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Abstract: Spotlight on Armenia examines a country that has had to grapple with huge economic, political and
security challenges in the two decades since independence. While recognising progress in some areas it
argues that the pace of reform has been slow, much better on paper than in practice, and that this is
undermining the hopes and aspirations of the Armenian people. It has identified three key areas: judicial
independence, media freedom and democratic development that are most in need of urgent reform but
the editor and authors have addressed a range of other challenges. The publication argues it is essential
for the international community to provide adequate incentives, pressure and monitoring to ensure that
the progress of reform is hastened. To this end it makes a number of recommendations for Armenia and
its international partners.
Abstract: An arms race, escalating front-line clashes, vitriolic war
rhetoric and a virtual breakdown in peace talks are increasing
the chance Armenia and Azerbaijan will go back
to war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Preventing this is urgent.
Increased military capabilities on both sides would make
a new armed conflict in the South Caucasus far more
deadly than the 1992-1994 one that ended with a shaky
truce. Neither side would be likely to win easily or quickly.
Regional alliances could pull in Russia, Turkey and Iran.
Vital oil and gas pipelines near the front lines would be
threatened, as would the cooperation between Russia and
Turkey that is central to regional stability. Another refugee
crisis would be likely. To start reversing this dangerous
downward trend, the opposing sides should sign a
document on basic principles for resolving the conflict
peacefully and undertake confidence-building steps to
reduce tensions and avert a resumption of fighting.
There has been significant deterioration over the past year.
Neither government is planning an all-out offensive in the
near term, but skirmishes that already kill 30 people a
year could easily spiral out of control. It is unclear if the
leaders in Yerevan and Baku thoroughly calculate the potential
consequences of a new round of tit-for-tat attacks.
Ambiguity and lack of transparency about operations
along the line of contact, arms deals and other military
expenditures and even the state of the peace talks all contribute
to a precarious situation. Monitoring mechanisms
should be strengthened and confidence-building steps
implemented to decrease the chance of an accidental war.
Abstract: Over 586,000 people remain internally displaced in Azerbaijan after the Nagorno-Karabakh war
ended with a ceasefire in 1994. The figure includes approximately 230,000 children born to internally
displaced people (IDPs) since they fled their homes. Insecurity near the line of contact with
Armenia continues to disrupt the livelihoods of IDPs and others who live nearby.
IDPs’ main concern, however, is their inadequate living conditions. Many still live in dilapidated
public buildings and makeshift accommodation, some with poor security of tenure. The government
has resettled some IDPs into new, purpose-built settlements, but while these offer better
conditions, they are often far from neighbouring towns and offer insufficient access to services,
jobs or livelihoods. Most IDPs have yet to benefit from this scheme and there is increasing disparity
in the living conditions of IDPs.
IDPs are more often unemployed than their non-displaced neighbours and the majority continue
to depend on government benefits as their main source of income. Limited finances prevent
some from accessing health care services and education despite provisions ensuring their free
access. IDPs continue to suffer mental health issues relating to their displacement and experiences
during the war, and there is a lack of appropriate and affordable support. Specific and expanded
measures are required to improve their self-reliance and decrease the pattern of dependency.
Return remains the preferred settlement option for many IDPs and for the government. Some
younger IDPs, however, say they would prefer to stay in their current places of residence even if
return were a viable option. While the government has allocated significant attention and resources
to improving the lives of IDPs, a better national response would entail efforts to engage
IDPs on issues that affect them and to amend regulations and practices that prevent IDPs from
enjoying a normal life at their current residence.
Abstract: This issue of the Caucasus Analytical Digest examines the importance of religion in the South Caucasus. First, Robia Charles examines the nature of religiosity in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Second, Harutyun Harutyunyan analyzes the role of the Armenian church during military conflicts, arguing that the Armenian church legitimized the use of violence, especially during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (1988–1994). Third, Kimitaka Matsuzato assesses the strategies for survival of the Orthodox communities in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Finally, Ruslan Baramidze examines the differences among Muslim communities in highland and lowland areas of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara.
Abstract: Black Sea region countries have diverse political systems, ranging from developed democracies
to authoritarian regimes. Communist pasts and a lack of democratic experience have stalled or
reversed democratisation processes in many cases. Flawed legal systems and a public distrust
in institutions have been paired with growing executive power in many countries. Increasing
inequality and unresolved conflicts undermine pro-democratic reforms as well. The region’s West and South, including Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Turkey, contain relatively
stable democracies. Reforms in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova have met with only limited
success, hampered by conflicts with neighbours or separatist regions. Russia has shown substantial
re-centralisation of power with authoritarian traits. The Ukraine’s post-Orange Revolution momentum
has been lost, but democratic procedures and the culture of an open society have taken root. Elections in Greece, Turkey, Romania and the Ukraine are generally free and fair, but show serious
flaws elsewhere in the region. Outside of Greece, political parties are weak. Parliaments in the West
and South hold some power, but often show functional weaknesses, while elsewhere executives –
often with authoritarian leanings – are little restrained by legislatures or opposition parties. With
the exception of Turkey and Greece, judicial corruption or lack of independence is common. Bribery and corruption is a problem across the region. In the post-communist states, this has
undermined state legitimacy. Increasing inequality is a pressing problem throughout, also
threatening regime credibility. The economic crisis may further undermine the attraction of
Western democratic values, contributing to poverty and social unrest. Civil society is hampered by a lack of democratic tradition. Outside of Turkey and Greece, domestic
NGOs are scarce or face substantial state resistance. Ethnic minority issues and a persistent brain
drain remain problematic, but a new technocratic generation offers the promise of change.
The EU has made numerous bilateral and multilateral overtures to Black Sea countries, but has
not shown a clear regional policy. It risks appearing to prioritise a stable energy supply over
true transformation. US interest has been focused on democratisation as well as regional energy
security.
In seeking to enhance democratic transformation, civil society groups should be given broad
practical support. Aid to states should be linked to democratic reforms, and combined with
substantial assistance for institutional and administrative capacity building. Judicial reforms and a
stronger rule of law will be critical in stabilising the region’s political and economic systems. The
EU in particular needs to develop a coherent regional policy, which must include cooperation with
Russia and Turkey.
Abstract: The current crisis between Armenia and Turkey will likely reach a head by April 24, the date commemorated as Armenian Genocide Day. While there is virtually no hope that the 2009 Armenian–Turkish Protocols will be ratified soon, both parties should take small steps to rebuild confidence and affirm their faith in the process.
If ratified, the Protocols would open the closed Armenia–Turkey border, promising Armenia long-term economic transformation and an end to its regional isolation. For Turkey, ratifying the protocols gives it a new role in the Caucasus and is a major step toward ending the humiliation of foreign parliaments passing genocide resolutions condemning Turkey. On April 24, President Obama should move beyond the annual debate over the word genocide and look ahead to the centenary of the tragedy in 2015 by encouraging the Turks to take part in commemorating the occasion.
“The Turkey–Armenia process was the most positive initiative in the South Caucasus in years and still has the potential to transform the region. If the process is to get back on track, all involved parties, including the United States, should articulate a strategic vision for the region, and for resolution of the Karabakh conflict,” writes de Waal. “The centenary of the Armenian tragedy in 2015 is a good reference point by which to set the goal of Armenian–Turkish normalization.”
Abstract: Some 20 years after the beginning of Armenia’s war with Azerbaijan and related violence,
information on the remaining 8,400 people internally displaced is scarce. People internally
displaced by the conflict have received hardly any government attention because
other larger refugee and internally displaced groups have made competing demands on
the state budget in a time of economic transition and crisis. International organisations
have also largely neglected their plight. The low public profile and lack of registration and
monitoring of these internally displaced people (IDPs) and returnees have made it difficult
to estimate how many have achieved durable solutions.
Abstract: At least 71 journalists were killed across the globe in 2009, the Committee to Protect Journalists announced Tuesday, the largest annual toll in the 30 years the group has been keeping track.
Twenty-nine of those deaths came in a single, politically motivated massacre of reporters and others in the Philippines last November, the worst known episode for journalists, the committee said.
But there were other worrisome trends. The two nations with the highest number of journalists incarcerated — China had 24 journalists imprisoned at the end of 2009 and Iran had 23 — were particularly harsh in taking aim at bloggers and others using the Internet. The number jailed in Iran has since jumped to 47, the committee said. Of the 71 confirmed deaths, 51 were murders, the committee said. The report noted that 24 additional deaths of journalists remained under investigation to determine if they were related to the journalists’ work. Previously, the highest number of journalists killed in a single year was 67, in 2007, when violence in Iraq was raging.
Abstract: The aims of this report are to critically assess how
the European Union has employed the instruments
at its disposal to contribute to the resolution of the
conflict in Nagorno Karabakh and how it can better
use the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a
means of advancing the resolution of the protracted
differences between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the
people of Nagorno Karabakh. Specifically, this report
will seek to: offer a comprehensive assessment of the
Nagorno Karabakh conflict in order to contribute
to strategic planning thereto at the EU level
(European Commission/European Council/EU
Member States) as concerns the resolution of the
conflict; provide an overview of the existing international
responses and identify the EU’s position in regard
to other actors involved; critically assess how the EU used the policy
instruments at its disposal within the framework
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and
how their implementation could have contributed
to the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict; identify challenges, needs and options for future
EU involvement in conflict resolution.
Abstract: A preliminary breakthrough in the two-decades-old Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – a framework agreement on basic principles – may be within reach. Armenia and Azerbaijan are in substantial accord on principles first outlined by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group in 2005. A basic principles agreement, while only a foundation to build on, is crucial to maintain momentum for a peace deal. Important differences remain on specifics of a subsequent final deal. Movement toward Armenia-Turkey rapprochement after a century of hostility has brought opportunity also for ending the Nagorno-Karabakh stalemate. Sustainable regional peace requires compromises on all the quarrels, but there is backlash danger, especially in Armenia, where public discontent could derail the Nagorno-Karabakh framework agreement. Presidents Sarkisian (Armenia) and Aliyev (Azerbaijan) need to do more to prepare their publics. The U.S., Russia and France, Minsk Group co-chairs, have stepped up collective efforts, but more is needed to emphasise dangers in clinging to an untenable status quo.
Although a deliberate military offensive from either side is unlikely in the near future, the ceasefire that ended active hostilities fifteen years ago is increasingly fragile. There has been a steady increase in the frequency and intensity of armed skirmishes that could unintentionally spark a wider conflict. Though the ceasefire has helped prevent return to full-scale hostilities, it has not prevented some 3,000 deaths along the front line – military and civilian alike – since 1994.
The official negotiations have also not significantly tempered the great scepticism and cynicism among both Armenians and Azerbaijanis about a possible end to the conflict. There is deep distrust of the mediating process, and many on both sides are suspicious that the talks are little more than window-dressing. Many also complain about what they perceive as the secretive nature of the talks. This gives rise to suspicions that a peace deal equates to surrender and that leaders who would take such action would be guilty of treason. These fears have been fuelled by years of official and unofficial propaganda on both sides, and particularly in Armenia, there is a growing sentiment that a change in the status quo could create new security threats. Notably, there is concern even among some government officials that Armenia is being pressured to give up something tangible – the occupied territories – in exchange for mere promises of security. These feelings are especially acute in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Abstract: Russia's military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 sent a shock wave across the post-Soviet space, particularly the republics to the west and south of Russia. In December 2008, the European Union formalized the Eastern Partnership initiative, directed at Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In order to understand the impact of this war both of Russia's bilateral relations with these countries and on the Eastern Partnership area as a whole, this article analyzes the reactions of these former Soviet republics to the Russian offensive. Three types of response are observed: keeping distance from Russia; maintaining a balance between Moscow and the West; and finally, changing course (from rapprochment to keeping distance and vice versa) vis-a-vis the former center of the Soviet Empire.
Abstract: This fourth edition of the Yearbook on Peace Processes analyses the conflicts in which
negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations
are formalised, are in the exploratory phases, are bearing fruit or, to the contrary, are stalled or
enmeshed in crisis. It also analyses certain cases in which the negotiations or explorations are
partial, that is, they do not encompass all the armed groups present in the country (as is the case
of Afghanistan and Iraq, for example). The majority of the negotiations are linked to armed
conflicts, but other situations are also analysed in which despite the fact that there are currently
no armed clashes taking place, the parties have yet to reach a permanent agreement to put an end
to the hostilities and disputes still pending. Thus, the negotiations are relevant for preventing the
beginning or resurgence of new armed confrontations.
The way of organising the analysis of almost every case follows a standard pattern, namely: 1) a
brief synopsis of the background of the conflict, with a short description of the armed groups and
the main players participating in the conflict; 2) the lead-up to the peace process; 3) the events
that took place throughout 2007; 4) a table displaying the most noteworthy events in the year in
summarised form; and 5) a list of websites where the conflict can be monitored. At the start of
each country there is a small insert with basic information on the conflict in question; in the
section entitled “Armed Actors” in this insert, the governmental armed forces are not included.
Abstract: Some 15 years have passed since a ceasefire was signed in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, yet the people forced out of their homes by the fighting have still not found peace. They still suffer from homesickness, poverty, discomfort and legal difficulties.
Refugees in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Karabakh – a majority-Armenian territory that broke free of Azeri control with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and unilaterally declared independence – have told IWPR how they feel abandoned in the student hostels, old hotels, schools and offices they now call home.
“Refugees today would like to forget that they are refugees, but this does not happen. What we lived through is unforgettable,” Sarasar Sarian, an Armenian from Baku now living in Karabakh, told IWPR.
Ethnic tensions between Armenians and Azeris boiled over in the late 1980s, when the Karabakh Armenians petitioned Moscow to detach their region from Azerbaijan and cede it to Armenia. Reciprocal demonstrations in Baku turned violent, leading to violence in Karabakh and Armenia. Riots between the two communities forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee each others’ countries, although at that time they were all citizens of the Soviet Union.
With independence in 1991 came war. At the ceasefire in May 1994, Armenian forces were occupying 14 per cent of Azerbaijan proper. At least 800,000 Azeris had fled to Azerbaijan from Armenia and parts of their own country seeking safety.
Since the war is not technically over, these people are still desperately hoping one day they can return to their homes.
Abstract: In a time of shooting wars, it is easy to lose sight of wars waiting to happen. This is dangerous, especially for a new US administration with an ample international agenda. Serious attention is required on Nagorno Karabakh, the simmering dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The danger of another open war in the Caucasus - one much worse than the August conflict between Russia and Georgia - is all too real. Frustration in Azerbaijan with a seemingly endless multilateral mediation effort has led opposition factions and, more recently, even the government to speak openly of a military option to restore Karabakh to Azeri sovereignty. The country's oil and gas earnings have reequipped its military, although with untested results. Russia recently sent a massive arms shipment to Armenia, while the Karabakh Armenians reportedly interpret the failure of Georgia's military last August as proof that Azerbaijan's army would fare no better in an assault on Karabakh or in a preventive war launched by the Armenian side. These views are dangerous and are riddled with error. The prevention needed is diplomatic, from Washington and Moscow working in tandem.
The apparent reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey announced on April 23, while very positive in itself, has largely ground to a halt. Ankara is unwilling, and politically unable, to move substantively in its ties with Yerevan without at least the appearance of movement on Karabakh. Unfortunately, the positive atmospherics of the meeting of the Armenian and Azeri presidents in Prague May 7 quickly dissipated in mutual accusations of bad faith. Experienced observers have seen this on-again, off-again process many times. Without progress on Karabakh, progress between Turkey and Armenia will be limited to symbolism at best.
Abstract: On April 22, the Foreign Ministries of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland issued a joint announcement saying that Ankara and Yerevan had agreed to work toward improving their relations within the framework of a roadmap under Swiss auspices. United States' diplomats were also closely involved in the talks which preceded the deal. Although the decision appears as a breakthrough in resolving this long-term dispute, significant obstacles remain before the completion of the rapprochement.
The joint statement read as follows:
"The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified" (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 22).
Subsequent statements from diplomatic sources clarified that no agreement has been signed and that the parties agreed to continue working toward fully normalizing their bilateral relations. Although the content of the ongoing talks were not disclosed officially, the deal is likely to include establishing diplomatic representations in their respective capitals, gradual re-opening of the border, Armenia's recognition of Turkey's international borders, and forming a joint committee of historians to examine the disputed events of 1915 (Sabah, April 24).
Many observers believe that if the process can be concluded successfully, it will not only end the long-standing enmity within the South Caucasus, but it also will redefine the geopolitical map of the region -helping to connect Armenia with Western interests in the region. Therefore, the decision was welcomed by the international community as a constructive step toward reconciliation. A statement from the U.S. State Department commended these efforts and called on the parties to proceed with the talks without any preconditions and within a reasonable time frame.
Abstract: When Armenian leaders in Constantinople (now Istanbul) were massacred on 24 April 1915, it was the signal for killings and deportations of Armenians across eastern Anatolia, then the heartland of the Ottoman empire and the core territory of what was in 1923 to become the Republic of Turkey. Together with deportations of Armenians from Cicilia and western Anatolia, "these events comprise the Armenian genocide. Approximately one million Ottoman Armenians died, half of the pre-war population and two-thirds of those deported" (see The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians [Oxford University Press, 2005]).
The campaign of destruction was instigated by the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government, which had been formed out of the Young Turk movement. It led to what Armenians call the "great catastrophe" - the end of the Armenian society that had existed in Anatolia for thousands of years, and the dispersal of most of the survivors.
These depredations took place amid the great war of 1914-18, in which the Ottomans were allied to Germany against Britain, France and Russia, and Turkish leaders saw Armenians as a fifth column for Russia. But unlike other events of this period, only the Armenian genocide is a live political issue today. The Ottoman empire did not survive its defeat in the war, but the genocide was a step towards the consolidation of the modern Turkish state. Although the new Turkey tried some of the CUP leaders after the war, campaigns against non-Turkish minorities continued under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the revered father of the secular Turkish republic.
Even now the Turkish state and most Turkish institutions continue to deny that the Armenians suffered genocide: as recently as 2004, novelist Orhan Pamuk was imprisoned and in 2007, journalist Hrant Dink was murdered for acknowledging this crime.
Abstract: Police and protestors clashed in Armenia's capital Yerevan on March 1, 2008, bringing to a head the country's latest electoral dispute, over the results of a presidential poll in February. In the course of some 20 hours on March 1, in episodes at different city center locations, police variously set upon protestors without warning or resistance, negotiated, withdrew, returned to the offensive, and finally fought a pitched battle with a small group of protestors. At least ten people died-eight protestors and two police officers-and scores were injured.
The full picture of what happened in Yerevan on March 1 has yet to emerge. Law enforcement actions caused deaths and injuries at different times during the day and at different locations. The shifting dynamics between police and protestors mean that each police action needs to be assessed distinctly as to whether it went outside the boundaries of legitimate policing, as defined in international standards for use of force and firearms. Yet it is clear from multiple accounts that at various times police deployed excessive use of force, beating demonstrators who were not behaving aggressively, and some of the police use of firearms appears to have been indiscriminate or disproportionate. The fact that police were themselves under attack at times does not excuse those incidents where their own use of force was excessive. Neither does it excuse ill-treatment and torture of detained persons, nor the denial of due process rights such as access to lawyers of choice.
Abstract: The conflict between Armenians and Azeris over Nagorny Karabakh (NK) continues to pose serious dangers to the future of the South Caucasus but is still low on the international agenda. There is a misconception that it is ’frozen’, yet the conflict is gradually thawing and there is a danger that fighting could resume.
Although a peace agreement is in everyone’s long-term interests, the parties involved are driven by short-term motives and are more comfortable with the status quo. They are caught in a ’Karabakh trap‘, where societies have been encouraged to have unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved and where compromise is fraught with risk.
This analytical paper is being published following extensive discussions of a draft version in Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert with officials, experts and non-governmental activists. (An earlier draft paper was published on two websites without permission).
It argues for more strategic and long-term thinking in debates on how to move the peace process forward. It also examines:
* the current state of the negotiation process mediated by the Minsk Group co-chairs; the ‘Madrid document’ under discussion; and the constraints on international actors
* the ceasefire regime along the ‘line of contact’ and its weaknesses
* the evolving situation in the region
* the changing ‘military balance’ and the significance of new military spending
* five ‘bad scenarios’ in which the situation around NK could potentially deteriorate.
Abstract: The South Caucasus region has been the most unstable in the former Soviet Union in terms of the
number, intensity, and length of ethnic and civil conflicts. Other emerging or full-blown security
problems include crime, corruption, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and narcotics trafficking. The regional governments have worked to bolster their security by
combating terrorism, limiting political dissent they view as threatening, revamping their armed
forces, and seeking outside assistance and allies.
The roles of neighbors Iran, Russia, and Turkey have been of deep security concern to one or
more of the states of the region. These and other major powers, primarily the United States and
European Union (EU) members, have pursued differing interests and policies toward the three
states. Some officials in Russia view the region as a traditional sphere of influence, while Turkish
officials tend to stress common ethnic ties with Azerbaijan and most of Central Asia. EU
members are increasingly addressing instability in what they view as a far corner of Europe.
Armenia has pursued close ties with Russia and Iran in part to counter Azerbaijan’s ties with
Turkey, and Georgia and Azerbaijan have stressed ties with the United States in part to bolster
their independence vis-a-vis Russia.
The United States has supported democratization, the creation of free markets, conflict resolution,
regional cooperation, and the integration of the South Caucasian states into the larger world
community. The Administration has backed regional energy and pipeline development that does
not give Iran and Russia undue political or economic influence. U.S. aid has been provided to
bolster the security and independence of the states, including substantial rebuilding aid after the
August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. In January 2009, the United States and Georgia signed a
partnership agreement to underline such U.S. support for Georgia. All three regional states have
supported the global war on terrorism and sent troops to assist the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
Congress has been at the forefront in supporting U.S. assistance to bolster independence and
reforms in the South Caucasus, but debate has continued over the scope, emphasis, and
effectiveness of U.S. involvement. Congressional support for the security of Armenia and
Nagorno Karabakh (NK; a breakaway region of Azerbaijan mostly populated by ethnic
Armenians) led in 1992 to a ban on most U.S. government-to-government aid to Azerbaijan.
Congress authorized a presidential waiver to the ban after the terrorist attacks on the United
States on September 11, 2001, to facilitate U.S.-Azerbaijan anti-terrorism cooperation.
Congressional support for U.S. engagement with the region also was reflected in “Silk Road
Strategy” legislation in FY2000 (P.L. 106-113) authorizing greater policy attention and aid for
conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and
communications, border control, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia. Congressional concerns about rising Russian military and economic
coercion against Georgia were reflected in legislation criticizing Russian actions and supporting
Georgia’s NATO aspirations. In the wake of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, Congress
condemned Russia’s invasion and provided boosted aid for Georgia’s rebuilding. Congress
regularly has earmarked foreign aid to Armenia and upheld a South Caucasus funding category to
encourage conflict resolution, provide for reconstruction assistance, and facilitate regional
economic integration.
Abstract: A Survey and Analysis of Border Management and Border Apprehension Data from 20 States.
With a Special Survey on the Use of Counterfeit Documents.
Based on the contributions of the border services of 20 Central and Eastern European states, the 2006 Yearbook again provides its valuable overview and analysis of irregular migration trends in the region. Over the past ten years the annual Yearbook on Illegal Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe has come to be regarded as an authoritative source of information on recent border trends and in particular on the phenomena of illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking. The annual Yearbook covers the most recent trends in illegal migration and human smuggling in the region, including long-term trends in border apprehensions, shifts in source, transit and destination countries, demographic characteristics of irregular migrants, the relationship between legal and illegal border crossings, new developments in the methods of border crossings and document abuse and on removals of irregular migrants. In addition, this year’s edition for the first time features a Special Survey on the use of counterfeit documents for illegal migration purposes. This Survey is based on the contributions received from document specialists or Special Units dealing with document security in the countries under review and provides the first comprehensive overview and analysis of patterns and trends in the use of counterfeit documents for illegal migration purposes in Central and Eastern Europe.
Abstract: The United States recognized the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia when the former Soviet Union broke up at the end of 1991. The United
States has fostered these states’ ties with the West in part to end the dependence of
these states on Russia for trade, security, and other relations. The United States has
pursued close ties with Armenia to encourage its democratization and because of
concerns by Armenian-Americans and others over its fate. Close ties with Georgia
have evolved from U.S. contacts with its pro-Western leadership. The Bush
Administration supports U.S. private investment in Azerbaijan’s energy sector as a
means of increasing the diversity of world energy suppliers. The United States has
been active in diplomatic efforts to resolve regional conflicts in the region.
As part of the U.S. Global War on Terror, the U.S. military in 2002 began
providing equipment and training for Georgia’s military and security forces.
Azerbaijani troops participate in stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
Armenian and Georgian personnel have served in Iraq. Georgia’s troops left Iraq in
August 2008, to help provide homeland security in the wake of Russia’s invasion and
partial occupation of Georgia. A ceasefire provides for Russian troops to withdraw
from areas outside of Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and for the
deployment of observers from the European Union. Although Russia recognized the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the United States and virtually all
other nations have upheld Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Key issues in the 2nd Session of the 110th Congress regarding the South
Caucasus are likely to focus on supporting Georgia’s integration into Western
institutions, including NATO; Azerbaijan’s energy development; and Armenia’s
independence and economic development. At the same time, concerns might include
the status of human rights and democratization in the countries; the on-going
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the breakaway Nagorno Karabakh region; and
threats posed to Georgia by Russia’s military actions in August 2008 and its
diplomatic recognition of Georgia’s breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions.
Congress will likely scrutinize Armenia’s and Georgia’s reform progress as recipients
of Millennium Challenge Account grants. Some Members of Congress believe that
the United States should provide greater attention to the region’s increasing role as
an east-west trade and security corridor linking the Black Sea and Caspian Sea
regions, and to Armenia’s inclusion in such links. They urge greater U.S. aid and
conflict resolution efforts to contain warfare, crime, smuggling, and Islamic
extremism and to bolster the independence of the states. Others urge caution in
adopting policies that will heavily involve the United States in a region beset by
ethnic and civil conflicts.
Abstract: This research paper provides a theoretical and methodological framework for studying the social
construction and consequences of “no war, no peace” societies - with Armenia and Azerbaijan as
examples. Scholars regularly describe these two countries as “no war, no peace” societies but to
date the concept of a “no war, no peace” society has not been theoretically elaborated on. In
response, this paper furnishes a theoretical framework for understanding the specific characteristics
of “no war, no peace” societies, in particular the reproduction of institutions that generate conflict
potential within and among societies. It also identifies core themes and issues that can be used for
the operationalization and execution of empirical research. Finally, it examines the existing scientific
knowledge of the consequences of long-lasting “no war, no peace” situations. The paper consists of
four parts. The first part presents several conceptual approaches, which contribute to the study of
“no war, no peace” societies. The second part discusses the analytical value of this concept. The
next part explores institutional theory in relationship to “no war, no peace” societies. It asks why
and how the reproduction of conflict potential takes place. The fourth part develops the
methodology for this research project. The final part indicates possible/planned research outcomes of
this INTAS-sponsored research project.
Abstract: Across Eurasia, recent events have complicated the security agenda. Russia's show of force may deter external actors from contesting its policy towards neighbouring countries; however the subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia could embolden separatist movements within the Russian Federation itself, and further south in Nagorno-Karabakh. The internal security of Georgia is also now uncertain; the current show of national unity may soon dissipate as increasingly critical questions are asked about poor, if not rash, decision-making in Tbilisi.
Abstract: This third edition of the Peace Process Yearbook analyses the conflicts in which negotiations
are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations are
formalised, are in the exploratory phases, are bearing fruit or, to the contrary, are stalled or
enmeshed in crisis. It also analyses certain cases in which the negotiations or explorations are
partial, that is, they do not encompass all the armed groups present in the country (as is the
case of Afghanistan and Iraq, for example). The majority of the negotiations are linked to armed
conflicts, but other situations are also analysed in which despite the fact that there are currently
no armed clashes taking place, the parties have yet to reach a permanent agreement to put an
end to the hostilities and disputes still pending. Thus, the negotiations are relevant for
preventing the beginning or resurgence of new armed confrontations.
The yearbook also examines certain processes that have theoretically come to a close through
a peace agreement, but that in our opinion are worth monitoring for at least another year with
the purpose of revealing whether or not implementation of the agreements takes place as
planned and whether the armed conflict can truly be regarded as over (such as in the cases of
the Congo, Indonesia [GAM], Northern Ireland, Nepal [CPN], East Sudan and South Sudan), as
there is a plethora of examples of peace agreements that for different reasons, have lasted a
short time and hostilities have resumed.
The way of organising the analysis of almost every case follows a standard pattern, namely: 1)
a brief synopsis of the background of the conflict, with a short description of the armed groups
and the main players participating in the conflict; 2) the lead-up to the peace process; 3) the
events that took place throughout 2007; 4) a table displaying the most noteworthy events in the
year in summarised form; 5) a list of websites where the conflict can be monitored; and 6) an
illustration that helps to exemplify the relationship between the primary and secondary actors in
each conflict, showing the spaces of intermediation that exist in each case. At the start of each
country there is a small insert with basic information on the conflict in question; in the section
entitled “Armed Actors” in this insert, the governmental armed forces are not included.
