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Abstract: One of the fundamental impediments to molding the Euro-Atlantic nations
into a more unified and workable security community, as became apparent
early in the deliberations of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, is the
lingering distrust that poisons too many of the region’s key relationships.
For this reason we organized a working group to explore deeper solutions to the challenges of
achieving historical reconciliation between countries divided by deep-seated historical grievances
and of breaking through the long-standing impasse in resolving a number of protracted conflicts
within the region. The two problems have as a common base the pernicious influence of that
underlying mistrust of the other side. In this report, the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative’s Working
Group on Historical Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts offers an approach that goes beyond
traditional diplomacy to get at the root causes of the problem and urges a broader strategy for
engaging society at large, the level at which solutions must be found.
Abstract: The issues of national healing, reconciliation, truth and justice are crucial and significant
for what happens next in countries emerging out of conflicts such as Liberia. Importantly,
these issues constitute a real challenge as well as moral and political dilemmas for
countries that are making a transition from war to peace. The real problem is that while
Truth Commissions have the potential of creating an enabling environment for truth
telling and forgiveness through amnesty, reparations and other things, there are doubts as
to whether people and societies torn asunder by protracted period of war can easily be
reconciled and healed through forgiveness and impunity.
Liberia is no exception to the above. When the decision to establish the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was made at the Accra peace talks and the
Commission was subsequently established in May 2005 by an Act of Legislature, it was
clear that the country was bent on seeking the truth in order to create an enabling
environment for national healing and reconciliation but without necessarily burying
justice.
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The main purpose of this policy brief is to critically examine, and provide a capsule
analysis and nuanced understanding of the context, mandate, reactions and key issues
emerging out of the TRC report and recommendations. Subsequently, the essay puts
forward some recommendations for immediate actions by the Government and people of
Liberia as well as the broader international community of state and non-state actors in
order to facilitate dialogue and informed social debates around the issues emerging out of
the report.
Abstract: The report we present here is the product of two years of effort by a group of former senior officials from government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations who came together as participants in the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative. Our agenda has been to address the future security needs of the Euro-Atlantic region. We set as our goal the development of an intellectual framework for our nations, societies, and peoples to build a security system that will meet the twenty-first-century security challenges that face our region.
Our report sets forth practical steps to begin building this future and calls upon our leaders, governments, and societies to act. As co-chairmen of the Euro-Atlantic Security Commission, we present this report with the endorsement and support of all commission members. We hope that our effort will lead to greater security for all in our region and to our region’s strengthened capacity for global leadership in the promotion of increased stability, safety, and progress in the world beyond.
Abstract: Post-conflict peacebuilding demands concerted efforts from all stakeholders
to ensure its success; particularly, civil society must complement the
capacity of the conflict-weary state. A successful peacebuilding, however,
requires a harmonious relationship between the state and civil society. This
paper analyses state-civil society relations at different phases of Liberia’s
protracted post-conflict peacebuilding process. The paper argues that civil
society groups have played and continue to play important role in the
peacebuilding process in Liberia and therefore need the support of the
Liberian state and the international community to continue their watchdog
role. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the Liberian experience
for other post-conflict states.
Abstract: Police reform in the Palestinian Territories has faced many challenges. Rebuilding the police force in a post-conflict environment is not an easy task, and must take into account the community’s needs in order to build legitimacy. In 2006, the European Union Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support was established to support the short-term objectives of the Palestinian Civil Police and provide longer-term transformational change assistance. This issue paper discusses a number of questions to address gaps in the evaluation of police reform efforts. It concludes with a series of recommendations, but maintains that building legitimate and sustainable institutions will not be possible without a credible Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
Abstract: Conflict Prevention includes a wide range of actions, interventions, programmes,
activities, mechanisms and procedures that address structural risks to prevent the
escalation of tension into violent conflict, the continuation of conflict or the
reoccurrence of armed conflicts in post-conflict situations.1 This in turn broadens and
diversifies the purpose of early warning, which is a tool responsible for data
collection, analysis and communication of the information for conflict prevention. In
2004, the African Union launched the Continental Early Warning System as part of the African Peace and Security Architecture. This was done in
acknowledgement of the effectiveness of conflict prevention, which is proactive than
the traditional reactive system in AU. Now the CEWS has been in place for almost
half a decade.
This paper examines the progress and challenges of this system by
looking at the African Union and other African regional organisations. Key issues to
be discussed include a historical background to the CEWS and commonly contested
issues in the system. Using different facts and the experiences of the regional
organisations, this paper tries to show the challenges and merits of early warning
systems in Africa. It also argues that the early warning systems should be included in
every stage of conflict and explains that the core value of early warning should be the
protection of individuals by the state or by the regional organizations if the state fails
to do so.
Abstract: The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS) is an organization of scholars and students of Africa dedicated to formulating alternative scholarly analysis of U.S. government policy, mobilizing support in the United States on critical current issues related to Africa, developing communication and action networks among scholars in the United States and Africa, and collaborating with other organizations that share our concerns.
Our interdisciplinary approach supports rethinking conventional interpretations of social and economic policy, globalization, development strategies, media representations, and nation building. For three decades, the Concerned African Scholars Bulletin has been a centerpiece of ACAS’s work. It continues to provide timely, relevant and incisive analysis of developments in Africa while promoting alternative views and policies.
Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, internal violence resulting from ethnic and sectarian conflict has erupted in a number of African countries, most notably Somalia, Liberia, Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo. The United Nations, other international and regional organizations, and interested foreign powers first responded to this explosion of internal violence by employing the traditional methods of conflict resolution that had been used with some success to resolve conflicts during the Cold War period.
Many of the leaders of multilateral international and regional organizations, foreign powers, and other interested parties quickly became frustrated by their inability to use these traditional methods to resolve internal conflicts. They therefore concluded that the traditional methods of conflict resolution were insufficient for dealing with internal violence and sought to develop and employ new methods of conflict resolution which involved the use of sanctions, investigations of human rights abuses, the imposition of legal penalties, and the use of military force.
This issue of the Bulletin presents the views of a wide variety of concerned scholars and activists who, although passionate and involved, seek to provide principled and practical perspectives on these questions.
William Minter and Alex de Waal discuss the broad ethical and political issues raised by intervention in African conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Anna Simons, Joost Hiltermann, and Stephen Weissman explore the lessons to be learned from the attempts by the international community to intervene in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi. Herb Howe examines Executive Outcomes - the best known of a number of private security firm that are increasingly active in Africa - and its role in African conflicts. And Adekeye Adebajo looks at the potential for an all-African intervention force, an idea first proposed by Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s.
Articles in this issue include:
1. “Intervention:” The Folly of Formulas | William Minter
2. African Encounters | Alex de Waal
3. Hardly Innocent: Armed Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia | Anna Simons
4. Post-Mortem on the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) | Joost R. Hiltermann
5. Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Burundi | Stephen R. Weissman
6. Executive Outcomes and African Stability | Herb Howe
Abstract: This issue of the Bulletin on health and political violence continues the theme of intervention and conflict presented in issue no. 48/49 (Fall 1997), this time from the perspective of those who suffer the consequences. With conflict in Africa so pervasive--more than twenty countries have been or are involved in recent wars - there is growing recognition that the development business cannot go on as usual, that policy makers have vastly underestimated the extent of war damage, and that planners must take into account the psychic as well as the physical devastation of war.
Articles in this issue include:
1. Reconstructing Health in Post-War Mozambique | Julie Cliff
2. A Critical Comment on “Reconstructing Health in Post-War Mozambique” | Karim Hirji
3. Violence, Gender and Illness in Post-War Mozambique | Robert P. Marlin
4. The Uprooted and the Forgotten | Asma Abdel Halim
5. Women and Conflict in Africa | Meredeth Turnshen
6. Some Reflections Arising from “Women’s War Stories” | Karim Hirji
7. Removing Landmines - One Limb at a Time? | Warren “Bud” Day
8. The Photographer, His Editor, Her Audience, Their Humanitarians: How Rwanda’s Pictures Travel Through the American Psyche | Niranjan S. Karnik
9. Professional Accountability: Lessons from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission | H. Jack Geiger
Abstract: 3 February 2011 was the day when protests in Yemen transformed into a mass movement. On that day a broad group of mainly students and activists calling itself the Youth of 3 February (since referred to itself as Youth of the Revolution) attracted tens of thousands of people to mass protests in the capital Sana’a.
Protests had begun the previous month after the government announced draft constitutional amendments to allow President Ali Abdullah Saleh, head of state since 1978 – first as President of north Yemen and then of unified Yemen – to run for Presidential elections for unlimited terms. But they were also fuelled by frustration at corruption, unemployment and repression of freedoms in the country, and partly inspired by events in Tunisia and Egypt.
The protesters called on President Ali Abdullah Saleh to dismiss the government and corrupt officials, dismiss his son as head of the Republican Guard and Special Forces, dissolve Parliament, appoint a government of national unity, return “embezzled” funds, and resign from the presidency and pledge not to run for office again.
Abstract: A violent standoff in northern Kosovo risks halting Kosovo’s and Serbia’s fragile dialogue and threatens Kosovo’s internal stability and Serbia’s EU candidacy process. Pristina’s push to control the whole territory of the young state, especially its borders with Serbia, and northern Kosovo Serbs’ determination to resist could produce more casualties. Belgrade has lost control and trust of the northern Kosovo Serb community, which now looks to homegrown leaders. The international community, especially the EU and U.S., should encourage Belgrade to accept the government in Pristina as an equal, even if without formal recognition, but not expect it can force local compliance in northern Kosovo. All sides should seek ways to minimise the risk of further conflict, while focusing on implementing what has been agreed in the bilateral technical dialogue. They should build confidence and lay the groundwork for the political talks needed to guide a gradual transformation in northern Kosovo and eventually lead to normal relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
The current flare-up of tensions began on 25 July 2011, when Pristina sent police to two customs gates along the border with Serbia. Local Serbs surrounded the police and forced them to retreat; one officer was killed in an ambush, and a border post was burned. On 16 September, EULEX, the EU rule of law mission, started to airlift Kosovo officials to the border. All roads leading to the customs points were barricaded by Kosovo Serbs intent on obstructing deployment of Kosovo officials. While the roadblocks have generally been peaceful, violence ensued on at least three occasions during the last months of the year, when NATO’s peace enforcement mission (KFOR) attempted to dismantle the barricades, and Kosovo Serbs pushed back. It is perhaps some testament to the general commitment to limiting casualties that while there have been many injuries, only two persons have died.
Abstract: The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations [FSFSPs] provide a framework to guide international actors in achieving better results in the most challenging development contexts. In 2011, the Second FSP Monitoring Survey was conducted in 13 countries: Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo. This followed a baseline survey in 2009 covering six countries [Afghanistan, CAR, DRC, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste]. This synthesis report reflects the overall picture that has emerged from the second survey. International performance against these Fragile States Principles is seriously off-track. Overall, in the thirteen countries under review in 2011, international stakeholder engagement is partially or fully off-track for eight out of ten of the FSPs.
The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations seem to have stimulated relatively limited change in international engagement at the country level since their endorsement by the OECD Development Assistance Committee [DAC] member countries in 2007 and their validation by both development partners1 and partner countries in Accra in 2008. According to the 2011 Survey, development partner practice has not improved significantly to achieve better results. The main message of this report is that a significant gap still exists between policy and practice. The findings of this survey challenge development partners to complement their focus on results, effectiveness and value for money with a focus on the field-level organisational and paradigm changes necessary for achieving better results. In addition, partner countries have underlined the need for stronger mutual accountability frameworks to guide and monitor joint efforts between them and their international counterparts. Such frameworks should be mutually agreed and results-oriented, reflecting the specific and changing needs and priorities of countries in situations of conflict and fragility.
The variation among the countries surveyed means that findings for individual countries may differ significantly from the overall picture. A distinction also needs to be made between the findings for the five countries that volunteered to monitor FSP implementation in 2009 and the eight countries where the monitoring was carried out for the first time in 2011.
Abstract: This paper highlights impediments to effective international responses to attacks on health and education in eastern Burma presented by lack of clarity regarding the meaning of "attacks" within the monitoring and reporting framework established by UN Security Council resolutions 1612 and 1998. In order to address this definitional ambiguity and enable recent developments in the UN Security Council to potentially provide support to communities facing attacks in eastern Burma, this paper argues for interpreting "attacks" in a fashion that is consistent with applicable international humanitarian law. The analysis below concludes that UN-led monitoring, reporting and response pursuant to UNSCRs 1612 and 1998 should include acts by parties to armed conflict that both: a) violate relevant international law; and b) attack or threaten to attack personnel related to schools or medical facilities and/ or destroy, damage or force the closure of a school or medical facility.
Abstract: This report presents primary evidence of attacks on education and health in eastern Burma collected by KHRG during the period February 2010 to May 2011. Section I of this report details KHRG research methodology; Section II analyses general trends in armed conflict and details a loose typology of attacks identified during the reporting period. Section III applies this typology to 16 particularly illustrative incidents, and analyses them in light of relevant international humanitarian law and UN Security Council resolutions 1612, 1882 and 1998. These incidents were selected from a database detailing 59 attacks on civilians documented by KHRG between February 2010 and May 2011.
Abstract: Human rights abuses faced by ethnic communities across rural eastern Burma have continued since November 2010, and are consistent with patterns KHRG has documented since 1992. Drawing from a dataset of 1,270 oral testimonies, sets of images and documentation written and collected over the last year by villagers trained to monitor human rights conditions in their own communities, this report presents information on 17 categories of abuse and quantifies their occurrence across KHRG research areas. By placing recent testimony from villagers in the context of twenty years of abusive practices, this report should make clear that developments since the 2010 elections have neither expanded villagers' options for claiming their human rights, nor addressed the root causes of abuse in rural eastern Burma. External assessments of developments in Burma that ignore local perspectives on continuing human rights abuse thus exclude the input of the most knowledgeable and engaged stakeholders – who also stand to lose the most from inaccurate conclusions drawn without their participation. The testimony presented in the report should thus function as a critique of any attempt to assess changes in Burma that ignores local perspectives, and a call to heed the concerns of rural people who are gauging, on a day-to-day basis, the way past, present and continuing abuse impacts the future for communities in eastern Burma.
Abstract: This brief suggests that those seeking an in-depth understanding of the social and political world need to apply a feminist curiosity – that is, a curiosity about the roles gender plays at all levels of human life, including politics. In other words, since gender is central to all inter-personal relationships and influences much of human activity, it clearly needs to be integral to all attempts to understand these. This includes not only situations on the ground but also at the top level of global politics. Finally, the brief demonstrates the important policy implications of using a gender lens in conflict analysis and suggests the penalties for failing to do this may be severe.
Abstract: Civilian displacement is a common phenomenon in developing countries confronted
with internal conflict. While displacement directly affects forced migrants, it also contributes to
deteriorating labour conditions of vulnerable groups in receiving communities. For the
displaced population, the income losses are substantial, and as they migrate to cities, they
usually end up joining the informal labour force. Qualitative evidence reveals that displaced
women are better suited to compete in urban labour markets, as their labour experience is more
relevant with respect to certain urban low-skilled occupations. Our study uses this exogenous
change in female labour force participation to test how it affects female bargaining power within
the household. Our results show that female displaced women work longer hours, earn similar
wages and contribute in larger proportions to household earnings relative to rural women who
remain in rural areas. However, as measured by several indicators, their greater contribution to
households’ earnings does not strengthen their bargaining power. Most notably, domestic
violence have increased among displaced women. The anger and frustration of displaced
women also increases the level of violence directed at children. Because the children of
displaced families have been the direct victims of conflict and domestic violence, the intragenerational
transmission of violence is highly likely.
Abstract: This paper is about Southern Sudanese IDPs and refugees who, after the 2005 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, chose not to return to their areas of origin, but instead to resettle elsewhere. Rather than
exploring the push and pull factors of this decision, this paper documents the ways in which they have
organised their lives in their places of post-war resettlement. More particularly, it explores their selfemployment
strategies in an institutional context characterised by weak state regulation and high reliance
on self-governance institutions, especially social networks. One observation in particular intrigued us: the
fact that some displaced were more successful than others in making a living in their places of
resettlement. Consequently, uncovering why some individuals and groups were wealthier than others
inspired and structured the research. In order to understand the difference between “networks of survival”
and “networks of accumulation” – a twin phrase we borrowed from Meagher (2006) – it was imperative
to comprehend the economy as a political terrain and to explore the structural position of groups. To this
end it was necessary to complement a social capital perspective with a political economy approach.
Abstract: This paper explores critical aspects of the agency of youngsters in situations of crisis. Throughout
the political-military conflict in Côte d‟Ivoire (2002-2011), the patriotic militias were the locus of
extensive networking and, to the extent that this was informed by political or ideological choices,
vast enterprises of civil society building. In this paper, I focus on the performative and social
dimension of youth militia activity: (a) the sustained attempts by youngsters to insinuate
themselves into the armed forces by „impersonation‟, and (b) the wider and often intricate
processes of networking and hierarchism within which these persistent pursuits of social mobility
took place. Rather than to capture the wider transformations triggered by these processes in
narrow analytical concepts such as „brutalisation‟ and „militianisation‟, this paper considers them
to be the contingent outcome of competencies, mobility, and creativity of youngsters whose
performative, social, and physical trajectories transform public life. This paper thus seeks to make
the point that the long post-war (post-2002), or rather pre-peace, multiplication of militias and
their growing impact on social and political life, constituted a protracted, multifaceted and multisited
process which we can productively begin to disentangle in terms of social mobility albeit of a
juvenile and subaltern kind.
Abstract: Today there are an estimated six million Palestinian refugees. Resolving their plight
has been a core part of the peace agenda in the Middle East since 1948. While
considerable diplomatic effort in the past two decades has centred on reaching a
bilateral Israeli–Palestinian permanent status agreement, implementing any such
agreement will present an equally massive challenge.
Any permanent status agreement that would see the end of conflict would have to
address the moral, legal, and material aspects of the refugee question, including
the provision of durable solutions to ensure permanent national protection and
socio-economic development for the refugees. The vast scale and complexities
involved in implementing a solution for some six million persons residing in more
than five geographical areas following more than 60 years of conflict would render
implementation a major operational task.
Third parties and international agency representatives will be especially critical for
lending political, financial, and logistical support and needed technical expertise in
seeing through the implementation process. Such support and expertise are likely
to be channelled through an ‘implementation mechanism’ (or agreed institutional
arrangement).
The implementation mechanism should account for both dimensions of a
comprehensive solution to the refugee question: repatriation, resettlement and
rehabilitation and reparations (i.e., restitution and compensation), with the former
likely to require significant international resources, policy engagement, and
monitoring and oversight.
Early preparations by the international community in consultation with refugees,
refugee-hosting governments and the parties would benefit an eventual
implementation phase. The contributions of the international community will be
influenced by the agreed design and mandate of the institutional mechanism for
implementation. Preparations should avoid prejudicing any future agreement to be
decided by the parties while anticipating measures that the international community
may need to take in order to facilitate implementation and the policy options with
respect to them.
This paper outlines possible international contributions and their implications based
on wide consultations and reflection on existing technical preparatory activities
produced through Track II initiatives.
Abstract: The deployment of U.S. military advisors to central Africa is potentially the most
significant step in a decade to end the war against the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA.
The comprehensive strategy to end the LRA that U.S. forces should help develop as
a result of their deployment will only have a chance of being successful if American
forces are supplemented by four additional ingredients from the United States and
other supportive countries: troops, transport, intelligence, and a defections strategy, or
TTID for short. This includes additional special forces troops, enhanced transport and
logistics, upgraded intelligence capacities, and a more effective strategy to increase LRA
defections.
If the mission is to succeed, it is essential for the U.S. advisors to stay in the field for a
significant amount of time and be buttressed by TTID support. The LRA has decreased
its attacks by two-thirds over the past six months in an effort to reorganize and lie
low.1 But this is not a sign of LRA weakness. It is part of the group’s historical pattern
of waiting out military incursions and then launching attacks. The LRA are among the
best survivors on the planet—and they could simply be playing a waiting game for the
departure of the U.S. soldiers. If the advisors withdraw prematurely and TTID support is
not given, the LRA will likely reemerge and resume its attacks on civilians.
Despite the U.S. deployment and a new African Union, or AU, initiative, which essentially
is a rehatting of the military operation by the four countries involved under
AU auspices, there is a serious danger of the LRA reorganizing for attacks because of
disturbing trends on both the military and civilian side. On the military side, Uganda
is the main force undertaking operations against the LRA, but its current capacity and
troop numbers—approximately half of what they were in 2010—are inadequate to be
able to pin the group down in the vast territory within which it operates, roughly the
size of Arizona and extending into four countries. Moreover, Uganda’s best soldiers are
deployed as peacekeepers in Somalia. Some 90 percent of LRA attacks over the past six
months have taken place in Congo, but Uganda does not have bases there at the request of the Congolese authorities. The shortage of troops is also hurting civilian protection
efforts, which are in urgent need of a boost. And the existing deployment is hampered
by a lack of mobility and intelligence capacity over the large territory.
Abstract: Since June 2010, the African Union High Level Implementation Panel, or AUHIP, led by
former South African President Thabo Mbeki, has facilitated “Post-Referendum
Arrangements Negotiations” between the Government of Sudan, or GoS, and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, and the Government of Southern Sudan.
Following South Sudan’s declaration of independence on July 9, 2011, negotiations have
continued between the GoS and the SPLM/Government of the Republic of South Sudan,
or RSS.
The AUHIP-facilitated negotiations have largely been an opaque process, leading to
much speculation in the press and elsewhere regarding the current status of talks
between the two parties. As discussed in a December 2011 Enough Project report on
the negotiations, the process has also undergone a number of structural iterations,
adding to speculation concerning the negotiations’ status and results.
In an attempt to shed light on what has occurred in the negotiations to date, as well as
to inform future discussions concerning the process, and the AUHIP’s contribution to it,
Enough has compiled the following timeline. This timeline provides an overview of the
negotiations to date, and reflects the various changes to the process’ structure.
Abstract: This report is part of a larger project funded by the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will be published by Routledge
in early 2012. The Report examines the approaches of eight
Muslim-majority states1 known to have developed ‘soft’
strategies to counter this problem, and demonstrates how
all of these countries have developed varied approaches,
strategies and processes. For example, some focus more
on countering and preventing further radicalisation in their
societies (what we refer to in this report as ‘counterradicalisation
strategy’). Countries that fall in this category
include Morocco and Bangladesh. Others, such as Yemen
and Egypt, focus more on rehabilitating and counselling those
who have already become radicalised (De-radicalisation).
Some have developed well-structured official programmes
(Saudi Arabia), while others rely more on individual initiatives
(Jordan). Finally, some have experienced collective deradicalisation,
whereby a group of former radicals decide to
take a collective decision to denounce violence, admit their
mistake and rejoin society. Such collective de-radicalisation
can, and has taken place inside prisons (e.g. Islamic
Jihad and Jihad Organisation in Egypt in 1997 and 2007,
respectively) and outside prisons (e.g. the Algerian Islamic
Salvation Army in 1997).
By studying the counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation
policies implemented in our eight Muslim-majority states, the
report identifies certain key factors which can be considered
as conducive to successful de-radicalisation programmes.
These include the following: the role of popular support
combined with a committed, charismatic, political leadership;
the role of families; the role of civil society; and the role and
quality of the clerics and scholars involved. The political and
developmental strength of the state is also important, as is
the relationship between national counter-radicalisation and
de-radicalisation efforts on the one hand, and external factors
and interventions on the other.
Finally, no single formula can deal with all cases of violent
extremism, even within a single region. Counter-radicalisation
and de-radicalisation efforts must take account of the culture,
mores, traditions, history, and rules and regulations of
each country.
Abstract: The last round of negotiations between the government of Sudan, or GoS, and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Republic of South Sudan, or SPLM/RSS, saw
significant concessions made by the SPLM/RSS and a lack of political will to negotiate
on the part of Khartoum. Although the two parties remain far apart in their positions,
the SPLM/RSS proposal put forward in the last round paves the way for a comprehensive
deal going forward. By virtue of the dynamics between the two parties, a package
deal inclusive of a transitional financial arrangement for the North, Abyei, and the
border is still the only feasible endgame.
Abstract: Mali has experienced perhaps the most significant external repercussions from the downfall of the regime of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi. Stratfor has discussed the impact of the conflict in Libya on the wider region since international intervention began in March 2011. Instability in Libya due to that country's deep internal fault lines meant that re-establishing a government would prove difficult. As we pointed out, that instability could spread to neighboring countries as weapons and combatants flow outward from Libya.
Reports now indicate that thousands of armed Tuareg tribesmen who previously served in Gadhafi's military have returned home to Mali. The influx of this large number of well-armed and well-trained fighters, led by a former Libyan army colonel, has re-energized the long-simmering Tuareg insurgency against the Malian government. These Tuareg insurgents have formed a new group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). In mid-January, they began a military campaign to free three northern regions of Mali from Bamako's control.
The government of Mali has claimed that the MNLA is aligned with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). MNLA, however, has strongly denied any link to the group and said it will serve as a bulwark against AQIM. Given the U.S. and European interest in preventing the strengthening of AQIM, both sides have considerable incentive to take their respective positions. These developments make it an opportune time to examine the MNLA, its current offensive and the potential implications for Mali and the region.
