The International Court of Justice’s docket increasingly
includes fact-intensive cases in which the Court must focus on
more than legal questions because the outcomes of the cases
depend on a detailed assessment of the facts. Examples of
such cases include Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) (the Armed Activities
case) and the more recent judgment in Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro).
In the Armed Activities case, the Court dealt with a wide
range of complex, highly factual issues. These issues related,
inter alia, to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC’s) assertions
that Uganda violated the prohibition on the use of
force and the principle of non-intervention by engaging in
military and paramilitary activities against the DRC, occupying
the DRC’s territory, and supporting irregular forces operating
there. The DRC further claimed that, in violation of international human rights and humanitarian law, Uganda had both
committed acts of violence against the DRC’s nationals and
their property and failed to prevent such acts by people under
its control. Finally, the DRC alleged that Uganda had violated
rules governing respect for sovereignty over national resources
and rules of occupation by looting, plundering, and illegally
exploiting the DRC’s assets and wealth.
In highly fact-intensive cases such as these, the Court must
untangle the exact sequence of events, identify the actors involved,
and make factual and, ultimately, legal determinations. For instance, in Armed Activities the Court had to assess
whether Ugandan forces were in the DRC, under what mandate,
and at what point in time. This task was further complicated
in Armed Activities by the fact that the deliberations on
the merits began before hostilities had concluded. The character
of these fact-intensive cases is fundamentally different
from that of the Court’s more traditional cases, such as territorial
disputes, where legal issues are clear-cut and involve many
of the same elements. In these cases, “it is not so much the facts that are disputed as the conclusions to be drawn from
The Court considers itself well equipped to engage in
complex factual determinations and has on occasion referred
to its very specific and fact-based findings as being “noteworthy.”
A close reading of Armed Activities challenges this view,
revealing that the Court fails to engage in independent fact assessment. Most strikingly, the Court accepts as proven facts
that are drawn from secondary evidence, in particular from
United Nations (UN) reports. Furthermore, the Court does
not articulate a clear standard of proof according to which it
might weigh the evidence presented by the parties, making its
factual findings difficult to disentangle from its legal conclusions....
June 14, 2007 Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior
As NATO has moved from being a primarily military alliance to seeking more political roles, it has become pertinent to consider its impact on democratisation. At first glance, it might seem incongruent even to deliberate on the democracy promotion relevance of an essentially military organisation. But, NATO's successive enlargements have often hinged on the
fulfilment of democratic preconditions in aspirant members, while technical assistance provided under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and other programmes has increasingly focused on the reform of civil-military relations. Assessment is consequently warranted of whether NATO has come to play any positive role in
encouraging democratisation across different regions, or whether its impact on political liberalisation has been either marginal or even negative. This paper argues that support for democracy has increasingly infused NATO policies, but that the organisation's role in democracy promotion is circumscribed by strategic considerations; most often an indirect side effect of
other aims; and most relevant to the niche area of defence reform....
The recent history of the Balkans suggests that the easiest way to challenge regional stability is combining a bad economic and social situation with oppressive national identity politics. After the proclamation of independence, the problem of identity has dominated the Montenegrin political scene. Ethnic groups are becoming increasingly politicised. The ruling Montenegrin elite sees no need for dialogue. Issues like the new constitution, symbols of the state and the church are highly volatile and could lead to new conflicts. Corruption, organised crime and absence of the rule of law still seriously threaten Montenegro's future in Europe....
November 14, 2006 United Nations // United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Over ten years after the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement which ended the
wars in Bosnia and Croatia, steady progress has been made in finding durable
solutions for the hundreds of thousands of persons displaced by the wars in the former
Yugoslavia. By September 2004, returns to and within Bosnia and Herzegovina
reached the one million landmark figure. The number of persons in need of durabl#e
solutions (refugees and internally displaced) in the former Yugoslavia, which peaked
at over two million during the Bosnian crisis in 1992-95 and the Kosovo crisis in
1999, decreased to less than one million by the end of 2003 and to approximately
560,000 by mid-2006.
Yet, behind these encouraging trends, the picture is more nuanced. Most of the
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who found durable solutions were
those displaced by the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in the first half of
the 1990s. But the majority of the IDPs and refugees who fled the Kosovo province
of Serbia and Montenegro after the ousting of the Yugoslav army and the return of the
ethnic Albanian majority in mid 1999 are still in their places of displacement and the
situation of the minorities remaining in Kosovo is still precarious, as the analysis
below shows. From an institutional point of view, there is still some "unfinished
business"1 in the Western Balkans: in June 2006 Montenegro declared independence
and was admitted to the UN, spelling the end of the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro, a loose confederation that replaced the remnants of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. The final status of the Kosovo province of Serbia is also being
discussed, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244.
As result of this situation, UNHCR's operations in the Western Balkans are centred
on two themes: "Post-Dayton" refugees and IDPs (from the wars in Croatia and
Bosnia) and refugees and IDPs from Kosovo. A third theme, beyond the scope of this
paper, is the development of asylum legislation and procedures in accordance with
international standards, in line with UNHCR's traditional mandate....
This working document is part of a research project for the Office for Scientific, Technical
and Cultural Affairs, the department of the Belgian Federal Government responsible for
scientific research. The project is carried out by the Centre for Political Science (POLI) of the
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (by Bruno Coppieters, Michel Huysseune, Tamara Kovziridze and
Theo Jans) and the Centre for European Policy Studies (by Michael Emerson, Elena
Prokhorova, Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci and Marius Vahl). It makes a comparative
assessment of the potential for supra-national and international settlement in four secessionist
conflicts at the periphery of the EU. It focuses on the potential role that institutional models
from the EU and its members can play in the design of solutions to such conflicts -
particularly the federation institutions such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) or the Council of Europe. In all of these cases, conflict settlement may
have to be facilitated by the intervention of third party actors....
August 26, 2008 International Center for Transitional Justice
Radovan Karadžić, the former Bosnian Serb leader, was arrested by the Serb authorities in July 2008 and then transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, where he remains in custody awaiting trial. Questions answered include: 1. What charges does Karadžić face? 2. Why will Karadžić’s trial take place in The Hague instead of Bosnia-Herzegovina? 3. When will the trial begin and how long will it last? 4. Karadžić has said he wants to defend himself rather than be assisted by lawyers. Can he indeed do so? 5. Who are the judges and prosecutors? 6. Is the ICTY hearing any cases other than that of Radovan Karadžić? 7. What will happen to the trial if former General Ratko Mladić is also extradited to the Tribunal? Could Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić be tried together? 8. The trial of Slobodan Milošević lasted for more than four years and ended with Milosevic’s death, before the court reached a verdict. How can the court avoid a similar scenario? 9. Some say that the ICTY is due to close down in 2010. What happens to the trial if it is not completed by then? 10. Who pays for the operation of the court? How much does it cost a year?...
This material contains 34 recently declassified National Intelligence Estimates or NIEs representing the Intelligence Community's most authoritative analysis of Yugoslavia. Over a period of nearly four decades, these reports gave U.S. policymakers keen insights into the factors shaping events in and around Yugoslavia xe2x80x94 Belgrade's break with the Soviet Union, through the Tito years, and right up to the eve of the nation's collapse xe2x80x94 an event foretold by the documents.
December 15, 2006 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The Tribunal's Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, addressed today the UN Security Counsel with a view to provide her regular assessment of the progress made in the completion strategy highlighting the problems and obstacles hampering it. She sought fresh and clear guidance from the Council on the fundamental issues of the completion strategy.
The Council is expected to recommend to the General Assembly on 22 June that Montenegro be admitted to the UN. The Council met today in closed session to give initial consideration to Montenegro's application for membership of the United Nations. In accordance with the Council Provisional Rules of Procedure, a Council Committee on Admission of New Members was formed. The Committee met later in the afternoon and is expected to present a report containing a draft resolution on the admission of Montenegro for the Council's consideration tomorrow morning. At its session on 22 June the Council is expected to adopt a resolution recommending to the General Assembly that Montenegro be admitted to the UN, and to issue a presidential statement....
March 2, 2007 Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
Croatia is quietly abandoning demands for financial compensation from Montenegro, tempted by new business opportunities in the neighbouring Adriatic republic. On February 27, Ranko Krivokapic, speaker of Montenegro's parliament, said the newly independent country would not need to pay full reparations to Croatia for the damage caused by military attacks launched from its territory in 1991. Instead, he said the two states would reach a bilateral agreement on Montenegro's "political and moral responsibility" for the attacks, which inflicted enormous damage on the nearby Croatian city of Dubrovnik....
March 2, 2007 Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
While the World Court's landmark ruling is supposed to help the people of both Bosnia and Serbia move ahead with reconciliation, initial reactions indicate there is still a long road ahead. Sarajevo was understandably disappointed by the ruling, while Belgrade breathed a sigh of relief and Banja Luka remained on the sidelines, unable to decide exactly what the judgment meant for the Bosnian Serb entity. Legal analysts concluded the International Court of Justice, ICJ, took a "rigid" view in determining what constitutes an act of genocide and a state's involvement in it....
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered its judgment Monday in the long-anticipated case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, finding that although the Serbian government was not directly responsible for genocide during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war, the country failed to meet its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention to prevent genocide. The court recognized that the mass killings of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica was nonetheless an act of genocide, and said that Serbia "should have made the best effort within their power to try and prevent the tragic events then taking shape."...
The process of transition from communism to democracy in southeastern Europe has reached the point at which the countries of the region are embarking on a much longer journey: the transformation process. While the transition so far has included dismantling of communist political structures and getting rid of one-party authoritarian rule, transformation is going to be much more complex. It involves state-building and good governance based on the rule of law, human rights, and civil liberties; a free-market economy; pluralistic democracy; and above all, socio-cultural changes and acceptance of new values and responsibilities across the board. The lesson the international community and #democratic governments are still to learn is that the holistic approach to reconstruction and development is the only way to guarantee stability and peace in the region. The holistic approach simply means realizing that civil liberties, safety and security, an independent judiciary, and good governance go hand in hand with market economies and private and entrepreneurial initiative, eventually creating conditions for a good society. Efforts and measures aimed at improving these policy areas should not be given priority over one another. Wherever the international community or local authorities have tried a sector-driven approach in transitional countries, it failed or slowed down the process of transformation. All these areas have to be addressed and confronted simultaneously from day one, in particular when dealing with communities struggling with post-war reconstruction as well....
December 14, 2006 Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
Montenegro's new constitution is causing new conflicts between the government and the mainly pro-Serbian opposition, almost certainly delaying its adoption to next summer. After the republic proclaimed independence in May, parliament in Podgorica began work on a new constitution at end of November. But the opposition has refused to join the parliamentary committee on the constitution, partly over a dispute on the procedural rules concerning adoption.
The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) was launched on 08 May 2002 in Belgrade. SEESAC is a component of the Regional Implementation Plan on Combating the Proliferations of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) formulated and adopted by the Stability Pact in November 2001(Revised in 2006), with the aims of stopping the flow and availability of SALW in the region, consolidating achievements so far and supporting the socio-economic conditions for peace and development in South Eastern and Eastern Europe. The uncontrolled proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a serious problem in South Eastern and Eastern Europe. SALW proliferation has fuelled crime and insecurity, exacerbating conflict in the region and undermining post conflict peace-building. Problems related to SALW are likely to pose a serious constraint to economic and social development in South Eastern and Eastern Europe. Established in co-operation with the UNDP and housed in their offices in Belgrade, SEESAC worked to support the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan for an initial period of three years; the impact of the project has led to a further four-year extension until December 2008. Political and strategic guidance and indigenous support for SEESAC is provided by a Regional Steering Group (RSG), which is composed of representatives of the governments of the states concerned, the Stability Pact, UNDP and observers from institutions such as the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and civil society. The RSG meets twice yearly and has approved the 2006 SEESAC Strategy and a revision of the SEESAC mandate. SEESAC capability is now available to all stakeholders within the CIS and Caucasus region. SEESAC is now also available to provide technical advice and project development assistance for the disposal of heavy weapons (within available resources). SEESAC operates under the guidance of The Regional Steering Group for Small Arms and Light Weapons and the UN Resident Co-ordinator in Belgrade. SEESAC liaises directly with governments and civil society, providing technical input, information exchange, co-ordination and overview of current and future efforts and fund-raising assistance for specific SALW projects. SEESAC's small team is in constant communication with all the governments involved and with the relevant international organisations, non-governmental organisations and bi-lateral donors. SEESAC's regional activities include sensitising governments and civil society on small arms issues, formulating national strategies for SALW control and incorporating small arms issues into UNDP development planning....
The mission of the International Mission on the Balkans is to develop a vision for the integration of the countries of Southeastern Europe into the European Union and other international structures highlighting the progress made to date, supported by recommendations for action to the governments of the region and to the international community. The Commission completed its work in May 2006.
The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation supports women in regions affected by war and armed conflicts. This support is needed not only during the heat of battle but also in the difficult work of building peace. The Foundation is active in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus and is involved on site to support women's organisations working to strengthen women's psychological and physical health, enhance their self-esteem and ability to participate as a force in the building of a democratic society.
Kvinna till Kvinna Foundations is convinced that sustainable peace can only be built by people living in the areas concerned. This is why the foundation always cooperates with local women's organisations that work without consideration of ethnic, national or religious boundaries. They generate projects themselves on the basis of the needs in their society. The role of Kvinna till Kvinna is to provide financial support, assistance and advice in the development of these organisations. In Sweden, the Foundation talks about the effects of war and the important role of women in the work of constructing new, democratic societies. In 2002, the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation was awarded The Right Livelihood Award....
The Dayton Peace Accords Project assists post-conflict parties in developing practical solutions to issues of peace implementation, constitutional development, institution building, economic development, and cultural and ethnic heritage through the provision of appropriate and time technical, legal, and advocacy assistance.
The HUMSEC Project is a Sixth Framework Programme Coordination Action, whose purpose is to contribute to a better understanding of the link between transnational terrorist groups and criminal organisations in the Western Balkans and their role in the peace-building process in the region. Main purpose of HUMSEC is to establish a network of scientists working in the project field and to enhance the dialogue between scientists from the European Union and the Western Balkan region. With the only exception of Macedonia, all Western Balkan countries are represented in the consortium. Particular attention has been paid in the composition of the consortium on the variety and equal distribution of scientific disciplines (the consortium consists of universities and research institutes of criminal law, international law and criminology as well as human rights centres) to allow a truly interdisciplinary scientific dialog....
The big-picture issues at the crossroads of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding were taken up by the Security Council in September 2010, under the presidency of Turkey. Leading up to that discussion, Turkey held numerous bilateral consultations, and, with the support of IPI, organized an expert meeting on these issues in New York in May 2010 and an informal retreat in Istanbul for members of the Council in June 2010.
This publication is intended to document some of that process, and includes the Statement by the President of the Security Council, the outcome summary of the June retreat, and the set of papers that were presented there. Three of these papers draw lessons from the UN’s experiences in different areas of the world (Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the Great Lakes region of Africa), and one paper analyzes cross-cutting themes.
Table of Contents:
Introduction, Francesco Mancini
Security Council Istanbul Retreat: At The Crossroads of Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding
Adam C. Smith and Vanessa Wyeth, Rapporteurs
Peacemaking In Afghanistan: A Role For The United Nations?
The Security Council And Peacekeeping In The Balkans, 1992-2010
Richard Gowan and Daniel Korski
The Great Lakes of Africa (Burundi, The Drc, And The LRA-Affected Areas)
Composite Paper on Cross-Cutting Themes
International Peace Institute
Statement by the President of the Security Council...
March 18, 2010 United Nations Human Rights Council // United Nations General Assembly
The mandate, established in 2004 by the Commission on Human Rights and extended in 2007 by the Human Rights Council in resolution 6/32, has provided a good basis for the Representative to build on the excellent work of his predecessor, Francis Deng. The nature of his mandate has allowed the Representative to benefit from privileged access, broad support and partnerships with United Nations institutions, member States, civil society and other stakeholders. It has been critical that the Representative has succeeded in linking the mandate to a broader international context inclusive of peace processes, humanitarian assistance and development, natural disasters and climate change. After discussing the achievements and activities of the mandate during the tenure of the present Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, the report identifies progress made as well as major challenges remaining, which relate to the human rights of internally displaced persons....
October 9, 2009 International Center for Transitional Justice
When the Security Council established the ICTY and ICTR to prosecute mass
atrocities, its motivation was clearly stated in the preambles to Resolutions 827 and 955:
it was—and I quote—“determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective
measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them.” The Council was
“convinced that in the particular circumstances [of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
respectively] the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the
process of national reconciliation and the restoration and maintenance of peace.” The
Council set out its belief that establishing such international tribunals would “contribute
to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed.” From the outset,
these goals were fundamental to the mandates of the international judicial institutions that
While neither ICTY nor ICTR were intended to be permanent institutions, neither of the
courts’ mandates specified an end date for their work. As discussions progress in
meetings such as this one about how the tribunals should complete the tasks the Council
has assigned them, it is important to reflect on the underlying conceptual framework that
drove those original commitments and to ensure that new decisions preserve the positive
legacies that have been built over the past 15 years. It is worth noting that this will
require input from the constituencies that have been the subject of the tribunals’ work....
Nations in Transit 2009 is the 13th edition of Freedom House’s comprehensive,
comparative study of democratic development from Central Europe
to Eurasia. It examines 29 countries, including the newest independent
state in the region, Kosovo. The overarching conclusion is that 2008 was a very
difficult year for democracy: scores declined for 18 of the 29 countries, and a record
8 countries are now in the “consolidated authoritarian regimes” category. Worrying
trends highlighted in the previous three editions of Nations in Transit became even
more pronounced in 2008, while positive trends lost momentum.
A number of events illustrate the intensification of these negative trends. In
2008, for the first time in the 21st century, a war erupted between two states covered
in Nations in Transit. The so-called “August War” between Georgia and Russia served
as a wake-up call for those who believed that the democratic decline observed in
the region over the last few years would not have a detrimental effect on security
and stability. Highly problematic elections accentuated the region’s troubles. Two
petro-states, Azerbaijan (which recorded the largest democratic decline in this
edition of Nations in Transit) and the Russian Federation, held uncompetitive
presidential elections in which the result was predetermined. Armenia’s presidential
poll was marred by lethal postelection violence. And the government in Georgia
used administrative resources to seriously influence that country’s hotly contested
presidential and parliamentary elections. Nations in Transit 2009 documents
how journalists were once again at risk throughout the region, from Croatia to
Uzbekistan, and national governments were challenged by corruption scandals, as
was the case in Bulgaria; by divisive ethnic politics, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
by parliamentary boycotts, as in Montenegro; or by infighting and outright
irresponsibility among political leaders, as in Ukraine....
The Security Council today extended the terms of the judges serving on the United Nations war crimes tribunals set up to deal with the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, so they can complete remaining cases by the deadline set for the courts’ work.
The Council, in two separate resolutions that were adopted unanimously, urged both tribunals “to take all possible measures to complete their work expeditiously,” and expressed its determination to support their efforts in this regard.
The so-called “completion strategy” of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which is based in The Hague, requires it to finish trials of first instance by 2009, and then start downsizing in 2010.
Among the decisions taken today, the Council extended the term of office of eight permanent judges at the ICTY and 10 ad litem, or temporary, judges until 31 December 2010, or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned.
In addition, the Council decided, on the request of the President of the ICTY, that the Secretary-General may appoint additional temporary judges to complete existing trials or conduct additional trials....