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Abstract: Blamed for the large-scale terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has gained prominence as one of the world’s most fearsome terrorist groups. In a Q&A;, Stephen Tankel discusses the growing threat posed by LeT and the group’s relationship with Pakistan’s government and security forces.
Tankel, author of the new book Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, explains what should be done to limit LeT’s reach and prevent a fresh attack in South Asia from bringing two nuclear powers to the brink of war.
Abstract: The left-wing revolutionary movement whose constituent
groups are known as Naxalites has been
active in India since 1967. There are more than a
dozen Naxalite parties leading this movement across
the country. Almost all of them pledge to capture
state power through armed struggle. The strongest
and most popular of the Naxalite parties, working
across ten states in east and central India, is known
as the Communist Party of India.
Formed in 1980, initially to mobilise the poor, tribal
and working classes, its militarization intensified
from the early 1990s onwards. By the late 1990s
violence between Naxalites and the Government
of Andhra Pradesh had reached a stage where
many in civil society felt that the suffering of a
large section of rural society was a serious concern
which merited civil society intervention. In 1997 a
group of civil liberties activists, former bureaucrats,
journalists and lawyers formed the Committee
of Concerned Citizens, CCC, to mobilise public
opinion in favour of a peace process.3 After five years
of patient effort, the CCC succeeded in building a
public constituency, and in 2002 and 2004 it
brought the revolutionaries and the State Government
to the table for negotiations. This case study
outlines the events and the lessons that can be
learned from this example of civil society leadership
in a peace process.
Abstract: China and India remain locked in a stagnant embrace when it comes to the most intractable of security dilemmas: the Sino-Indian border issue. A closer look at Chinese and Indian strategic, scientific and academic experts' security perceptions vis-à-vis one another reveals that there is much more to the Sino-Indian security dynamic than meets the eye. Chinese and Indian strategic analysts hold divergent interests when evaluating each other's military modernization, the former preoccupied with India's naval development and the latter with China's army. Technical analysts in each country share a similar level of interest in the other's aviation and aerospace programs. Scholars exhibit a strong, if not symmetrical, level of focus on the other country's nuclear strategy and status. Using this tripartite discourse as a baseline, this essay provides both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of each group's perceptions to better understand Sino-Indian security relations and to propose measures within each arena to enhance mutual understanding. It shows that the Sino-Indian security dilemma cannot be simply viewed through the prism of the border anymore.
Abstract: The sea lanes of Indo-Pacific Asia are becoming more crowded, contested and
vulnerable to armed strife. The changing deterrence and
warfighting strategies of China, the United States and Japan involve expanded
maritime patrolling and intrusive surveillance, bringing an uncertain mix of
stabilising and destabilising effects.
Nationalism and resource needs, meanwhile, are reinforcing the value of territorial
claims in the East and South China seas, making maritime sovereignty disputes
harder to manage. Chinese forces continue to show troubling signs of assertiveness
at sea, though there is debate about the origins or extent of such moves. All of these factors are making Asia a danger zone for incidents at sea.
While the chance that such incidents will lead to major military clashes should not be
overstated, the drivers – in particular China’s frictions with the United States, Japan
and India – are likely to persist and intensify. As the number and tempo of incidents
increases, so does the likelihood that an episode will escalate to armed confrontation,
diplomatic crisis or possibly even conflict.
This report, part of the Lowy Institute’s MacArthur Foundation Asia Security
Project, explores the major-power maritime security dynamics surrounding China’s
rise. It focuses on the risks and the management of incidents at sea involving Chinese
interactions with the United States, Japan and India. The report concludes with some realistic recommendations to reduce risks of crisis
and escalation under conditions of continued mistrust.
Abstract: Pakistan is the most critical example of a series of issues that are vital to determining whether the US and its allies should pursue the war in Afghanistan, and to determining the chances for any meaningful grand strategic victory in the war. As Vietnam showed all too clearly, tactical victories, and even apparent strategic success, have no value unless they produce stable and lasting favorable results.
The current odds of such success may be uncertain even if one only considers the problems in Afghanistan.
All wars involve the risk of failure, and no one can ever guarantee lasting strategic and grand strategic success. The practical problem, however, is that the war is not simply being fought in – or for – Afghanistan. The stability and future of Pakistan alone is critical, and so is its willingness to put an end to Al Qa’ida, Taliban, Haqqani, and other sanctuaries inside Pakistani territory.
Abstract: India has long been the country with the greatest influence over Sri Lanka but its policies to encourage the government there towards a sustainable peace are not working. Despite India’s active engagement and unprecedented financial assistance, the Sri Lankan government has failed to make progress on pressing post-war challenges. Government actions and the growing political power of the military are instead generating new grievances that increase the risk of an eventual return to violence. To support a sustainable and equitable post-war settlement in Sri Lanka and limit the chances of another authoritarian and military-dominated government on its borders, India needs to work more closely with the United States, the European Union and Japan, encouraging them to send the message that Sri Lanka’s current direction is not acceptable. It should press for the demilitarisation of the north, a return to civil administration there and in the east and the end of emergency rule throughout the country.
Abstract: Most Pakistanis disapprove of the U.S. military operation that
killed Osama bin Laden, and although the al Qaeda leader has
not been well-liked in recent years, a majority of Pakistanis
describe his death as a bad thing. Only 14% say it is a good
thing.
Moreover, many Pakistanis believe the U.S. raid on bin Laden’s
compound – which was located about 35 miles from Islamabad
– will have a negative impact on the already strained relations
between the U.S. and their country.
However, the current survey, taken after the raid, showed no
material change in opinion of the U.S., when compared with
polling conducted immediately before it. In fact, prior to the
raid favorable ratings of the U.S. had already fallen to a level
not seen since 2002, following the invasion of neighboring
Afghanistan.
Abstract: From rape and domestic violence to lack of healthcare and education, millions of women experience daily peril, but nowhere more than in the five countries a TrustLaw Women expert poll identifies as the world's most dangerous countries to be female in 2011: Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, India and Somalia.
TrustLaw Women asked 213 gender experts from five continents to rank countries by overall perceptions as well as by six key risks: sexual violence; non-sexual violence; cultural or religious factors; discrimination and lack of access to resources; and trafficking. These info-graphics hone in on some of the dangers cited in the poll for each country.
Abstract: From rape and domestic violence to lack of healthcare and education, millions of women experience daily peril, but nowhere more than in the five countries a TrustLaw Women expert poll identifies as the world's most dangerous countries to be female in 2011: Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, India and Somalia.
Abstract: Violence, dismal healthcare and brutal poverty make Afghanistan the world's most dangerous country for women, with Congo a close second due to horrific levels of rape, a Thomson Reuters Foundation expert poll said on Wednesday.
Pakistan, India and Somalia ranked third, fourth and fifth, respectively, in the global survey of perceptions of threats ranging from domestic abuse and economic discrimination to female foeticide, genital mutilation and acid attacks.
Abstract: Russia and Mexico, two of the world’s most murderous countries for the press, are heading in different directions in combating deadly anti-press violence, the Committee to Protect Journalists has found in its newly updated Impunity Index. The index, which calculates unsolved journalist murders as a percentage of each country’s population, found improvement in Russia as journalist murders ebbed and prosecutors obtained two high-profile convictions. But deadly anti-press violence continued to climb in Mexico, where authorities appear powerless in bringing killers to justice.
Colombia continued a years-long pattern of improvement, CPJ’s index found, while conditions in Bangladesh reflected a slight upturn. But the countries at the top of the index—Iraq, Somalia, and the Philippines—showed either no improvement or even worsening records. Iraq, with an impunity rating three times worse than that of any other nation, is ranked first for the fourth straight year. Although crossfire and other conflict-related deaths have dropped in Iraq in recent years, the targeted killings of journalists spiked in 2010.
“The findings of the 2011 Impunity Index lay bare the stark choices that governments face: Either address the issue of violence against journalists head-on or see murders continue and self-censorship spread,” said CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon. “Convictions in Russia are a hopeful sign after years of indifference and denial. But Mexico’s situation is deeply troubling, with violence spiking as the government promises action but fails to deliver.”
CPJ’s annual Impunity Index, first published in 2008, identifies countries where journalists are murdered regularly and governments fail to solve the crimes. For this latest index, CPJ examined journalist murders that occurred between January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2010, and that remain unsolved. Only the 13 nations with five or more unsolved cases are included on the index. Cases are considered unsolved when no convictions have been obtained.
Impunity is a key indicator in assessing levels of press freedom and free expression in nations worldwide. CPJ research shows that deadly, unpunished violence against journalists often leads to vast self-censorship in the rest of the press corps. From Somalia to Mexico, CPJ has found that journalists avoid sensitive topics, leave the profession, or flee their homeland to escape violent retribution.
Abstract: This report summarizes important recent developments in Pakistan and in Pakistan-U.S. relations.
These include high-profile political assassinations in early 2011; the Raymond Davis affair
involving a CIA operative accused of murder in the city of Lahore; and the May killing of Osama
bin Laden in the city of Abbottabad, among others. The report also summarizes key issues in the
bilateral relationship. Recent Obama Administration engagement with Pakistan is discussed and
the current status of Pakistan-U.S. relations is briefly analyzed. Other key issues include links
between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism; Islamist militancy in Pakistan and
Islamabad’s policies toward the Afghan insurgency; Pakistan’s relations with historic rival India;
nuclear weapons proliferation and security in Pakistan; and the status of Pakistan’s economic and
political settings. Human rights concerns are briefly summarized, and the report closes with
discussion of U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan.
A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy is considered
vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism;
efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; the Kashmir problem
and Pakistan-India tensions; democratization and human rights protection; and economic
development. Pakistan is praised by U.S. leaders for its post-2001 cooperation with U.S.-led
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, although long-held doubts exist about
Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. A mixed record on battling Islamist
extremism includes ongoing apparent tolerance of Taliban elements operating from its territory.
May 2011 revelations that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had found apparently years-long
refuge inside Pakistan has led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the now deeply troubled
bilateral relationship. Anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories remain rife
among ordinary Pakistanis. Pakistan’s troubled economic conditions and precarious political
setting combine with perilous security circumstances and a history of difficult relations with
neighbors to also present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers.
Islamist extremism and militancy in Pakistan is a central U.S. foreign policy concern. Its arguably
growing influence hinders progress toward key U.S. goals, including the defeat of Al Qaeda and
other anti-U.S. terrorist groups, Afghan stabilization, and resolution of the historic Pakistan-India
rivalry that threatens the entire region’s stability and that has a nuclear dimension. Long-standing
worries that American citizens have been recruited and employed in Islamist terrorism by
Pakistan-based elements have become more acute. Bilateral distrust has peaked since the death of
bin Laden, with some in Congress openly calling for the curtailment or significant reduction of
U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan, a country among the leading recipients of such aid, having
been appropriated more than $20 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001.
For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41307, Pakistan: Key Current Issues and
Developments, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
Abstract: The United States is at a strategic inflection point in South and Central Asia. The death of Osama bin Laden, together with the projected transition to a smaller U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, presents a new opportunity for the United States to protect its enduring interests in the region. In Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia, CNAS authors Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.), Andrew Exum and Matthew Irvine identify key priorities for the United States and the key components of a regional strategy in light of fast-changing current events.
This report culminates a year-long project examining the future of U.S. strategy in South and Central Asia given the pending drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Barno, Exum and Irvine examine U.S. relationships with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and offer immediate and long-term policy recommendations for protecting U.S. interests in the region.
Abstract: Scholars of South Asian security and media analysts explain Pakistan‘s reliance upon LeT—and a raft of other groups—as a response to its enduring rivalry with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir specifically and deep neuralgic fears about Indian intentions towards Pakistan more generally. 5 Lacking military, diplomatic or political options to resolve its security competition with India, Pakistan has developed a series of proxies that operate in India and Afghanistan, with presumably plausible deniability. Pakistan‘s activities and use of militants in Afghanistan stems directly from Pakistan‘s fears about India and a desire to prevent it from developing influence and deepening its capabilities of fomenting insurgency along the border in Pakistan (e.g. in Balochistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Khyber Pakhtunkha). Fair argues in this testimony that this conventional understanding of Pakistan‘s reliance upon militancy, framed within the logic Pakistan‘s external security preoccupations, is dangerously incomplete as it excludes the domestic politics of militant groups and the support they enjoy from the state. The author proposes that LeT plays an extremely important domestic role countering the other militants that are increasingly attacking the state and that this domestic role of LeT has increased since 2002 as the other groups began attacking the Pakistani state and its citizens. Further, author's argumentation—if valid—suggests that the death of Bin Laden will have little or no mitigating impact upon LeT or other groups operating in the region. This is true in part because, in the view of this analyst, the evidence for LeT‘s tight ties with Al Qaeda is not robust.
Abstract: ORF has launched a new book -- Counter Terrorism in South Asia. The book, released by Dr. Shashi Tharoor, Member of Parliament, is a collection of papers and proceedings of the ORF-Heritage Foundation Counter Terrorism Dialogue held in Delhi last year. The ORF-Heritage Foundation Counter-Terrorism Dialogue, that took place in New Delhi on July 20-21, 2010, brought together top Indian experts led by Ambassador M. Rasgotra, President, ORF Centre for International Relations and a distinguished American delegation led by The Heritage Foundation's Vice President for Foreign and Defence Policy Studies, Dr. Kim Holmes, to exchange ideas for expanding US-India counter-terrorism cooperation.
The main themes of the conference included the differing policy approaches of Washington and New Delhi in grappling with terrorist threats; growing alliances among insurgent groups, criminal networks, and terrorists; lessons learned from the Obama Administration's Afghanistan-Pakistan policies in its first eighteen months in office; influence of radicalism in the institutional structures and armed forces in the region; and nuclear and non-nuclear threats to India and the US from transnational terrorist groups.
Chapters:
1. Prospects for US-India Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: An Historical Perspective, Polly Nayak
2. Counter-Terrorism: The Indian Experience, Vikram Sood
3. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Lessons Learned and Future Directions, Lisa Curtis
4. Radical Influences in Institutional Structures and Armed Forces in the Region: An Assessment, Wilson John
5. Growing Alliance of Insurgent, Terrorist and Criminal Organisations – A Case Study of the Pakistan Taliban, Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti
6. United States Experience with Domestic Terrorism Cases and Counter-Radicalisation, Sheriff Lee Baca, John Stedman and John Sullivan
7. Six Lessons from a Flawed 'AfPak' Strategy, Siddharth Varadarajan
8. Security Perspectives on the AfPak Region, Leela K. Ponappa
9. Reversing Pakistan's Sponsorship of Militancy: A Strategy to Alter the Logic of Pakistan's Use of Terrorist Groups as a Tool of Statecraft, Daniel Twining
Abstract: This brief is largely based on several discussions organised at Observer Research Foundation over a period of time. These discussions were enriched by the presence of some of the well-known experts on water issues in the country, like former Union Minister for Water Resources, Dr. Suresh Prabhu, current High Commissioner of Bangladesh, Tariq Ahmad Karim, Mr. Sunjoy Joshi, Director, Observer Research Foundation, Ms. Clare Shakya, Senior Regional Climate Change and Water Adviser, DFID*, India, Mr. Samir Saran, Vice President, ORF and Dr. Dinesh Kumar, Executive Director, Institute for Resource Analysis and Policy, Hyderabad.
It is estimated that by 2030, only 60 per cent of the
world's population will have access to fresh water
1 supplies . This would mean that about 40 per cent
of the world population or about 3 billion-people
would be without a reliable source of water and
most of them would live in impoverished, conflictprone
and water-stressed areas like South Asia.
Water is already an extremely contentious, and
volatile, issue in South Asia. There are more people
in the region than ever before and their dependence
on water for various needs continues to multiply
by leaps and bounds. The quantum of water
available, for the present as well as future, has
reduced dramatically, particularly in the last half-acentury.
This is due to water-fertiliser intensive
farming, overexploitation of groundwater for
drinking, industrial and agricultural purposes,
large scale contamination of water sources, total
inertia in controlling and channelising waste water,
indifferent approach to water conservation
programmes and populist policies on water
consumption.
Abstract: Is Afghanistan a playground for the India-Pakistan conflict? Or, are the countries in South Asia – Pakistan in particular – the recipients of unrest that spills over from Afghanistan? Alternatively, is the larger neighbourhood, South Asia and Afghanistan included, a mere victim of rivalry between global powers? Views on the relationship between Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries vary widely, with fundamental consequences for how one understands the conflict, and what policies one finds constructive. Cognizant of the roles of actors in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf region, and excluding neither the importance of Afghan domestic factors nor global forces, this paper focuses on the way that the India-Pakistan conflict – the primary security dynamic in the South Asian region – informs the two countries’ engagement in Afghanistan.
The paper argues that because the problem of Afghanistan is at the periphery, rather than at the core, of the security problems of the South Asian Security Complex, any ambitions for influence in the future of Afghanistan that Pakistan and India, as the key players of South Asia, may have are related to resolving their own internal insecurities, their own security dilemmas within the South Asia region and their own global ambitions rather than in ‘entering’ Afghanistan and replacing the US and NATO troops after they depart. If both want influence there, it is primarily because they seek solutions to their own insecurities, as well as guarantees from the US against each other. This means that as long as the core insecurities within the South Asia RSC are not resolved, negative influences may continue to hamper stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.
Abstract: The risks posed by fragile states have moved to the
centre-stage of Western security consciousness only in
recent years, fundamentally as the result of globalisation
and precipitously due to the 9/11 attacks on the United
States.1 The threats posed by fragile states to the Western
countries are palpable and proximate—for instance, in the
form of terrorist plots, influx of refugees and organised
crime—but the origins of the threats are relatively remote.
Western policymakers and publics, therefore, enjoy a
certain geographical and temporal insulation, not only
allowing for detached analysis but also allowing a broader
range of policy options.
It is different for India. Both its immediate and its extended
neighbourhoods consist of several states that are in the
turbulence of transition, contending with institutional
weaknesses, political fragility and governance failure. For
India, history and proximity turn what might have been
largely matters of foreign policy into a number of interconnected
issues of domestic politics.
Abstract: Lashkar-e-Taiba (the Army of the Pure or LeT) is one of
Pakistan’s oldest and most powerful jihadi groups. Yet
despite its long and bloody history, LeT only began
generating significant attention outside South Asia after
launching a multi-target attack on the Indian city of
Mumbai in November 2008. The boldness of the Mumbai attacks and target selection
suggested LeT continued to prioritize jihad against India,
but was moving deeper into al-Qaeda’s orbit. Approximately
one year after Mumbai, U.S. President Barack Obama
wrote a letter to his Pakistani counterpart, President Asif
Ali Zardari, in which he specifically mentioned LeT as one
of the militant groups against which the government
should act.2 A chorus of U.S. diplomats, security officials
and military officers reiterated this call for action,
pressuring Pakistan publicly as well as privately to move
against LeT. Yet LeT’s position remains relatively secure.
This paper seeks to explain how LeT became so powerful,
as well as to address the evolving nature of the threat that
LeT poses and, more broadly, to provide a general overview
of the group. It argues that to understand LeT, one must
recognize the two dualities that define it. The first is that it
is a missionary and a militant organization that for most of
its history has placed an equivalent emphasis on reshaping
society at home (through preaching and social welfare) and
on waging violent jihad abroad. The second is that its
military activities are informed both by its pan-Islamist
rationale for jihad and its role as a proxy for the Pakistani
state. LeT was able to grow into a powerful and protected
organization in Pakistan as a result of its ability to reconcile
these dualities.
Abstract: This report offers a critical examination of Iran’s influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Two points are made: that Iran’s top priority is its own regime’s survival and
its regional policies are directed by its national security concerns. Secondly, that
Iran’s engagements in Afghanistan are clearly guided by the presence of the US.
Iran’s predominant interest is in stabilizing Afghanistan, but as long as Afghanistan
is neither safe nor stable, Iran will play a double game and engage with its regional
neighbours according to the US–Iran equation. Deterrence, counter-containment
and competition are the keywords in these complex relations. The report outlines
Iran’s reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, its political platform and ‘soft power’,
and the bonds of mutual dependency in terms of water rights, refugees and drug trafficking.
It examines Iran’s alleged military interventions and the reasons for playing
this double game. Lastly, the report discusses Iran’s tense relationship with Pakistan
with regard to both Afghanistan and the troubled region of Baluchistan.
Abstract: Delhi’s decision to abstain on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973, authorising the use of force in the Libyan civil war was not about expressing India’s non-aligned or non-Western identity. Delhi’s own mixed record on international interventions suggests there was no question of high principle involved in its UNSC vote on Libya. Delhi’s response can be explained in terms of India’s strategic culture that is very risk-averse and rather prudent when it comes to the use of force. It has also been shaped in part by a long-standing domestic political tradition of expressing wariness towards Western intervention in the Middle East. India’s policy on Libya appears to be driven by a cold calculus of national interest and a healthy scepticism about the use of force by third parties towards an internal conflict.
Abstract: This Security Policy Brief looks at the vote
on the UNSC resolution on Libya and tries
to see in it some signs of the new
international order in the making. Why did
the BRIC countries abstain? Why was the
US so shy? What does it all mean for the
EU?
Abstract: This briefer provides up-to-date information on the Burma-China gas and oil pipelines. Through firsthand accounts, leaked documents, and publicly available information, EarthRights International analyzes corporate responsibility and accountability with respect to the pipelines, according to international laws and standards, and Burmese law. It discusses how to mitigate harmful impacts and improve the benefits for the people of Burma, and concludes with practical recommendations for key stakeholders.
Abstract: While erstwhile authoritarianism and absolutist rule may no longer be possible, it
would be naïve to expect that the Middle East will undergo a metamorphosis. There
would undoubtedly be changes, greater openness, increased transparency, enhanced
governance and increased popular participation. Even these changes would not be
uniform and/or happen immediately. But the process would be on and the
governments, especially ruling elites, would be monitored more closely by the ruled.
Yet, it is extremely unlikely that the current wave of protests will transform the
Middle East into an oasis of democracy. Samuel Huntington’s third wave of
democracy is unlikely to sweep the region any time soon. Relaxing, increasingly
transparent and reforming status quo is perhaps the maximum that one can anticipate
from the current wave of unrest in the Middle East. This being so, what are the
options for the Indian Government? While individuals could demand a more liberal
and people-centric platform, governments have limited space for manoeuvre.
Though ideal, siding with the democratic aspirations of the Arab people is not a
viable option for a state. Wrong moves, missteps or ideology-driven actions would
bring misery for a vast majority of the Indian population.
Abstract: China’s rise on the international stage has been accompanied by an increase in its military’s presence. Beijing’s expanding ambition is prompting calls on the country’s leaders to be more proactive in protecting its national interests. These calls by Chinese analysts have raised concerns about the military’s capability to mobilize troops to defend the country’s vast borders.
