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Abstract: Ten years after signature of the Ohrid Framework Agreement - OFA - that ended fighting between the country’s ethnic Albanians and Macedonians, much of the agreement has been implemented, and a resumption of armed conflict is unlikely. Macedonia is justified in celebrating its success in integrating minorities into political life, but inter-party and inter-ethnic tensions have been growing for five years. While this part of the Balkans looks to eventual EU membership to secure stability, it remains fragile, and worrying trends – rising ethnic Macedonian nationalism, state capture by the prime minister and his party, decline in media and judicial independence, increased segregation in schools and slow decentralisation – risk undermining the multi-ethnic civil state Macedonia can become. Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, who has just formed a new government, should work closely with his Albanian coalition partners and opposition parties to pass and implement the measures needed for more democratisation, inter-ethnic reconciliation and a solution to the name dispute with Greece.
Abstract: The big-picture issues at the crossroads of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding were taken up by the Security Council in September 2010, under the presidency of Turkey. Leading up to that discussion, Turkey held numerous bilateral consultations, and, with the support of IPI, organized an expert meeting on these issues in New York in May 2010 and an informal retreat in Istanbul for members of the Council in June 2010.
This publication is intended to document some of that process, and includes the Statement by the President of the Security Council, the outcome summary of the June retreat, and the set of papers that were presented there. Three of these papers draw lessons from the UN’s experiences in different areas of the world (Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the Great Lakes region of Africa), and one paper analyzes cross-cutting themes.
Table of Contents:
Introduction, Francesco Mancini
Meeting Note
Security Council Istanbul Retreat: At The Crossroads of Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding
Adam C. Smith and Vanessa Wyeth, Rapporteurs
Discussion Papers
Peacemaking In Afghanistan: A Role For The United Nations?
Gerard Russell
The Security Council And Peacekeeping In The Balkans, 1992-2010
Richard Gowan and Daniel Korski
The Great Lakes of Africa (Burundi, The Drc, And The LRA-Affected Areas)
François Grignon
Composite Paper on Cross-Cutting Themes
International Peace Institute
Annex
Statement by the President of the Security Council
Abstract: This report compiles the latest evidence of European countries' complicity in the CIA's programmes in the context of the fight against terrorism in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA.
"The EU has utterly failed to hold member states accountable for the abuses they've committed," said Nicolas Beger, Director of Amnesty International's European Institutions Office.
"These abuses occurred on European soil. We simply can't allow Europe to join the US in becoming an 'accountability-free' zone. The tide is slowly turning with some countries starting investigations but much more needs to be done." Intergovernmental organizations such as the Council of Europe, the European Union and the UN have been at the forefront of investigating human rights violations associated with the CIA rendition and secret detention programmes.
Following disclosures in their reports, inquiries into state complicity or legal processes aimed at individual responsibility took place or are currently in progress in countries such as Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Abstract: The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen increasing interest in the related issues of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The death toll and associated costs of major military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and lengthy conflicts or insurgencies in many other states and regions – including Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sri Lanka, India, Israel-Palestine, the Caucasus, Central Asia and parts of South America – have highlighted the need for a more strategic approach to preventing conflict. Research suggesting that as many as 40 per cent of states fall back into conflict within 10 years of violence ending also indicates that a great deal more needs to be done to ensure that temporary cessations of hostility are transformed into sustainable peace settlements.
Despite the obvious benefits of attempting to defuse potential conflicts before they emerge, policymakers have found it hard to sell the idea of putting time and money into addressing latent hostilities that may never become violent. This is partly because it is difficult to provide empirical evidence for the efficacy of these measures, and partly because examples of successful conflict prevention tend to be under-reported by governments and the media.
A different set of challenges present themselves when it comes to peacebuilding. Efforts to resolve conflict and rebuild societies that are capable of withstanding future shocks are often drawn-out processes that require sustained commitment from a range of actors who have overlapping – but sometimes competing – objectives. Without a clear consensus about the best way to support peace processes, external players may exacerbate conflicts rather than help to end them. These problems of strategy may also be compounded by straitened global financial circumstances, which have left many countries with fewer resources to spend on lengthy peacebuilding processes.
This briefing paper draws out some of the lessons learned about conflict prevention and peacebuilding through the work of ippr’s Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. It draws heavily on four published case study reports on conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, as well as the findings presented in the Commission’s interim and final reports. The report seeks to identify those lessons that will be most relevant to governments and international organisations, and argues that in spite of the difficulties described above, there is still a compelling case for policymakers investing more political and financial capital in both conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
Abstract: The break-up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was followed by a series of bloody and protracted conflicts. Throughout the 1990s the Balkans were engulfed by inter-ethnic violence of such a magnitude as to prompt unprecedented international intervention in the region. In contrast to its neighbours, however, and despite the hostility of its surroundings, Macedonia escaped the conflict of the post-Cold War decade. Moreover, although the country suffered a violent inter-ethnic crisis in 2001, it has made substantial progress over the past eight years to the extent that Macedonia now stands at the gateway to both the European Union and NATO.
That Macedonia has made the transition from Yugoslav republic to independent state relatively smoothly is due in no small part to the sustained preventive engagement of international actors in the country. Of course, some substantial challenges still remain and the country has not, as yet, emerged from the shadow of the 2001 conflict. Nonetheless, the range of activities undertaken by the international community in Macedonia since its independence has no doubt helped to prevent protracted violent conflict from taking hold.
This report presents a rundown and analysis of conflict prevention in Macedonia. First, however, it presents a brief overview of background material on the country for the reader not familiar with Macedonia and its circumstances.
Abstract: The Security Council today extended the terms of the judges serving on the United Nations war crimes tribunals set up to deal with the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, so they can complete remaining cases by the deadline set for the courts’ work.
The Council, in two separate resolutions that were adopted unanimously, urged both tribunals “to take all possible measures to complete their work expeditiously,” and expressed its determination to support their efforts in this regard.
The so-called “completion strategy” of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which is based in The Hague, requires it to finish trials of first instance by 2009, and then start downsizing in 2010.
Among the decisions taken today, the Council extended the term of office of eight permanent judges at the ICTY and 10 ad litem, or temporary, judges until 31 December 2010, or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned.
In addition, the Council decided, on the request of the President of the ICTY, that the Secretary-General may appoint additional temporary judges to complete existing trials or conduct additional trials.
Abstract: It has been 10 years since the U.S.-led war on Yugoslavia. For many leading Democrats, including some in top positions in the Obama administration, it was a "good" war, in contrast to the Bush administration's "bad" war on Iraq. And though the suffering and instability unleashed by the 1999 NATO military campaign wasn't as horrific as the U.S. invasion of Iraq four years later, the war was nevertheless unnecessary and illegal, and its political consequences are far from settled.
Unless there's a willingness to critically re-examine the war, the threat of another war in the name of liberal internationalism looms large.
Abstract: Forced Migration Review (FMR) provides a
forum for the regular exchange of practical
experience, information and ideas between
researchers, refugees and internally
displaced people, and those who work with
them. It is published in English, Arabic,
Spanish and French by the Refugee Studies
Centre of the Oxford Department of
International Development, University
of Oxford. This issue focuses on 'Statelessness'. A ‘stateless person’ is someone who is not recognised as a national by any state.
They therefore have no nationality or citizenship (terms used interchangeably in
this issue) and are unprotected by national legislation, leaving them vulnerable
in ways that most of us never have to consider. The possible consequences of
statelessness are profound and touch on all aspects of life. It may not be possible
to work legally, own property or open a bank account. Stateless people may be
easy prey for exploitation as cheap labour. They are often not permitted to attend
school or university, may be prohibited from getting married and may not be able to
register births and deaths. Stateless people can neither vote nor access the national
justice system.
Abstract: The Security Council today called on the United Nations war crimes tribunals dealing with the 1994 Rwanda genocide and the Balkans conflicts of the 1990s to conduct their trials as quickly and efficiently as possible, and pledged to support their efforts to complete their work.
The 15-member body noted with concern “that the deadline for completion of trial activities at first instance has not been met and that the Tribunals have indicated that their work is not likely to end in 2010,” in a statement read out by Ambassador Neven Juric of Croatia, which holds the Council Presidency for the month of December.
Abstract: Le Conseil de sécurité a demandé vendredi aux États, en particulier ceux où des fugitifs sont soupçonnés de vivre en toute liberté, d'« intensifier encore leur coopération » avec le Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) et le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR).
Dans une déclaration lue par le président du Conseil pour le mois de décembre, Neven Jurica (Croatie), le Conseil leur demande également de fournir aux deux Tribunaux « toute l'aide nécessaire, en tant que de besoin », en particulier aux fins de l'arrestation et de la remise à ceux-ci de « tous les accusés encore en fuite ».
Le Conseil se dit « préoccupé de constater que la date limite fixée pour l'achèvement des procès de première instance n'est pas respectée » et que les Tribunaux ont indiqué qu'ils avaient peu de chances d'achever leurs travaux en 2010. Il souligne que « les procès doivent se dérouler avec la plus grande rapidité et la plus grande efficacité possibles ».
Abstract: A Survey and Analysis of Border Management and Border Apprehension Data from 20 States.
With a Special Survey on the Use of Counterfeit Documents.
Based on the contributions of the border services of 20 Central and Eastern European states, the 2006 Yearbook again provides its valuable overview and analysis of irregular migration trends in the region. Over the past ten years the annual Yearbook on Illegal Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe has come to be regarded as an authoritative source of information on recent border trends and in particular on the phenomena of illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking. The annual Yearbook covers the most recent trends in illegal migration and human smuggling in the region, including long-term trends in border apprehensions, shifts in source, transit and destination countries, demographic characteristics of irregular migrants, the relationship between legal and illegal border crossings, new developments in the methods of border crossings and document abuse and on removals of irregular migrants. In addition, this year’s edition for the first time features a Special Survey on the use of counterfeit documents for illegal migration purposes. This Survey is based on the contributions received from document specialists or Special Units dealing with document security in the countries under review and provides the first comprehensive overview and analysis of patterns and trends in the use of counterfeit documents for illegal migration purposes in Central and Eastern Europe.
Abstract: November 2005 marked the 10th anniversary when in Dayton, Ohio, the
conflict parties from Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed on a peace accord,
stopping a war that had caused 250.000 deaths and two million refugees.
After the UN-brokered ceasefires and peace agreements in the conflict in
Croatia, the Dayton Framework Agreement was the first in a long line of
peace plans with which the International Community attempted to
transform the chaotic and antagonistic region of the Western Balkans
towards a more peaceful and co-operative area in the late 1990s and
early 2000s.
Comparable to the Dayton/Paris accords, which seek to preserve the
unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina by creating two entities, the Bosniak-
Croat Federation and the Serb Republika Srpska, stands the UN master
plan for Kosovo that was defined by a military-technical agreement and
the ensuing the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999.
Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, where none of the conflict parties had
lost or won the war in a military sense, the Kosovo Albanians – with the
support of the NATO air strikes – had clearly won the war against the
Serbs. This fact has had deep implications on the Kosovo peace process
and on today’s relationship between the Albanian majority and the Serb
minority.
In Southern Serbia and in Macedonia (FYROM), the International
Community could prevent the fighting from spreading into a full-fledged
civil war in 2001, between Serbs, Macedonians and Albanians through
the Ohrid Agreement.
Also in the case of Serbia and Montenegro the process of nationbuilding
still influences political stability and interethnic relations. The
Belgrade Agreement that was reached under the mediation of the
European Union in March 2002 was not able to stop the disintegration of the state union. In May 2006 the majority of the Montenegrin electorate
in a referendum voted for Montenegro’s independence of Serbia.
The year 2006 finds the Western Balkan countries at a crossroad; some
have taken the road toward Euro-Atlantic institutions; others seem to
keep on being involved in ethnic and political conflicts. To prevent such
a scenario of a divided and fragmented Western Balkan region it is
important to discuss the issue, whether the peace plans, which represent
the basis for the stabilisation process, are up-to-date, and which are the
lessons to be learned from them.
This study includes the results of a workshop held by the working group
Regional Stability in Southeast Europe of the PfP Consortium of
Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes in Reichenau,
Austria in May 2006. The case studies presented in this study
concentrate especially on the following questions:
• What are the main reasons for the varying success in implementing
the peace plans (internal and external factors)?
• How strong are the peace plans interlinked?
• Do the peace plans contribute to regional stability?
• Is it necessary to rework or re-launch the peace plans?
• What should these changes look like?
The second part of this study deals with the role of important
international factors in helping to implement the peace plans. In this
regard especially, the changing role of the OSCE, the EU and the US in
the process of peace-building is reflected.
Abstract: Does the progress of the ‘Ohrid Process’ mean in the same time the
progress of Macedonia? The short answer from today’s perspective
would be yes. It does not mean that in Macedonia the conflict and its
consequences are forgotten. The recent conflict in Macedonia has made
the road to NATO and the EU more difficult. Years were lost for conflict
resolution and rehabilitation. Instead of benefiting from the peaceful
transition from the turbulent regional events, Macedonia was
unnecessarily interwoven in the regional security puzzle. The Kosovo
crisis was one of the key factors that led to the spillover of instability
into Macedonia. But the international community could not allow
another Bosnia in the area where it is far more dangerous to light a fire.
The international community, led by the EU and the U.S. especially,
reacted.
So far Macedonia has gained from the implementation of the Framework
Agreement and subsequent constitutional amendments. Perhaps it is now
on the path to building a functional multi-ethnic society. This is an
important precondition for peaceful balance in society. Macedonia made
significant progress towards stability and ethnic reconciliation after the
conflict. People today do not speak about security and ethnic tensions
but instead they seek jobs and ways how to escape from poverty.44 Local
problems are on the agenda having in mind that the “macro-political
questions” are resolved. Southeast European States have the same
pathway: NATO and EU. Macedonia is no different. Fifteen years ago many things were unclear and the future of that part of the continent was
uncertain.
Abstract: The origins of this article, and the book from which it derives, lie in
the largely unanticipated end of the Cold War in 1989-90, when I had
the good fortune to be a William C. Foster Fellow at the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This fellowship included
serving as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) within the
context of the (then) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), based in Vienna, Austria. The CSCE, now the OSCE, is the
world’s pre-eminent regional peace and security organization
comprising former enemies of the Cold War (NATO and Warsaw Pact)
and the neutral and nonaligned of Europe.
The end of the Cold War provided opportunities and challenges for
reshaping international peace and security into a “New World Order” in
which the former Cold War foes could collaborate on global problemsolving
to the benefit of all. Having become aware of the CSCE’s
contribution to ending the Cold War (see Leatherman, 2003) as part of
the experience of serving as a diplomat on the U.S. Delegation to the
CSBMs Negotiations, I was intrigued by the possibility that the CSCE
could play a useful role in realizing this goal of a “New World Order.”
Regrettably, the end of the Cold War also provided opportunities for
parts of Europe, particularly the Balkans, to descend into brutal
genocidal warfare.
Abstract: More than any other region, over the past fifteen years Southeast Europe
has both reflected and impacted the broader state of transatlantic, and in
particular United States-European Union, relations. During this period,
the level of U.S. focus and engagement in region has waxed and waned.
Strong American focus and leadership have alternated with
disengagement and deference to EU initiatives according to a four- to
five-year cycle. Without fully reversing the current decade’s dynamic of
“Europeanization”, the past year has seen a resurgence of U.S. activism.
The extent and duration of this latest pendulum swing will depend on
developments both inside and outside the region.
Abstract: As the recent commemoration of Srebrenica has put in stark contrast,
over the past decade the EU has evidently come a long way in defining,
implementing and upholding its strategic vision for the Balkans.
Handling the independence of Croatia and Slovenia was not the heyday
of European policy coordination with the naiveté of the Dutch
government eager to take the credit for solving the post-Yugoslav crisis
in its presidency and the Franco-German wariness. In the early days of
Eastern enlargement Paris had insisted on multilateral regionalism as a
model for stabilisation, whereas Bonn favoured bilateral conditionality.
Conversely, in the Balkans France banked on individual solutions,
whereas Germany opted for regional holistic strategies. Additionally,
European coherence was hampered by the standoff between those
rejecting post-Yugoslav federal constructions and those offering national
self-determination. Between 1995 and 1999 Europe has mastered a steep
learning curve – from the ethnocentric and dysfunctional Dayton model
to the more realistic and workable Ohrid model, from the adhockery of
the Bosnian conflict to the concerted conflict-management in Kosovo
and Macedonia five years later. In 1999, in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo War, the
International Community laid out its strategic principles and objectives
for the Western Balkans region, five in total (not necessarily in this
order): • regionalism, multilateral relations and the instigation of regional
cooperation;
• conditionality as the bilateral basis for status vis-à-vis the EU and
access to preferential treatment;
• separation of the agendas of integration, transformation and
stabilisation;
• the European perspective; and
• standards before status.
The European principle of regionalism was enshrined in the June 1999
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. After drawing some heavy fire
in 2001-2002, the Stability Pact has now scaled down its ambitions,
prioritised its objectives and found its niche in the international
framework for Kosovo and the Balkans. The principle of regionalism,
however, by and large lost out to conditionality.
Abstract: Armed violence data gathering systems in SEE countries vary in quality and coverage of the population. No single
country embodies best practices by itself. In existing research, because of the lack of continuous monitoring,
data has sometimes been generated by research that attempts to recover information on armed violence
retrospectively. Different methods for doing this offer differing degrees of reliability; analysis of media reports
and perceptions surveys offer an important substitute for continuously gathered data, but are unreliable for a
number of reasons. Other studies have been obliged to recover data from past records, which were not designed
for storing data specifically on armed violence. In other cases, individual institutions have conducted their own
data gathering, and have supplied useful fragments of a comprehensive picture of the problem. The conclusion of this report offers a starting point for those SEE countries that wish to develop a system through
healthcare providers to monitor armed violence. Following the approach of the WHO to injury prevention, it would
be possible to build a system in each country that would adequately monitor the level of armed violence and
identify the social determinants of the problem. If regional countries wish to harmonise their data collection
systems, a collaborative consultation involving all stakeholders (particularly those operating the system, and
those wishing to use the resulting information) would be an appropriate next step.
Abstract: This bulletin contains information about Amnesty International’s main concerns in Europe and
Central Asia between July and December 2007. Not every country in the region is reported on; only
those where there were significant developments in the period covered by the bulletin, or where
Amnesty International (AI) took specific action.
A number of individual country reports have been issued on the concerns featured in this bulletin.
References to these are made under the relevant country entry. In addition, more detailed
information about particular incidents or concerns may be found in Urgent Actions and News
Service Items issued by AI.
This bulletin is published by AI every six months.
Abstract: The fifteenth annual report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia covers the period from 1 August 2007 to 31 July 2008.
During the reporting period, the Tribunal continued to adopt concrete measures
aimed at increasing the efficiency of trial and appeal proceedings. For the first time
in the history of the Tribunal, eight trials were conducted simultaneously by the three
Trial Chambers, including three multi-accused trials involving 18 accused. In
addition, the Appeals Chamber issued a record number of decisions, including six
judgements in the past year and three in the last six months.
Proceedings before the Tribunal focused on the most senior-level individuals
accused of the most serious crimes. All low- and mid-level accused have been
referred back to the courts of the region pursuant to rule 11 bis.
The Tribunal also hosted an increasing number of working visits and training
programmes for courts in the region in order to ensure the preservation of its legacy
through the prosecution of war crimes cases by domestic courts. Serge Brammertz was appointed Prosecutor in January 2008, replacing Carla
Del Ponte. He concentrated his efforts on securing the arrest of the remaining
fugitives. Stojan Župljanin and Radovan Karadžić were arrested and transferred to
the seat of the Tribunal in June and July 2008, respectively. The failure to arrest the
remaining two fugitives, Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić, remains of grave concern
to the Tribunal.
The Office of the Prosecutor strengthened its relations with prosecutors and
courts in the region through training sessions, conferences and seminars. The Office
of the Prosecutor also worked closely with the governments of the States of the
former Yugoslavia in order to improve their relationships with the Tribunal.
The Registry continued to play a crucial role in the provision of administrative
and judicial support. During the reporting period, the Registrar, under the authority
of the President, also assisted in the identification of residual issues, including
possible residual mechanisms. The Registry continued negotiations for the relocation
of witnesses and enforcement of sentence agreements, successfully concluding three
new agreements.
The Outreach Programme carried out a diverse range of activities with a view
to increasing the profile of the Tribunal and bringing its judgements to the relevant
communities. Court Management Services supported 12 trials and maintained all
relevant documentation. The Victim and Witnesses Section assisted numerous
witnesses and accompanying persons in The Hague and continued its work in
relocating protected witnesses. The Office of Legal Aid continued to support the assignment of Defence
Counsel to accused at the Tribunal. It also addressed requests to facilitate the selfrepresentation
of high-profile accused.
The Human Resources Section recruited 76 staff in the Professional and higher
categories and 124 General Service staff. The section oversaw the administration of a
total of 1,146 staff members.
To date, the Tribunal has concluded proceedings against 114 accused out of the
161 indicted. The report that follows details the activities of the Tribunal during the
reporting period and illustrates the Tribunal’s unwavering commitment to meeting
the completion strategy targets without sacrificing due process.
Abstract: Le quinzième rapport annuel du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-
Yougoslavie couvre la période comprise entre le 1er août 2007 et le 31 juillet 2008.
Au cours de la période considérée, le Tribunal a continué d’adopter des
mesures concrètes pour accroître l’efficacité des procédures en première instance et
en appel. Pour la première fois dans l’histoire du Tribunal, les trois Chambres de
première instance ont mené huit procès de front, dont trois procès à accusés
multiples concernant 18 accusés. En outre, la Chambre d’appel a rendu un nombre
record de décisions, notamment six arrêts, dont trois au cours des six derniers mois.
Le Tribunal a concentré son action sur les principaux responsables des crimes
les plus graves. Tous les accusés de rang intermédiaire ou subalterne ont été déférés
aux autorités des pays de l’ex-Yougoslavie en application de l’article 11 bis du
Règlement de procédure et de preuve (le « Règlement »).
Le Tribunal a également organisé un plus grand nombre de visites de travail et
de programmes de formation au profit des magistrats des juridictions de l’ex-
Yougoslavie pour préserver son héritage et permettre à ces juridictions de poursuivre
les auteurs de crimes de guerre.
En janvier 2008, Serge Brammertz a été nommé Procureur du Tribunal,
remplaçant à ce poste Carla Del Ponte. Il s’est employé avant tout à obtenir
l’arrestation des accusés encore en fuite. Stojan Župljanin et Radovan Karadžić ont
été appréhendés et transférés au siège du Tribunal en juin et juillet 2008. Le fait que
les deux autres fugitifs, Ratko Mladić et Goran Hadžić, n’ont pas encore été
appréhendés demeure très préoccupant.
Le Bureau du Procureur a renforcé ses liens avec les parquets et les juridictions
nationales grâce à des programmes de formation, des séminaires et des conférences.
Il a également travaillé en étroite collaboration avec les autorités des pays de l’ex-
Yougoslavie afin d’améliorer les relations entre celles-ci et le Tribunal.
Le Greffe a continué de jouer un rôle essentiel en fournissant au Tribunal un
appui administratif et judiciaire. Au cours de la période considérée, le Greffier s’est
employé, sous l’autorité du Président, à identifier les fonctions résiduelles du
Tribunal et à réfléchir aux structures qui pourraient les remplir. Le Greffe a
également continué de mener des négociations en vue de la conclusion d’accords
concernant la réinstallation des témoins et l’exécution des peines. Trois nouveaux
accords ont été conclus.
Le Programme de sensibilisation a mené un grand nombre d’activités visant à
mieux faire connaître le Tribunal et ses décisions aux communautés de la région. La
Section d’administration et d’appui judiciaire a préparé et organisé 12 procès en
première instance et a enregistré et conservé tous les documents du Tribunal. La
Section d’aide aux victimes et aux témoins a apporté son soutien à de nombreux témoins et accompagnateurs venus à La Haye et a continué d’oeuvrer à la
réinstallation des témoins protégés.
Le Bureau de l’aide juridictionnelle et des questions liées à la détention a
continué de régler les questions concernant la commission de conseils de la défense.
En outre, il a dû répondre aux demandes d’accusés connus ayant choisi d’assurer
eux-mêmes leur défense.
Durant la période considérée, la Section des ressources humaines a recruté 76
administrateurs ou hauts fonctionnaires et 124 agents des services généraux. Elle a
supervisé l’administration d’un total de 1 146 fonctionnaires.
À ce jour, 114 accusés sur 161 ont été définitivement jugés par le Tribunal. Le
présent rapport décrit en détail les activités que le Tribunal a menées au cours de la
période considérée et montre que le Tribunal est fermement résolu à respecter les
échéances fixées par la stratégie d’achèvement de ses travaux sans pour autant
sacrifier les garanties de procédure.
Abstract: Radovan Karadžić, the former Bosnian Serb leader, was arrested by the Serb authorities in July 2008 and then transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, where he remains in custody awaiting trial. Questions answered include: 1. What charges does Karadžić face? 2. Why will Karadžić’s trial take place in The Hague instead of Bosnia-Herzegovina? 3. When will the trial begin and how long will it last? 4. Karadžić has said he wants to defend himself rather than be assisted by lawyers. Can he indeed do so? 5. Who are the judges and prosecutors? 6. Is the ICTY hearing any cases other than that of Radovan Karadžić? 7. What will happen to the trial if former General Ratko Mladić is also extradited to the Tribunal? Could Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić be tried together? 8. The trial of Slobodan Milošević lasted for more than four years and ended with Milosevic’s death, before the court reached a verdict. How can the court avoid a similar scenario? 9. Some say that the ICTY is due to close down in 2010. What happens to the trial if it is not completed by then? 10. Who pays for the operation of the court? How much does it cost a year?
Abstract: The author provides a short history and a general overview of the situation and trends in the three
most vibrant and resilient sectors of organized crime in the Western Balkans – illicit drugs, weapons,
and human trafficking – and aims to assess the government’s efforts (or the lack of it). The author
provides also recommendations for the future. He concludes that the three main sectors of organized
crime activities – trafficking in drugs, human beings, and weapons – are intertwined, and all three are
deeply embedded in the pervasive culture of corruption in the region and that there is no
comprehensive strategy to address the problem, neither locally, nor in the EU, although organized
crime in the Western Balkans is widely recognized as the main threat against stability in the region
and in Europe.
Abstract: The aim of the article is to highlight the ways in which transnational organised crime in the Western
Balkans developed and is developing, on the one hand, and some problems of combating transnational
organized crime on the other. For that purpose the author analyses the development and challenges of
criminal investigation trends in the Western Balkans and Slovenia, and reviewed literature and other
sources to identify main problems and try to find some answers. If new technologies are being used
(misused) for criminal purposes, then it is logical to use them in the field of criminal justice, that is,
for the purpose of the scientific suppression of crime. In that sense, professional education of judges,
prosecutors, attorneys and police should include knowledge of criminalistics, which is not the case in
all transitional countries. From all above stated facts it is important to analyse transitional crime
problems in the Western Balkans that we can plan for the future. In conclusion, the author examines
certain measures that expose failures and suggests some answers to the questions in connection with
the fight on transnational organised crime in the Western Balkans. The diffuse nature and complexity
of the problem should not reduce the countries’ determination to counter it, for that alone would result
in failure.
Abstract: Selon de nombreux observateurs, le pan-albanisme représente une menace sérieuse pour la stabilité des Balkans. Cent ans de frontières fluctuantes ont largement contribué à la dispersion des Albanais de souche à travers les Balkans: Kosovo, Serbie, Monténégro, Macédoine et Grèce. L'Armée de Libération du Kosovo (ALK), l'Armée Nationale de Libération (ANL) en Macédoine et d'autres groupes ont tous eu recours à la violence pour mieux faire valoir les droits des communautés albanaises. Mais jusqu'où vont leurs ambitions?
Les recherches d'ICG suggèrent que la notion de pan-albanisme est beaucoup plus nuancée et complexe que ne le laissent transparaître les portraits approximatifs dépeignant habituellement les Albanais comme étant simplement focalisés sur la création d'une Grande Albanie ou d'un Grand Kosovo. Il est instructif de s'apercevoir que le soutien populaire dont ont commencé à bénéficier l'ALK et l'ANL, respectivement au Kosovo et en Macédoine, est concomitant à l'abandon de leurs visées initiales nationalistes pan-albanaises au profit d'une revendication pour que leur propre peuple dispose de plus de droits. En appelant ouvertement à la création d'une "Grande Albanie", l'Armée Nationale Albanaise (ANA) n'a jamais réussi à s'octroyer une véritable crédibilité populaire. L'usage de la violence pour servir la cause d'une Grande Albanie ou celle de n'importe quelle expansion territoriale n'est pas plus politiquement populaire que moralement justifié.
Abstract: Les organisations de défense des droits de l’homme et les associations qui luttent contre l’impunité dans les Balkans rendent public aujourd’hui un manifeste commun pour s’élever contre le projet de fermeture prématurée du Tribunal Pénal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) avant que les principaux criminels de guerre aient été jugés.
