This paper identifies the factors linked to cross-country differentials in growth performance in the aftermath of social conflict for 30 sub-Saharan African countries using panel data techniques. Our results show that changes in the terms of trade are the most important correlate of economic performance in post-conflict environments. This variable is typically associated with an increase in the marginal probability of positive economic performance by about 30 percent. Institutional quality emerges as the second most important factor. Foreign aid is shown to have very limited ability to explain differentials in growth performance, and other policy variables such as trade openness are not found to have a statistically significant effect. The results suggest that exogenous factors ("luck") are an important factor in post-conflict recovery. They also highlight the importance in post-conflict settings of policies to mitigate the macroeconomic impact of terms of trade volatility (including countercyclical macroeconomic policies and innovative financing instruments) and of policies to promote export diversification....
May 29, 2007 Center for Policy Research and Dialogue // Institute for Security Studies
This paper contends that conflict in the Afar region is attributable to numerous reasons: nationalism, inter communal (e.g. Afar-Issa) conflict, competition for power between political parties, and on occasion, inter-clan conflict over resources. The conflict is exacerbated by misguided and externally imposed development strategies, the militarisation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia and decline of traditional values and dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper makes the following recommendations to address this conflict: strengthening IGAD's conflict prevention capacity in the sub-region by tackling the hostility between and within some of its members, especially its early warning mechanism; and an inwardlooking approach by the governments of the three states in which the Afar that would produce policies that are inclusive,
non-discriminatory, and participatory. ...
Internal conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are never the result of internal factors only, but rather
a confluence of other factors, most of which bear a relationship to the shadow economic networks of
individuals or institutions connected to the international systems of trade and finance. These networks
foster corruption, elite rivalry and ethnic hatred because they survive on the indiscriminate plundering
of natural resources. But since they function outside domestic and international legal regimes, they
suffer little or no sanctions at all. This paper explores the limitations of international legal regimes in
this regard and suggests some improvements that could enhance their conflict-reduction function in
Conflict resolution in the African Great Lakes Region has been linked to the protocols and projects
agreed upon at the Second International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The
ICGLR created a continental-wide framework of conflict circuit breakers focused on resolving the
structural and surface situational causes of the 1996 to 2003 armed conflicts that drew in at least six
nations and destabilised the entire region. The implementation of these protocols and projects will
serve as a test for the African Great Lakes Region to move away from conflict and into a cooperation
and development phase; however, the effort to bring peace, stability and development will face
obstacles not only in the security sector, but also in developing infrastructure, civil society, and good
governance. In summary, this article contends that peace in the Great Lakes Region will depend
equally on two factors: internal governance and building civil society institutions, and focused regional
interlocking circuit-breaking institutions....
May 25, 2006 Journal Of Peace, Conflict And Development
In the past three years, the Horn of Africa has been characterised by keen diplomatic activities
and advanced processes of mediation. To end Africa's oldest war, representatives of the
Sudanese government began negotiations in Machakos (Kenya) with the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA), Sudan's most important rebel movement. Kenya is also hosting
peace talks to set up a new Somali government; participants include the Transitional National
Government (TNG) first set up in Arta (Djibouti) in 2000, numerous warlords who were
excluded from the Arta process, and local politicians and tribal elders of every shade of
opinion. And finally, an international commission in April 2002 made public a decision
regarding the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highly contentious issue; thus a
mechanism to manage conflict through arbitration was applied. It was agreed upon in the
Algiers Peace Agreement of December 2000. But demarcation remains to be done and is
contested by Ethiopia....
Profile: Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) operative who also worked for al-Qaeda; Grew up in Germany and Sweden, a refugee from the Somali civil war. An imam in Sweden sponsored his trip for weapons training in Afghanistan in 1996; he returned to Somalia that year. He joined AIAI in 1997 to oppose Ethiopia; He met Abu Talha in early 2003, and on his orders cased Camp Lemonier, the U.S. military base in Djibouti in Fall 2003; He was one of 14 key al-Qaeda operatives and associates transferred from CIA custody to the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2006....
July 13, 2006 Project on International Courts and Tribunals // African International Courts and Tribunals
To oversee the implementation and interpretation of the COMESA agreement, the Treaty established a Court of Justice, modeled on the European Court of Justice. Like the European Court of Justice, the COMESA Court of Justice can be seized of a matter by one of several ways. First, a member State may bring another member State or the Council before the Court for breach of the Treaty or failure to fulfill an obligation thereunder. Providing the Common Market with independent monitoring and enforcement power, the Treaty permits the Secretary General (with the agreement of the Council) also to bring a member State before the Court for failure to fulfill its Treaty obligations. Like the European Court of Justice, the COMESA Courtxc3xads decisions have precedence over any decisions of national courts....
The small country of Djibouti has become an important military hub in the Horn of Africa for the United States over the past several months. Djibouti has allowed the US to build a new command center, as thousands of US troops gather there for the war on terrorism. For this operation, the US is defining the Horn of Africa r#egion as the total airspace and land areas out to the high-water mark of Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Yemen.
December 1, 2004 Minorities at Risk Project // Center for International Development and Conflict Management // University of Maryland
About two-thirds of the Republic of Djibouti's inhabitants live in the capital city, but over 50 percent of the total Afar population are migrant nomads or reside in small towns or oases. The condition of Afars in Djibouti is certainly better at present than a decade ago. However, despite some political reforms, Issa presently dominate executive decision-making, the civil service, and the ruling party, which is a situation that has bred resentment and political competition between the Somali Issas and the Afars. Because a certain number of Afar still wishes to reunite with their brethren in the region, there is a level of uncertainty concerning the Afar. Yet, there is no united regional movement fighting for this cause, and support amongst the Afar for militant organizations like FRUD seems to be waning in the early 2000s....
WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean consists of four technical divisions headed by directors reporting to Deputy Regional Director/Regional Director. They are: Health Protection and Promotion (DHP), Health Systems and Services Development (DHS), Communicable Disease Control (DCD), General Management (DAF). There are two departments in the office of the Assistant Regional Director and they report directly to the Assistant Regional Director. The two departments are Knowledge Management & Sharing and Policy & Strategy Support. Five priority programmes are supervised by the Regional Directory/Deputy Regional Director while reporting through their respective divisional directors. The priority programmes are the Tobacco Free Initiative, Roll Back Malaria, Stop TB, Community-based Initiatives, Women in Health and Development. Further, the regional office runs a special programmes on Polio Eradication, which reports directly to the Regional Director. Another is the UNAIDS Inter-Country Programme. It gives support to the development of an expanded response to HIV/AIDS through the coordinated action of the UN theme groups on HIV/AIDS as well as the process of national strategic planning; collaborates with EMRO in the joint response to HIV/AIDS at the regional and country level; strengthens partnerships with UNAIDS cosponsers through joint regional initiatives in HIV/AIDS priority areas.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986. The ultimate goal of IGAD is to achieve economic integration and sustainable development for the region. In order for IGAD to play its proper role in regional and continental integration and be recognised as a suitable vehicle for promoting development in the region, it must address the following objectives:-
Promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macro-economic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields;
Harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, services, and people within the region.
Create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment;
Initiate and promote programmes and projects to achieve regional food security and sustainable development of natural resources and environment protection, and encourage and assist efforts of Member States to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their consequences;
Develop a coordinated and complementary infrastructure, in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy in the region;
Promote peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue;
Mobilize resources for the implementation of emer#gency, short-term, medium-term and long-term programmes within the framework of regional cooperation;
Facilitate, promote and strengthen cooperation in research development and application in science and technology.
It would be hard to conceive of two States that offer greater contrasts than
Somalia and Eritrea: the former, a collapsed State for over two decades, with no
functional national institutions; the latter, possessing the most highly centralized,
militarized and authoritarian system of government on the African continent. From a
sanctions monitoring perspective, however, the two countries present very similar
challenges: in both cases, power is concentrated in the hands of individuals rather
than institutions and is exercised through largely informal and often illicit networks
of political and financial control. Leaders in both countries often depend more
heavily on political and economic support from foreign Governments and diaspora
networks than from the populations within their own borders. And both countries —
in very different ways — serve as platforms for foreign armed groups that represent a
grave and increasingly urgent threat to peace and security in the Horn and East
More than half of Somali territory is controlled by responsible, comparatively
stable authorities that have demonstrated, to varying degrees, their capacity to
provide relative peace and security to their populations. Without exception, the
administrations of Somaliland, Puntland, Gaalmudug, and “Himan iyo Heeb”
evolved independently of centralized State-building initiatives, from painstaking,
organic local political processes. Much of Galguduud region is controlled by anti-Al-
Shabaab clan militias loosely unified under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a
(ASWJ), but lacks a functional authority. Consolidation of and cooperation between
such entities represents the single most effective strategy for countering threats like
extremism and piracy, while expanding peace and security in Somalia....
The recent political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa region have exposed growing concerns about conflict risk, political stability, and reform prospects across its societies. Given the prevalence of oil and gas resource endowments in the region, which a voluminous literature suggests can be associated with adverse development consequences, this paper examines the interplay between their associated rents and political economy trajectories. The contribution of the paper is threefold: first, to examine the quantitative evidence of violent conflict in the region since 1960; second, to provide a nuanced review of the regional case study literature on the relationship between resource endowments, political stability, and conflict risk; and third, to assess how prospective political transitions have implications for the World Bank Group's work in the region on public sector management and private sector development. The authors find that resources and regimes have intersected to provide stability and limited violent conflict in the region, but that these development patterns have yielded a set of policy choices and development patterns that are proving increasingly brittle and unsustainable. A major institutional challenge for reforms will be to consolidate a requisite degree of inter-temporal credibility and stability in these regimes, while expanding inclusiveness in state-society relations....
May 18, 2011 Nordic Africa Institute // Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
This Policy Note focuses on the gendered consequences of the militarisation of the Horn of Africa. Despite being in different ‘moments’ of conflict, the countries of this region share features of extreme social, economic and political violence, which impact negatively on their citizens. Protracted refugee and refugee-like conditions, extreme disinvestment in social programmes, increasing militarisation and political repression adversely affect women, thereby further entrenching gender disparities. Concerted national and international efforts and resources should support local democratic initiatives to find political solutions to these protracted conflicts and advance the struggle against sexual and gender-based violence and discrimination....
April 13, 2011 Center for Strategic and International Studies
National security is normally seen in terms of military strength and internal security operations against extremists and insurgents. The upheavals that began in Tunis, and now play out from Pakistan to Morocco,. have highlighted the fact that national security is measured in terms of the politics, economics, and social tensions that shape national stability as well. It is all too clear that the wrong kind of internal security efforts, and national security spending that limits the ability to meet popular needs and expectations can do as much to undermine national security over time as outside and extremist threats.
It is equally clear that calls for democracy are at best only the prelude to dealing with critical underlying problems, pressures, and expectations. It is far from certain that even successful regime change can evolve into functional democracies and governance. Countries with no political parties and experienced leaders, with no history of checks and balances in government, with weak structure of governance led by new political figures with no administrative experience, will often descend into chaos, extremism, or a new round of authoritarianism. Even the best governments, however, are unlikely to change an economy and national infrastructure in less than half a decade, and existing demographic pressures will inevitably go on for at least the next decade....
March 28, 2011 Nordic Africa Institute // Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
Somalia has engendered the policy debate on the extent of the spread of transnational Islamist Jihadist groups in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and their consequences for peace and security across the region. These concerns are justified given the emergence since the late 1980s of extremist groups such as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement and the Somali Jihadist Islamist groups of the likes of Al-Ittihad, the Islamic Courts Union and currently Al Shabab. The leaders and fighters of these groups relocated to the HOA after the defeat of the Taliban following the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan. The operations of these transnational Islamist groups within and across the countries of the Horn pose serious challenges to the region and beyond....