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Abstract: This Policy Brief examines the real and imagined influence of al-Qa‘ida in North Africa and the Sahel. Despite a perception of the transnationalization of terrorist movements in North Africa under al-Qa‘ida’s banner, robust evidence of an effective al-Qa‘ida’s expansion in the Maghreb and the Sahara/Sahel region remains elusive at best. Rather, doubts about al-Qa‘ida’s actual threat and the efficacy of international response in the context of pervasive state failure in the Sahel raise questions regarding the policy objectives of US-led counter-terrorism in the region.
Abstract: National security is normally seen in terms of military strength and internal security operations against extremists and insurgents. The upheavals that began in Tunis, and now play out from Pakistan to Morocco,. have highlighted the fact that national security is measured in terms of the politics, economics, and social tensions that shape national stability as well. It is all too clear that the wrong kind of internal security efforts, and national security spending that limits the ability to meet popular needs and expectations can do as much to undermine national security over time as outside and extremist threats.
It is equally clear that calls for democracy are at best only the prelude to dealing with critical underlying problems, pressures, and expectations. It is far from certain that even successful regime change can evolve into functional democracies and governance. Countries with no political parties and experienced leaders, with no history of checks and balances in government, with weak structure of governance led by new political figures with no administrative experience, will often descend into chaos, extremism, or a new round of authoritarianism. Even the best governments, however, are unlikely to change an economy and national infrastructure in less than half a decade, and existing demographic pressures will inevitably go on for at least the next decade.
Abstract: The Portfolio of Mine Action Projects is a resource tool and reference document for donors, policy-makers, advocates, and national and international mine action implementers. The country and territory-specific proposals in the portfolio reflect strategic responses developed in the field to address all aspects of the problem of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). This country and territory-based approach aims to present as comprehensive a picture as possible of the full range of mine action needs in particular countries and thematic issues related to mine action. The portfolio ideally reflects projects developed by mine- and ERW-affected countries and territories based on their priorities and strategies; the approaches are endorsed by national authorities. The portfolio does not automatically entail full-scale direct mine action assistance by the United Nations, but is in essence a tool for collaborative resource mobilization, coordination and planning of mine action activities involving partners and stakeholders. A country portfolio coordinator (CPC) leads each country portfolio team and coordinates the submission of proposals to the portfolio’s headquarters team. While the majority of the CPCs are UN officials, this role is increasingly being assumed by national authorities. The country portfolio teams include representatives from national and local authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations and the private sector. Locally based donor representatives are invited to attend preparation meetings. Each portfolio chapter contains a synopsis of the scope of the landmine and ERW problem, a description of how mine action is coordinated, and a snapshot of local mine action strategies. Many of the strategies complement or are integrated into broader development and humanitarian frameworks such as national development plans, the UN development assistance frameworks and national poverty reduction plans. This 14th edition of the annual Portfolio of Mine Action Projects features overviews and project outlines for 29 countries, territories or missions affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war. There are 238 projects in the 2011 portfolio. Africa accounts for the largest number: 92.
Abstract: This report covers the period from January
2008 until June 2010, and attempts to distill the
information Geneva Call and its numerous local
partners have collected on humanitarian mine
action in areas where the organization works,
specifically in locations where armed NSAs that
have signed the Deed of Commitment operate.
As such, the reader will find information on
landmine issues in parts of the world that do not
often get much attention.
Cognizant also of the fact that each of Geneva
Call’s signatories to the Deed of Commitment
was once a non-signatory, it is useful to examine
examples of armed NSAs Geneva Call currently
engages and whose position concerning AP
mines is evolving.
In each of the cases presented below,
NSAs, though not yet willing to commit to
the mine ban, are actively involved in humanitarian
mine action in some form, at times
independently, at others with the assistance
of international mine action agencies.
Abstract: We know little about what NSAs themselves
think about the protection of children in armed
conflict. How do they see their role? What challenges
do they face? How do they perceive and react to
international mechanisms? This publication not only
takes an initial step towards answering these questions,
but it also provides examples of good practices
that can help other NSAs better protect children
and thereby meet their international obligations. It
is clear that NSAs are part of the problem. The focus
here is on how they may be part of the solution.
Contributions come from NSAs which operate in Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East. Four of the contributing
NSAs are listed as violators in the annexes to the 2010
Report of the Secretary-General on Children and
Armed Conflict (Armée populaire pour la restauration
de la République et la démocratie (APRD), Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM), Karen National Union
/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), and
Moro Islamic Liberation Front/Bangsamoro Islamic
Armed Forces (MILF/BIAF). One has entered into an
Action Plan with the relevant UN Country Team (MILF/
BIAF).
Abstract: The military balance in North Africa, and internal security developments in each country, receive less attention than the Arab-Israeli balance and the balance in the Gulf. They are, however, an important part of the security of world energy exports, and the struggle against terrorism and extremism. Moreover, major acquisitions on the part of Algeria and Morocco starting in 2006, and potential major orders by Libya, could mark the beginning of important military modernization efforts in the region.
Abstract: Nine actual or potential conflict situations around the world deteriorated and one improved in November 2010, according to the latest issue of the International Crisis Group’s monthly bulletin CrisisWatch released today.
Tensions surged on the Korean peninsula as two South Korean civilians and two marines were killed when North Korea fired dozens of artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, where South Korea was conducting military drills. Haiti ’s late month presidential elections ended in confusion, as several opposition candidates called for the vote to be annulled amid reports of fraud, and thousands of people took to the streets in protest. International observers from the OAS called the vote valid despite “serious irregularities”, but tensions remain high. Ivory Coast saw deadly pre-election clashes on the streets of the capital Abidjan between rival supporters of the two presidential candidates, incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. The tightly contested 28 November run-off and delays in announcing the preliminary results has led to heightened tensions between the two camps and fears of further violence.
In Guinea, preliminary results declaring opposition leader Alpha Condé winner of the 7 November second round presidential election sparked three days of violence resulting in at least four deaths and dozens injured. CrisisWatch also noted deteriorated situations in Burundi, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Egypt and Western Sahara.
In Niger, the situation improved as results from the 31 October referendum showed 90 per cent of voters in favour of the new constitution, paving the way for January 2011 elections and a return to civilian rule.
Once again this month CrisisWatch describes violence against civilians in North and South Kivu provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Abstract: The conflict over Western Sahara between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, which
represents the people of Western Sahara, has been on the agenda of the United Nations Security
Council for close to 19 years, since June 1991, when the council took up the issue and established
MINURSO, the U.N. mission in Western Sahara. Throughout this period, the U.N. cannot show any
real progress towards resolution of the conflict, other than occasional outbursts of optimism that
eventually have come to naught.
Peacemaking efforts towards a political solution, undertaken in order to move the parties away
from the winner takes all solution envisaged by the referendum on self-determination under the
U.N. Settlement Plan, have been at an impasse since June 2004. James A. Baker, III, the first United
Nations personal envoy of the secretary-general, charged with such a task, resigned from his
position at that time after he served in that role for seven years, stating that he had done all he
could to resolve the conflict. He pointed out that only the parties themselves could exercise the
political will necessary to reach an agreed-upon solution, as the U.N. would not solve the problem
without requiring the parties to do something they would not voluntarily agree to do. The most
recent informal talks between the parties organized by Christopher Ross, current personal envoy, on
February 10 and 11, 2010 resulted at an impasse as did all previous talks organized by the U.N. since
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1754 on April 30 2007, asking the parties to negotiate
without preconditions.
Abstract: The Security Council today extended the mandate of the United Nations peacekeeping mission tasked with organizing a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara for another year.
In a unanimously adopted resolution, the 15-member Council called on Morocco and Frente Polisario – the parties to the conflict in Western Sahara – to “continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations.”
The resolution was adopted after Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in his latest report on the peacekeeping mission (known as MINURSO), recently welcomed both parties’ commitment to the process of negotiations and their willingness to engage in the preparatory informal format.
But he noted that two informal meetings under the auspices of his personal envoy Christopher Ross held in August 2009 and February this year produced no movement on the core substantive issues, and more work is needed before a fifth round can be held.
Mr. Ross’ efforts to promote a settlement have been “laborious,” the Secretary-General said. “Their pace and substance have been heavily affected by the parties’ reaction to events in the region and their unyielding attachment to mutually exclusive positions.”
Abstract: The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution
1871 (2009) of 30 April 2009, by which the Council extended the mandate of the
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until
30 April 2010 and requested me to provide a report on the situation before that date.
The present report covers developments since the issuance of my previous report
dated 13 April 2009 (S/2009/200). The Territory remained largely calm during the period under review. King
Mohammed VI of Morocco made a speech on the occasion of the thirty-fourth
anniversary of the “Green March”, on 6 November, in which he proposed a fivepoint
plan towards “regionalization”, to be focused initially on the part of Western
Sahara controlled by Morocco. He reaffirmed the commitment of the Kingdom to its
autonomy proposal as presented in the negotiations being held under the auspices of
the United Nations. In a letter dated 9 November addressed to me, the Secretary-
General of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y Río de Oro
(Frente Polisario), Mohamed Abdelaziz, referring to the speech made by the King of
Morocco, reiterated his position that the Saharan people should decide their future
by means of a free referendum.
Abstract: This book gives a comprehensive background to the long running conflict on the status of Western Sahara and particularly highlights the question of the territory's natural resources, such as fish, oil and phosphates. The book analyses why this territory, mainly covered by desert and only sparsely populated has since 1976 when the former colonial power Spain left the territory, engaged governments and people, both regionally and internationally, and the implications of its natural resources. The book includes: - a summary of the Western Saharan conflict, by Pedro Pinte Leite, specialist in international law in the Netherlands; - an up-to-date picture of the situation in Western Sahara with regard to natural resources, and the way in which exploitation is taking place, by Toby Shelley, a British journalist; - the UNs legal opinion from 2002 on exploitation of the natural resources of a Non-Self-Governing Territory written by Hans Corell, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel. Two political views of the conflict are also included. Magnus Schöldtz and Pål Wrange from the Swedish Foreign Ministry elucidate the Swedish Foreign Policy on the Western Sahara Conflict. A statement by Karin Scheele, MEP and President of the Intergroup on Western Sahara in the European Parliament focuses on the economic interests of the parties involved in the conflict.
These contributions together with an extended chronology, by Claes Olsson, over the different phases of the conflict form a useful information source for policy-makers, researchers, students and activists interested in or dealing with issues related to the Maghreb framework and in particular the Western Saharan conflict.
Abstract: This paper examines the democratisation agenda laid out by Western governments
for the North African region vis-à-vis their Realpolitik conflict containment
approach towards the Western Sahara conflict. Western policymakers conceive
the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara as a safety
net that contains tension in the region and enables geo-strategic and economic
partnerships with Algeria and Morocco. This paper underlines that the
international community could play a greater role in promoting the long-term
stability of the North African region by pursuing innovative policies geared
towards addressing the root causes of the Western Sahara conflict.
Abstract: In 2009, the Kingdom of Morocco celebrated the 10th anniversary of the accession of King
Mohamed VI to the throne. The official discourse marking the occasion emphasized the
progress made since the rule of King Mohamed VI in a numbers of fields including
democratic governance, economic development and human rights. In the past decade, the
human rights situation in Morocco and Western Sahara witnessed some improvements.
However, the Moroccan authorities’ prevention of a weekly to distribute an issue carrying a
census on the popularity of the King in the wake of celebrations - albeit demonstrating a
favourable opinion of the ruler- was a grim reminder that some issues remain taboo and that
red lines continue to exist and to be enforced against those who dare to transcend them.1
There is no doubt that the human rights situation in Morocco and Western Sahara today has
much changed since the “years of lead” (les années de plomb)- a period under the rule of King
Hassan II marked by widespread political repression and grave violations of human rights. While
the whole period between Morocco’s independence in 1956 and the death of King Hassan II in
1999 was characterized by serious human rights violations, it is between the 1960s and early
1990s that human rights violations reached their highest level. Violations were particularly
rampant when the Moroccan authorities felt under internal or external security threat from
opponents of the status-quo such as in the aftermath of the attempted military coups and
during the armed conflict with the Polisario Front2. Systematic use of torture or other illtreatment,
the enforced disappearance of hundreds of individuals and the arbitrary detention of
thousands characterized this dark period.
Abstract: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, established in January 2007, is the latest
in a long line of Algerian jihadi groups. Like many terrorist organizations,
AQIM enjoys global media exposure on activist Internet sites, but unlike other
al-Qaeda franchises, it has managed to maintain its indigenous leadership. The
group has become known for fearsome suicide attacks, which were previously
unheard of in Algeria, but has failed to incorporate the jihadi outfi ts from
neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. AQIM has therefore focused on the northern
Sahara, carving out safe havens and threatening weak government forces,
fi rst in Mauritania, and now increasingly in Mali.
At the outset, AQIM’s global strategy was based on the triangular dynamic
of the Middle East (where Iraq serves as a magnet for potential recruits),
North Africa (where the group functions as a regional jihadi recruiting hub),
and Europe (where it pursues aggressive propaganda against the French and
Spanish “Crusaders”). The demise of al-Qaeda in Iraq jeopardized this grand
design, undermining AQIM’s capabilities on both sides of the Mediterranean,
but although it primarily targets Western “Crusaders” in its own Algerian and
Saharan environment, AQIM remains wedded to a global agenda.
The threat of AQIM must be contained, and hopefully, ultimately eradicated.
Algeria and the other targeted states have a long record of fi ghting similar
jihadi networks, but they cannot confront transnational movements without
international cooperation. To address this threat, regional security organizations
can enhance much-needed bilateral exchanges among law enforcement
and intelligence agencies. Additionally, the countries implementing the UN
global strategy against terrorism should focus considerable attention on North
Africa and the Sahel, where the threat is on the rise, but not yet out of control.
Abstract: This fourth edition of the Yearbook on Peace Processes analyses the conflicts in which
negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations
are formalised, are in the exploratory phases, are bearing fruit or, to the contrary, are stalled or
enmeshed in crisis. It also analyses certain cases in which the negotiations or explorations are
partial, that is, they do not encompass all the armed groups present in the country (as is the case
of Afghanistan and Iraq, for example). The majority of the negotiations are linked to armed
conflicts, but other situations are also analysed in which despite the fact that there are currently
no armed clashes taking place, the parties have yet to reach a permanent agreement to put an end
to the hostilities and disputes still pending. Thus, the negotiations are relevant for preventing the
beginning or resurgence of new armed confrontations.
The way of organising the analysis of almost every case follows a standard pattern, namely: 1) a
brief synopsis of the background of the conflict, with a short description of the armed groups and
the main players participating in the conflict; 2) the lead-up to the peace process; 3) the events
that took place throughout 2007; 4) a table displaying the most noteworthy events in the year in
summarised form; and 5) a list of websites where the conflict can be monitored. At the start of
each country there is a small insert with basic information on the conflict in question; in the
section entitled “Armed Actors” in this insert, the governmental armed forces are not included.
Abstract: The Security Council today extended for one year the mandate of the United Nations mission tasked with organizing a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara and monitoring the ceasefire between Morocco and the Frente Polisario.
In a unanimously adopted resolution, the Council called on the parties “to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations.”
Morocco holds that its sovereignty over Western Sahara should be recognized, while the Frente Polisario’s position is that the Territory’s final status should be decided in a referendum that includes independence as an option.
Several rounds of talks between the two parties were held under UN auspices in 2007 and 2008 in New York but did not result in any substantial agreements.
The 15-member body added that “realism and a spirit of compromise” by the parties are essential to achieve progress in the negotiations, which are led by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Personal Envoy Christopher Ross.
In his latest report on Western Sahara, Mr. Ban welcomed the commitment by the parties to continue their negotiations – as stated in the final communiqué issued at the last round – but he accepted the advice of his Personal Envoy that informal meetings be held first.
The Council today welcomed the parties’ agreement with the Personal Envoy’s suggestion to hold small, informal talks in preparation for a fifth round of negotiations.
The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been in place since September 1991.
Abstract: At the end of April, the UN Security Council will have the opportunity to make the right choice or the safe choice when it renews the authorization for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The right choice would be to give the new UN envoy a mandate for peace. To do this, the Security Council would have to secure the commitment of both sides of the conflict, Morocco and the pro-independence Polisario Front, to power-sharing and self-determination. The safe choice, meanwhile, would be to continue under the weak mandate that contributed to the failure of the previous UN envoy.
Though the UN has ritually reauthorized MINURSO since its creation in April 1991, this will be the first time under the Obama administration and its new UN envoy to Western Sahara, Christopher Ross. With an extensive diplomatic background in Middle East and North Africa posts as ambassador to Algeria and Syria, Ross is already quite familiar with the dynamics underlying the conflict.
But will he and the Obama administration back the right choice or the safe choice?
Abstract: The paper describes and analyses the role of civil society in five conflict
cases – Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Western Sahara and Israel/
Palestine. It evaluates the relative effectiveness of civil society organisations (CSOs)
and assesses the potential and limits of CSO involvement in conflicts. In particular it
concentrates on civil society activities in the fields of peace training and education,
including formal and non-formal education, as well as research and media work. The
research also identifies the obstacles that local third sector is faced with, examining
experiences and lessons learned. The study then presents critical assessments of local
CSO contributions to conflict transformation and concludes with a set of suggestions
for local and mid-level civil society actors involved in these five conflict cases and
beyond. This paper is an overview study, to provide ideas and documentation to the
more detailed empirical research carried out in the context of the MICROCON Work
Package ‘Conflict in the European Neighbourhood’.
Abstract: (Rabat, December 19, 2008) - Morocco violates the rights to expression, association, and assembly in Western Sahara, Human Rights Watch said in a new report issued today, revealing stark limits to the progress that Morocco has made in protecting human rights overall. Human rights conditions have also improved in the Sahrawi refugee camps managed by the Polisario Front in Algeria, although the Polisario marginalizes those who directly oppose its leadership.
Human Rights Watch called on both Morocco and Polisario to take specific steps to improve the human rights situation in the territories under their de facto control, and on the United Nations Security Council to ensure regular human rights monitoring in both Western Sahara and Tindouf.
"The repression has eased somewhat, and today dissidents are testing the red lines," said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. "But Moroccan authorities - to their credit - ask us to judge them not against their own past record, but against their international human rights engagements. By that standard, they have a long way to go."
The 216-page report, "Human Rights in Western Sahara and in the Tindouf Refugee Camps," focuses on the present-day situation rather than on past abuses. Human Rights Watch documents how Morocco uses a combination of repressive laws, police violence, and unfair trials to punish Sahrawis who advocate peacefully in favor of independence or full self-determination for the disputed Western Sahara.
Abstract: North Africa is often loosely defined, but
for the purposes of this paper, it
encompasses the states of the Arab
Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia)
together with Egypt. With the exception
of Mauritania, this group of states lies on
the northern littoral of the African
continent, between the Mediterranean Sea
to the north and the Sahara to the south.
This contiguity, however, has not
automatically made for a cohesive region;
differences between political and
economic trajectories have overridden the
social solidarities that still unite the
peoples of North Africa.
The core regional states of Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya share an
Arabo-Berber heritage and the legacy of
the predominately French linguistic and
administrative practices of the protectorate and
colonial eras. By contrast, the ethnic make-up of
Egypt (Arabic, Hamitic, and Nubian) places the
largest state of the region, of some 76 million
people, apart from the “Maghrebi” heartland. Egypt
has also variously been a leader of Arab nationalism
and a key player in attempts to resolve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and thus looks toward the
Middle East more than it does west or south to its
neighbors in Africa.
What all these states, and the region as a whole,
face over the next five to ten years is a series of old
and neglected issues of a structural nature,
combined with newer, less manageable challenges
arising largely outside their control. Climate
change, soaring energy and food prices, and an
unprecedented range of influences and pressures
arising from globalization have all highlighted the
weaknesses of the region’s current models of
development. None of them are equipped to absorb
unforeseen change quickly.
Abstract: This third edition of the Peace Process Yearbook analyses the conflicts in which negotiations
are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations are
formalised, are in the exploratory phases, are bearing fruit or, to the contrary, are stalled or
enmeshed in crisis. It also analyses certain cases in which the negotiations or explorations are
partial, that is, they do not encompass all the armed groups present in the country (as is the
case of Afghanistan and Iraq, for example). The majority of the negotiations are linked to armed
conflicts, but other situations are also analysed in which despite the fact that there are currently
no armed clashes taking place, the parties have yet to reach a permanent agreement to put an
end to the hostilities and disputes still pending. Thus, the negotiations are relevant for
preventing the beginning or resurgence of new armed confrontations.
The yearbook also examines certain processes that have theoretically come to a close through
a peace agreement, but that in our opinion are worth monitoring for at least another year with
the purpose of revealing whether or not implementation of the agreements takes place as
planned and whether the armed conflict can truly be regarded as over (such as in the cases of
the Congo, Indonesia [GAM], Northern Ireland, Nepal [CPN], East Sudan and South Sudan), as
there is a plethora of examples of peace agreements that for different reasons, have lasted a
short time and hostilities have resumed.
The way of organising the analysis of almost every case follows a standard pattern, namely: 1)
a brief synopsis of the background of the conflict, with a short description of the armed groups
and the main players participating in the conflict; 2) the lead-up to the peace process; 3) the
events that took place throughout 2007; 4) a table displaying the most noteworthy events in the
year in summarised form; 5) a list of websites where the conflict can be monitored; and 6) an
illustration that helps to exemplify the relationship between the primary and secondary actors in
each conflict, showing the spaces of intermediation that exist in each case. At the start of each
country there is a small insert with basic information on the conflict in question; in the section
entitled “Armed Actors” in this insert, the governmental armed forces are not included.
Abstract: This second edition of the Peace Process Yearbook analyses the conflicts in which
negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these
negotiations are formalised, are in the exploratory phases, are bearing fruit or, to the contrary,
are stalled or enmeshed in crisis. The majority of the negotiations are linked to armed conflicts,
but other situations are also analysed in which despite the fact that there are currently no armed
clashes taking place, the parties have yet to reach a permanent agreement to put an end to the
hostilities and disputes still pending. Thus, the negotiations are relevant for preventing the
beginning or resurgence of new armed confrontations.
The yearbook also examines certain process that have theoretically come to a close through a
peace agreement, but that in our opinion are worth monitoring for at least another year with the
purpose of revealing whether or not implementation of the agreements takes place as planned
and whether the armed conflict can truly be regarded as over (the cases of the Aceh in
Indonesia or Northern Island, for example), as there is a plethora of examples of peace
agreements that have lasted a short time.
The way of organising the analysis of almost every case follows a standard pattern, namely: 1)
a brief synopsis of the background of the conflict, with a short description of the armed groups
and the main players participating in the conflict; 2) the lead-up to the peace process; 3) the
events that took place throughout 2006; 4) a table displaying the most noteworthy events in the
year in summarised form; 5) a list of websites where the conflict can be monitored; and 6) a
table that helps to illustrate the relationship between the primary and secondary actors in each
conflict, showing the spaces of intermediation that exist in each case.
Abstract: Two years ago a ruthless Algerian terrorist outfit, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, better known by its French abbreviation, GSPC, announced it was joining al-Qaeda. Since then, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as the group is now known in counter-terrorism circles, has stepped up a bombing campaign in Algeria and claimed responsibility for operations in several other North African countries. Last month the Moroccan government said it had broken up a terrorist cell with links to the group, while Algeria has toughened its security measures since more than 70 people were killed in attacks by AQIM in the last two weeks of August. The emergence of a powerful regional group of Islamist insurgents, recruiting members from among the millions of religious and poor North Africans, is rattling all the governments in the region and raises the unnerving prospect of a new wave of North African bombers heading for the cities of western Europe. But does AQIM really exist as a co-ordinated regional organisation?
So far there is little evidence that it does. Until now, nearly all of AQIM’s claimed attacks have been in a rectangle of land to the east of Algeria’s capital, Algiers. (The GSPC, from which AQIM has emerged, is a ruthless remnant from the civil war which began after the Algerian army stepped in to prevent Islamists from taking over after they had won the first round of an election in December 1991, thereby prompting a decade of strife that left as many as 200,000 people dead.) In this mountainous zone, clashes between AQIM fighters and Algerian security forces are occurring almost every day. Whenever the authorities claim a big victory, AQIM invariably sets off a suicide-bomb or a remote-controlled explosion, usually aimed at Algerian forces, sometimes at foreigners. AQIM said it was behind the double bombing last December of the UN offices in Algiers and a court house, killing more than 40 people. But AQIM’s presence elsewhere in the region is fuzzier. In Algeria, says George Joffé, a north Africa specialist at Cambridge University, there is “constant low-level violence, a bit like in Colombia”. But he doubts that AQIM is a “coherent regional organisation, more a series of groups with national agendas and a common ideology”. He discounts the idea that they are controlled by al-Qaeda’s leaders on the Afghan-Pakistan border.
Abstract: En 2005, le conflit du Sahara occidental entrait dans sa trentième
année sans que l’on puisse parler de vainqueur ni de vaincu. Les
deux options préconisées pour mettre un terme à ce conflit qui
oppose le Maroc au Front Polisario pour la souveraineté de
l’ancienne colonie espagnole du Sahara occidental semblent difficiles
à réaliser. L’autodétermination demeure le choix du Front Polisario, il
est approuvé par l’Algérie et depuis peu par la Russie.
Pour Rabat, l’ancienne colonie espagnole du Sahara
occidental pourrait constituer une région autonome au sein d’un
royaume souverain. Une option que privilégient également les États-
Unis, la France et le gouvernement espagnol. Le 11 avril 2007, le
Maroc a soumis à l’ONU un projet d’autonomie sur le Sahara
occidental qui vise à « mettre fin à l’impasse », il a été aussitôt rejeté
par le Front Polisario qui a également fait parvenir aux Nations Unies
son propre projet qui porte sur l’autodétermination.
À ces deux documents, le secrétaire général des Nations
unies a répondu par une résolution (1 754) qui appelle les deux
parties à « engager des négociations de bonne foi, sans conditions
préalables, en tenant compte des développements survenus ces
derniers mois en vue de parvenir à une solution politique juste,
durable et mutuellement acceptable qui permette l’autodétermination
du peuple du Sahara occidental ».
Si ce n’était la nouvelle donne régionale, ces rencontres
programmées pourraient ressembler à toutes les précédentes
négociations qui ont échoué. Mais il faut compter cette fois-ci avec la
peur entretenue sur la zone grise située au Sahel, susceptible pour
certains de constituer un espace de repli pour Al-Qaïda. Il faut aussi
prendre en considération les nouveaux acteurs russe et américain, et
prendre nécessairement en compte les manifestations récurrentes
qui se produisent dans les villes du Sahara occidental et en particulier
à Lâayoune.
Abstract: The ongoing negotiations between Morocco and the Algeria-backed Polisario Front regarding the future status of the disputed Western Sahara territory have yet to demonstrate that a seemingly elusive settlement could be a realistic, if distant prospect. With Morocco on the one hand supporting autonomy for the territory within its international border, and Polisario on the other hand advocating the resumption of the stalled UN process leading to a self-determination referendum, the search for a common ground looks to be a near impossible task. Though autonomy in the abstract world (sometimes intersecting with Washington’s short attention span) seems a perfect fit for an international dispute pitting pro-independence and pro-annexation camps, in the volatile North African context, which sets the dispute in complex parameters, reconciling these two opposites seems a stretch. Yet, the debate about the virtues of each position is worth an exercise in clarifying what’s behind and what’s beyond such
eloquent re-statements of interests and objectives.
