September 2, 2010
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The January 2011 referendum on self-determination could result in Sudan’s partition, and the country’s North-South border may ultimately become the world’s newest international boundary. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended two decades of civil war called for the border between the North and the semi-autonomous South to be demarcated within six months. Five years later, the task remains incomplete. The sooner the parties break the border deadlock the better, though the process need not necessarily be completed prior to the referendum as Khartoum has argued previously. Furthermore, a solution to the border is about not only drawing a line, but also defining the nature and management of that border and the future relations of communities on both sides. A “soft” boundary is ideal, one backed by a framework for cross-border arrangements and, if necessary, safeguarded by a joint monitoring mechanism. Progress toward both demarcating and defining the border will prevent it from becoming a source of renewed conflict in the post-CPA era....
September 2, 2010
Institute for Security Studies // L'Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité
Abstract:
The Burundi peace process has essentially been completed. At the time of
writing this monograph (August 2009), the last rebel group to the conflict,
Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu – Forces Nationales de Libération
(PALIPEHUTU-FNL), had just begun its Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration (DDR) process and had been registered as a political party.
This monograph will focus on the role played by peacekeeping missions in
the Burundian peace process to ensure that agreements signed by parties to
the conflict were adhered to and implemented. The deployment of peacekeeping
missions went full circle and more. An African Union (AU) peace mission
followed by a United Nations (UN) mission replaced the initial South African
Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD). Because the peace process had not
yet been completed, and because of the return of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to
Burundi, the UN Security Council (UNSC) approved the redeployment of an
AU mission to oversee the completion of the final phase by December 2008....
September 2, 2010
Institute for Security Studies // L'Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité
Abstract:
On 23 July 2010, the eve of the African Union’s Summit in
Kampala, AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping announced
that he had asked countries, including South Africa, Angola,
Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea, to send troops to Somalia to
boost the under-strength African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), currently comprising Ugandan and Burundian
forces. This move came against the background of suicide
bombing attacks on 11 July 2010 that had killed 79 people in
the Ugandan capital. Al-Shabaab, the militant Somali
organisation with undefined links to al-Qaeda, claimed
responsibility for the bombings, explaining that these were
retribution for Ugandan and Burundian violence against the
civilian population in Mogadishu. It would appear that the
bombings were also aimed at testing the endurance of Uganda
as a contributing country, as well as the resolve of other AU
member states that may be contemplating contributing
towards the required troop surge.
AMISOM was first deployed in 2007 to protect the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and strategic
infrastructures (the port and airport) in Mogadishu from the
insurgents who had strengthened their position as Ethiopian
forces withdrew, and to provide support for humanitarian
assistance for the Somali population. The proposed
additional deployment to Somalia must be viewed in the
context of the chronically unstable situation in Mogadishu
and in Somalia as a whole.
In a nutshell, the AU decision to reinforce AMISOM by
almost 2 000 troops would increase the size of the force from
its current level of around 6 300 (4 Ugandan and 3
Burundian battalions), to the 8 000 mandated in 2007. Some
AU member states had even called for the force to be augmented to between 14 000 and 20 000 troops. This Policy Brief examines the apparent urgency to increase
AMISOM force levels. It interrogates the AU’s
interventionist strategy in Somalia, including the planned
troop surge, analyses the terrorist dimension of the bombings,
drawing parallels with the Afghanistan case as a basis for
suggestions for a clear and holistic approach to the conflict
in Somalia....
September 1, 2010
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Abstract:
This map represents estimations of the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) throughout Somalia as of July 2010.
September 1, 2010
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs // Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt
Abstract:
Rule of law reforms in Liberia over the past five years serve as a clear example of how the international community has failed on this point, as the country’s own practices have been generally neglected in the process. Characteristically, there is little updated information on the customary law and traditional practices of Liberia. In investigating how the international community addresses SGBV in Liberia, we found within the liberal peacekeeping/building paradigm few analytical tools that could be used to gain a solid understanding of the host country ‘from below’. This area of society remains a professional blind-spot and represents a gap in the efforts of the international peacekeeping/-building community to build a sustainable peace in the country....