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Abstract: This report presents information on the current state of femicide in
Guatemala. In Part II, we discuss the meaning of the term “femicide” and
place the phenomenon as emerging out of a culture involving pervasive and
widespread violence against women. In Part III, we revisit a topic
examined in our prior two reports — the theories regarding the causes for
the escalating gender-motivated murders of women. In Part IV, we detail
the response of the Guatemalan government to rising violence, as well as
the efforts and pronouncements of international human rights bodies
regarding the femicide. We also examine the efficacy, or lack thereof, of
recent developments in Guatemala, as well as the barriers that exist to
meaningful change. Finally, in Part V, we discuss recommendations for
action by the Guatemalan government, as well as for other significant
actors involved in developing a response to this phenomenon, including the
United States government.
Abstract: What role do women play in statebuilding? How do statebuilding processes affect women's participation? Support for statebuilding has become the dominant model for international engagement in post-conflict contexts, yet donor approaches lack substantial gender analysis and are missing opportunities to promote gender equality. This paper presents findings from a research project on the impact of post-conflict statebuilding on women's citizenship. It argues that gender inequalities are linked to the underlying political settlement, and that donors must therefore address gender as a fundamentally political issue.
Abstract: Guatemalans go to the polls in September 2011 to elect a
president, the Congress and local officials. The vote itself
is likely to be reasonably free, but violence and unregulated
campaign finance imperil the country’s political institutions.
Deteriorated security, drug traffickers’ brutality and
polarised politics leave candidates especially vulnerable
to attacks. An exorbitant campaign, meanwhile, threatens
to indebt office-holders to powerful financial interests, including
organised crime, deepening corruption and widening
the gulf between citizens and their politicians. State security
agencies should redouble efforts to prevent bloodshed,
especially in the most dangerous municipalities; politicians
and parties must fully reveal who funds them, and
the Public Prosecutor’s office, electoral authorities and donors
should press them to do so.
Abstract: Crisis Watch summarises briefly developments during the previous month in some 70 situations of current or potential conflict, listed alphabetically by region, providing references and links to more detailed information sources (all references mentioned are hyperlinked in the electronic version of this bulletin); assesses whether the overall situation in each case has, during the previous month, significantly deteriorated, significantly improved, or on balance remained more or less unchanged; alerts readers to situations where, in the coming month, there is a particular risk of new or significantly escalated conflict, or a particular conflict resolution opportunity (noting that in some instances there may in fact be both); and summarises Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers that have been published in the last month.
Amid mounting tensions between North and South Sudan over the disputed border area of Abyei, clashes broke out between the two sides at the beginning of the month. Northern Sudanese forces invaded Abyei on 20 May and asserted control in breach of existing peace agreements. Tens of thousands are reported to have fled south. The attacks threaten renewed conflict and weaken confidence between North and South as critical post-referendum arrangements remain unresolved.
Tensions also increased over military control and the presence of armed forces in the transitional areas of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, and CrisisWatch identifies a conflict risk alert for North Sudan for the coming month.
Violence escalated further in Yemen, where military forces loyal to President Saleh battled on several fronts, renewing fears that the continued political stalemate could erupt into civil war.
President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria continued to use troops and tanks to violently suppress the ongoing revolt, with hundreds of protesters feared killed, thousands detained, and widespread reports of torture.
In Pakistan, the U.S. killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad at the beginning of the month again raised questions about the military's possible involvement with jihadist groups.
Local elections in Albania on 8 May proved even more troubled than anticipated as the race for the Tirana mayor's seat ended deep within the margin of error.
In Guatemala, the Mexican Los Zetas cartel killed and decapitated 27 farm workers in the northern Petén department.
In Serbia, war crimes fugitive Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military leader accused of commanding the Srebrenica massacre and the siege of Sarajevo during the 1992-95 Bosnian war, was arrested after 16 years on the run. He was extradited to The Hague, where he will stand trial for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Abstract: Since it began operations in September 2007, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG) has brought a degree of hope to a country deeply scarred by post-conflict violence and entrenched impunity. As homicide rates sky-rocketed to rival Mexico’s, and criminals fought for territorial control and dominated or corrupted multiple levels of state agencies, the novel independent investigating entity created by agreement between the government and the UN Secretary-General responded to fear that illegal armed groups had become a threat to the state itself. Much remains to be done, however. During the next years the commission should establish the strategic basis for dismantling the illegal security forces and clandestine security organisations (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos de Seguridad, CIACS) over the long term and building Guatemalan justice capacity, including by supporting national ownership of the commission’s functions and embedding them within the judicial system.
CICIG’s formal mandate is to support and assist domestic justice institutions in the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by CIACS, to identify their structures, operations and financing and ultimately to dismantle them. At the same time, CICIG has sought to strengthen the weak judicial system in order to put an end to impunity, a task made infinitely more difficult by the complex relationship between elements of state institutions, political parties, the private sector and the CIACS.
Abstract: Criminal violence has taken on epidemic proportions in several Latin American countries. While the violence has complex causes and expressions, a major reason behind the current surge in levels is the strengthening of transnational criminal organisations (TCOs), most of which are based on illicit drug trafficking. TCOs have fuelled a deepening of multi-faceted state crises, which in some cases may be characterised as the “criminalisation of the state”. The seminar on which this report is based focused on the causes of this wave of violence and policy responses at different levels.
The main conclusion from the seminar was that, while US policy includes an array of measures, it is still heavily focused on military assistance and a “supply-side” approach to curbing the flow of drugs and other illicit goods into the US. National responses have in many cases mirrored this approach, focusing on strengthening police controls and in some cases deploying military forces. Regional responses have so far proven weak, yet there are important initiatives in the pipeline. The idea of an alternative agenda is also gaining support both nationally and regionally. This includes measures to decriminalise the production and possession of soft drugs, bolster police and judicial reform, and focus on treatment and finding alternative livelihoods for growers.
Abstract: Over the past decade, there has been growing international momentum to conceptualise, document and
address the various manifestations of “armed violence”. To date the discourse has focused largely on the
causes and effects of armed violence and explored the range of available programming options to prevent
and reduce it. Discussions on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) currently underway in the United Nations
(UN) provide an important opportunity to examine armed violence in the context of decisions concerning
international transfers and the export and import of conventional arms used in armed violence.
One of the objectives of the ATT is to address the “absence of common international standards on the
import, export and transfer of conventional arms.” As the UN General Assembly has noted, this absence
contributes to “conflict, displacement of people, crime and terrorism” thereby undermining peace,
reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development.” In other words, the absence of such
common international standards contributes to armed violence.
This report is divided into two parts, and includes three case studies drawn from recent examples of armed
violence in Bangladesh, Guatemala and the Philippines. Part I examines how an ATT with a clearly elaborated
risk assessment process can make a contribution to the prevention and reduction of armed violence. Part II focuses on one form of armed violence: firearms-related homicide. Discussions of armed violence
have repeatedly noted that the use of firearms in non-conflict settings is the most prevalent form of armed
violence and the form that results in the most deaths and injuries. This fact underscores the importance of
adopting an approach to addressing armed violence that will encompass violence outside of armed conflict
settings.
Abstract: Across the globe today, you'll find almost three dozen raging conflicts, from the valleys of Afghanistan to the jungles of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the streets of Kashmir. But what are the next crises that might erupt in 2011? Here are a few worrisome spots that make our list. [Captions provided by International Crisis Group]
Abstract: Over the last decade, the international community
has been working toward a new and broader concept
of security, drawing input from a number of
governments, non-governmental organizations and
civil society groups as well as scholars and other
prominent individuals. This new concept—known
as human security—calls on states to ensure the
survival, livelihood and dignity of their inhabitants.
At the same time, it encourages e≠orts to equip
people to act more e≠ectively on their own behalf. Following the report by the Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, this booklet seeks to show practical applications of human security and give the concept a human face. Between March-June 2006, in preparation for this publication, the Human Security Unit, a freelance journalist and a team of photographers visited dozens of project sites, conducting hundreds of interviews with local staff and beneficiaries. From these many compelling initiatives, nine stories were selected that reflect the range of issues, regions and institutions involved in human security work around the globe. Human security represents a fundamentally new
way of thinking about a range of contemporary
challenges—from hunger, poverty and failing
schools to armed conflict, forced migration and
human tra≤cking. Because these issues are closely
intertwined, human security emphasizes the need
for multi-sectoral responses and collaboration
among all stakeholders. Moreover, it aims to bridge
the gaps between security, humanitarian assistance,
human rights and development aid.
Abstract: The scale and severity of the challenges facing the Guatemala state have been underlined by events over the past year. Humanitarian crises and a continuing wave of violent crime, exacerbated by the penetration in Guatemalan territory of Mexican cartels, have multiplied the demands on public authorities. The government of President Alvara Colom, a self-declared social democrat, has vowed to fight poverty and clean up the security and judicial systems. To a significant extent, the country is still locked into the terms of the informal political and economic settlement that lay beneath the formal peace process ending the country's civil war in 1996. Whereas the peace accords promised rural development, a stronger and wealthier public sector, and a dismantling of the structures of counter-insurgency, the post-conflict reality fell under a different paradigm. Criminal groups, involving former military officers, acting state officials, criminal entrepreneurs and gang members, extended their influence. This paper, which forms part of the broader Clingendael research programme into post-conflict and fragile states, aims to unpick these constrains on governance in Guatemala, and also points to the emerging trends that are now altering the country's internal balance of power. In particular, the election of Colom in 2007 and the creation in the same year of the UN Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) are landmark events that appear to have undermined the post-conflict settlement. However, recent setbacks, including the paralysis of key policy initiatives - such as tax reform - and repeated acts of corruption in the security forces and the judicial system have raised questions over whether reform of the state is possible, and how it is to be carried out.
Abstract: While Mexico is having some limited success dealing with its spiraling conflict, vulnerable
States in Central America are struggling to keep the organized criminal groups at bay, even while
they face other challenges such as widespread gang activity. Problems are particularly acute in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, three States with vast
coastlines, large ungoverned spaces and the greatest proximity to Mexico. However, geography
is only part of the problem. Armed conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador and parts of Honduras
between 1960 and the mid-1990s laid the foundations for the weapons trafficking, money
laundering and contraband traffic that we are witnessing today. This chapter is about drug trafficking organizations (DTO) operating in Central America. It is
broken down by theme rather than by country. It provides a brief history of DTO activity in the
region; descriptions of who operates the DTOs, both locally and internationally, and their modus
operandi; the use of street gangs in DTO activities; DTO penetration in government and security
forces; local, regional and international efforts and challenges as they try and combat DTOs. The
chapter is centered on the three countries where the problem of DTOs appears to be the most
acute: Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras.
Abstract: A survey of the models of peace processes existing today
and in the immediate past will show how they are very
closely bound to the kinds of demands underlying each of
the conflicts. In other words, the underlying issue being
disputed is what determines the model of peace process. Following
this line of thought, we can distinguish between five
main models, namely reinsertion, power-sharing, exchange,
trust-building measures and self-governance. The first model, reinsertion, is the simplest, although
it is also not very frequent. It refers to cases in which the
armed group agrees to lay down its weapons in exchange
for facilities to help them reintegrate into society. The second model, one of the most frequent, which
involves political, economic and military power-sharing,
takes place when the armed groups seek to attain the power
to take over the political steering of a country and from
there run all the economic and military affairs. The third model is what we call exchange, in which
peace is achieved in exchange for something else. A fourth model of peace process, though not a common
one, is based on creating confidence-building measures. Finally, the fifth model involves achieving some kind
of self-governance in regions with demands for autonomy
or independence; this is called “intermediate political
architectures”.
Abstract: This Overview summarises the key findings and policy challenges identified by the CRISE
research programme in its evaluation of three Latin American countries. The case studies
selected were the three countries with the largest indigenous populations in proportionate
terms: Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru. The underlying research challenge was to understand
the role of horizontal or group inequality in overall acute inequality in the countries studied,
and the relevance of group inequality to political violence.
The paper shows that horizontal inequalities (HIs)—political, social, economic and cultural—
are deeply embedded in two of these countries, Guatemala and Peru, and have played a significant
role in terrible political violence. They remain severe; indeed, political HIs have worsened
in some respects with the legacy of violence and repression. In Guatemala and Peru, the pervasiveness
of embedded prejudice and ways of thinking make even good policy initiatives
non-functional. In Bolivia, meanwhile, an exceptional set of political and geographical circumstances has,
over many decades, resulted in political accommodation mechanisms that have avoided
widespread violence and led to a genuine improvement in political HIs.
Abstract: The 1996 peace accords formally ended Guatemala’s civil
war but failure to address the conflict’s root causes and
dismantle clandestine security apparatuses has weakened
its institutions and opened the door to skyrocketing violent
crime. Guatemala is one of the world’s most dangerous
countries, with some 6,500 murders in 2009, more
than the average yearly killings during the civil war and
roughly twice Mexico’s homicide rate. Under heavy pressure
at home, Mexican drug traffickers have moved into
Guatemala to compete for control of Andean cocaine
transiting to the U.S. The UN-sanctioned International
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) has
brought hope by making some progress at getting a handle
on high-level corruption. However, in June 2010 its
Spanish director, Carlos Castresana, resigned saying the
government had not kept its promise to support CICIG’s
work and reform the justice system. President Álvaro
Colom needs to consolidate recent gains with institutional
reform, anti-corruption measures, vetting mechanisms and
a more inclusive political approach, including to indigenous
peoples.
The administration of President Álvaro Arzú and the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) guerrilla
group signed peace accords fourteen years ago that
promised a massive overhaul of the military and of a
system that marginalised the majority of citizens, among
them large sectors of the indigenous population, and
served the interests of the small economic and political
elite. However, there has been little follow-through. Tax
collection is still the lowest in Latin America (some 10
per cent of gross domestic product, GDP), in flagrant violation
of a key provision of the peace accords. In addition
to the rise of clandestine groups, many directed by exsenior
military officers and politicians, the country has
seen the proliferation of Mexican drug-trafficking organisations
(DTOs) and youth gangs (maras). Criminal organisations
traffic in everything from illegal drugs to adopted
babies, and street gangs extort and terrorise entire neighbourhoods,
often with the complicity of authorities.
Abstract: Guatemala is currently experiencing a full-blown crisis of the democratic state. An unholy trinity of criminal elements—international drug traffickers, domestically based organized crime syndicates, and youth gangs—is effectively waging a form of irregular warfare against government institutions, with devastating consequences. The police, the judiciary, and entire local and departmental governments are rife with criminal infiltrators; murder statistics have surpassed civil-war levels in recent years; criminal operatives brazenly assassinate government officials and troublesome members of the political class; and broad swaths of territory are now effectively under the control of criminal groups. Guatemala’s weak institutions have been unable to contain this violence, leading to growing civic disillusion and causing a marked erosion in the authority and legitimacy of the government.
Abstract: Structural inequality, restricted political participation and discriminatory state policies are at the core of Guatemala’s challenges today as they were 50 years ago when its war started. The Guatemalan civil war, which lasted from 1960 to 1996, was fuelled by racial discrimination, political exclusion and indigenous hunger for land. A growing insurgency was met by increasing vio-lence from the US-backed army and subsequently by military governments. The conflict ended with several years of negotiation between the guerrilla coalition and the government, which led to the signing of 11 separate peace accords between January 1994 and December 1996. The ample consultation with civil society organizations, including those representing internally displaced people (IDPs), set a new standard in the involvement of such groups in the transition from war to peace. 14 years have passed since the signing of the peace accord which marked the end of the country’s conflict and promised durable solutions for those people displaced. Many of the country’s IDPs have returned or resettled in areas where they live under simi-lar conditions as before they were displaced. But they face continuing poverty and new struggles to access land to farm; thousands of peasant farmers and smallholders have been forcibly evicted by businesses interested in large-scale export agriculture. Others fled to the capital and other cities, where they have struggled to integrate culturally and where they compete with economic migrants for poorly paid jobs in the informal sector. In cities, widespread violence by criminal gangs has caused new intra-urban displacements.
Abstract: The Guatemalan army, under the direction of military ruler Efraín Ríos Montt, carried out a deliberate counterinsurgency campaign in the summer of 1982 aimed at massacring thousands of indigenous peasants, according to a comprehensive set of internal records presented as evidence to the Spanish National Court and posted today by the National Security Archive on its Web site. The files on “Operation Sofia” detail official responsibility for what the 1999 UN-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission determined were “acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people.” After months of analysis, which included evaluations of letterheads and signatures on the documents and comparisons to other available military records, the National Security Archive’s Kate Doyle said, “we have determined that these records were created by military officials during the regime of Efraín Ríos Montt to plan and implement a ‘scorched earth’ policy on Mayan communities in El Quiché. The documents record the military’s genocidal assault against indigenous populations in Guatemala.”
Abstract: Border zones are incubators of criminal instability and violence. Weak state presence and the lucrative drugs trade is combining to challenge state sovereignty in acute ways. Consider Mexico, where the northern frontier with the US and southern border with Guatemala are contested zones. The bloody center of gravity of Mexico’s drug cartels is the ‘plazas’, the drug smuggling corridors that link the borders. When most think of conflict and border zones, they imagine territorial disputes such as India and Pakistan’s recurring battles over Kashmir or less serious tug-of-wars such as Japan and South Korea’s contestation of the Liancourt Rocks. To be sure, there have been territorial disputes, such as Nicaragua’s dispute with Colombia over several islands, or Colombia’s conflicts with Venezuela and Ecuador over narco-guerrillas operating from their territory. Yet, as former FRIDE researcher Ivan Briscoe argues, the biggest sources of violent conflict has been the erosion of government control over border zones and the rise of criminal groups, gangs, and cartels in loosely governed zones. As Briscoe argues, "violence and institutional corrosion have plagued as never before the frontier between Mexico and the United States, while Guatemala’s eastern border region and Colombia’s frontiers with Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil witness these countries’ highest murder rates, as well as territorial capture by armed groups and narco-trafficking networks."
Abstract: In order for fragile states and the concept of state weakness to be properly understood, they need to be considered in the contexts of political economy and world history.
Four apparently disparate cases – Guatemala, Haiti, Kosovo and Angola – show surprising similarities, and highlight common lessons for international state-building efforts. In all four cases, behind a façade of ‘normal’ state institutions, public life and development are increasingly subject to shadow economies and shadow forces with strong international linkages.
There are unfortunately no existing remedies for state weakness. However, methods of improvement should include autonomous non-state actors, sustained efforts to build state capacities and restore the fabric of society, and significantly improved governance of global flows.
Abstract: As leaders in civil society, particularly during and following violent conflict, women are critical players in peace negotiations. In formal negotiations, they raise often-ignored political and social issues, ensure that the voices of victims and civilians are consistently heard, and build bridges among negotiating parties. They also have a solid record of successfully bringing together representatives of opposing factions in unofficial talks. Yet women remain the largest group of stakeholders regularly excluded from official negotiation processes.
In October 2000, the UN Security Council acknowledged in Resolution 1325 the importance of inclusion, mandating women’s full participation in peace building; few policymakers, however, know how to fulfill this obligation. This guide provides the international community with concrete strategies to successfully bring women into peace negotiations.
Abstract: The end of war did not bring peace to Guatemala.
Thirteen years on from the formal end of its conflict,
Central America’s most populous nation is wracked by
some of the worst crime rates in the world, while
criminal organisations have extended their influence
over state bodies, political parties and entire regions.
Situated on the new, favoured drugs route from the
Andes to North America, hundreds of tons of cocaine –
nearly half the world’s total production - are believed
to pass through the country each year.
At the same time, the country’s traditional economic
elites and its military, the pillars of an oligarchy that
notoriously brought down the incipient social democracy
of the 1950s with help from Washington, have watched
over a flawed transition to democracy. Guatemala is now
a highly unequal country with little respect for its
political parties or democratic institutions, in which the
rich and powerful have easy access to decision-makers
and judges. These actors would not appear to gain much
from the current breakdown in law and order, yet
abundant evidence points to a host of linkages between
these elites, the erosion of the state and the encroaching
power of clandestine and criminal cartels.
The paper seeks to dissect the multiple manifestations
of the security crisis in Guatemala, and the ways in
which the financial, political and criminal aspects of
state fragility combine and reinforce one another. Based
on numerous interviews and field research, it argues that
the withering of public authority can be understood as
the effect of a proliferation and fragmentation of
business transactions between non-state groups, factions
within the state and political leaders. With international
interest and concern over the fate of Guatemala and
Central America on the increase, it is clear that a new
approach to dealing with elites and the country’s
political economy is essential. Negotiation with nonstate
actors, and a reform process which combines
enhanced public finance with public security targets,
constitute the basis for a new period of international
engagement.
Abstract: This report analyses the progress made by Guatemala in implementing recommendations
made by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions following his
visit to Guatemala from 21-25 August 2006 (A/HRC/4/20/Add.2). Guatemala has seen a
significant rise in its homicide rate since the Special Rapporteur’s visit. Particularly concerning
are the continued attacks on human rights defenders, increases in the killings of women, and the
emergence of new targets (public transit operators) of unlawful killings. The State continues to
inadequately investigate and respond to unlawful killings. Much needed improvements to the
criminal justice institutions, witness protection, budget allocation, and fiscal policy have not
been implemented. Significant improvement has been achieved with the establishment of the
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). The CICIG has the potential
to improve criminal investigation and prosecution procedures, witness protection, and to assist
the State in implementing necessary national security legislation.
Abstract: When men have done making war on each other and on each other’s women, many return to home to make war on their own. Aftermath is the neglected story of war: what happens to the guerrilla fighter after he lays down his gun? Or to the former soldiers with stories of horrors never told, men cast adrift from the companionship of shared military experience, alone with unspoken memories?
The evidence is that many come home to act out their nightmares through violence against women. Every society that has suffered prolonged conflict experiences a surge in domestic violence, in sexual abuse of children and in rape after the “peace” returns. The half-life of war is a long tail of fragmented, private conflict, in which the enemy is always defenceless. If the story of war was told from the women’s perspective there might be less appetite for it, but their stories are not tied to the fate of the nation and there is no glory to be celebrated. The victims of this war are unseen and uncounted.
Abstract: We combine data from the 2002 National Population Census and the
distribution of the number of victims and human rights violations across 22 departments
to examine how the worst period of the civil war in Guatemala, between 1979 and 1984,
affected human capital accumulation. The year of birth and the department of birth jointly
determine an individual's exposure to the worst period of the civil war. Specifically, the
identification strategy exploits variation in the war's intensity across departments and
which cohorts were school age during the war. We find a strong negative impact of the
civil war on female education, with exposed girls completing 0.44 years less schooling
than non-exposed girls. Given an average of 3.65 years of schooling for females, this
represents a 12 percent decline. This impact is stronger for older female cohorts exposed
to the war, who completed 0.64 years less schooling, a decline of 17 percent. Older males
exposed to the war were less likely to complete grades 7 to 12. However, older females
exposed to the war experienced a larger decline in completing grades 4 to 12. These
effects are robust to the inclusion of indicators for department of residence, year of birth,
and controls for differential trends in human development in war affected and peaceful
departments of Guatemala.
