September 1, 2010
Crisis States Research Centre // London School of Economics // Development Studies Institute
Abstract:
This paper considers the reasons behind Zambia's avoidance of civil war, despite persistent regional instability, focusing on the inclusiveness of the country's 'elite bargain', i.e. the inter-group distribution of access to positions of state power. The author hypothesizes that, although colonial rule left Zambia with high levels of social fragmentation - evident in pronounced tribal, linguistic and class cleavages - the country's post-colonial governments have all managed to accommodate the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation by forging and maintaining inclusive elite bargains. The paper argues that this achievement can be directly related to the avoidance of civil war since independence in 1964....
August 25, 2010
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
About 150 leading policymakers, scholars, diplomats, and nongovernmental organization (NGO)
leaders participated in a conference entitled “Preventing Violent Conflict: Principles, Policies and
Practice,” organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention on
July 1, 2010. This Peace Brief summarizes the presentations from each panel discussion. The central
focus was on the unique challenges and opportunities associated with preventing the initial onset
of large-scale violence, i.e. primary prevention. Conflict prevention is widely endorsed in principle—including in the 2010 U.S. National
Security Strategy— but too rarely put into serious practice. It is thus important to narrow the
gap between rhetoric and action in preventing violent conflicts.
The interest of elites in exploiting ethnic differences for political gains, the absence of well-established
mechanisms for prevention in certain regions, and the destabilizing role of external
meddling continue to impede the development of effective prevention strategies.
Yet, much progress has been made in the field of conflict prevention, both at the normative
and the operational levels.
As a crucial actor in conflict prevention, the United States should work with others to forge
a consistent approach to countries at risk, urge countries to deal with arbitrary borders
through negotiation rather than violence, and support greater cooperation between regional
organizations....
August 23, 2010
RAND Corporation
Abstract:
Deterrence of terrorism is best approached as part of a broader effort to influence elements of
the terrorist system. Although efforts to deter or otherwise influence will only sometimes succeed,
to forgo attempting influence because of uncertainty would be to squander the possibility
of extremely valuable effects (e.g., averting a terrorist mass-casualty attack). That is, deterrence
and other influence efforts are desirable because of their upside potential rather than
the certainty or expectation of good results. This paper selectively reviews prior work on such
matters and then goes on to argue that a useful way to find influence stratagems with high
upside potential is to construct plausible alternative models of adversary decisionmaking and
behavior—models that also allow for variability. A stratagem found worthless if assessed with
a best estimate of adversary behavior might instead look attractive when viewed with plausible
alternative models. This is significant because best estimates are often wrong when made
about people in different cultures and settings being viewed emotionally from afar. Further,
the mind-sets and behaviors of terrorists—like those of people more generally—vary with circumstances
and recent history. Thus, opening our minds to possibilities can be valuable and
alternative models can help. To protect against wishful thinking and other problems, of course,
a proposed stratagem must also be assessed by its cost and potential side effects. This paper builds on a 2002 monograph (Davis and Jenkins, 2002) and a good deal of more
recent research. It has been most influenced by lessons from a recent project reviewing the
social science of terrorism (Davis and Cragin, 2009), but also by a book describing the perspectives
of participants in al-Qaeda and related movements (Stout, Huckabey, and Schindler,
2008), a book on terrorism and political violence (Gupta, 2008), a new edition of an overview
of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006), a book on prospects for nuclear terrorism (Jenkins, 2008),
several sources drawing on Israeli experience (Doron, 2004; Ganor, 2005; Bar, 2008), and a
recent paper focused on homeland security (Morral and Jackson, 2009)....
August 23, 2010
The Stanley Foundation
Abstract:
In 2003, more than a decade of civil war had cost more than 250,000 lives, earning Liberia The Economist’s dubious distinction as “the world’s worst place to live.” Seven years later, increasing stability in the country reflects the substantial progress that can be achieved by determined national leadership, active international community engagement, and realistic approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. Central actors in the immediate post-conflict period reflect on lessons learned from the implementation of Liberian disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and security sector reform programs. Rooted in the concepts of human security and building basic state institutions, their approaches reveal telling insights with potential resonance across the diverse spectrum of post-conflict experience....
August 23, 2010
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, highlights the risk of spiralling violence in the south of Kyrgyzstan and the central government’s loss of control over the region. It calls for the Kyrgyz government to support an internationally backed enquiry into the pogroms which took place in May and June 2010 in Jalalabad and in Osh. It also urges the international community to form a united front in calling on the Kyrgyz government to address the root causes of the violence, and in warning the country’s leadership of the dangers of inaction and denial. [...] Successive governments have failed to address ethnic tensions in the south or even to admit their existence. Many features of the 2010 violence strongly resemble the last round of bloody ethnic clashes, in 1990. One of the most striking differences, however, is that twenty years ago, a large number of elite Soviet troops were deployed in the region for six months to normalise the situation. This time, a weaker government facing a greater challenge has refused any external help, unrealistically arguing that it can handle the situation itself. In fact, the government has now lost control of a significant part of southern Kyrgyzstan, where the mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov, publicly rejects the president’s authority. The Kyrgyz government should take a strong public stand against positions of extreme nationalism by prominent national and regional politicians. The government of Kyrgyzstan, as well as donors and supporters, should support a full, open and internationally backed enquiry into the recent pogroms. Given the weakness of the Kyrgyz government, responsibility rests upon the shoulders of the international community. It should play a more forthright role than usual in raising the long-term dangers to Kyrgyzstan of extremism, the need to restore the central government’s political control over the city of Osh, and the urgent necessity of reconciliation between ethnic communities....