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Abstract: Normalisation between Greece and Turkey has come far
since tensions in the Aegean Sea threatened war three times
between the NATO allies. Trade, investments and mutual
cooperation and tourism have taken off, sidelining issues
like the Cyprus problem, which first stirred up the Aegean
dispute in the early 1970s. Frequent bilateral talks and Turkey’s
unofficial 2011 suspension of military over-flights of
Greek islands suggest that the time may be ripe for a solution
to that dispute. Turkey’s strong new government elected
in June is interested in further asserting itself as a responsible
regional power, solving problems in its neighbourhood
and clearing obstacles to its European Union accession.
With Athens in the midst of a financial crisis and needing
any economic lift and increased security it can find, this
unnecessary and still potentially dangerous conflict should
be resolved. A good strategy would be a synchronised set of
steps to prepare public opinion on both sides, leading to a
bilateral agreement and including, if needed, eventual recourse
to international adjudication.
Abstract: The political transitions in Egypt and Tunisia have rekindled
the interest in how states and societies have moved from authoritarian
regimes to democracy after overthrowing old regimes.
This report responds to that interest by providing a factual
overview of transitions to democracy of nine European states
between 1974 and 1991.
The states covered fall into two geographical regions:
Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe. The context
of transition in each of these regions was different. The transitions
in Southern Europe took place as mainly discrete events
with little influence of one country over another. In contrast,
there was a strong regional dynamic in Central and Eastern
Europe, where all transitions were influenced by Gorbachev’s
policies of perestroika and glasnost and the loosening of the
Soviet Union’s grip on its satellite states.
Abstract: Ban Ki Moon’s long awaited progress report on the negotiations in Cyprus did not come up with a final recommendation on how long the United Nations will be committed to engage in Cyprus. However, he warned that the UN would not continue indefinitely to spend efforts and money on a process that does not seem to render any progress. The underlying question is why so much time has been spent on a process that does not seem to be leading toward a successful conclusion.
In order to assess this question this ECMI Issue Brief #25 addresses a couple of interrelated questions, such as how a desired future solution should be devised for the respective communities. Is there a real desire to change the current political system on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community? Does the Turkish Cypriot community really wish to enter a multi-cultural political set-up in which it shall play a minority role albeit one that will include extensive participation rights? What are the interests of external actors, notably Turkey, the European Union and the United States of America? Finally, are there push factors that would make a solution possible or might there be an overarching interest that unites various actors in the secret desire to perpetuate the situation and preserve the so called “Cyprus Problem”?
Abstract: • The protection of asylum-seekers in Europe is dealt with under three principal bodies of law: the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, the law of the European Union and the soft law developed by the Council of Europe.
• Member states of the Council of Europe are also bound by the judgments of the European Convention on Human Rights; although the convention makes no reference to refugee protection, its provisions and the judgments of its court in Strasbourg impose important obligations on states in respect of asylum.
• The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 initiated the first phase of the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which aimed to harmonize refugee protection among member states while enabling them to meet their international obligations in that respect.
• The harmonizing measures adopted by the EU have been subject to severe criticism and the practices of member states reveal a systemic failure to comply with international refugee protection obligations.
• While there have been improvements in European refugee policy, significant challenges must be addressed before Europe can regain its reputation as a champion of the rights of the refugee. This is given particular urgency by recent events in North Africa, which may lead to large numbers of persons fleeing violence and disorder.
Abstract: With the Cyprus reunification negotiations under way since 2008 at an impasse, dramatic steps are needed. As the stalemate continues, the costs for Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and the European Union (EU) are growing. Neither Greek Cypriots nor Turkish Cypriots can fulfil their potential on an island whose future is divided, uncertain, militarised and facing new economic difficulties. Time is making it ever harder to reunify the island, divided politically since Greek Cypriots seized control of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963 and militarily since a Turkish invasion in 1974 created a Turkish Cypriot zone on its northern third. After nearly four decades, the sides remain far apart even on the meaning of the talks’ agreed goal, a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. While there has long been peace, and relative freedom to interact since 2003, trade and visits between the two communities across the Green Line are decreasing.
Lack of a settlement damages everyone’s interests and keeps frustrations high. More than 200,000 Cypriots are still internally displaced persons (IDPs), and Turkish troops remain in overwhelming force. Few outside the military command in Ankara know if there are 21,000 soldiers, as Turkey says, or 43,000, as Greek Cypriots claim – a dispute that is one indication among many of the distrust and lack of information. Crisis Group has detailed in four reports since 2006 how the interests of the 1.1 million Cypriots and outside parties would be best met with a comprehensive political settlement. This remains the ideal, but as it is unrealistic in the coming months, ICG proposes interim unilateral steps.
Abstract: Media, politics and the Cyprus Problem are the main themes of the present study. While
each topic on its own occupies an important place in the islandʼs daily life, the three are
very closely interrelated; political actors are, by far, the most prominent if not the almost
exclusive group on the media stage, and the Cyprus Problem is the main topic of discourse. All
developments and any references, whether significant or minimal, to aspects of the Problem,
become news items and give political party leaders and others the opportunity to access the
media and present their views and comments. However, issues related to the media in Cyprus
have been very little researched.
Our study focuses on the analysis of media content and discourses on television and in
newspapers on both sides of the dividing line. The material studied is the main television news
bulletin on Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot channels, broadcast in the evening; in the case of
newspapers, the focus is on editorials and leading news articles in the Turkish and Greek
language dailies. We chose to leave out English language newspapers given that they address a
public that could hardly compare to the readers of the other dailies.
The aim of this research is to examine how the media cover issues related to aspects of the
Cyprus Problem and political actors, the authorities and political parties. The main subjects of
interest are the nature of the Cyprus Problem and the envisaged or preferred solution, matters of
identity, representations about the other parties engaged in the conflict, positions vis-à-vis the
European Union, and the relationship with the authorities and political forces on each side. We
sought answers to questions related to the approaches and positions the media adopt, and their
views as these are expressed in editorials and comments, or that transpire between the lines as
hidden or implied meaning. In addition to describing the main features of media treatment of the
respective issues, we felt it was important to delve deeper and attempt to ascertain the underlying
values guiding media choices and approaches.
Abstract: This issue includes the following articles: AQAP’s Growing Security Threat to Saudi Arabia, by Caryle Murphy; Assessing AQI’s Resilience After April’s Leadership Decapitations, by Myriam Benraad; The Return of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Revival of the Mahdi Army, by Babak Rahimi; Indoctrinating Children: The Making of Pakistan’s Suicide Bombers, by Kalsoom Lakhani; The Third Way: A Paradigm for Influence in the Marketplace of Ideas, by Scott Helfstein; Still Fighting for Revolution: Greece’s New Generation of Terrorists, by George Kassimeris.
Abstract: Recent news updates from leading Greek media citing commentary and exclusive information from high-level police and security circles indicate that arrests are underway regarding domestic terrorist groups that have managed over the past 5 years to launch impressive attacks against a variety of state, diplomatic and police targets.
According to the reports there are indications that the Greek anti-terrorist unit and the Greek intelligence service have managed to acquire valuable information relating to the culprits of the attacks and several journalists have noted that arrests cannot be ruled out within the coming weeks.
The two most sought-after terrorist groups in Greece are the "Revolutionary Struggle" and the "Revolutionary Sect". The former appeared in late 2003 and has launched a series of attacks since then, the most important being the rocket attack against the US Embassy in Athens on January the 12th 2007. The latter appeared in early 2009 and has attacked a TV station, public buildings and fatally wounded an anti-terrorist police Sergeant in June this year.
The present article will provide several notes and information regarding the attack against the American Embassy in Athens, streaming from news reports at that time and public commentary thereafter in the Greek and international media.
Abstract: Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, nor is it likely to disappear anytime soon. It is not the exclusive domain of any single religion or ideology, nor do all terrorists come from the same socioeconomic class or share the same mental pathologies.1 In part, the diversity within contemporary terrorism is what makes it so great a challenge. This report describes, in great detail, the state of terrorism in Western countries over the course of 2008.
Before turning to terrorism events in the West during 2008 and key developments within Western countries’ legal systems, we are going to pinpoint a few broad trends—a few currents that run through the various incidents and cases that follow. As this report will show, concerns about the contemporary connection between criminal activities and terrorism are clear in Bulgaria, a country rife with organized crime. An April 2008 parliamentary report charged that profits from the country’s drug trade were channeled to Middle Eastern terrorist groups.
Abstract: This Synthesis Report extracts the main findings from seven EU Member State case studies surveyed under
the Capacity-Building and Training Cluster of the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP). Case studies were conducted
in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain in order to assess these countries’
capacities to meet EU spending targets for official development assistance (ODA) and to analyse the position of
peacebuilding within national ODA policies. Each case study analysed country-specific ODA policies by focusing
on institutional mechanisms and key actors in managing and implementing ODA; the role and capacity of civil
society organisations in influencing planning, implementation, and evaluation of ODA; and public awareness of
and support for ODA.
This report finds that international development cooperation has received growing attention during the last
decade in all surveyed case-study countries. New EU Member States in particular are striving to adhere to
their international commitments by further refining their ODA policies; enhancing the institutional structures
for managing and implementing ODA; and increasing cooperation with and consultation of civil society
organisations.
Abstract: Contrairement à une idée reçue, la France et le Royaume-Uni ne sont pas les seules puissances nucléaires en Europe. En effet, depuis 1954, dans le cadre de l’OTAN, les États-Unis stationnent des forces nucléaires dans plusieurs pays du continent. Reliques de la Guerre froide, ces forces devaient originellement faire face à la supériorité des troupes conventionnelles du pacte de Varsovie. De plus de 7 000 armes nucléaires tactiques, réparties dans une dizaine d’États européens au milieu des années 1970, l’arsenal n’a cessé de diminuer, à la suite de l’éclatement de l’URSS, pour parvenir au chiffre de 350 armes en 2007. Depuis le début de la décennie, la question de l’utilité de ces armements, et donc indirectement d’un possible retrait, est de plus en plus souvent évoquée.
En toute discrétion entre 2005 et 2008, les États-Unis ont dénucléarisé deux de leurs plus grandes bases européennes, Ramstein (Allemagne) et Lakenheath (Royaume-Uni). Elles abritaient au total 180 bombes nucléaires. Indéniablement, ce désarmement apporte un nouvel éclairage sur cette posture nucléaire de l’OTAN. À ce titre, les 240 bombes restantes ont sans doute définitivement perdu leur rôle militaire au profit d’un rôle politique. Les raisons de ce retrait ne se limitent pas seulement à des problèmes de sécurité dans ces bases. Non, d’autres problématiques comme l’évolution de l’Alliance atlantique, la politique de chacun des pays hôtes, le renouvellement des flottes à capacité duale, l’utilité stratégique, sans compter la pression de l’opinion publique soutenue par des organisations pacifistes, contribuent et vont contribuer à limiter ce stationnement d’armes. Désormais seuls l’Allemagne, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, l’Italie et la Turquie ont sur leur territoire des armes nucléaires américaines, mais pour combien de temps encore ? Demain, l’Europe va-t-elle être une zone libre d’armes nucléaires américaines ?
Abstract: On December 8, 2008, a young boy was shot dead by a policeman in a neighborhood of Athens, known for the conflicts that frequently take place there between anarchist groups and the police. The shooting followed an exchange of insults between two policemen and a group of teenagers. It is still unclear whether the policeman in question shot directly at the boy, i.e. with the intention to kill him, or whether he just shot in the air, hitting the boy accidentally.
An hour after the boy’s death, demonstrations started in Athens and soon spread to the rest of the country. Thousands of young people protested against the killing of one of their peers but also against the brutality of the police in general; in the margins of these demonstrations, shops were broken, cars were burnt, and stones were thrown at the police. The riots lasted for more than three days.
It is not the only time that the Greek police have abused its power in recent years. In a video shown in Greek television in 2007, Greek policemen obliged two young Albanians accused of robbery to hit each other in a police station; in another one, a group of policemen laughed as two prostitutes were forced to dance in front of them. But though these videos were a shock for Greek public opinion, this kind of police abuse is, unfortunately, not new and certainly not a Greek privilege. Yet, one rarely sees reactions of similar violence and intensity as those that shook Greece during the last month. There are much deeper causes to the anger of the Greek youth.
Abstract: Urban radicalism in Europe as portrayed by the recent riots in Athens is a constant worry of the European security services, since there is ample evidence of wider connections between radicals and terrorists.
There are two major themes to be looked upon. Firstly the relationship between the extreme-leftist terrorist groups that operate in the so-called "Mediterranean axis" - France, Italy, Greece and Spain - and secondly, the connection of these groups to Islamic extremists.
The radical - anarchist movement in Europe is pretty strong and well organized with thousands of loyal supporters. Back in 2005, the riots in Paris proved that the radicals and second-generation Muslim immigrants in France were able to form the political agenda of that time, although they were not successful in preventing Sarkozy’s ascendance to power 18 months later.
Abstract: Some 1,000 unaccompanied migrant children who have entered Greece in 2008 without parents or caregivers struggle to survive without any state assistance, Human Rights Watch said in a new report issued today. Although a member of the European Union, Greece flouts its most basic obligations when it comes to meeting the rights of these children, many of whom come from war-torn countries, including Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq, with special protection needs.
This 111-page report documents the plight of the majority of unaccompanied children who have entered Greece and end up in a daily fight for survival.
Abstract: Greece has been a recipient of international and European aid and assistance throughout the twentieth century.
It is only in the past decade that it has been transformed into a donor country. In recent years, Greece has
been very active in emergency humanitarian assistance and it has gradually developed official development
assistance (ODA) policies. Its current priority is to substantially increase the volume of its aid and further develop
an integrated and comprehensive approach to its ODA. In effect, Greece has a long road to cover to meet the
EU commitment of 0.51 percent of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2010.
Greece’s ODA programmes have been formulated through a top-down approach. Greek state authorities, and
particularly government officials and staff at the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), have formulated these
policies and priorities as a result of Greece’s international activity in the context of regional and international
organisations, which have largely influenced the country’s approach to development and human security. These
have created pull factors by making funding available for the implementation of projects and research on
peacebuilding, human security, the effects of climate change and the impact of these on more vulnerable groups.
As a result, there has been a growing space for action by Greek civil society on such issues, and a wider scope
to tap into the resources of the international epistemic communities in this field and raise public awareness of
these issues.
The rather recent change by Greece from recipient to donor has not yet translated, however, into a shift in
mentalities on the part of public opinion and civil society. Public opinion has not been a factor in pushing for
greater activity and responsibility on the part of Greek authorities on these issues so far. In effect, pressure from
below is in its infant stages. Civil society and the academic community have only become involved in these areas
in the past decade, but a budding NGO community has developed in this field.
There is undoubtedly a need for further capacity-building both within the Greek ODA system and among the
civil society sector. As regards the public authorities, there is a strong need for capacity-building in planning,
managing and assessing ODA – particularly as the volume of aid increases. This requires tapping into relevant
ODA knowledge and experience, and drawing from expertise and best practice from other Member States or from
the EU itself, in order to upgrade and improve the planning of ODA spending; the follow-up of relevant projects;
and impact assessment in the recipient societies, in order to further improve the next stages of ODA planning.
As regards the NGO community interested in development cooperation, poverty reduction and humanitarian
assistance, these actors need to improve their project management skills and be more proactive in suggesting
priority areas for ODA. This will enable them to participate more substantially in the policy process, contribute to
making ODA more transparent and better suited to the needs on the ground, and implement ODA programmes
more efficiently.
Abstract: Iraqis are currently the largest nationality group of asylum seekers lodging new claims in
the European Union (EU), and Greece has become their favored entry point. But Greece
does not want this role, nor do Iraqis appear to want to stay in Greece, but would prefer
to seek asylum in countries to the west and north. However, Iraqi asylum seekers find
themselves stuck in Greece. First, they can’t move onward because EU asylum law, via
the Dublin II regulation, normally requires asylum seekers to lodge their claims for
protection in the first EU country in which they set foot and they also can’t move back
home because of fear of war and persecution. They are almost never provided asylum in
Greece.
Most Iraqi refugees attempt to enter the EU via the Greek islands off the coast of Turkey
or by crossing the Evros River that marks Greece’s land border with Turkey. Despite having 1,170 kilometers of porous land borders and 18,400 kilometers of coastline,
including islands in close proximity to Turkey, Greek police and Coast Guard authorities
are zealous in their efforts to prevent irregular entry. In 2007, Greek police recorded
112,369 arrests for illegal entry or presence. However, Human Rights Watch believes this
is the tip of the iceberg. Many, perhaps most, of the apprehensions in the border region
are not recorded at all. Police in the Evros region (northeastern Greece) systematically arrest migrants on Greek
territory and detain them for a period of days without registering them. After rounding up
a sufficient number of migrants, the police take them to the Evros River at nightfall and
forcibly and secretly expel them to the Turkish side. The Turkish General Staff has
reported that Greece “unlawfully deposited at our borders” nearly 12,000 third-country
nationals between 2002 and 2007. Because this number only indicates those migrants
who the Turkish border authorities apprehended and registered and many evade arrest,
the actual number that Greece has summarily expelled is very likely to be higher.
Abstract: Two related, but distinct, phenomena have been attracting increasing attention: ethnic violence
and civil war. This interest is driven by two political developments: first, the decline of interstate
wars and the concomitant rise of internal or civil wars (David 1997); and second, the decline of
civil wars that are classified as “ideological” or class-based and the concomitant rise of conflicts
classified as ethnic (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Most research has focused on the causes of
ethnic civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 1999). We know far less about the dynamics of civil war
violence per se.
First, I introduce three conceptual distinctions: (a) between “violence” and “(violent) conflict,” (b)
between “violence in times of peace” and “violence in times of war,” and (c) between different
types of violence based on the intersection of two criteria: the purpose and the production of
violence. Second, I sketch a simple model of violence in civil war based on a corresponding
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. Third, I present preliminary systematic empirical
evidence from Greece. Because the data come from a civil war which lacked the kind of deep
ethnic, religious, and even class, cleavages deemed necessary for the eruption of large-scale
violence, this paper provides a warning against making attractive but problematic connections
between ethnic cleavages and high levels of violence. Likewise, this paper suggests that the
widespread perception of civil war violence as a random, chaotic, and anarchical process (first
suggested by Thucydides and Hobbes) or a phenomenon better (or even exclusively) approached
from the perspective of passions and emotions are not warranted.
Abstract: In this paper a particular strand of collaboration in occupied Greece is explored:
military or armed collaboration. The available evidence is reviewed and several
puzzles raised by armed collaboration in Greece are discussed: its geographical
distribution, size, timing, relation to prewar politics and cleavages, and the motivations
of officers and rank-and-file who served in collaborationist militias. A statistical
analysis is then presented using data from a regional study conducted in Greece by the
author. The article concludes with some general points about the theoretical framework
that best helps the analysis of the phenomenon and three key theoretical concepts are
underlined: indirect rule, civil war, and endogenous dynamics.
Abstract: This bulletin contains information about Amnesty International’s main concerns in Europe and
Central Asia between July and December 2007. Not every country in the region is reported on; only
those where there were significant developments in the period covered by the bulletin, or where
Amnesty International (AI) took specific action.
A number of individual country reports have been issued on the concerns featured in this bulletin.
References to these are made under the relevant country entry. In addition, more detailed
information about particular incidents or concerns may be found in Urgent Actions and News
Service Items issued by AI.
This bulletin is published by AI every six months.
Abstract: U.S. policymakers have made securing and maintaining foreign contributions
to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq a major priority since the preparation
period for the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. This report
highlights and discusses important changes in financial and personnel contributions
from foreign governments to Iraq since 2003.
To date, foreign donors have pledged an estimated $16.4 billion in grants and
loans for Iraq reconstruction, with most major pledges originating at a major donors'
conference in Madrid, Spain, in October 2003. However, only a small part of the
pledges have been committed or disbursed to the World Bank and United Nations
Development Group Trust Funds for Iraq. The largest non-U.S. pledges of grants
have come from Japan, the European Commission, the United Kingdom, Canada,
South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. The World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, Japan, and Saudi Arabia have pledged the most loans and export
credits.
Currently, 33 countries including the United States have some level of troops
on the ground in Iraq or supporting Iraq operations from nearby locations. Those
forces are working under the rubric of one of several organizations — the
Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I); or
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Currently, the largest
troop contributors, in addition to the United States, are the United Kingdom, Georgia,
Australia, South Korea, and Poland. Some of these key contributors have announced
their intention to reduce or withdraw their forces from Iraq during 2008. The total
number of non-U.S. coalition troop contributions has declined since the early
stabilization efforts, as other countries have withdrawn their contingents or
substantially reduced their size.
Abstract: Selon de nombreux observateurs, le pan-albanisme représente une menace sérieuse pour la stabilité des Balkans. Cent ans de frontières fluctuantes ont largement contribué à la dispersion des Albanais de souche à travers les Balkans: Kosovo, Serbie, Monténégro, Macédoine et Grèce. L'Armée de Libération du Kosovo (ALK), l'Armée Nationale de Libération (ANL) en Macédoine et d'autres groupes ont tous eu recours à la violence pour mieux faire valoir les droits des communautés albanaises. Mais jusqu'où vont leurs ambitions?
Les recherches d'ICG suggèrent que la notion de pan-albanisme est beaucoup plus nuancée et complexe que ne le laissent transparaître les portraits approximatifs dépeignant habituellement les Albanais comme étant simplement focalisés sur la création d'une Grande Albanie ou d'un Grand Kosovo. Il est instructif de s'apercevoir que le soutien populaire dont ont commencé à bénéficier l'ALK et l'ANL, respectivement au Kosovo et en Macédoine, est concomitant à l'abandon de leurs visées initiales nationalistes pan-albanaises au profit d'une revendication pour que leur propre peuple dispose de plus de droits. En appelant ouvertement à la création d'une "Grande Albanie", l'Armée Nationale Albanaise (ANA) n'a jamais réussi à s'octroyer une véritable crédibilité populaire. L'usage de la violence pour servir la cause d'une Grande Albanie ou celle de n'importe quelle expansion territoriale n'est pas plus politiquement populaire que moralement justifié.
Abstract: Alors que les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement européens s'apprêtent à entériner,
sous présidence française, un nouveau projet ambitieux de coopération avec
les pays de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée, la mer Noire s'impose comme le
second bassin maritime fondamental pour l'Union européenne. Initiative proposée
par la Commission européenne en avril 2007, la synergie de la mer Noire
reflète l'importance stratégique que revêt pour l'Union le Sud-Est du continent
après l'adhésion de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie. Cette synergie s'inscrit également
dans le cadre de la " Neue Ostpolitik " souhaitée par la présidence allemande
(à l'origine de l'initiative), qui entend donner une nouvelle impulsion aux
politiques européennes à l'Est.
Abstract: Agacés d’être perçus comme une menace, les États de la rive sud de la Méditerranée risquent d’opposer une fin de non-recevoir à la présidence française de l’Union européenne si celle-ci s’aventurait un peu trop ostensiblement sur ce terrain. Mais c’est bien de cela dont il s’agit, en partie, derrière ce vaste chantier.
Perverti et trop souvent invoqué de manière irréfléchie, le concept de sécurité reste néanmoins un objectif dont découle la réalisation concomitante des autres aspects du projet de la présidence française. L’idée de la sécurité n’existe pas sans les usages dont elle fait l’objet. Si la définition minimaliste de la
sécurité est « l’absence de menaces, ou de craintes de menaces, sur les valeurs centrales », reste à déterminer ce à quoi l’on se réfère : aux États membres, à l’Union méditerranéenne en tant que telle, aux individus qui composent les différentes populations ? Par ailleurs, à quelles menaces s’agit-il de faire
face : les menaces militaires et/ou non militaires (économiques, environnementales, pertes d’identité…) ? Bien qu’elles puissent apparaître comme le fruit d’une construction intellectuelle sans fondement concret, ces questions sont au coeur du projet d’Union de la Méditerranée comme elles
ont été le fondement des multiples initiatives de part et d’autre de la « mare
nostrum ». L’absence d’entente entre les parties prenantes sur l’étendue que doit couvrir ce volet risque de faire de l’Union méditerranéenne, au mieux une construction institutionnelle parmi d’autres, au pire un échec de plus dans cette région du monde, avec les conséquences humaines que l’on devine.
Abstract: La présente évaluation de la politique des vingt-sept pays membres de l’Union
européenne en faveur des droits de l’Homme répond au développement récent des
« investissements éthiques », constitués pour une grand part d’actions d’entreprises privées, mais également d’obligations d’Etat. C’est cette partie « obligataire » dont il s’agit ici d’éclairer les fondements dans une perspective « éthique », dans l’optique de favoriser les investissements dans les Etats menant une politique plus active de promotion des droits de l’homme. Cette étude s’inscrit dans la continuité des études élaborées en 2001, 2003 et 2005.
Abstract: President Sarkozy has recently said that France may re-integrate into NATO's military command. This abrupt change in French policy opens doors to a much-needed improvement in EU-NATO relations. The two institutions have been barely co-operating on important missions like Kosovo, which leaves Europe ill-prepared for security challenges on its borders. But for the EU and NATO to really turn a corner, the UK must first agree with France how independent from the US, Europe's defences should become. The US will need to give France command posts in NATO, and Turkey will have to drop its opposition to Cyprus' co-operation with the alliance.
