January 21, 2011 Households in Conflict Network // Institute of Development Studies // University of Sussex
This is the first paper using household survey data from two countries involved in an international war (Eritrea and Ethiopia) to measure the conflict’s impact on children’s health in both nations. The identification strategy uses event data to exploit exogenous variation in the conflict’s geographic extent and timing and the exposure of different children’s birth cohorts to the fighting. The paper uniquely incorporates GPS information on the distance between survey villages and conflict sites to more accurately measure a child’s war exposure. War-exposed children in both countries have lower height-for-age Z-scores, with the children in the war instigating and losing country (Eritrea) suffering more than the winning nation (Ethiopia). Negative impacts on boys and girls of being born during the conflict are comparable to impacts for children alive at the time of the war. Effects are robust to including region-specific time trends, alternative conflict exposure measures, and an instrumental variables strategy....
January 26, 2010 German Institute of Global and Area Studies // Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien
This article analyzes contemporary Eritrea’s acute crisis within the framework of the theory
of anomie. It is based on the hypothesis that militarization, forced labor, mass exodus,
and family disintegration can be interpreted as the consequences of two incompatible
norm and value systems: the collectivist, nationalistic, and militaristic worldview of the
former liberation front and ruling party People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ),
and the traditional cultural system of Eritrea’s society. In 2002 the regime introduced an
unlimited “development campaign,” thereby forcing large parts of the society to live as
conscripts and perform unpaid labor. This has caused a mass exodus of young people and
a rapid process of family disintegration. The article is based on empirical fieldwork and
evaluates the ongoing developments, which have led to rapid economic decline and the
destabilization of the entire fabric of society....
For years international attention in Sudan focused on the southern civil war, but the conditions of marginalization and resentment which motivated that conflict also existed in the east of the country. While dissidents in the south moved quickly to launch a rebellion and were later joined by western rebels,
their counterparts in the east endeavoured to overcome their problems by
political means. However, successive dictatorial regimes in Khartoum led
Beja Congress (BC) politicians to move to Eritrea, join the National Democratic
Alliance, and launch an armed struggle in the early 1990s. In 2005 the
BC joined the Rashaida Free Lions to form the Eastern Front but weak leadership,
lack of a clear political programme, poor organization, and dependence
on Eritrea contributed to the failure of the military campaign. The Eastern
Sudan Peace Agreement of 14 October 2006 calls for the absorption of the
Eastern Front armed forces into the Sudan Armed Forces in exchange for
political positions in the national government, the national assembly, and in
three eastern states. The agreement, however, largely reflects the broader regional
interests of Khartoum and Asmara and is unlikely to end the marginalization
that led the Eastern Front to launch its armed struggle....
May 29, 2007 Center for Policy Research and Dialogue // Institute for Security Studies
This paper contends that conflict in the Afar region is attributable to numerous reasons: nationalism, inter communal (e.g. Afar-Issa) conflict, competition for power between political parties, and on occasion, inter-clan conflict over resources. The conflict is exacerbated by misguided and externally imposed development strategies, the militarisation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia and decline of traditional values and dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper makes the following recommendations to address this conflict: strengthening IGAD's conflict prevention capacity in the sub-region by tackling the hostility between and within some of its members, especially its early warning mechanism; and an inwardlooking approach by the governments of the three states in which the Afar that would produce policies that are inclusive,
non-discriminatory, and participatory. ...
May 29, 2007 Center for Policy Research and Dialogue // Institute for Security Studies
This paper seeks to explain the origin and causes of the conflict in eastern Sudan, its regional dimensions, considers the
principal actors, provides some background to the negotiations between the Eastern Front and the GOS, and ends with a
consideration of the peace agreement and some projections for the future.
April 6, 2009 Forced Migration Review // University of Oxford // Refugee Studies Centre
Forced Migration Review (FMR) provides a
forum for the regular exchange of practical
experience, information and ideas between
researchers, refugees and internally
displaced people, and those who work with
them. It is published in English, Arabic,
Spanish and French by the Refugee Studies
Centre of the Oxford Department of
International Development, University
of Oxford. This issue focuses on 'Statelessness'. A ‘stateless person’ is someone who is not recognised as a national by any state.
They therefore have no nationality or citizenship (terms used interchangeably in
this issue) and are unprotected by national legislation, leaving them vulnerable
in ways that most of us never have to consider. The possible consequences of
statelessness are profound and touch on all aspects of life. It may not be possible
to work legally, own property or open a bank account. Stateless people may be
easy prey for exploitation as cheap labour. They are often not permitted to attend
school or university, may be prohibited from getting married and may not be able to
register births and deaths. Stateless people can neither vote nor access the national
December 18, 2006 Inventory of Conflict and Environment
The area comprising Eritrea and Ethiopia has been in periodic conflict for decades and seems prime for resurgence due to drought conditions, economic issues and belligerent claims of land ownership. There are a number of areas along the border between these two states that are currently still at issue. The town of Badme is the critical point of contention since it is conflict in that border area that began the major conflict of 1998 - 2000. This town and others lie in the Tigray region which encompasses the origin of the founding Ethiopian empire, Aksum. The second main front on the border region is around Zalambessa further to the southeast of Badme. There are very complex ethnicities, histories, and cultures that are in conflict in the region and these fundamental differences are the reason for continued border tensions. Dispute settlement in the region of Ethiopian and Eritrean is ongoing, despite international agreements that define the border. Most recently, the conflict is changing as Ethiopia and Eritrea shift their resources to conflict in Somalia and conduct their dispute by proxy. Current trends toward religious extremism and violence in Somalia are resulting in serious distraction from resolution of the border dispute at the heart of Ethiopian and Eritrean relations. The establishment and agreement of defined boundaries will be the only way for these countries to create a legitimate framework for continued conflict resolution and dissuasion....
September 8, 2006 Special Program on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions
Factsheet on sanctions regimes which have been terminated. The list includes Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Haiti, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Sudan and Libya.
July 13, 2006 Project on International Courts and Tribunals // African International Courts and Tribunals
To oversee the implementation and interpretation of the COMESA agreement, the Treaty established a Court of Justice, modeled on the European Court of Justice. Like the European Court of Justice, the COMESA Court of Justice can be seized of a matter by one of several ways. First, a member State may bring another member State or the Council before the Court for breach of the Treaty or failure to fulfill an obligation thereunder. Providing the Common Market with independent monitoring and enforcement power, the Treaty permits the Secretary General (with the agreement of the Council) also to bring a member State before the Court for failure to fulfill its Treaty obligations. Like the European Court of Justice, the COMESA Courtxc3xads decisions have precedence over any decisions of national courts....
On 31 May, the Council adopted resolution 1681, authorising the downsizing of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) from 3,277 to up to 2,300 troops, including 230 military observers, and extending UNMEE's mandate until 30 September. The downsizing represented the materialisation of threats against the parties should they refuse to comply with Council demands for the demarcation of the border without preconditions and for the lifting of restrictions against UNMEE. There were divisions on the precise number and whether this should be accompanied by changes to the mandate. Early discussions focused on a US proposal that UNMEE be downsized to 1,500 troops and the mandate changed to include security for the staff of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), inter alia, and to reflect the reduction in UNMEE's monitoring capabilities....
The Council is expected to adopt a resolution on 30 or 31 May to downsize the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to an observer mission with significantly less troops, and change the mandate. There are divisions inside the Council on the precise number of personnel to be phased out, as well as the shape of the new mandate. The US has proposed that the final number of troops be 1,500 with an additional mandate on the demarcation of the border. But most Council members and troop contributing countries would prefer a number above that. The Secretariat has indicated that an additional mandate as proposed by the US with less troops would be difficult to implement....
The 700-mile-long frontier between Ethiopia and its former province of Eritrea, which became independent in 1993, is at the heart of a conflict that has been raging since May 1998, undermining all prospects of development in two of the world's poorest countries.
Iran’s sustained crackdown on critical voices and China’s brutal suppression of ethnic journalism have pushed the number of journalists imprisoned worldwide to its highest level since 1996, the Committee to Protect Journalists has found. In its annual census of imprisoned journalists, CPJ identified 145 reporters, editors, and photojournalists behind bars on December 1, an increase of nine from the 2009 tally.
Iran and China, with 34 imprisoned journalists apiece, are the world’s worst jailers of the press, together constituting nearly half of the worldwide total. Eritrea, Burma, and Uzbekistan round out the five worst jailers from among the 28 nations that imprison journalists....
"One stupid war is enough," Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told Newsweek in April 2008, explaining why he doesn't want to war with Eritrea again. Yet a few hundred UN troops are all that stands between the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces massed on either side of the disputed border zone. Those peacekeepers will be withdrawn (Bloomberg) on July 31, when the UN ends its Ethiopia-Eritrea mission. Neither side says it wants war, but experts continue to worry the standoff could spark open conflict, potentially igniting skirmishes across Africa's volatile horn....
The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea has been mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution 1320 of 15 September 2000 to monitor the cessation of hostilities following the signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement on 18 June 2000. UNMEE has an authorized maximum strength (Security Council resolution 1320 of 15 September 2000) of 4,200 troops, including 220 military observers. The current strength (31 July 2005) is 3,293 military personnel, including 3,079 troops and 214 military observers. UNMEE also includes 241 international civilians, 245 local civilians and 66 United Nations Volunteers....
After the wartime Allies expelled Eritrea's Italian colonial rulers in 1941, Britain took control of the region and eventually was assigned it as a UN trust territory. In 1952, the UN decided to federate Eritrea to Ethiopia, hoping to reconcile Ethiopian claims of sovereignty and Eritrean aspirations for independence. A decade later, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie dissolved the federation and annexed Eritrea, triggering a thirty year armed struggle in Eritrea. In 1991, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) captured the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and established a provisional government. Eritrea finally achieved independence, following an internationally monitored referendum in 1993. But friction between the two countries continued. A border clash in 1998 around the town of Badme escalated into a full-scale war, displacing about 250,000 Eritreans and killing thousands of soldiers from both sides. The UN Security Council called for a cease-fire and imposed a one-year arms embargo on both countries. In 2000, Addis Ababa and Asmara signed a peace agreement brokered by the Organization of African Unity, calling for both parties to withdraw to the positions held before the 1998 war and establishing a boundary commission. The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) also began patrolling along the security zone. However, r#elations between the two neighbors deteriorated in 2003 when the boundary commission ruled that the town Badme lies in Eritrean territory. While Ethiopia rejected the commission's ruling, Eritrea refused to negotiate a new settlement with the UN Special Envoy for Ethiopia-Eritrea Lloyd Axworthy. Demarcation of the long-disputed border has been shelved indefinitely and tension on the border threatens violence anew....
This Policy Brief examines the real and imagined influence of al-Qa‘ida in North Africa and the Sahel. Despite a perception of the transnationalization of terrorist movements in North Africa under al-Qa‘ida’s banner, robust evidence of an effective al-Qa‘ida’s expansion in the Maghreb and the Sahara/Sahel region remains elusive at best. Rather, doubts about al-Qa‘ida’s actual threat and the efficacy of international response in the context of pervasive state failure in the Sahel raise questions regarding the policy objectives of US-led counter-terrorism in the region....
It would be hard to conceive of two States that offer greater contrasts than
Somalia and Eritrea: the former, a collapsed State for over two decades, with no
functional national institutions; the latter, possessing the most highly centralized,
militarized and authoritarian system of government on the African continent. From a
sanctions monitoring perspective, however, the two countries present very similar
challenges: in both cases, power is concentrated in the hands of individuals rather
than institutions and is exercised through largely informal and often illicit networks
of political and financial control. Leaders in both countries often depend more
heavily on political and economic support from foreign Governments and diaspora
networks than from the populations within their own borders. And both countries —
in very different ways — serve as platforms for foreign armed groups that represent a
grave and increasingly urgent threat to peace and security in the Horn and East
More than half of Somali territory is controlled by responsible, comparatively
stable authorities that have demonstrated, to varying degrees, their capacity to
provide relative peace and security to their populations. Without exception, the
administrations of Somaliland, Puntland, Gaalmudug, and “Himan iyo Heeb”
evolved independently of centralized State-building initiatives, from painstaking,
organic local political processes. Much of Galguduud region is controlled by anti-Al-
Shabaab clan militias loosely unified under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a
(ASWJ), but lacks a functional authority. Consolidation of and cooperation between
such entities represents the single most effective strategy for countering threats like
extremism and piracy, while expanding peace and security in Somalia....
May 18, 2011 Nordic Africa Institute // Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
This Policy Note focuses on the gendered consequences of the militarisation of the Horn of Africa. Despite being in different ‘moments’ of conflict, the countries of this region share features of extreme social, economic and political violence, which impact negatively on their citizens. Protracted refugee and refugee-like conditions, extreme disinvestment in social programmes, increasing militarisation and political repression adversely affect women, thereby further entrenching gender disparities. Concerted national and international efforts and resources should support local democratic initiatives to find political solutions to these protracted conflicts and advance the struggle against sexual and gender-based violence and discrimination....
March 28, 2011 Nordic Africa Institute // Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
Somalia has engendered the policy debate on the extent of the spread of transnational Islamist Jihadist groups in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and their consequences for peace and security across the region. These concerns are justified given the emergence since the late 1980s of extremist groups such as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement and the Somali Jihadist Islamist groups of the likes of Al-Ittihad, the Islamic Courts Union and currently Al Shabab. The leaders and fighters of these groups relocated to the HOA after the defeat of the Taliban following the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan. The operations of these transnational Islamist groups within and across the countries of the Horn pose serious challenges to the region and beyond....
March 21, 2011 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
This paper analyses Israel's response to a recent influx of African asylum seekers, a phenomenon whose nature and scale are unprecedented in Israel's history. It addresses three intertwined questions. What are the discursive challenges to the construction of an Israeli refugee regime? What dynamics foster their development? And how can those challenges be explained and deconstructed?
The paper consists of two parts. The first provides a historical overview that aims to situate the influx within a regional geo-political context. The second suggests a threefold evaluative typology of discourses; security, ethnonationalism and the gravity of the holocaust – societal pillars which critically influence both the state and the asylum seekers.
By critically presenting the evolution of Israel's responses to the influx, it argues that a pattern of 'ordered disorder' governs a spectrum of rejectionist responses, underpinned by the fundamental role of the 'asylum-migration nexus'. The ordered disorder also explains the degree of accommodating measures, provided by all actors. The disordered relationship between the nation-state and the asylum seekers becomes the Israeli "national order of things" (Malkki 1995a)....
November 3, 2009 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
This data source provides the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya, disaggregated by country of origin and location, and with trend data from 2006 to 2009. The data source also provides numbers of refugees and asylum seekers by the status of refugee or asylum status (applied, decided, pending), and the numbers of repatriated and resettled refugees and asylum seekers.