July 28, 2005
U.S. Army War College

Abstract:

The US military has had a host of successful experiences in counter-guerrilla war, including some distinct successes with certain aspects of the Vietnam War. However, the paradox stemming from America's unsuccessful crusade in the jungles of Vietnam is thisxe2x80x94because the experience was perceived as anathema to the mainstream American military, hard lessons learned there about fighting guerrillas were neither embedded nor preserved in the US Army's institutional memory. The American military culture's efforts to expunge the specter of Vietnam, embodied in the mantra "No More Vietnams," also prevented the US Army as an institution from really learning from those lessons. In fact, even the term "counterinsurgency" seemed to become a reviled and unwelcome word, one that the doctrinal cognoscenti of the 1980s conveniently transmogrified into "foreign internal defense." Even though many lessons exist in the US military's historical experience with small wars, the lessons from the Vietnam War were the most voluminous. Yet these lessons were most likely the least read, because the Army's intellectual rebirth after Vietnam focused almost exclusively on a big conventional war in Europexe2x80x94the scenario preferred by the US military culture. Since the US Army and its coalition partners are currently prosecuting counter-guerrilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is useful to revisit the lessons from Vietnam and other counterinsurgencies because they are germane to the wars of today and tomorrow. Capturing all or many of these lessons is beyond the scope of this article and is most likely beyond the scope of a single-volume book. However, this article aims to distill some of the more relevant counterinsurgency lessons from the American military's experiences during Vietnam and before. A bigger goal of this article, however, is to highlight some salient studies for professional reading as the US Army starts to inculcate a mindset that embraces the challenges of counterinsurgency and to develop a culture that learns from past lessons in counterinsurgency. This analysis also offers a brief explanation of US military culture and the hitherto embedded cultural obstacles to learning how to fight guerrillas. To simplify and clarify at the outset, the terms counterinsurgency, counter-guerrilla warfare, small war, and asymmetric conflict are used interchangeably. It is a form of warfare in which enemies of the regime or occupying force aim to undermine the regime by employing classical guerrilla tactics. For most of the 20th century, the US military culture (notwithstanding the Marines' work in small wars) generally embraced the big con#ventional war paradigm and fundamentally eschewed small wars and insurgencies. Thus, instead of learning from our experiences in Vietnam, the Philippines, the Marine Corps' experience in the Banana Wars, and the Indian campaigns, the US Army for most of the last 100 years has viewed these experiences as ephemeral anomalies and aberrationsxe2x80x94distractions from preparing to win big wars against other big powers. As a result of marginalizing the counterinsurgencies and small wars that it has spent most of its existence prosecuting, the US military's big-war cultural preferences have impeded it from fully benefitingxe2x80x94studying, distilling, and incorporating into doctrinexe2x80x94from our somewhat extensive lessons in small wars and insurgencies. This article starts by briefly examining some of the salient lessons for counterinsurgency from Vietnam and lists some of the sources for lessons from that war that have been neglected or forgotten. This article also examines some sources and lessons of counterinsurgencies and small wars predating Vietnam. ...

September 16, 2008
En la Mira - The Latin American Small Arms Watch

Abstract:

Although all countries, in theory report their authorized transfers - and such information may even be available in certain public databases - the task of providing an overview of SALW transfers, their parts and munitions, is an arduous one. Nonetheless, despite the difficulties, we have some extremely positive initiatives on a global scale, such as for example, the Small Arms Survey, recognized as an important source of information, especially on SALW production and transfers, as well as the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) which has a database containing transfer records going back to 1962.Despite these important initiatives, themselves when researchers, activists and policy makers try to understand a regional market, such as Latin America and the Caribbean, they encounter a dearth of information. With the intent of addressing this shortcoming, En La Mira has, since 2007, dedicated an issue to transfers of SALWs, parts and ammunition in this region. Further, according to statistics from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN-Comtrade or Comtrade), USD 6.7 billion were exported between 2004 and 2006, while USD 6.5 billion were imported. Despite the fact that Latin America and the Caribbean represent 6% and 3%, respectively, of total transfers worldwide during this period, 42% of firearms related homicide is committed in the region. This discrepancy between the international transfer volume share and the levels of armsrelated violence in Latin America and the Caribbean calls attention to itself, above all because of the tragic and startling number of homicides. Obviously, far from wishing to increase arms transfers in order to be more in sync with homicide rates, we decided, a year ago, to study this issue and periodically monitor its development based on our interest in understanding the primary legal entry and exit routes of firearms and ammunition. The result is a report - based on customs information as stated by Latin American and Caribbean countries and their respective partners - whose objective is to describe the movement of the SALW imports and exports, as well as ammunition and parts, during the present decade. Based on this data, we answer the following questions: who exported and who imported? From whom? What? And when? It is worth restating that the intent of this report is not to explain the cause of arms imports and exports by Latin American countries. Beyond merely providing information, we do indeed wish to awaken, by means of the information presented here, the curiosity of other researches, activists and government staff members such that they may continue to perform research in their countries regarding the transparency of this information, on who is using the transferred SALW, and how. The data used for this report came from the NISAT database, which contains more than 800,000 entries for SALW transfers worldwide since 1962. The NISAT database gets its information from different sources, COMTRADE among them. In this study we decided to restrict ourselves to data from this latter source because, in theory, all countries report transfers to the UN. This data is declared in accordance with the Harmonized System (SH) merchandise classification system. The HS has existed since 1988and, in 2007, was revised for the fourth time; previous revisions were in 1992, 1996 and in 2002. Regarding the period analyzed, we are looking at data up until 2006, since at the time the study closed this was the most recent year available on NISAT....

February 24, 2006
U.S. Department of State

Abstract:

Dominica is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy governed by a prime minister, a cabinet, and a unicameral legislative assembly. A president, nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of the opposition party, and elected for a 5-year term by the Parliament, was head of state with largely ceremonial powers. Prime Minister Pierre Charles' Dominica Labour Party (DLP) prevailed in generally free and fair elections in 2000. Following the sudden death of Prime Minister Charles on January 6, Members of Parliament appointed Roosevelt Skerrit as Prime Minister on January 8. The judiciary is independent. The Office of the Prime Minister oversaw the Dominica Police, the country's only security force. The civilian authorities maintained effective control of the security forces. Some members of the security force committed human rights abuses....

September 2, 2004
Amnesty International

Abstract:

Against the international trend away from the use of the death penalty, executions have increased in the English speaking Caribbean (ESC) in recent years. Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas and St. Kitts and St. Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines have all carried out executions in the last seven years. Jamaica, Antigua, Grenada, St Lucia, Dominica, Belize and Barbados all currently have condemned prisoners and continue to impose sentences of death.