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Abstract: It would be hard to conceive of two States that offer greater contrasts than
Somalia and Eritrea: the former, a collapsed State for over two decades, with no
functional national institutions; the latter, possessing the most highly centralized,
militarized and authoritarian system of government on the African continent. From a
sanctions monitoring perspective, however, the two countries present very similar
challenges: in both cases, power is concentrated in the hands of individuals rather
than institutions and is exercised through largely informal and often illicit networks
of political and financial control. Leaders in both countries often depend more
heavily on political and economic support from foreign Governments and diaspora
networks than from the populations within their own borders. And both countries —
in very different ways — serve as platforms for foreign armed groups that represent a
grave and increasingly urgent threat to peace and security in the Horn and East
More than half of Somali territory is controlled by responsible, comparatively
stable authorities that have demonstrated, to varying degrees, their capacity to
provide relative peace and security to their populations. Without exception, the
administrations of Somaliland, Puntland, Gaalmudug, and “Himan iyo Heeb”
evolved independently of centralized State-building initiatives, from painstaking,
organic local political processes. Much of Galguduud region is controlled by anti-Al-
Shabaab clan militias loosely unified under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a
(ASWJ), but lacks a functional authority. Consolidation of and cooperation between
such entities represents the single most effective strategy for countering threats like
extremism and piracy, while expanding peace and security in Somalia.
Abstract: The recent political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa region have exposed growing concerns about conflict risk, political stability, and reform prospects across its societies. Given the prevalence of oil and gas resource endowments in the region, which a voluminous literature suggests can be associated with adverse development consequences, this paper examines the interplay between their associated rents and political economy trajectories. The contribution of the paper is threefold: first, to examine the quantitative evidence of violent conflict in the region since 1960; second, to provide a nuanced review of the regional case study literature on the relationship between resource endowments, political stability, and conflict risk; and third, to assess how prospective political transitions have implications for the World Bank Group's work in the region on public sector management and private sector development. The authors find that resources and regimes have intersected to provide stability and limited violent conflict in the region, but that these development patterns have yielded a set of policy choices and development patterns that are proving increasingly brittle and unsustainable. A major institutional challenge for reforms will be to consolidate a requisite degree of inter-temporal credibility and stability in these regimes, while expanding inclusiveness in state-society relations.
Abstract: This paper identifies the factors linked to cross-country differentials in growth performance in the aftermath of social conflict for 30 sub-Saharan African countries using panel data techniques. Our results show that changes in the terms of trade are the most important correlate of economic performance in post-conflict environments. This variable is typically associated with an increase in the marginal probability of positive economic performance by about 30 percent. Institutional quality emerges as the second most important factor. Foreign aid is shown to have very limited ability to explain differentials in growth performance, and other policy variables such as trade openness are not found to have a statistically significant effect. The results suggest that exogenous factors ("luck") are an important factor in post-conflict recovery. They also highlight the importance in post-conflict settings of policies to mitigate the macroeconomic impact of terms of trade volatility (including countercyclical macroeconomic policies and innovative financing instruments) and of policies to promote export diversification.
Abstract: This Policy Note focuses on the gendered consequences of the militarisation of the Horn of Africa. Despite being in different ‘moments’ of conflict, the countries of this region share features of extreme social, economic and political violence, which impact negatively on their citizens. Protracted refugee and refugee-like conditions, extreme disinvestment in social programmes, increasing militarisation and political repression adversely affect women, thereby further entrenching gender disparities. Concerted national and international efforts and resources should support local democratic initiatives to find political solutions to these protracted conflicts and advance the struggle against sexual and gender-based violence and discrimination.
Abstract: National security is normally seen in terms of military strength and internal security operations against extremists and insurgents. The upheavals that began in Tunis, and now play out from Pakistan to Morocco,. have highlighted the fact that national security is measured in terms of the politics, economics, and social tensions that shape national stability as well. It is all too clear that the wrong kind of internal security efforts, and national security spending that limits the ability to meet popular needs and expectations can do as much to undermine national security over time as outside and extremist threats.
It is equally clear that calls for democracy are at best only the prelude to dealing with critical underlying problems, pressures, and expectations. It is far from certain that even successful regime change can evolve into functional democracies and governance. Countries with no political parties and experienced leaders, with no history of checks and balances in government, with weak structure of governance led by new political figures with no administrative experience, will often descend into chaos, extremism, or a new round of authoritarianism. Even the best governments, however, are unlikely to change an economy and national infrastructure in less than half a decade, and existing demographic pressures will inevitably go on for at least the next decade.
Abstract: Somalia has engendered the policy debate on the extent of the spread of transnational Islamist Jihadist groups in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and their consequences for peace and security across the region. These concerns are justified given the emergence since the late 1980s of extremist groups such as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement and the Somali Jihadist Islamist groups of the likes of Al-Ittihad, the Islamic Courts Union and currently Al Shabab. The leaders and fighters of these groups relocated to the HOA after the defeat of the Taliban following the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan. The operations of these transnational Islamist groups within and across the countries of the Horn pose serious challenges to the region and beyond.
Abstract: This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also includes American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen. Casualty data of U.S. military forces are compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency's press releases. Also included are statistics on those wounded but not killed.
Because the estimates of Afghan casualties contained in this report are based on varying time periods and have been created using different methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look to them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact. This report will be updated as needed.
Abstract: Tens of thousands of Somali refugees have sought asylum in cities in neighboring countries but have long been overlooked by humanitarian actors. Many of these refugees have found ways to survive in Nairobi, Djibouti, Aden, and Sana’a and have become self-reliant, but others suffer from police harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, and forced return. Registration and documentation should be the foundation of refugee protection in cities. Partnerships with community-based organizations and ongoing refugee profiling is essential to identify and serve the most vulnerable. Promoting the protection of refugees in cities helps them live with greater independence and dignity. Due to ongoing violence, human rights violations, and conflict in Somalia, today there are some 580,000 Somali refugees in four main asylum countries—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen.
Abstract: The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional organisation of
seven Eastern African countries with a stated ambition to achieve peace, prosperity and
regional integration among its member states. Each of these objectives is challenging, but
none more so than the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict in a region
that has been steeped in warfare for decades. The current conflicts in the Horn of Africa
include civil war in Darfur, protracted state collapse in Somalia, deep hostility and a stalled
peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a fragile peace agreement between North and
South Sudan, a border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti and periodic bouts of unrest in
the Ogaden and Northern Uganda.
This paper assesses the contribution that IGAD has made to regional security in the Horn of
Africa since the mid 1990s. It begins with a brief account of the origins of IGAD in 1986 and
the development of its peace and security mandate in 1996, set in the context of an evolving
African regionalism. It then examines the two major peace processes over which IGAD has
presided, the first for Sudan (1993-2005) and then the Somali process (2002-2004). The next
section considers the overall effectiveness of IGAD’s contribution to peace and security and
assesses the success of IGAD’s reconciliation efforts in Sudan and Somalia. The paper argues
that the regional security framework of IGAD was conceived during an exceptional (and
brief) interlude of good relations among all its member states. It attributes the subsequent
failure of IGAD to prevent or resolve much of the serious conflict in the Horn to an
entrenched political culture that endorses the use of force and mutual intervention by states in
each other’s conflicts and domestic affairs. It notes that IGAD member states continue to fuel
conflict even when reconciliation talks are in progress and suggests that where positive results
have been achieved these are more the product of regional power politics than of IGAD’s
institutional strength. It concludes that the scope for the IGAD Secretariat to develop an
autonomous conflict-resolution capability will remain limited, but that member states will still
seek to utilise IGAD’s authority to legitimise their own regional policies.
Abstract: The following is intended to provide a report of the discussions at the “Examining the ‘Bastions’ of Terror: Governance and Policy in Yemen and the Horn of Africa” conference held November 4-6, 2004 at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and the Sudan—the countries constituting the “Horn of Africa”— together with Yemen, are potential hostages to terrorism. Their largely unsecured territories provide a platform for terrorists, and their internal conflicts and weaknesses create potential breeding grounds for current and future anti-American terrorism.
American efforts to combat terrorism in the region demand cohesive strategies across U.S. foreign policy agencies and across the region. The U.S. must employ multipronged social, economic, political, and military strategies to overcome not only the immediate threats but medium- and longer-term risks.
Abstract: The Security Council today imposed arms and travel sanctions on Eritrea for supporting insurgents trying to topple the nascent government in nearby Somalia.
The resolution, supported by 13 of the 15 members of the Council, places an arms embargo on Eritrea, imposes travel bans on the Horn of Africa nation's top political and military officials, and freezes the assets of some of the country's senior political and military officials.
China, one of the five permanent members of the Council, abstained from voting for the resolution, while Libya voted against it.
In the resolution, the Council expressed concern over Eritrea's rejection of the United Nations-facilitated Djibouti Agreement, a 2008 peace accord between Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).
Despite that pact, fighting and humanitarian suffering continue to engulf Somalia, which has been without a central authority for nearly two decades. Eritrea and Djibouti are also engaged in a border dispute.
Today's resolution “demands that all Member States, in particular Eritrea, cease arming, training, and equipping armed groups and their members including al-Shabaab, that aim to destabilize the region or incite violence and civil strife in Djibouti.”
It also calls on all nations to support the Djibouti peace process and support the TFG's reconciliation efforts in Somalia.
Abstract: Fragile and conflict-affected states are not new, but the challenges they pose have moved to the top of the development agenda in recent years. Experience has shown that the task of moving a poor, conflict-affected state out of fragility is a complex, difficult and long-term project. In many cases, like in Afghanistan, gains have been hard-won, slow and uncertain. Nonetheless, recent history offers grounds for optimism. Mozambique and El Salvador, once stuck in a downward slide of violent conflict and economic ruin, are now democracies enjoying growth and relative stability. Rwanda, Liberia and Angola have made rapid progress, especially given the conditions they faced when their conflicts ended. But Timor Leste and the Horn of Africa, while very different, remind us that progress can also be marred by setbacks.
Paul Collier, who contributed an article to this issue of Development Outreach, has helped us understand
the forces that keep states fragile, and how that fragility undermines development prospects. External assistance is essential to help solve the problems of what Collier calls the “Bottom Billion” states, many of which are fragile, conflict-affected or both. But this aid must be complemented by local leaders who fill the institutional voids that created the vulnerability in the first place. One of their first tasks is to build capacity in the public service and in key institutions of civil society. Sanjay Pradhan and Alastair McKechnie, respectively World Bank Vice President for the World Bank Institute, and Director of the Bank Group’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected States Unit, outline the challenges on these fronts.
Elsewhere in this issue—which was developed with guidance from Henriette von Kaltenborn-
Stachau and Erik Caldwell Johnson—analysts and world leaders offer lessons. Timor Leste’s Finance
Minister Emilia Pires underlines the importance of long-term commitments by donors. At the same
time, she cautions governments in fragile settings not to take on everything at once. Perhaps the most decisive element in success or failure is the kind of leadership that emerges in fragile situations. Harvard Professor Matt Andrews, defines this as, “individuals connected in networks [who] intentionally mobilize people, ideas,meaning and resources toward achieving a purpose.”
Abstract: Few nations in the world are as strategically important but as little known as Djibouti, a small desert nation of half a million people in the heart of the Horn of Africa. A lingering insurgency by the ethnic-Afar Front pour la Restauration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy - FRUD) that many believed was over in 2001 has reemerged as one of a number of security problems challenging Djibouti’s continued stability.
FRUD is based in northern Djibouti, the traditional home of the nomadic Afar people. The Afar ethnic group represents roughly a third of the population in Djibouti, where the dominant ethnic Somali group is divided between the majority Issa clan and smaller groups from the Issaq clan and the Gadabursi, a Dir sub-clan. Most of the nomadic Afars live in the Danakil Desert of Ethiopia, giving them their alternate name of “Danakil.” The lack of Afar representation in the central government sparked the Djiboutian Civil War in 1991. France became involved in both mediation efforts and support missions for government troops, but the conflict continued until 2001, when the remaining radical faction signed a peace agreement with the government and joined the president’s governing coalition. Since then, however, it appears that a number of Afar militants have retaken the field, dissatisfied with the implementation of the peace treaty. Most of the movement made peace with the government in 1994, with a group of hardliners under the late FRUD founder Ahmad Dini Ahmad holding out until 2001 before cutting their own deal with the government. Though certain roles at the highest level of the government have been reserved for Afars, the rest of the administration is still largely dominated by the ethnic-Somali Issa clan.
Abstract: Urging Djibouti and Eritrea to peacefully resolve a border dispute that flared into fighting in June 2008, killing at least 35 people and leaving dozens wounded, the United Nations Security Council demanded today that Eritrea pull its forces from the contested area and cooperate with diplomatic initiatives.
Through a unanimously adopted resolution, the 15-member body welcomed Djibouti’s withdrawal to its positions before the dispute, which centres on an un-demarcated border in an area known as Doumeira, and condemned Eritrea’s refusal to follow suit.
The armed conflict erupted last year after weeks of tensions and military build-up on both sides, and a subsequent UN fact-finding mission, which was welcomed by Djibouti and blocked by Eritrea, reported that the dispute had the potential to destabilize the entire region.
In October 2008, Representatives of Djibouti and Eritrea outlined their positions to a Council meeting that also heard statements from the Council’s 15 members, in which they stressed the need for restraint and backed existing international efforts to mediate a settlement.
In today’s resolution, the Council said it deeply regretted that Eritrea continuously refused to admit the fact-finding mission or any envoy of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who has offered his good offices to help resolve the issue.
The Council encouraged the African Union and the Arab League to strengthen their efforts to engage both parties in diplomacy, and asked Mr. Ban to contact both organizations before reporting back on the matter within six weeks.
Abstract: On May 12, 2009, the UN General Assembly will elect 18 new Human Rights Council members. Twenty countries are candidates. However, each is not competing against all of the others, but rather only against the ones from the same UN regional group. In this year’s election, all but two regional groups have submitted the same amount of candidates as available seats. The Asian Group has 5 countries vying for 5 available seats, the Latin American and Caribbean Group (―GRULAC‖) has 3 countries vying for 3 available seats, and the Western European and Others Group (―WEOG‖) has 3 countries vying for 3 available seats. This does not mean that the candidate countries for these groups will automatically be elected; in order to become a Council member, a country must receive the votes of at least 97 of the 192 General Assembly member states (an absolute majority). Competition between the candidates exists only in the African Group, where 6 countries are vying for 5 available seats, and in the Eastern European Group, where 3 countries are vying for 2 available seats.
Abstract: “Eastern Africa” denotes the geographical area
comprising the seven member states of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD):
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan,
and Uganda. Tanzania is also included because it
has had long historical and political interactions
with Kenya and Uganda within the rubric of the
East African Cooperation (EAC). The main
challenges to human security in this region have
originated from political and state fragility,
resource scarcities, and environmental degradation.
All these factors have contributed to a regional
context that is characterized by intrastate conflicts,
interstate wars, and political extremism. Raging
civil wars and interstate conflicts have, in turn,
produced forms of statelessness and marginality
that have deepened societal insecurities and
strained human livelihoods. Consequently, in
addition to profound political instability and
economic destitution, human security is arrayed
against escalating communal violence, small arms
proliferation, and massive movements of people
within and beyond the region.
Regional insecurities have also had wider global
resonance, attracting international actors, institutions,
and resources. Since the turn of the new
century, man-made conflicts and natural disasters,
such as droughts and floods, have tasked the
energies of the international community.
International engagement will continue because
new security threats such as terrorism and piracy
have emerged, exploiting extant weaknesses in
states and societies of the region. Resuscitating
structures that reduce the challenges to human
livelihoods in eastern Africa will entail the return to
sturdy territorial order, national cohesion,
economic viability, and the building of regional
institutions for security and prosperity.
The key challenges for East Africa and the Horn
include the following:
• Weak states and governments that lack authority
and legitimacy, resulting in the weak organization
• Ecological, environmental, and health vulnerabilities
that have exacerbated the inability of
states and societies to produce food and other
forms of material sustenance;
• The proliferation of lawless and marginal
communities imperiled by the vagaries of the
weather, internecine communal violence, and
• Susceptibility to international terrorist and
Abstract: Une carte qui montre:
(1) les conflits armés dans la région de la Corne de l'Afrique dans les années 1980-2006
(2) les zones régionales de forte insécurité alimentaires et de famines
(3) le nombre de déplacés et réfugiés dans la région
Abstract: The Council will hold an open debate tomorrow, 24 June, on the recent border fighting between Djibouti and Eritrea. The meeting will be convened at the request of Djibouti under the general agenda item “Peace and Security in Africa.” It is intended to provide an opportunity for the parties to present views. But it is unclear whether Eritrea will address the Council. No formal outcome is expected at this stage.
Abstract: Ce rapport contient des résumés sur les régions suivants: Afrique australe, Afrique de l’Est, Afrique de l’Ouest et Afrique centrale, et Afrique centrale, et aussi sur les thèmes suivantes: le double défi de la tuberculose et du VIH, circonsion masculine et préventions du VIH, epidémies latentes parmi les hommes ayant des rapports sexuels avec des hommes, la consommation de drogues injectables: un facteur croissant dans plusiers épidémies de VIH de L'Afrique Subsaharienne, et signes de changements vers des comportements à moindre risque.
Abstract: This paper contends that conflict in the Afar region is attributable to numerous reasons: nationalism, inter communal (e.g. Afar-Issa) conflict, competition for power between political parties, and on occasion, inter-clan conflict over resources. The conflict is exacerbated by misguided and externally imposed development strategies, the militarisation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia and decline of traditional values and dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper makes the following recommendations to address this conflict: strengthening IGAD's conflict prevention capacity in the sub-region by tackling the hostility between and within some of its members, especially its early warning mechanism; and an inwardlooking approach by the governments of the three states in which the Afar that would produce policies that are inclusive,
non-discriminatory, and participatory.
Abstract: Internal conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are never the result of internal factors only, but rather
a confluence of other factors, most of which bear a relationship to the shadow economic networks of
individuals or institutions connected to the international systems of trade and finance. These networks
foster corruption, elite rivalry and ethnic hatred because they survive on the indiscriminate plundering
of natural resources. But since they function outside domestic and international legal regimes, they
suffer little or no sanctions at all. This paper explores the limitations of international legal regimes in
this regard and suggests some improvements that could enhance their conflict-reduction function in
Abstract: Conflict resolution in the African Great Lakes Region has been linked to the protocols and projects
agreed upon at the Second International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The
ICGLR created a continental-wide framework of conflict circuit breakers focused on resolving the
structural and surface situational causes of the 1996 to 2003 armed conflicts that drew in at least six
nations and destabilised the entire region. The implementation of these protocols and projects will
serve as a test for the African Great Lakes Region to move away from conflict and into a cooperation
and development phase; however, the effort to bring peace, stability and development will face
obstacles not only in the security sector, but also in developing infrastructure, civil society, and good
governance. In summary, this article contends that peace in the Great Lakes Region will depend
equally on two factors: internal governance and building civil society institutions, and focused regional
interlocking circuit-breaking institutions.
WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean consists of four technical divisions headed by directors reporting to Deputy Regional Director/Regional Director. They are: Health Protection and Promotion (DHP), Health Systems and Services Development (DHS), Communicable Disease Control (DCD), General Management (DAF). There are two departments in the office of the Assistant Regional Director and they report directly to the Assistant Regional Director. The two departments are Knowledge Management & Sharing and Policy & Strategy Support. Five priority programmes are supervised by the Regional Directory/Deputy Regional Director while reporting through their respective divisional directors. The priority programmes are the Tobacco Free Initiative, Roll Back Malaria, Stop TB, Community-based Initiatives, Women in Health and Development. Further, the regional office runs a special programmes on Polio Eradication, which reports directly to the Regional Director. Another is the UNAIDS Inter-Country Programme. It gives support to the development of an expanded response to HIV/AIDS through the coordinated action of the UN theme groups on HIV/AIDS as well as the process of national strategic planning; collaborates with EMRO in the joint response to HIV/AIDS at the regional and country level; strengthens partnerships with UNAIDS cosponsers through joint regional initiatives in HIV/AIDS priority areas.
Abstract: Profile: Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) operative who also worked for al-Qaeda; Grew up in Germany and Sweden, a refugee from the Somali civil war. An imam in Sweden sponsored his trip for weapons training in Afghanistan in 1996; he returned to Somalia that year. He joined AIAI in 1997 to oppose Ethiopia; He met Abu Talha in early 2003, and on his orders cased Camp Lemonier, the U.S. military base in Djibouti in Fall 2003; He was one of 14 key al-Qaeda operatives and associates transferred from CIA custody to the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2006.
Abstract: To oversee the implementation and interpretation of the COMESA agreement, the Treaty established a Court of Justice, modeled on the European Court of Justice. Like the European Court of Justice, the COMESA Court of Justice can be seized of a matter by one of several ways. First, a member State may bring another member State or the Council before the Court for breach of the Treaty or failure to fulfill an obligation thereunder. Providing the Common Market with independent monitoring and enforcement power, the Treaty permits the Secretary General (with the agreement of the Council) also to bring a member State before the Court for failure to fulfill its Treaty obligations. Like the European Court of Justice, the COMESA Courtxc3xads decisions have precedence over any decisions of national courts.