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Abstract: If current developments are any indicator, the long road to economic integration on either side of the Taiwan Straits has commenced. In a first of its kind, a sixty member delegation led by Chen Yunlin, Chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) visited Taiwan from November 3-7, 2008 to hold talks with his counterpart Chiang Pin-kung, Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). ARATS and SEF are two non-governmental organisations authorised by China and Taiwan in the early 1990s to examine the entire gamut of cross-Strait relations. ARATS takes its brief from the Taiwan Office of the State Council in Beijing, while the SEF is guided by the Mainland Affairs Council, a cabinet level agency that deliberates policies towards the mainland in Taipei. Before his current designation as Chairman of ARATS, Chen Yunlin was heading the powerful Taiwan Office at the State Council.
Four agreements were signed during the course of the contentious visit – on direct flights, direct sea transport, the postal services and food safety. With June 22, 2009 set as a date for starting direct passenger flights between the two sides, the air transport agreement, while falling short of an ‘open skies policy’, increases the number of chartered direct flights from 38 to 108 each week. Hong Kong and Macau will continue as transit points for passenger flights. By this agreement Taiwan hopes to attract tourists from the mainland on a regular basis. The agreement on food safety was necessitated by the ‘melamine incident’ in China that has led to a worldwide recall of dairy products and pet food produced on the mainland. The ‘melamine incident’ has made distributors and bakeries suffer huge losses in lost sales in Taiwan and there are proposals calling for the mainland to compensate for the losses incurred.
According to the China Post published from Taipei, the Chairman of the SEF, Chiang pin-Kung portrayed the agreements as “getting the distance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait ever closer not only substantially but also in form.” ARATS and SEF also agreed to have a systematic dialogue process every six months. Three agreements – on direct flights to the mainland, direct sea transport and direct mail, are expected to go into effect within six weeks after they are ratified by the Legislative Yuan in Taipei.
Abstract: U.S.-Taiwan relations have undergone important changes, sparked in part by the
increasing complexity of Taiwan’s democratic political environment and the
continued insistence of Beijing that the separately ruled Taiwan is a part of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, elected on
March 22, 2008, in a surprisingly broad electoral victory, has moved quickly to repair
Taiwan’s relations with the PRC. Since President Ma assumed office on May 20,
2008, Taiwan-PRC talks have resumed for the first time since 1998. The first set of
talks resulted in establishment of regular direct weekend charter flights. Taiwan also
has made other concessions, such as lifting long-standing caps on Taiwan investment
in the PRC and giving a lower profile to Taiwan’s bids for participation in U.N.
specialized agencies. Opponents of the government’s plans have said that President
Ma’s moves to improve cross-strait relations have been too rapid, too unilateral, and
have compromised Taiwan’s sovereignty and placed its economic security in
jeopardy.
President Ma also has sought to address any annoyances in Taiwan-U.S.
relations arising from the former Chen Administration. Throughout his tenure from
2000-2008, President Chen Shui-bian, a member of the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), pursued the position that Taiwan already “is an independent, sovereign
country.” This position was highly objectionable to Beijing and problematic for many
aspects of U.S. policy, which is based on vague “one-China” policy formulations.
Term-limited, Chen was required to step down in May 2008. Since then he has been
fighting a growing financial scandal that erupted during his presidency involving
allegations of money-laundering and corruption by his administration and members
of his family.
In addition to its U.N. bid, the Taiwan government also is seeking to raise its
international profile in other ways involving the United States. Taiwan is seeking to
be removed from the U.S. Special 301 “Watch List” (its inclusion connotes problems
with intellectual property rights, or IPR) by making significant IPR improvements.
It also is seeking to qualify for the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which
eliminates some visa requirements for qualified countries. The Taiwan government
also continues to place a high priority on obtaining a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade
Agreement (FTA); U.S.-Taiwan trade discussions to date have been held under a
1994 Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA).
Abstract: The 2008 Taiwan presidential election has brought with it the hope of a new era in cross-strait relations. The 2000 election and especially the 2004 reelection of Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan's president dramatically changed the cross-strait geopolitical landscape and put cross-strait dialogue, particularly on confidence-building measures (CBMs) on the back burner. With the change in government in Taipei in 2008, the opportunity for a new era in cross-strait relations once again presents itself. The now-ruling Kuomingtang (KMT) party has attached a high priority to improving cross-strait relations under President Ma Ying-jeou's "three nos" policy of "no independence, no unification, and no use of force." The tacit acceptance by both sides of the "1992 consensus," under which both sides essentially agreed to a "one-China, different interpretations" policy, provides a new opportunity in cross-strait relations if Taiwan and China show the political wisdom, courage, and maturity to step across this threshold together. It was in anticipation of this prospective new era that China specialist Bonnie Glaser from the Center for Strategic and International Studies led a team of experts in April 2008 to both Taipei and Beijing to examine the prospects for cross-strait CBMs. Glaser and trip rapporteur Brad Glosserman from Pacific Forum CSIS have prepared this highly useful report summarizing key observations and insights obtained during the team's visit as they captured the changing atmosphere.
Abstract: The West's tepid response to Russia's recent invasion of Georgia sends a dangerous message to Asian democracies who have long depended upon support from the United States to protect them from regional menaces. Lack of pronounced U.S. support for its Georgian ally may lead China and other autocratic powers in Asia to infer that the American defense of global liberalization is mere rhetoric. When autocracy sneezes, Asia catches cold. Russia's naked power grab in the Caucasus will have global repercussions, nowhere more so than in Asia. While Europe now contemplates a return to long-term tension on Russia's southwestern borders, Moscow's act of war will have lasting effects far from the Black Sea, namely the threat to democratic trends in Asia, and the bolstering of China's global position.
The struggle for freedom in Asia has changed millions of lives, and yet is an unfinished battle. Asia's young democracies, from Mongolia to Taiwan, are no doubt chilled by Georgia's plight. The naked use of force against a sovereign, democratic state by a gargantuan rival sends a message hard to miss. Whatever the pretext, be it natural resources, separatist movements, or old territorial disputes, the reassertion of might over right threatens the political gains of the past decades that have helped Asia become the most vibrant region on earth. Anti-liberal forces at home in these smaller nations will take comfort from the reversion to a machtpolitik world, while other national elites may well be willing to compromise their freedoms to maintain their economic privileges.
Abstract: A new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 17 nations finds that majorities in only nine of them believe that al Qaeda was behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. In no country does a majority agree on another possible perpetrator, but in most countries significant minorities cite the US government itself and, in a few countries, Israel. These responses were given spontaneously to an open-ended question that did not offer response options. On average, 46 percent say that al Qaeda was behind the attacks while 15 percent say the US government, seven percent Israel, and seven percent some other perpetrator. One in four say they do not know. WPO_911_Sep08_graph.jpgGiven the extraordinary impact the 9/11 attacks have had on world affairs, it is remarkable that seven years later there is no international consensus about who was behind them," comments Steven Kull, director of WorldPublicOpinion.org.
Abstract: Following what was essentially an agreed script to deal first with the “easy” (economic) steps and only later with the more difficult (political and security) ones, when the two “authorized” organs—Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)—met in Beijing in June after a hiatus of 10 years, they quickly agreed to begin weekend cross-Strait passenger charter flights in early July and Mainland tourist travel to Taiwan two weeks later. Though during the first several weeks under the new arrangements the number of PRC tourists was disappointingly small, optimistic projections indicated growth after the Beijing Olympics concluded.
Despite some glitches, the atmospherics surrounding Taiwan’s participation in those Olympics tended to bolster a sense of cross-Strait momentum, with the PRC showing flexibility on use of a name for the Taiwan team while Taipei accepted compromises on other matters. Various senior Taiwan visitors at the games were accorded VIP treatment and, in meetings with Hu Jintao, both sides reaffirmed mutual commitments to sustaining upward momentum into the future. At the same time, the opposition DPP engaged in a relentless series of attacks on Ma Ying-jeou’s cross-Strait policies, charging that he was not only placing Taiwan’s economic fortunes in Beijing’s hands but that he was preemptively ceding Taiwan’s sovereignty by his handling of the Olympics issues and his proposal to seek “meaningful participation” in UN specialized agencies rather than applying for UN membership. In light of what appears to be a metastasizing scandal over Chen Shui-bian’s mishandling of various funds, there was some question whether this barrage would wane, at least for awhile, as the party sought to recover its equilibrium. However, the decision to participate in 30 August anti-Ma demonstrations suggests that the DPP will try not to allow the Chen scandal to put it off stride.
Abstract: The Russian attack on Georgia sent ripples of alarm through Europe and the United States. Irrespective of arguments over who started the conflict and who is responsible, the West got the message: Russia expects to dominate the states of the former Soviet Union, and we can expect years of jockeying for influence in those states, with attendant tensions.
Americans and Europeans are not the only ones who have been watching with interest. In Asia—particularly Taiwan—people are wondering what events in the Caucasus may portend about their own security.
Like Georgia, Taiwan lies on the periphery of a major power, in this case China, growing in strength in recent years. Russia’s designs for Georgia are not absolutely clear, but with regard to Taiwan, China is unambiguous in its assertion of sovereignty and its intention to absorb it in the long-run.
In both cases, the policy of the United States is central to the calculations of all the players. The United States leads plans to bring Georgia into NATO. With respect to Taiwan, U.S. security interests are of much longer standing, and the assumption of a U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan in case of attack is one of the foundations of security and stability in Asia. It is no wonder that many Taiwanese watched the events in Georgia with deep concern about their own future, and what these events say about the reliability of U.S. defense assurances.
What are the lessons of the Russia–Georgia crisis for Taiwan, and for U.S. policy toward Taiwan?
Abstract: Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition. When such competition entails military confrontation or war, the pressure to escalate can become intense due to the potential cost of losing conflicts of deadly force. Cold War–era thinking about escalation focused on the dynamics of bipolar, superpower confrontation and strategies to control it. Today's security environment, however, demands that the United States be prepared for a host of escalatory threats involving not only long-standing nuclear powers, but also new, lesser nuclear powers and irregular adversaries, such as insurgent groups and terrorists. This examination of escalation dynamics and approaches to escalation management draws on historical examples from World War I through Somalia in the early 1990s. It reveals that, to manage the risks of escalatory chain reactions in future conflicts, military and political leaders will need to understand and dampen the mechanisms of deliberate, accidental, and inadvertent escalation. Informing the analysis are the results of two modified Delphi exercises, which focused on a potential conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan and a potential conflict between states and nonstate actors in the event of a collapse of Pakistan's government.
Abstract: This paper quantifies the impact of terrorism and conflicts on income per capita growth in Asia for 1970–2004. Our panel estimations show that transnational terrorist attacks had a significant growth-limiting effect. Transnational terrorism reduces growth by crowding in government expenditures. An internal conflict has the greatest growth concern, about twice that of transnational terrorism. For developing Asian countries, intrastate and interstate wars have a much greater impact than terrorism does on the crowding-in of government spending.
Policy recommendations indicate the need for rich Asian countries to assist their poorer neighbors in coping with the negative growth consequences of political violence. Failure to assist may result in region-wide repercussions. Conflict and terrorism in one country can create production bottlenecks with region-wide economic consequences. International and nongovernmental organizations as well as developed Western countries and regions could assist at-risk Asian countries with attack prevention and post-attack recovery.
This study has six purposes. First, and foremost, we present panel estimates for a sample of 42 Asian countries to quantify the impact of terrorism and conflicts on income per capita growth for 1970–2004. Panel estimation methods control for country-specific and timespecific unobserved heterogeneity. Second, we distinguish the influence of terrorism on economic growth from that of internal and external conflicts. Third, these influences are investigated for cohorts of developed and developing countries to ascertain whether development can better allow a country to absorb the impact of political violence. Fourth, econometric estimations relate violence-induced growth reductions to two pathways— reduced investment and increased government expenditures. Fifth, a host of diagnostic and sensitivity tests to support our empirical specifications. Last, we draw some policy conclusions.
Abstract: Le 13 juin 2008, sous l’impulsion du nouveau président taiwanais Ma Ying-jeou, la Chine et Taiwan ont relancé le train des négociations en signant deux nouveaux accords qui amorcent la reprise des « liaisons directes ». Du côté des autorités taiwanaises, le choix de reprendre les négociations avec la Chine découle avant tout de considérations économiques et stratégiques afin d'éviter tout conflit armé. L'ambition du nouveau président est aussi d'obtenir enfin de Pékin un "espace international" et en tout premier lieu la possibilité d'être représenter dans certaines organisations internationales.
Abstract: Alors que le quotidien du mois de juin demeure terriblement ténu en d’autres
régions d’Asie, l’Extrême-Orient semble ces temps-ci se complaire sur le
devant de l’actualité asiatique : tantôt pour en tirer quelque honneur (Chine -
Taïwan), susciter de l’espoir (Corée du nord—USA), tantôt pour révéler mécontentement
et désillusion (Corée du sud ; Japon).
Abstract: Publiée par le Réseau des femmes autochtones d’Asie (Asian Indigenous Women’s Network, AIWN) et l’Alliance des peuples autochtones de l’archipel (AMAN: Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), de concert avec Droits et Démocratie.
Cette trousse d’information met en évidence le travail accompli par les femmes autochtones, qui agissent aux échelons local, national et international afin de faire respecter leurs droits.
Cette trousse est une adaptation du document << Femmes autochtones des Amériques >>.
Abstract: Un printemps sous le signe du scrutin. Il n’est pas qu’en France (municipales) ou en Espagne (législatives) que cette fin d’hiver inspire l’électeur épris de devoir civique. A l’instar des élections législatives du weekend dernier en Malaisie (tout en demeurant majoritaire à l’Assemblée, le parti au pouvoir… depuis l’indépendance en 1957, affiche son plus mauvais résultat en un demi-siècle), du scrutin local se déroulant ce jour dans les provinces orientales du Sri Lanka (« libérées » l’été dernier du joug de la guérilla sécessionniste tamoule du LTTE), les semaines, les mois à venir vont voir défiler, en cette lointaine Asie, un florilège de rendez-vous politiques et électoraux . Si la majorité de ces scrutins n’emportera de conséquences qu’au niveau local ou national, il en est en revanche une poignée qui, de part l’importance ou la sensibilité de « l’enjeu », dépassent pourtant le stade
strictement national, ainsi que le suggère le cas taïwanais ci-après.
Abstract: The election campaigns in Taiwan continue to move along with all of the surprise twists and turns one might have predicted. The decision of the Central Election Commission (CEC) to opt for a “one-step†ballot at the
time of the LY election on 12 January—handing out all ballots, including for candidates and referenda, at the same time—has created great turmoil. KMT authorities, who control 18 out of 23 localities, pledged not to go along with the CEC decision, which in turn triggered a spate of harsh comments from all sides. Included among those was one from President Chen Shui-bian, who seemed to threaten martial law. Chen later
dissociated himself from that idea, but the firestorm he set off did not dissipate and he did not disown other suggestions that he said merited “serious consideration,†such as replacing election officials in those places that refuse to obey the CEC or invalidating or delaying the LY election.
Abstract: Taiwan's free-riding on the United States for military defense coupled with its increasingly aggressive call for independence could drag the United States into a catastrophic war with China, finds a policy analysis report issued by the Cato Institute.
Abstract: This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan,
or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation.
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC)
instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the
August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" made to
Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. In addition, the United
States has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in
1995-1996. However, there is no defense treaty or alliance with Taiwan.
Abstract: This British House of Commons paper reports on trade, security, politics and governance in East Asia with specific reference to the rise of China as the dominant regional power.
Abstract: In analyzing China's new approach to conflict prevention and management,
this paper examines Chinese foreign policy toward two flashpoints in East
Asia - the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. It argues that there has
been an evolution in terms of Beijing's approaches toward these two
international crises over time. One can discern three different approaches.
First, historical legacies have always played a critical role in the formulation
of China's policy calculations and the Korea and Taiwan issues are no
exception. I call this the "history-embedded" perspective. Second, with the
recent rise of China's economic and political might, nationalism in China has
correspondingly been on the rise. National interests have been further
prioritized over ideological considerations. This approach can be called
"national interest-driven" foreign policy. Third, Beijing has become
increasingly confident not only about its strengths in the world arena but
also in its ability to coordinate with related powers regarding their various
interests. This approach can be called "co-management of international
crises" with major powers. This paper argues that until recently China has
emphasized the first two sets of considerations, but seems to be gradually
moving toward a new approach in terms of conflict prevention, namely comanagement
with major powers.
Abstract: xe2x80x98Human securityxe2x80x98 is clearly a growing and evolving
concept in the discourse of global security. Over the last decade,
with increasing attention from the political and academic
community, the concept of human security has developed into a
major issue of debate as it transcends the traditional concept of
state security and gives individual security precedence over
territorial security.
Within East Asia, the concept of human security has not
yet been established, and thus has not been considered as a
security concern. East Asia itself is a vast region, stretching from
Korea, Japan and China in the north to Myanmar, Indonesia and
Singapore in the south, including at least fifteen countries where
about 40 per cent of the world population lives. The region as a
whole has experienced many important and fundamental
changes since the 1960s, not only in terms of economic growth
but also in terms of political and social transformation. It is also
the centre of major concerns about human rights abuses, poverty,
refugee problems, human and drug trafficking, HIV/AIDS,
environmental degradation and food insecurity, all of which
increasingly threaten the security and order of East Asia.
Abstract: Taiwan is primarily a destination for women and girls, mainly from the People's Republic of China P.R.C., who are trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Some trafficking victims from the P.R.C., Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam are forced or coerced into the commercial sex trade or lured to Taiwan by fraudulent offers of employment or marriage. Some Taiwan women are also trafficked to Japan for sexual exploitation. Foreign victims of trafficking who are not of P.R.C. origin are provided with shelter and counseling and are generally quickly repatriated.
Abstract: Le 15 aoxc3xbbt 2005, le Gouvernement indonésien et
le Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (mouvement de libération
d'Aceh) ont signé un mémorandum d'accord
confirmant leur volonté de trouver une solution
pacifique, globale et durable au conflit qui sévit dans
la province de Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Il est Ã
espérer que l'application de cet accord permettra le
rapatriement dans la sécurité et la dignité des
habitants de la province qui vivent actuellement Ã
l'étranger, et en particulier en Malaisie, oxc3xb9 quelque
20 000 d'entre eux sont recensés par l'UNHCR.
L'Organisation se tient prxc3xaate à venir en aide à toutes
les parties concernées, dans la limite de ses responsabilités
et de ses compétences.
Toujours en Indonésie, l'UNHCR a participé Ã l'intervention
interorganisations menée dans la province
de Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam à la suite du tremblement
de terre et du tsunami survenus dans l'océan
Indien le 26 décembre 2004. Aprxc3xa8s s'xc3xaatre retiré
d'Aceh à la fin de la phase d'urgence, enmars 2005,
l'UNHCR est retourné dans la région en juin 2005,
à l'invitation du Gouvernement indonésien. Ses
efforts porteront principalement sur l'aide à la
réhabilitation et à la reconstruction dans la province
de Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam et sur l'xc3xaele de
Nias, au nord de Sumatra, oxc3xb9 une assistance immédiate
a été fournie à quelque 20 000 personnes victimes
du tremblement de terre du 28 mars 2005.
Abstract: The current cross-Strait situation is critical. The Taiwanese President Chen
Shuibian is in his second term. His periodical but consistent provocative
moves challenge the status quo. Beijing is increasingly concerned with
Taiwan's drifting toward permanent separation. The relations between both
sides are getting worse and worse. The lack of trust dilutes the political will
to find a peaceful solution and increases the risk of a non-peaceful or
military solution to the problem. Both sides are engaged in preparations for
possible military actions across the Strait. Therefore, studies on conflict
prevention and maybe also conflict management across the Taiwan Strait
have special significance at this time. In addition, confidence building
measures are urgently needed in such a situation.
Abstract: CNAC's Center for Strategic Studies sponsored a day-long conference, "The United States Army in Asia: Legacies of the Past, Present Challenges, and Prospects for the Future," as part of the U.S. Army's Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series. The conference featured presentations by scholars, former military officials, and researchers from CNAC as well as The American Enterprise Institute, The Brookings Institution, The Congressional Research Service, The Heritage Foundation, The Hudson Institute, and The U.S. Army Military History Institute
Abstract: On 14 March China approved a law that codifies its long-standing threat to use military force if Taiwan formally declares independence. The measure could touch off a destabilising action-reaction cycle that could spin out of control and draw China into unnecessary armed conflict with the United States over Taiwan.
