August 1, 2012
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The cases of successful breakthrough examined in this study are the Soviet Union in 1991 and Russia in 1993, Poland in 1989, Serbia in 2000, Ukraine in 2004, Indonesia by 1999, Chile in 1988, and South Africa by 1996. Cases of failed and then ultimately successful democratic transition are Ghana by 2000, Mexico by 2000, South Korea by 1987, and Turkey by 1983. Finally, the cases of failed transition examined are Algeria in 1991, Iran in 1979, China in 1989, and Azerbaijan in 2005.
Ten domestic influences were found to be common to each of the successful cases of democratic breakthrough examined in this study, including incremental reform victories preceding breakthrough attempts, the presence of coherent oppositions, economic distress and poor service delivery, rising expectations and increasing levels of literacy and education, mass mobilization, a growing influence of civic actors, preservation of independent information flows, reform offers by regimes that only embolden oppositions, robust “get out the vote” and “protect the vote” efforts, and breakthroughs that are largely free from violence.
Seven types of external influence were identified as influential, including passive factors, such as economic shocks, diffusion, and the influence of norms and ideas; and active factors, such as direct democracy aid, diplomatic influence, economic influence, and reputational influence.
Even though all of these domestic factors and most of the external ones featured in every successful case of breakthrough, the impact of these precipitants varied in influence from case to case....
January 12, 2012
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Over the past few years there has been a resurgence of interest in employing preventive tools to thwart the outbreak and escalation of violent conflict. This paper looks at the state of and challenges ahead for preventive diplomacy in four different regions of the world: Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia.
As Francesco Mancini, IPI's Senior Director of Research, noted in the paper's introduction, the instruments of preventive diplomacy are more cost-effective than the deployment of a peacekeeping operation and can avert the loss of innocent lives and prevent the devastating consequences produced by internal displacement and economic upheaval. It remains a key priority for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who has called it “one of the smartest investments [the UN] can make.”
Additionally, Mr. Mancini wrote that the preventive diplomacy field has become increasingly crowded, and now comprises a vast array of international, national, and local actors. Furthermore, this new wave of prevention is no longer primarily externally driven. Local actors have become more proactive in expanding their roles in support of preventive initiatives within their own countries.
Contents:
Introduction
by Francesco Mancini, International Peace Institute
Preventive Diplomacy in Africa: Adapting to New Realities
by Fabienne Hara, International Crisis Group
Optimizing Preventive Diplomacy Tools: A Latin American Perspective
by Sandra Borda, Universidad de Los Andes
Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia
by Jim Della-Giacoma, International Crisis Group
Optimizing Preventive Diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula
by Leon Sigal, Social Science Research Council...
July 18, 2011
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
As the number of defectors from North Korea arriving in
the South has surged in the past decade, there is a growing
understanding of how difficult it would be to absorb a
massive flow of refugees. South Korea is prosperous and
generous, with a committed government and civil society,
and yet refugees from the North almost all fail to integrate
or thrive. Part of this is the change in the people coming;
it is no longer just senior officials and fighter pilots who
were useful and privileged propaganda tools. Nowadays
many are women who have endured terrible deprivation
in the North and abuse on their way to the South. Reconfiguring
programs for defectors to take account of this
change is essential if new defectors are to find a place in
their new home.
The heart of the issue is humanitarian: those who arrive in
the South are often fleeing material deprivation and political
persecution and under South Korean law must be accepted
and helped. But as with all humanitarian issues, it
is complicated by politics. Defectors have been used by
both sides. The South once rewarded them with wealth
and public regard but that changed when rapprochement
with the North began in the late 1990s. Defectors became
something of an embarrassment, and policies to help them
did not keep up with the numbers and types of people
arriving.
As the difficulties of absorbing North Koreans become
clear, the South is also wrestling with the possibility that
it one day might have to handle a vast outflow of refugees
from a collapsing North. The two sides of the Demilitarised
Zone have diverged so much in economics, politics,
language and social organisation that the people are now
strangers to each other. South Korean law and opinion
from some quarters would likely demand a rapid unification,
but economic and social realities suggest such a move
could be catastrophic. The difficulties of handling just over
20,000 refugees over a few decades should be a warning
to those who wish to encourage the collapse of the North
rather than a more gentle integration....
April 4, 2011
EarthRights International
Abstract:
This briefer provides up-to-date information on the Burma-China gas and oil pipelines. Through firsthand accounts, leaked documents, and publicly available information, EarthRights International analyzes corporate responsibility and accountability with respect to the pipelines, according to international laws and standards, and Burmese law. It discusses how to mitigate harmful impacts and improve the benefits for the people of Burma, and concludes with practical recommendations for key stakeholders....
March 3, 2011
Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung
Abstract:
The following remarks are from a lecture given by Dr. Kongdan Oh at the 1st RINSA-Konrad Adenauer Foundation Internatio-nal Conference “European and Asian Perspectives on International Security Policies”, organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in cooperation with the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA), Korea National Defense University (KNDU) , February 15, 2011 in Seoul, South Korea:
The two Koreas have suffered through a long history of military confrontation, and there is little reason to expect that relations will improve in the near future. Over the last few years both Koreas have strengthened their armed forces, and thanks to the 2010 North Korean attacks in the West Sea, this military buildup is likely to continue in the years ahead.
The motivation for North Korea to engage in active confrontation continues, and may even be increased, and the resources that could be employed in those confrontations are becoming more deadly.
The incompatibility of the political, economic, and social systems of the two Koreas is a continuing source of ill will. Military confrontation is an extension of political confrontation. Until the political system of North Korea changes, South Korea’s best hope for peace is to limit the North’s employment of its military forces in active engagements....
Northeast Asia 
