February 8, 2010
National Defense Research Institute // RAND Corporation
Abstract:
A critical question surrounding the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq
is Iraq’s internal security and stability. Although the U.S. withdrawal
plan is designed with care to avoid weakening Iraq’s security, the end
of U.S. occupation may alter the strategies of the main Iraqi political
actors, each of which has enough armed power to be able to shatter
Iraq’s domestic peace. In view of the potential for insecurity in Iraq,
the United States cannot afford to take a passive or reactive stance.
To anticipate dangers and act purposefully, U.S. policy-makers need a
dynamic analytic framework with which to examine the shifting motivations
and capabilities of the actors that affect Iraq’s security. This
monograph offers such a framework....
February 8, 2010
Congressional Research Service
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of current issues in U.S.-Palestinian relations and. It also
contains an overview of Palestinian society and politics and descriptions of key Palestinian
individuals and groups—chiefly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian
Authority (PA), Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestinian refugee population. [...] The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state
neighbors, but to many countries and non-state actors in the region and around the world—
including the United States—for a variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. U.S. policy
toward the Palestinians since the advent of the Oslo process in the early-1990s has been marked
by efforts to establish a Palestinian state through a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and establish norms of democracy,
accountability, and good governance within the PA. Congressional views of the issue have
reflected concern that U.S. bilateral assistance not detrimentally affect Israel’s security by falling
into the hands of Palestinian rejectionists who advocate terrorism and violence against Israelis....
February 8, 2010
Congressional Research Service
Abstract:
Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that
perpetrated the September 11, 2001, attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a
core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets, with a centralized leadership
structure, made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organization’s plots either emanated from the
top or were approved by the leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al Qaeda as akin to a
corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile Chief Executive Officer issuing orders and
soliciting ideas from subordinates.
Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Out of necessity, due to
pressures from the security community, in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse
global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees
of independence. The core leadership, headed by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, is thought to
live in the mountainous tribal belt of northwest Pakistan, where it continues to train operatives,
recruit, and disseminate propaganda. But Al Qaeda franchises or affiliated groups active in
countries such as Yemen and Somalia now represent critical power centers in the larger
movement. Some affiliates receive money, training, and weapons; others look to the core
leadership in Pakistan for strategic guidance, theological justification, and a larger narrative of
global struggle. Over the past year senior government officials have assessed the trajectory of Al
Qaeda to be “less centralized command and control, (with) no clear center of gravity, and likely
rising and falling centers of gravity, depending on where the U.S. and the international focus is
for that period.” While a degraded corporate Al Qaeda may be welcome news to many, a trend
has emerged over the past few years that some view as more difficult to detect, if not potentially
more lethal. [...] The focus of this report is on the history of Al Qaeda, actions and capabilities of the organization
and non-aligned entities, and an analysis of select regional Al Qaeda affiliates. This report may be
updated as events warrant....
February 8, 2010
South Asia Analysis Group
Abstract:
Pakistani leaders often project Jammu & Kashmir as Pakistan’s jugular vein in justification of their supporting jihadi terrorist groups against India in an attempt to change the status quo in J&K. It is not.
Karachi is Pakistan’s jugular vein. It is the economic capital of Pakistan contributing a substantial part of Pakistan’s industrial production and tax revenue. It has Pakistan’s only functioning international port. The Gwadar port, on the Mekran coast of Balochistan, constructed with Chinese assistance and commissioned three years ago, has so far failed to come up to expectations as an alternative to Karachi as an international port due to the continuing Baloch freedom struggle and the inability of the Pakistani authorities to develop the subsidiary infrastructure to connect Gwadar with the other economic centres of Pakistan, particularly in Punjab.
Karachi is also of strategic significance not only to Pakistan, but also to the NATO troops fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is still Pakistan’s most important naval base. Gwadar is being developed as an alternate naval base to reduce the vulnerability of the Pakistan Navy in Karachi, but it is estimated that it will take another five to eight years before Gwadar as a naval base starts functioning in a satisfactory manner....
February 5, 2010
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The war in Iraq may be winding down but it is scarcely over. Iraq is still the scene of major attacks on ongoing violence. Equally important, Iraq is still far from political stability, faces major problems in political accommodation, and must both conduct a major election and develop far more effective patterns of governance. Iraq must take the lead in these efforts and shape its own destiny, but it has not had stable or effective governance for more than half a century, and only began to emerge from some four decades of external and internal conflict in 2009. [...] This reports shows that Iraq has made major progress in many areas, but still faces critical challenges. It will be at least five years before Iraq can develop the kind of economy it needs, achieve stable security and political accommodation, and create a fully effective mix of governance and rule of law. In practice, it is probably far more realistic to think of 2020 than 2015, or the completion of US troop withdrawals by the end of 2011.
The key to a successful US policy will be to establish an enduring strategic partnership that can help Iraq make progress. This must involve continuing US support in helping Iraq deal with the underlying causes of ethnic and sectarian tension in Iraq, in helping Iraq create an effective government and strong security forces, and in helping Iraq make the structural changes in its economy necessary to use its potential oil wealth to help all of its people....
Africa 
