The most likely context for our withdrawal will be a relatively peaceful one because those who would most likely interfere with itâ€”the Sunni insurgentsâ€”are largely co-opted at this point for whatever reason. And therein lies the rub. If the Sunnis are indeed converts to the American way, if they are committed to a unified Iraq, however imperfectly conceived, and convinced that workable and acceptable power-sharing arrangements are in place and that their rights as the largest minority in Iraq will be reasonably looked after, then the withdrawal will not lead to an even more vigorous civil war than what we've witnessed so far. In short, a fair amount of security, stability, and in that context, economic progress, will be possible. Iraq will muddle through, U.S. forces will be largely repositioned, regional forces in Iraq will rise to the forefront of the power management structureâ€”centered of course in the north, the center, and the southâ€”and a largely feckless national government will be tolerated until another strong man comes along to challenge the status quo and consolidate power once again in Baghdad, the most likely ultimate result in Iraq. But the U.S. will be gone, our true interests in the region will be once again reasonably secure, and coalition troops and Iraqi citizens will not be dying in the high numbers of recent years.