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Abstract: Enthusiasts of human security argue that what is needed in the post-Cold-War period is a
foreign policy agenda that is more ‘people-centred’ than the state-centred focus of security
policy during the Cold War period. Among the most enthusiastic proponents of the human
security paradigm in the 1990s was the Canadian government, which, in partnership with
a number of other like-minded governments, sought to press the human security agenda,
taking a number of human security initiatives. However, since the late 1990s, we have seen
a paradox: the concept has attracted increased attention from scholars while its salience
among policy-makers appears to be declining. Using the case of the Canadian government’s
policy towards the crisis in Timor in September 1999, we explore the difficulty that
policy-makers have had in moving human security from the rhetorical realm to the level of
concrete policy that makes a difference to the safety of people whose security is threatened.
We conclude that there was a significant gap between Canada’s human security rhetoric
and Ottawa’s actual policy in Timor. While the Canadian government did eventually
contribute troops to the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET), we show that
Canada’s response was slow, cautious, and minimalist. There was neither the willingness
nor the capacity to be at the forefront of the efforts to send a robust force to East Timor.
This case demonstrates some important limits of the human security agenda, and why this
agenda remained so firmly in the realm of the rhetorical in the 1990s.
Efforts
Abstract: On June 2, 2011, Peacebuild, with the financial support of the International Development
Research Centre, convened a day-long discussion on the tumultuous changes taking place in the
Middle East and North Africa.
Objectives for the roundtable were to share up-to-date information on current and longer-term
political issues and dynamics, to assess areas for possible support for democratic transitions in
the region, identify areas of relevant Canadian expertise – diaspora, NGO, academic, business
sector, governmental -- and, based on the discussion, generate a set of policy options and/or
recommendations for people-to-people support, NGOs, academics and the Government of
Canada.
Participants in Cairo, Ottawa and Montreal were linked into a wide-ranging discussion, which
first focused on hearing activist and expert views from the epicentre of regional change – Egypt.
Among the questions explored with human rights activist Hossam Baghat, strategic analyst
Mustafa El-Labbad, activist author May Telmissany and IDRC regional expert Roula El-Rifai were
the makeup of the reform movements in the region and their objectives, what is the real extent
of political Islam’s influence in the Middle East and what has been the role of the armed forces
in the transitions?
Abstract: On March 14, 2011, Peacebuild, with financial support from
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT),
convened the first of a series of six workshops on various
peacebuilding and conflict prevention policy issues. This policy
brief synthesizes the findings and recommendations arising from
the first workshop and from two issue papers prepared to inform
the workshop discussion. It highlights policy and programming
options aimed at improving Canadian and global responses to
violent conflict.
Abstract: Canadian foreign direct investment in Colombia has
grown consistently since the 1990s, particularly in
telecommunications, mining, and fossil fuel extraction.
Canadian mining and oil companies are major players in
Colombia.
Despite a concerted public relations campaign by
the Colombian government, Colombia continues to suffer
widespread human rights abuses, including extrajudicial
executions, disappearances, extortion, and threats.
Control over land, labour, and natural resources are
integral to the war and violence in Colombia, and the
past few decades have seen massive displacement and
murder for political and economic ends. Striking correlations
have been observed between where investment –
both domestic and foreign – takes place and rights abuses,
ranging from murder and massacres and related massive
land and property theft to violations of the rights to
freedom of movement and to a healthy environment.
Human rights violations are linked to efforts by
those behind Colombia’s murderous paramilitaries to
create conditions for investment from which they are
positioned to benefit. There are also ongoing relations
between the paramilitary forces and all levels of government
and the armed forces, up to the highest officials,
and there are clear indications that political cover for
such human rights abuses and crimes will continue.
Abstract: Progress in Afghanistan has been achieved on a number of fronts at the national, provincial,
district and local levels. The pace of change in Afghanistan however has been slow and not
without setbacks. Sustaining progress—whether political, economic or social—will depend on
continuing Afghan leadership, within government and in particular throughout Afghan society.
While much remains to be done, Canada continues to be inspired by those Afghans who are
fighting for change, for peace, for greater rights and freedoms for women and girls, and for
improved quality of life for all Afghans.
This quarterly report, covering the period of January 1 to March 31, 2011, describes the progress
made on Canada’s six priorities and three signature projects in Afghanistan, through a lens of
how our priorities, projects and partnerships have worked to support Afghan leadership and
ownership of their future. This report also provides insight into some of the progress that has
been made in Afghanistan through the experiences and thoughts of the Afghan people
themselves.
Abstract: The report covers the period from July 1 to September 30, 2010, and focuses on the progress achieved on Canada’s six priorities and three signature projects in Afghanistan, through the lens of security. The capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces contributed to an increased perception of security among Kandaharis. According to polling results, a majority of Kandaharis felt safe in their communities in four of the six key districts. This is an increase of three districts over last quarter. Province-wide, a full 60 percent of Kandaharis felt safe in their communities.Other notable achievements include: Canadian-supported training programs at Sarpoza Prison progressed, and a basic training program was delivered by Afghan correctional trainers—the result of a Correctional Service Canada train-the-trainer program.Canada helped complete seven more schools, bringing the total to date to 26. Canada advanced toward rehabilitating the Dahla Dam and irrigation system; canal surveying was conducted on 10 sub-canals. Canada continued to support efforts to eradicate polio at the national level. One national vaccination campaign. The Afghan National Customs Academy graduated its third class of students, for a total of 144 officers trained. The Canada Border Services Agency continued to provide training, mentoring and curriculum development to the Academy.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to address the evolving context affecting Canadian objectives in Afghanistan and to inform debate on Canada's future policy options regarding its post-2011 presence in Afghanistan. For example, even if the Canadian mission is reoriented to be of a purely civilian nature, security issues will still loom large in determining how to proceed. This paper begins by briefly revisiting some antecedents to the current state of Canada's policy on Afghanistan. It then examines trends in the six areas of policy priority set out by the government in 2008. The subsequent section surveys factors that should be taken into account in assessments of the overall Canadian policy-making environment. Finally, possible roles for Canada's principal foreign policy instruments in the areas of peace and security, development and democracy assistance, and diplomacy are examined.
Abstract: Since mid-2006 Project Ploughshares has worked with the policy branch
of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) on a joint
project to address the urgent need for linking official development
assistance (ODA) programs with armed violence prevention and
reduction and, more specifically, with the control and reduction of small
arms and light weapons (SALW).1 The project is intended to provide
CIDA with policy guidance on the challenge of integrating armed
violence/small arms reduction with sustainable development. It has
involved several components—papers, workshops, interviews, and
international seminars—and has drawn on the growing, if still nascent,
body of policy research and analysis related to the small armsdevelopment
nexus.
This paper provides a summary of the recognized linkages between armed
violence, small arms, and development as well as the multilateral and
national policy landscape related to the integration and mutual resolution
of these issues. The paper notes that the small arms-development link
could represent an important point of application of Canada’s “whole-of government”
foreign policy. Consequently, the paper explores the role
CIDA might play within this collaborative approach by integrating armed
violence and SALW control and reduction with its development program.
In the final analysis, the paper is intended to assist CIDA towards the
policy and practice required to achieve levels of community safety that
will allow development processes to take root and grow.
Abstract: Throughout the second quarter of 2010, Canada continued to progress on its six priorities and
three signature projects in Afghanistan. Given Afghanistan’s increasingly volatile security
situation, such progress is only achieved through the unflagging dedication of our military and
civilian personnel, the ongoing commitment of our international partners, and the courageous
efforts of the Afghan people as they endeavour to rebuild a nation that will one day be safe,
secure, democratic and self-sufficient.
Thirty years of conflict, political instability and economic hardship have decimated
Afghanistan’s infrastructure and institutions, and diminished the confidence of the Afghan
people in their government. Rebuilding this confidence is largely dependent on increasing the
capacity of the Afghan government to deliver basic, essential services such as education, health
care, roads, job creation, irrigation, clean water and electricity.
This quarterly report, covering the period April 1 to June 30, 2010, describes progress made on
our six priorities and three signature projects through the lens of Canada’s efforts to assist the
Afghan government in developing its capacity to deliver these services, all of which, in turn,
improve the lives of the Afghan people.
Abstract: Canada’s naval response to Somali piracy has been a mixed affair.On the positive
side, in recent years the CanadianNavy has successfully dedicated a significant
level of resources to countering Somali piracy: the destroyer HMCS
Iroquois, the frigatesHMCS Calgary, Ville de Québec,Winnipeg, and Fredericton,
and the oiler HMCS Protecteur. Collectively, these vessels operated effectively
alongside the ships of several other navies, especially those of the U.S.Navy, that
together form the various international flotillas confronting Somali pirates. The
Canadian Navy’s level of involvement has been no mean task, because of the
great distances involved, its limited number of surface combatants, and its other
responsibilities.
On the negative side, the effective handling of Somali pirates has been an
ephemeral and problematic task. Despite the international naval presence, the
incidence of Somali piracy has increased. In light of the counterpiracy mission’s prominence
for Canada and the limited effect navies have had so
far, a call by the United States for international commercial shippers to rely upon private security companies (PSCs) demands
attention. What, therefore, are the call’s implications in terms of future Canadian activism
and the overall effectiveness of countering Somali piracy?
Abstract: Domestic public opinion is frequently and correctly described as a crucial battlefront in the war in Afghanistan. Commentary by media and political figures currently notes not only the falling support for the war in the United States but also in many of its key allies in Europe and elsewhere, making it all the more difficult for the Obama administration to secure the help it believes it needs to bring the war to a successful conclusion. This study is an extensive examination of the determinants of domestic support for and opposition to the war in Afghanistan in the United States and in five of its key allies--the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia. Tracing the trajectory of public opinion on the war from the original invasion in 2001 to the fall of 2009, this paper concludes that the combination of mounting casualties with a declining belief that the war could be won by the Coalition is the key factor driving the drop in support. Other factors, such as the deployment of numerous and shifting rationales by the political leadership in various countries, and the breakdown of elite consensus have played important but secondary roles in this process.
Abstract: In accordance with the motion passed by the House of Commons on March 13, 2008, we are
honoured to place before Parliament this eighth quarterly report on Canada’s engagement in
Afghanistan. This report addresses the period from January 1 to March 31, 2010. In December 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that a major surge of U.S. military
and civilian personnel would take place in Afghanistan throughout 2010. Canada welcomes this
commitment from our largest coalition partner. This quarterly report describes the impact of the
U.S. surge on Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, focusing in particular on those opportunities
and challenges that arise as the international community collaboratively endeavours to build an
environment of stability and sustainability in Afghan security, governance and development.
It is evident that, in this quarter, Afghanistan’s political environment remained unsettled. We are
hopeful that President Hamid Karzai will stand by the important commitments made at the
London Conference of January 28, and take measures to strengthen the credibility of the 2010
parliamentary elections, while addressing ongoing concerns about corruption.
One of Canada’s key priorities in Afghanistan is to enable the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment, and promote law and order.
Discussions during the March 29-30 meeting of G8 foreign ministers focused in part on security
issues at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In April, Canada announced that up to 90 additional
Canadian Forces personnel will be deployed to Afghanistan to support ANSF training, further
enhancing Afghan capacity to assume responsibility for their own security as Canada prepares
for the drawdown of our military mission in 2011.
Abstract: Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify. Monsieur le President, membres du comité, merci de m'avoir donnée l'occasion de témoigner. It means a great deal to me to be before this body as both a concerned member of the human rights community, and as a Canadian. Based on first-hand interviews with former detainees and their family members, as well as on information provided by Afghan nongovernmental organizations and other international organizations working on human rights, Human Rights Watch has developed a good understanding of the problem of detainee abuse in Afghanistan. We are particularly concerned about the torture and other ill-treatment of detainees by the National Directorate of Security (NDS)-the Afghan intelligence service that most frequently takes custody of persons captured by NATO forces.
As discussed below, the transfer of detainees by Canadian forces to the NDS, even under memoranda of understanding that include diplomatic assurances, violates Canada's obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law.
Abstract: The Netherlands Ministry of Defence (NL MOD) commissioned RAND Europe to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Netherlands armed forces, asking RAND to focus on recent deployments of the Netherlands armed forces relative to the deployments of other countries' armed forces. This study is therefore not a root and branch consideration of the Netherlands armed forces, but a comparative study of several different armed forces to illustrate contrasts and similarities with those of the Netherlands. This study was conducted within the context of the NL MOD's Future Policy Survey, which is a review of the Netherlands' future defence ambition, required capabilities and associated levels of defence expenditure. The Future Policy Survey was delivered to the Netherlands Parliament in April 2010. The overarching aim of the Dutch Future Policy Survey is to provide greater insight into how to exploit and enhance the potential contribution of the Netherlands armed forces.
Abstract: The path into terrorism in the name of Islam is often described as a process of radicalisation. But to be radical is not necessarily to be violent. Violent radicals are clearly enemies of liberal democracies, but non-violent radicals might sometimes be powerful allies.
This report is a summary of two years of research examining the difference between violent and non-violent radicals in Europe and Canada. The report covers five countries: the UK, Canada, Denmark,
France and the Netherlands, focusing on the phenomenon
of ‘home-grown’ al-Qaeda inspired terrorism in these
countries. It represents a step towards a more nuanced understanding of behaviour across radicalised individuals, the appeal of the al-Qaeda narrative, and the role of governments and communities in responding.
Abstract: On March 13, 2008, following the report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (the 'Manley Panel' report), the House of Commons adopted a resolution calling for an end to Canadian combat operations in Kandahar by July, 2011. Specifically: 'Canada will end its presence in Kandahar as of July 2011, and, as of that date, the redeployment of Canadian Forces troops out of Kandahar and their replacement by Afghan forces start as soon as possible, so that it will have been completed by December 2011.' Instead of resolving the uncertainties surrounding Canada’s role in Afghanistan through 2011 and generating debate about the options for Canada’s commitments to Afghanistan Post-2011, the resolution created a policy vacuum. The Canada Afghanistan Solidarity Committee (CASC) has set out to help reinvigorate the Canadian debate and to focus attention on Canada’s unfulfilled and continuing obligations in Afghanistan. To this purpose, CASC is proceeding with a program of consultation and analysis in order to help us articulate a vision for a new Canadian mission in Afghanistan. The CASC 'Keeping Our Promises' project is predicated on the conviction that a Canadian multi-party consensus on the way forward, beyond 2011, remains possible. This report marks the beginning of our efforts. We have not covered every possible Canadian contribution. We have also tried to avoid the temptation to be overly prescriptive. This report is a work in progress.
Abstract: Afghan civilians deserve amends from warring parties for deaths, injuries, and property
losses—that is, some form of recognition and monetary compensation. Under international
law and agreements signed with the Afghan government, the troop contributing nations
(TCNs) of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are not liable for damage to
civilian property or civilian injury or death as a result of lawful operations. However, most
ISAF members now offer payments when such losses occur. This is a marked improvement
from the early days of the conflict when the US and its NATO allies declined to address civilian
harm. CIVIC’s research into the experiences of ISAF troops and Afghan civilians demonstrates that
when international military forces provide payment (henceforth called “compensation” to
indicate both monetary and in-kind help), especially combined with an apology for harm,
civilian hostility toward international forces decreases. However, the effectiveness of these
payments has been limited by the lack of uniform policies across ISAF nations, limited information
gathering about civilian harm generally and, in many cases, insensitive requirements
that civilians suffering losses take the initiative to file claims.
This report describes the policies and practices of major ISAF TCNs. It finds that soldiers as
well as civilians view amends for harm favorably. The process of investigation, negotiation
of payment, and offers of formal compensation are opportunities to strengthen relationships
with local leaders and communities, to explain what happened, and acknowledge loss.
Abstract: Today, a great number of people wonder about what has become of peacekeeping. There is no
simple answer, and this study aims at painting the rich, but necessarily complex, picture of
peacekeeping in all of its contemporary incarnations. In order to have a good understanding of
the basis of peacekeeping, the first part provides a historical overview of the classical era of
peacekeeping. The second part deals with the quasi-revolutionary transformation of
peacekeeping operations in the nineties. One of the most innovative aspects of this
transformation is the emergence and activism of non-UN players. Special attention is given to
this inasmuch as Canada and many other Western countries have now essentially abandoned
the UN for these new players, specifically NATO and the European Union. The third part deals with the terms used to describe "peacekeeping" practices, proposing the term "peace operations" as a new general term to cover both armed interventions and interventions in the service of peace. The fourth part explores the future role in peace operations for Canada. The fifth part concludes that it is in Canada's national interest to re-engage in these operations, in their old forms as well as their new ones.
Abstract: Aujourd’hui, nombreux sont ceux qui se demandent ce qu’est devenu le maintien de la paix. Il
n’y a pas de réponse simple, et la présente étude se propose de brosser le tableau, riche mais
nécessairement complexe, du maintien de la paix dans toutes ses incarnations contemporaines.
Pour bien comprendre les fondements du maintien de la paix, la première partie propose un
bref survol historique de l’époque classique du maintien de la paix. Lui succède une deuxième
partie consacrée à la transformation quasi révolutionnaire des opérations de paix pendant les
années quatre-vingt-dix. Un des aspects les plus novateurs de cette transformation est
l’émergence et l’activisme des acteurs non onusiens. Une attention particulière est accordée à
ces évolutions, d’autant plus que le Canada et plusieurs pays occidentaux ont maintenant
pratiquement délaissé l’ONU au profit de ces nouveaux acteurs, en particulier l’OTAN et l’Union
européenne. La troisième partie propose le terme <> pour décrire la différence essentielle entre une
intervention armée classique et des interventions au service de la paix. La quatrième partie de l’étude discute la tradition canadienne et l'importance que les Canadiens connaissent et acceptent les modalités de ces nouvelles
opérations de paix. La cinquième partie conclus qu’il est dans
l’intérêt national du Canada de se réengager dans ces opérations, dans leurs formes anciennes
comme nouvelles.
Abstract: As 2009 closed, Canada continued to make inroads on a number of key priorities and signature
projects in Afghanistan, and continued to focus on creating an environment of stability and
sustainability in Afghan security, governance and development. Where progress has been made
this quarter, it has been earned through the determination and hard work of our military and
civilian staff and through close collaboration with the Afghan government, our allies and other
partners.
Canada’s military and civilian work in Afghanistan has increasingly centred on building local
capacity in the province of Kandahar, with additional engagements at the national level to help
Afghans rebuild their country as a stable, secure, democratic and self-sufficient society. In doing
so, we have established a model for security and stability—building blocks for economic
development—that is being applied by our NATO partners in the south and other parts of the
country.
Abstract: Eight years since the allied ouster of the Taliban regime, the Afghanistan balance sheet presents
both pluses and minuses. The latest coalition analysis acknowledges that the insurgents have
seized the initiative, both in the armed conflict and by creating a crisis of confidence among the
populace through the equally important “silent war” of fear, intimidation and persuasion. At the
same time the widely acknowledged fraud in the landmark presidential election poses an equally
serious crisis of credibility within Afghanistan and in nations whose soldiers are fighting and
dying on Afghan soil.
Yet the Afghan people, while voicing frustration that their fledgling democratic institutions have
not delivered more, nonetheless turned out in significant numbers to vote, despite being subject
to violence and intimidation from the insurgents. Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan is
contributing directly to strengthening such institutions, to increasing the capacity of the Afghan
government to extend basic services and to bolstering the ability of Afghan forces to provide
security.
This report covers the period from July 1 to September 30, and pays particular attention to
national institutions and democratic governance as core elements in Canada’s mission in
Afghanistan. This focus may seem self-evident since presidential and provincial council
elections were held across the country on August 20, the first Afghan-led elections in three
decades. Yet the polling day itself is only part of the story. Just as vital to democratic governance
is the capacity for all the nitty-gritty of an election—publicizing how and where to vote,
inclusive voter registration, an open nominating procedure, neutral and unbiased media, impartial
adjudication of complaints, accessible voting centres and efficient supervision and administration
of the actual voting. In Afghanistan all this and more had to be provided in areas racked by
insurgent violence.
Abstract: Public backing for the mission in Afghanistan is eroding in two countries, according to a poll by Angus Reid Strategies. 59 per cent of respondents in Britain oppose the military operation involving UK soldiers in Afghanistan, up six points since July. In Canada, overall support for the mission stands at 37 per cent, down six points in three months. In the United States, public backing for the military commitment remains stable at 54 per cent. Afghanistan has been the main battleground in the war on terrorism. The conflict began in October 2001, after the Taliban regime refused to hand over Osama bin Laden without evidence of his participation in the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked and crashed four airplanes on Sept. 11, 2001, killing nearly 3,000 people. At least 1,445 soldiers—including 869 Americans, 221 Britons and 131 Canadians—have died in the war on terrorism, either in support of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom or as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Abstract: In 2001, when foreign militaries – including the American, Belgian, British, Canadian, Danish, German, Italian, and Turkish – entered the country, Afghans welcomed them warmly, strewing flowers as they passed through towns and villages. There was widespread hope that the country would finally see peace and stability after decades of war.
Eight years later, however, there is still a consistent failure to establish the appropriate mechanisms for security and development in Afghanistan. Since the Bonn Agreement, both security assistance and development assistance have taken a short term view – primarily addressing immediate and acute problems rather than identifying and responding to underlying weaknesses. Such a “quick fix” approach has cost time and popular support from those eager for change, and has wasted resources and opportunities. Significant amounts of aid are re-routed back to the donors’ home countries through contractors and consultants. The creation of parallel structures of governance such as command and control centers and prisons has undermined national authority, inhibited national initiative, weakened security, and slowed development. Prospects for sustainable development are slim, and the initially close relationship between the Afghan public and international forces has deteriorated.
Underlying the current approach is the assumption that Afghanistan could only be rescued by an enormous international intervention. However the presence of the international community, even if extensive and well-directed, will not be useful if Afghans are not in charge of their own recovery and development. Although the international community and the Afghan government have rhetorically committed themselves to inclusive nation-building, significant progress has yet to be made in including a wide cross-section of Afghan society.
Abstract: The fundamental goal of this report is to identify strategic and practical steps to
raise the capacity of government officials, legislators, civil servants, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), advocacy groups, journalists, and media owners and managers
to build the political will to prevent mass atrocities. The Will to Intervene (W2I)
Project report, Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership and Action to Prevent
Mass Atrocities, draws on interviews with more than 80 foreign policy practitioners
and opinion shapers in Canada and the United States. Many of the interviewees
participated directly in Canadian and American government decision making
during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the 1999 Kosovo crisis.
The interviews furnished us with an inside view of the decision making processes
that shaped each country’s responses to Rwanda and Kosovo, exemplifying a
failure to act and a strong will to act. The W2I Project’s researchers also wanted
to understand what civil society groups and the news media could have done to
ramp up the pressure on Prime Minister Chrétien and President Clinton to save
lives in Rwanda. We wanted to learn if civil society played a role in the decisions of
Canada and the United States to preserve lives in Kosovo and what considerations
propelled the decision to intervene. We designed our questions with an eye to the
future, hunting for “lessons learned,” informed not only by our interviews, but also
by scholarly studies of Canadian and U.S. Government policies. One of the major outcomes of the W2I study is the finding that when leadership
at the top is absent, civil society in Canada and the United States must strongly
pressure governments to broaden their concept of “national interests.” Saving the
lives of innocent civilians in future Rwandas and Kosovos is vital to saving lives
in Canada and the United States. More and more, our security is threatened by
neglected crises in faraway places.
Abstract: Canada reinforced essential elements of our engagement in Afghanistan during the quarter,
preparing for the opportunities and challenges expected in the months to come. Work progressed
on Canada’s three signature projects—school construction, rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and
its irrigation system, and polio eradication. Canadian soldiers and civilians, in concert with the
United States and other partners, laid the groundwork to take best advantage of large and
welcome new deployments of U.S. forces in Kandahar and across southern Afghanistan. As well,
Canadians supported Afghans as they prepared for critical elections scheduled for August 20
throughout the country. All these actions were undertaken as Canadian soldiers, with Afghan and
coalition forces, fought an increasingly aggressive campaign against the insurgency. This quarterly report addresses Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan from April 1 to
June 30, 2009. The next report will cover the quarter ending September 30.
