summary]: This project is part of the overall reintegration component of the Sudan DDR Programme (SDDRP) for Sudan 2009-2012. Within the overall context of the SDDRP, this project component focuses on the economic and social reintegration for 674 women in Blue Nile State, from planning to implementation and monitoring and evaluation. It directly contributes to CPA implementation and paves the way to future human security, reconstruction and development activities.
Abstract: Over 40 years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades.
The Libyan government's use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi's overthrow sparked an international outcry and led the United Nations Security Council to adopt Resolution 1973, which authorizes "all necessary measures" to protect Libyan civilians. The United States military is participating in Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to enforce the resolution. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and other partner governments also are participating. Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remains defiant amid continuing coalition air strikes, and his forces continue to attack opposition-held areas. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC), which claims to represent all areas of the country. They seek foreign political recognition and material support. Resolution 1973 calls for an immediate cease-fire and dialogue, declares a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, and authorizes robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo on Libya established by Resolution 1970 of February 26.
As of April 21, U.S. military officials reported that U.S. and coalition strikes on Libyan air defenses, air forces, and ground forces had neutralized the ability of Muammar al Qadhafi's military to control the country's airspace. Coalition forces target pro-Qadhafi ground forces found to be violating Resolution 1973 through attacks that threaten civilians. President Obama has said the United States will not introduce ground forces, and Resolution 1973 forbids "a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory."
Some Members of Congress expressed support for U.S. military intervention prior to the adoption of Resolution 1973, while others disagreed or called for the President to seek explicit congressional authorization prior to any use of force.
Many observers believe that Libya's weak government institutions, potentially divisive political dynamics, and current conflict suggest that security challenges could follow the current uprising, regardless of its outcome. In evaluating U.S. policy options, Congress may seek to better understand the roots and nature of the conflict in Libya, the views and interests of key players, and the potential consequences of military operations and other proposals under consideration.
Abstract: Pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-15/1 of 25 February 2011, entitled
“Situation of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”, the President of the Human
Rights Council established the international commission of inquiry, and appointed M.
Cherif Bassiouni as the Chairperson of the commission, and Asma Khader and Philippe
Kirsch as the two other members.
In paragraph 11 of resolution S-15/1, the Human Rights Council requested the
commission to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of
the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible, to make
recommendations, in particular, on accountability measures, all with a view to ensuring that
those individuals responsible are held accountable.
The commission decided to consider actions by all parties that might have
constituted human rights violations throughout the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. It also
considered violations committed before, during and after the demonstrations witnessed in a
number of cities in the country in February 2011. In the light of the armed conflict that
developed in late February 2011 in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and continued during the
commission’s operations, the commission looked into both violations of international
human rights law and relevant provisions of international humanitarian law, the lex
specialis that applies during armed conflict.1 Furthermore, following the referral of the
events in the Libyan Arab Jamahirya by the Security Council to the International Criminal
Court, the commission also considered events in the light of international criminal law.
Abstract: The war in Afghanistan continues regardless of the demise of the leader
of the al‑Qaeda terrorist network, Osama bin Laden, over the border in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, in the early hours of 2 May 2011. Hard fighting is
expected throughout the 2011 fighting season now underway, as the Taliban
attempts to regain influence in historical safe havens in southern Afghanistan
that it lost over the past six months to the NATO‑led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
partner. For their part, the forty‑nine members of the 146,000-strong coalition
in Afghanistan, including Australia, must ensure that ISAF’s governance
and development lines of operation keep pace with recent gains in security
if the Afghan Government is to assume responsibility for the entire country
by the end of 2014. This will require more people with the requisite skills—
not necessarily an increased military commitment, but certainly a larger
Abstract: Crisis Watch summarises briefly developments during the previous month in some 70 situations of current or potential conflict, listed alphabetically by region, providing references and links to more detailed information sources (all references mentioned are hyperlinked in the electronic version of this bulletin); assesses whether the overall situation in each case has, during the previous month, significantly deteriorated, significantly improved, or on balance remained more or less unchanged; alerts readers to situations where, in the coming month, there is a particular risk of new or significantly escalated conflict, or a particular conflict resolution opportunity (noting that in some instances there may in fact be both); and summarises Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers that have been published in the last month.
Amid mounting tensions between North and South Sudan over the disputed border area of Abyei, clashes broke out between the two sides at the beginning of the month. Northern Sudanese forces invaded Abyei on 20 May and asserted control in breach of existing peace agreements. Tens of thousands are reported to have fled south. The attacks threaten renewed conflict and weaken confidence between North and South as critical post-referendum arrangements remain unresolved.
Tensions also increased over military control and the presence of armed forces in the transitional areas of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, and CrisisWatch identifies a conflict risk alert for North Sudan for the coming month.
Violence escalated further in Yemen, where military forces loyal to President Saleh battled on several fronts, renewing fears that the continued political stalemate could erupt into civil war.
President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria continued to use troops and tanks to violently suppress the ongoing revolt, with hundreds of protesters feared killed, thousands detained, and widespread reports of torture.
In Pakistan, the U.S. killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad at the beginning of the month again raised questions about the military's possible involvement with jihadist groups.
Local elections in Albania on 8 May proved even more troubled than anticipated as the race for the Tirana mayor's seat ended deep within the margin of error.
In Guatemala, the Mexican Los Zetas cartel killed and decapitated 27 farm workers in the northern Petén department.
In Serbia, war crimes fugitive Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military leader accused of commanding the Srebrenica massacre and the siege of Sarajevo during the 1992-95 Bosnian war, was arrested after 16 years on the run. He was extradited to The Hague, where he will stand trial for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Abstract: Scores of people have vanished from Libya’s Nafusa Mountain area apparently at the hands of forces loyal to Colonel al-Gaddafi, Amnesty International said today as it released a new report into deteriorating conditions in the western region of the country
Libya: Disappearances in the besieged Nafusa Mountain as thousands seek safety in Tunisia details a number of cases of people who have disappeared and are believed to have been taken Tripoli from Nafusa Mountain, which has been under siege and fire from pro-Gaddafi forces since early March 2011.
“It is outrageous that the families of these men have absolutely no idea what has happened to them,” said Amnesty International.
“Given what we know about the treatment of prisoners by the Tripoli authorities, there is every reason to fear for their safety and wellbeing.”
Nafusa residents believe that soldiers have targeted people they believed were involved in protests, supported of the opposition, or were organizing supplies to the besieged region.
Family members told Amnesty International of relatives who were detained by al-Gaddafi forces when they went to buy basic necessities. Some have subsequently appeared on Libyan state television “confessing” to being pressured to act against the country’s best interests, but most have simply vanished.
Abstract: Iraqis live in a tough region. Although none of
their neighbors have been designing military
forces specifically to target them, general tensions
in the region and among Iran, Israel, and Western
powers have led to the maintenance of regional
conventional militaries that pose a significant
threat to Iraq with its current armed forces, configured
as they are exclusively for internal security
missions. Those missions are made much more
daunting by Iran’s continued support for—and use
of—armed proxy groups to influence Iraqi decision
making and pursue Iranian interests. Even
the task of keeping sufficient pressure on al Qaeda
in Iraq and other Sunni revanchist groups will
strain the Iraqi military if it has little or no external
Iraq’s military weakness will threaten American
interests in one of two ways. Either Iraq will remain
so weak that the internal security and, ultimately,
political gains made since 2006 will be jeopardized,
leading to the prospect of renewed communal
conflict and the reemergence of militant Islamist
groups, or Iraq will engage in a military buildup that
in itself will be destabilizing in an already unstable
region. The Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to
defend Iraq’s sovereignty, independence from Iran,
and internal stability without American assistance,
including some ground forces in Iraq, for a number
of years. The negotiation of a security agreement
extending the presence of US forces in Iraq beyond
the end of 2011 is thus an urgent national security
priority for the United States and Iraq.