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Abstract: After the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, Cambodia set about the difficult process of state-building. Despite violent clashes in 1997-98, the Cambodian government has been largely successful in establishing full control of military forces, into which former Khmer Rouge soldiers have been reintegrated. The Cambodian government, with support of donors, successfully improved infrastructure throughout the country, built up capacity in key state institutions, and provided basic public services to the people. Behind these achievements was assistance from a grassroots network built by the Cambodian People‟s Party in the 1980s. This network is characterized by patronage connections between the government and village chiefs, and between the latter and villagers. Consequently, the legitimacy of the state has been strengthened. In contrast, social empowerment has been delayed, and people's political rights and freedoms have been restricted by the state. As shown by the recent increase of corruption charges and land tenure disputes, the imbalance between the powerful state and a stunted civil society is a potential factor of instability.
Abstract: The sea lanes of Indo-Pacific Asia are becoming more crowded, contested and
vulnerable to armed strife. The changing deterrence and
warfighting strategies of China, the United States and Japan involve expanded
maritime patrolling and intrusive surveillance, bringing an uncertain mix of
stabilising and destabilising effects.
Nationalism and resource needs, meanwhile, are reinforcing the value of territorial
claims in the East and South China seas, making maritime sovereignty disputes
harder to manage. Chinese forces continue to show troubling signs of assertiveness
at sea, though there is debate about the origins or extent of such moves. All of these factors are making Asia a danger zone for incidents at sea.
While the chance that such incidents will lead to major military clashes should not be
overstated, the drivers – in particular China’s frictions with the United States, Japan
and India – are likely to persist and intensify. As the number and tempo of incidents
increases, so does the likelihood that an episode will escalate to armed confrontation,
diplomatic crisis or possibly even conflict.
This report, part of the Lowy Institute’s MacArthur Foundation Asia Security
Project, explores the major-power maritime security dynamics surrounding China’s
rise. It focuses on the risks and the management of incidents at sea involving Chinese
interactions with the United States, Japan and India. The report concludes with some realistic recommendations to reduce risks of crisis
and escalation under conditions of continued mistrust.
Abstract: This is a study of how human security was introduced into Japan’s
foreign policy. Human security is a security idea that came into the limelight
in 1994 when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
issued its annual report. In a speech in the United Nations the following
year Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi of Japan endorsed the concept
and three years later Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo declared that human
security was going to be a key element of Japan’s foreign policy. Subsequently,
the Japanese government began to put in what has been described
by a pundit as ‘a considerable effort’ to implement this new priority.
Soon after Obuchi’s announcement, the concept was part and parcel
of Japan’s foreign policy liturgy. As Eva Block has pointed out in her
discussion of the heavily ritualized communications that constitute the
foreign policy liturgy of a country, certain things ‘must’ be said, even if
the concepts behind them have little substantive import, and certain other
things ‘must not’ be said despite the fact that they could be justified. In
Japan, human security became a buzz-word and showed up in official
declarations and statements to such a degree that the country began to be
described as a leading proponent of human security.
The aim of the present study is to trace how human security was added
to the Japanese political agenda and made part and parcel of governmental
policies; to clarify the theoretical context and historical background of the
new policy that positioned human security as a key consideration of policies
pursued by the Japanese government; to analyze how its introduction into Japanese foreign policy was implemented in practice; and to study
how it impacted on and resulted in modifications of policies pursued by
Abstract: Japan has played a central role internationally to promote and mainstream human security, the alternative security concept launched by the UNDP in 1994. Two key instruments devised by Japan are the Trust Fund for Human Security within the United Nations (established 1999) and the Commission on Human Security (2001-03). This report focuses on Japan’s policy for human security and the place of human security in Japan’s foreign policy.
Abstract: This is the capstone essay of a larger project that looks at Pakistan’s medium-term future, defined as the next five to seven years (2012-2017). Other project elements include a summary of past predictions of Pakistan’s future (Appendix) and fourteen essays commissioned for a workshop at the Rockefeller Conference Center in Bellagio, Italy in May 2010. The authors were asked to briefly set forth important variables or factors that might shape Pakistan’s future and to speculate on the likely outcomes.1 This essay follows the same pattern. After a brief summary of recent developments, it examines a number of factors – distributed among four categories – and then sets forth a number of alternative futures. It also explores the methodological problems inherent in this exercise and discusses policy options, especially for the United States, other Western countries, Japan, and India.
Abstract: On 16 April the Council will hold an open debate on Post Conflict Peace Building: Comprehensive Peacebuilding Strategy to Prevent the Recurrence of Conflict under the presidency of the Council for April, Japan. Japan circulated a concept paper for the debate on 1 April suggesting that such a debate would provide a forum to “consider a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy to prevent the recurrence of conflict” (S/2010167). The paper argues that peacebuilding constitutes one of the major remedies for contemporary threats to international peace and security. It notes that there are far more demands for effective peacebuilding in the world than are being addressed by the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) which only has on its agenda four countries: Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone.
The paper identifies critical gaps in three areas of peacebuilding which Japan believes are currently hampering international efforts to help countries emerging from conflict to stabilise and build sustainable peace: political stability and security; promotion of social stability; and strengthening of international cooperation. Two key questions will be discussed during the debate: 1)how to improve coherence and linkage among individual policy areas such as peace, security, human rights and the rule of law; and
2)how to better coordinate activities at the international, regional, national and local levels.
Abstract: As the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect noted in its October 2008 on Japan and Korea on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Japan is a supporter of the R2P principle which it sees as part of the broader human security agenda, a key pillar of Japanese foreign policy.
However, Japan has recently been criticised for ‘most surprisingly and disappointingly’ opposing UN Security Council engagement in the humanitarian crisis that has been unfolding in Sri Lanka. Japan’s position appears to run counter to its support for human security and commitment to civilian protection, which has resulted in pressure for Tokyo to take a more robust stance by supporting efforts to introduce the situation in Sri Lanka onto the official agenda of the UN Security Council. The following Update Report offers an overview of Japan’s engagement in the crisis and seeks to contextualize the concern that Japan is falling short of following through on its responsibility to assist in protecting civilians at risk in Sri Lanka. It demonstrates that Japan’s position must be understood in relation to its commitment to the Sri Lankan peace process and broader Council dynamics.
Abstract: In July 2009, the UN General Assembly held an Interactive Informal Dialogue and plenary session on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). The dialogue provided the first opportunity for the UN membership as a whole to discuss implementation of the 2005 World Summit’s commitment to the RtoP and the UN Secretary-General’s report on the matter. Fifteen governments from the Asia-Pacific region, namely Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea, New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Japan, China, Vietnam, Solomon Islands, Myanmar, Timor-Leste, DPRK, PNG and Malaysia, participated in the dialogue. This culminated in a resolution co-sponsored by, inter alia, Australia, Fiji, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Timor-Leste and New Zealand that noted the Secretary-General’s report, observed the fruitfulness of the interactive dialogue, and committed the Assembly to further consideration of the RtoP.
According to the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, one of the most significant aspects of the dialogue was the positive transformation of attitudes towards the RtoP within the Asia-Pacific region. Having previously been considered the region most opposed to the RtoP, the region now boasts near unanimity in its endorsement of the principle and the Secretary-General’s efforts towards its implementation (with the exception of North Korea).
Abstract: Governments in the Asia-Pacific are often referred to as skeptics or spoilers in conversations about deepening and harnessing global consensus on the „Responsibility to Protect‟ (R2P). This working paper argues that, on the contrary, there exists a broad constituency within the region for moving the principle from rhetoric to reality at the United Nations (UN). Based on contributions to Security Council debates on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (POC), regional states have been both receptive to and promoters of tangible measures to operationalise institutional mechanisms to prevent and halt mass atrocity crimes. Statements in the two most recent meetings are of particular significance given that they represent one of the last opportunities to gauge regional positions ahead of the forthcoming General Assembly debate on the R2P. In conclusion, I suggest that the Asia-Pacific region is much more receptive to the R2P principle than has hitherto been acknowledged. The first section of the working paper walks through the development of the R2P principle and the history of the UN Security Council's thematic interest in POC. The subsequent section unpacks and clarifies the relationship between the R2P and POC. The paper then proceeds to analyse the contributions of Asia-Pacific states to the two lattermost Council debates on POC, emphasising the significance of these statements for the institutional future of the R2P at the UN, as well as normative traction and increased ownership of the R2P in and by the region. Finally, the paper concludes by recommending the way ahead if Asia-Pacific states are to remain constructive partners in moving the principle towards praxis.
Abstract: The success of international efforts to foster security and economic growth in Afghanistan is increasingly linked to wider stabilization and development in the states in its proximity. In order to elucidate the challenges in the region and draw recommendations for the Italian G8 Presidency, an Experts Meeting on Afghanistan and Regional Stabilization was organized by Ipalmo, ARGO and Carnegie Europe on May 28-29th 2009 in Rome. Participants noted five areas of interest that could be taken into consideration at the June 2008 meeting of G8 Foreign Ministers in Trieste: 1) The countries of the region are interlinked in a regional security complex which requires a regional approach in response; 2) Constructive action by the states of the region and existing regional institutions need to be reinforced; 3) Border management is necessary to curb illicit trafficking while encouraging a better flow of resources across the region; 4) Security remains a major priority in the region; and 5) Greater economic cooperation would increase welfare for populations while encouraging cooperation and trust in the region.
Abstract: Forced Migration Review (FMR) provides a
forum for the regular exchange of practical
experience, information and ideas between
researchers, refugees and internally
displaced people, and those who work with
them. It is published in English, Arabic,
Spanish and French by the Refugee Studies
Centre of the Oxford Department of
International Development, University
of Oxford. This issue focuses on 'Statelessness'. A ‘stateless person’ is someone who is not recognised as a national by any state.
They therefore have no nationality or citizenship (terms used interchangeably in
this issue) and are unprotected by national legislation, leaving them vulnerable
in ways that most of us never have to consider. The possible consequences of
statelessness are profound and touch on all aspects of life. It may not be possible
to work legally, own property or open a bank account. Stateless people may be
easy prey for exploitation as cheap labour. They are often not permitted to attend
school or university, may be prohibited from getting married and may not be able to
register births and deaths. Stateless people can neither vote nor access the national
Abstract: The Japanese decision to initiate war against the
United States in 1941 continues to perplex. Did the
Japanese recognize the odds against them? How did
they expect to defeat the United States? The presumption
of irrationality is natural, given Japan’s acute imperial
overstretch in 1941 and America’s overwhelming
industrial might and latent military power. The
Japanese decision for war, however, must be seen in
the light of the available alternatives in the fall of 1941,
which were either national economic suffocation or
surrender of Tokyo’s empire on the Asian mainland.
Though Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root
cause of the Pacific War, the road to Pearl Harbor was
built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations,
most of them mired in mutual cultural ignorance and
Japan’s aggression in China, military alliance with
Hitler, and proclamation of a “Greater East Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere” that included resource-rich
Southeast Asia were major milestones along the road to
war, but the proximate cause was Japan’s occupation of
southern French Indochina in July 1941, which placed
Japanese forces in a position to grab Malaya, Singapore,
and the Dutch East Indies. Japan’s threatened conquest
of Southeast Asia, which in turn would threaten
Great Britain’s ability to resist Nazi aggression in
Europe, prompted the administration of Franklin D.
Roosevelt to sanction Japan by imposing an embargo
on U.S. oil exports upon which the Japanese economy
was critically dependent. Yet the embargo, far from
deterring further Japanese aggression, prompted a
Tokyo decision to invade Southeast Asia. By mid-1941
Japanese leaders believed that war with the United States was inevitable and that it was imperative to
seize the Dutch East Indies, which offered a substitute
for dependency on American oil. The attack on Pearl
Harbor was essentially a flanking raid in support of
the main event, which was the conquest of Malaya,
Singapore, the Indies, and the Philippines,
Japan’s decision for war rested on several assumptions,
some realistic, others not. The first was
that time was working against Japan—i.e., the longer
they took to initiate war with the United States, the
dimmer its prospects for success. The Japanese also
assumed they had little chance of winning a protracted
war with the United States but hoped they could force
the Americans into a murderous, island-by-island
slog across the Central and Southwestern Pacific that
would eventually exhaust American will to fight on to
total victory. The Japanese believed they were racially
and spiritually superior to the Americans, whom
they regarded as an effete, creature-comforted people
divided by political factionalism and racial and class
U.S. attempts to deter Japanese expansion into
the Southwestern Pacific via the imposition of harsh
economic sanctions, redeployment of the U.S. Fleet from
southern California to Pearl Harbor, and the dispatch
of B-17 long-range bombers to the Philippines all failed
because the United States insisted that Japan evacuate
both Indochina and China as the price for a restoration
of U.S. trade. The United States demanded, in effect,
that Japan abandon its empire, and by extension its
aspiration to become a great power, and submit to the
economic dominion of the United States—something
no self-respecting Japanese leader could accept.
The Japanese-American road to the Pacific War in
1941 yields several enduring lessons of particular relevance for today’s national security decision-makers:
1. Fear and honor, “rational” or not, can motivate
as much as interest.
2. There is no substitute for knowledge of a potential
adversary’s history and culture.
3. Deterrence lies in the mind of the deterree, not
4. Strategy must always inform and guide operations.
5. Economic sanctioning can be tantamount to an
act of war.
6. The presumption of moral or spiritual superiority
can fatally discount the consequences of an enemy’s
7. “Inevitable” war easily becomes a self-fulfilling
Abstract: America’s military intervention in
Iraq has catalyzed major changes
in the Middle East, but the ramifications
of its military campaigns around the
world, particularly in Asia, remain understudied.
Throughout major capitals in
Asia discussions relating to America’s
staying power and influence are becoming
Many of these debates are playing out openly in
Japan where strategists and policymakers grapple
with similar security challenges emanating from
North Korea and growing uncertainty regarding
China, a resurgent Russia in the greater Asia-
Pacific theater, and questions about America’s
staying power and commitment to the bilateral
alliance. Japan, unlike India and China, has been
analyzed through the prism of the Iraq war; however,
a majority of these analytic undertakings fail
to decipher long-term structural changes that are
taking place in Tokyo’s policymaking apparatus.
For almost two decades, the end of the Cold War,
the relative decline in Japan’s economic influence,
and increasing regional security threats
from Japan’s East Asian neighbors have compelled
Japanese leaders to revise their country’s national
security policies. The Iraq war accelerated but
did not start this trend or change its trajectory.
Similarly, the end of the war will unlikely reverse
recent changes in Japanese foreign and defense
Despite Article 9 of the Occupation-era Japanese
Constitution in which Japan “forever renounces
war as a sovereign right,” Japan became intimately
involved in the U.S.-led Iraq war, providing logistical
support for American and coalition troops,
pledging $5 billion in aid for Iraq’s economic
rehabilitation, and even sending hundreds of
members of its military, the Self-Defense Forces
(SDF), to engage in noncombatant humanitarian
and reconstruction operations in southern Iraq.
Th e latter decision represented the first deployment
of Japanese soldiers to a combat zone since World
War II. These decisions required Tokyo to take
risky actions that could have generated tremendous
domestic political upheaval, as well as making
Japan a more likely target of Islamist terrorists
and inducing anxiety in East Asia of potential
a Japanese military revival. Moreover, Japan’s
pronouncements came against a background in
which many other great powers either opposed the war or adopted a low profile, a situation in which a
more isolationist Japan would have found plenty of
Japan’s commitment to U.S.-led military operations
has been extremely contentious. Three prime ministers
have served since the Iraq war started and
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party faced a major
political defeat at the hands of the Democratic
Party of Japan — partly because of its strong
commitment to U.S.-led military operations. Even
though Japan’s commitment to American military
operations initially helped strengthen alliance-based
cooperation, it has over the years become
politically caustic and eroded Japanese domestic
support for military assistance to U.S. operations.
Abstract: Enigmatic as ever, North Korea sparks interest like no other country. If not the official release of new footage of Kim Jong-Il, rumoured to have succumbed to a heart attack, the world's media report on the latest twist in the ongoing nuclear crisis. Distracted by incidents, the wider background to the nuclear crisis is often overlooked. For more than five years, six countries - North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia - have been working towards a negotiated solution. The so-called Six-Party Talks seek a settlement by addressing the global, regional and national concerns of all of the countries involved. In doing so, they effectively function as an informal multilateral framework and ongoing security dialogue. Unimpressed with an exclusively North Korea-focused narrative, this study edited by Koen De Ceuster and Jan Melissen offers a broader perspective.
It enhances insight into the conditions and factors that contribute to success or failure of this diplomatic process, and argues that the Six-Party Talks have the potential to become a permanent security mechanism for North-East Asia.
Abstract: The main theme of the foreign policy debate in the ongoing U.S. presidential campaign is how to restore the U.S. reputation in the world. Five years after the Iraq war, a consensus has emerged, not just in the United States but throughout the rest of the world, that the war will not bring about the Iraqi state for which the Bush administration had originally planned and hoped. As a result, the post–September 11 U.S. strategy, consisting of preemptive warfare, democracy promotion, and unilateralism, has been widely discredited. The United States has suffered from what could be described as 9/11 post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which has enormously hindered its capability to play the role of world leader.
Japan is one of the states that is most vulnerable to such damage to U.S. leadership because it does not have any viable strategic options other than remaining a junior alliance partner. As the U.S. reputation has progressively deteriorated since the September 11 attacks, it has become more difficult for allies and friends to follow its lead. It is no coincidence that nearly all of the national leaders who supported the decision to go to war in Iraq suffered fatal political blows later, including Prime Ministers Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, John Howard of Australia, and Tony Blair of the United Kingdom.
Abstract: U.S. policymakers have made securing and maintaining foreign contributions
to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq a major priority since the preparation
period for the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. This report
highlights and discusses important changes in financial and personnel contributions
from foreign governments to Iraq since 2003.
To date, foreign donors have pledged an estimated $16.4 billion in grants and
loans for Iraq reconstruction, with most major pledges originating at a major donors'
conference in Madrid, Spain, in October 2003. However, only a small part of the
pledges have been committed or disbursed to the World Bank and United Nations
Development Group Trust Funds for Iraq. The largest non-U.S. pledges of grants
have come from Japan, the European Commission, the United Kingdom, Canada,
South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. The World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, Japan, and Saudi Arabia have pledged the most loans and export
Currently, 33 countries including the United States have some level of troops
on the ground in Iraq or supporting Iraq operations from nearby locations. Those
forces are working under the rubric of one of several organizations — the
Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I); or
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Currently, the largest
troop contributors, in addition to the United States, are the United Kingdom, Georgia,
Australia, South Korea, and Poland. Some of these key contributors have announced
their intention to reduce or withdraw their forces from Iraq during 2008. The total
number of non-U.S. coalition troop contributions has declined since the early
stabilization efforts, as other countries have withdrawn their contingents or
substantially reduced their size.
Abstract: This paper quantifies the impact of terrorism and conflicts on income per capita growth in Asia for 1970–2004. Our panel estimations show that transnational terrorist attacks had a significant growth-limiting effect. Transnational terrorism reduces growth by crowding in government expenditures. An internal conflict has the greatest growth concern, about twice that of transnational terrorism. For developing Asian countries, intrastate and interstate wars have a much greater impact than terrorism does on the crowding-in of government spending.
Policy recommendations indicate the need for rich Asian countries to assist their poorer neighbors in coping with the negative growth consequences of political violence. Failure to assist may result in region-wide repercussions. Conflict and terrorism in one country can create production bottlenecks with region-wide economic consequences. International and nongovernmental organizations as well as developed Western countries and regions could assist at-risk Asian countries with attack prevention and post-attack recovery.
This study has six purposes. First, and foremost, we present panel estimates for a sample of 42 Asian countries to quantify the impact of terrorism and conflicts on income per capita growth for 1970–2004. Panel estimation methods control for country-specific and timespecific unobserved heterogeneity. Second, we distinguish the influence of terrorism on economic growth from that of internal and external conflicts. Third, these influences are investigated for cohorts of developed and developing countries to ascertain whether development can better allow a country to absorb the impact of political violence. Fourth, econometric estimations relate violence-induced growth reductions to two pathways— reduced investment and increased government expenditures. Fifth, a host of diagnostic and sensitivity tests to support our empirical specifications. Last, we draw some policy conclusions.
Abstract: Ce recueil contient les exemples soumis par les membres de dépenses dans le domaine des conflits de la paix et
de la sécurité. Pour chaque exemple, le Secrétariat fournit des commentaires sur l’éligibilité au titre de l’APD et
sur la façon de notifier.
Les extraits pertinents des directives de notification statistique, y compris les codes-objet (secteurs) et les
montants notifiés par les membres pour ces codes, sont aussi inclus.
La présente version revisée incorpore les clarifications apportées par plusieurs membres jusqu’au 16 août 2007.
Abstract: Alors que le quotidien du mois de juin demeure terriblement ténu en d’autres
régions d’Asie, l’Extrême-Orient semble ces temps-ci se complaire sur le
devant de l’actualité asiatique : tantôt pour en tirer quelque honneur (Chine -
Taïwan), susciter de l’espoir (Corée du nord—USA), tantôt pour révéler mécontentement
et désillusion (Corée du sud ; Japon).
Abstract: Du 28 au 30 mai dernier s'est tenue à Yokohama la quatrième Conférence internationale de Tokyo sur le développement de l'Afrique (TICAD). Cette initiative japonaise co-organisée par l'ONU, le PNUD et la Banque mondiale lancée en 1993 et qui a lieu tous les cinq ans a pour ambition de faire progresser le dialogue entre les responsables africains et les responsables des pays ou organisations internationales qui s'investissent dans l'aide au développement. Cette quatrième conférence a réuni des représentants de 51 pays africains dont 40 chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement. L'ampleur de cette édition et les annonces qui y ont été faites illustrent l'intérêt persistant du Japon pour l'Afrique.
Abstract: Edition 2008. Réunis le temps d’un week-end (30 mai– 1er juin) dans le
confort du Shangri-La Hotel de Singapour — un cadre propice à l’étude des
grands enjeux contemporains de sécurité en Asie…—, les représentants des
27 délégations officielles ont honoré de leur présence et enrichi de leurs réflexions
ce 7eme rendez-vous annuel, plus connu sous le vocable informel de
Shangri-La Dialogue. Un forum annuel unique en son genre en Asie, organisé
par le prestigieux International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) londonien,
lequel célébrait au passage son demi-siècle d’existence de fort belle manière.
Evénement sur lequel les médias occidentaux s’arrêtent de coutume fort peu,
ce « sommet » aux atours moins protocolaires concentre deux jours durant
une somme inédite de décideurs politiques (ministres ; parlementaires) et
militaires (officiers d’état-major), d’experts (institutions internationales ; fonctionnaires
; chercheurs), d’hommes d’affaires et de journalistes autour d’une
pléiade de séances plénières, de tables rondes et de débats publics (et de
réunions plus restreintes...). La diversité et le sérieux des thèmes abordés
(voir p.2), la qualité des intervenants et des échanges, les inévitables
« déclarations » collatérales et autres réactions « à chaud », justifient qu’on
lui consacre ci-après quelque attention.
Abstract: Visite historique. Dimanche 10 mai, alors que la Birmanie sinistrée et isolée
se « pressait » vers les urnes — avec l’enthousiasme que l’on imagine…—
(referendum sur un projet de nouvelle Constitution), que la police népalaise procédait à l’arrestation de 600 manifestants tibétains à Katmandou, un événement politique majeur s’achevait en Asie, dans l’harmonie et l’entrain. Après une visite « historique » d’une exceptionnelle densité, le Président chinois Hu Jintao quittait l’archipel nippon pour regagner, à l’issue de cinq journées de rencontres, de discours et déclarations communes, Pékin et sa fièvre pré-olympique. Une mauvaise nouvelle l’accueillerait hélas deux jours plus tard (séisme dans le Sichuan ; 10 000 morts). Ainsi, nulle anicroche tibétaine significative lors de ce séjour en terre japonaise, pourtant bercée de shintoïsme et de bouddhisme ; Tokyo et le fébrile gouvernement de Y. Fukuda s’y sont employés (7 000 policiers déployés) ; rien ni personne ne devait gâcher la fête des « retrouvailles » entre les deux puissances d’Asie orientale, 2eme et 3eme économies mondiales, toute à la fois voisines, partenaires et rivales. Il n’aurait pû être question que ce rarissime déplacement du plus haut dignitaire chinois au Japon (seulement le 2eme depuis 1972 !) ne soit terni par des phénomènes périphériques… ou suive une trame aussi catastrophique qu’en 1998, lors de la venue du Pdt Jiang Zemin, lestée du sceau de l’échec et de l’incompréhension (J. Zemin avait évoqué, devant l’Empereur Akihito notamment, l’occupation militaire japonaise en Chine).
Abstract: Très exposé aux catastrophes naturelles, le Japon a intégré dans une
approche globale de sa sécurité1 les événements extrêmes (séismes,
éruptions volcaniques, tsunamis, inondations et l’érosion des sols –
glissement de terrain et avalanches). Depuis plusieurs décennies, le Japon
est confronté à des dégradations de l’environnement qui ne relèvent ni de
son seul fait, ni de changements naturels. Non intégrés à la doctrine de
sécurité nippone, ces pollutions transfrontalières et les problèmes
afférents aux ressources marines en Asie de l’Est, relèvent-ils pourtant de
la sécurité environnementale ? Comment une question environnementale
transnationale pénètre-t-elle la sphère de la sécurité, certes élargie ?
Abstract: Le Centre Asie Ifri a mis en place en novembre 2006 un groupe de travail consacré aux cultures stratégiques asiatiques. Il rassemble des chercheurs et des experts spécialistes des problématiques de défense en Asie.
Le concept de "culture stratégique", apparu aux Etats-Unis dans les années 1970 pour mieux appréhender les particularités de la stratégie soviétique, renvoie à l'ensemble des pratiques et des idées, qui dans un environnement géographique défini, déterminent le recours à la force militaire pour l'accomplissement de fins politiques spécifiques. S'il semble évident, au premier abord, que les pays asiatiques partagent une culture stratégique originale, les études détaillées sur les particularités d'une telle culture, et ses nuances entre les acteurs nationaux dans la région sont rares.
Le groupe de travail se donne donc pour objectif de :
- mener une analyse critique du concept de culture stratégique appliqué à l'Asie,
- mettre en évidence les caractéristiques des cultures stratégiques des grands acteurs nationaux présents en Asie (Chine, Japon, Corées, Etats-Unis, Inde) et leurs interactions,
- évaluer la place et le rôle de la culture stratégique dans la pratique et l'évolution des politiques de défense des acteurs nationaux en Asie.
Une attention particulière est portée aux apports extérieurs dans l'évolution stratégique nationale (occupation américaine et alliance avec les Etats-Unis pour le Japon et la Corée, colonisation pour l'Inde, entre autres). Cette analyse des cultures stratégiques en Asie s'inscrit enfin dans le débat sur l'éventuelle création d'une institution multilatérale de sécurité en Asie.
Abstract: Some analysts have questioned whether U.S. security interests in the Asia Pacific region are best served by its existing framework of bilateral alliances. The region is now facing an array of changes: deepening trade links, the formation of new regional institutions, and increased attention to the threat of Islamic terrorism. Against this backdrop, China’s rise represents the key driver in the evolving security landscape in Asia. China is now attracting regional states with its economic power and is offering competing vision to the U.S.-centric “hub and spokeâ€ system of alliances. In essence, China’s increasing economic, diplomatic, and military strength is compelling countries to rethink existing security arrangements and take initial steps that may lead to the formation of regional groupings of nations with common interests and values. At the same time, the Bush Administration has pursued stronger defense relations with Australia, Japan, and India.