September 8, 2010
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
This report is the first publication produced by IPI’s
research project on Understanding Compliance with
UN Security Council Resolutions. It provides fresh
insights from the new IPI Security Council
Compliance Database. The report examines trends
in how the Security Council has engaged with civil
wars since 1989, variations in where and when it
chose to engage, and the gradual evolution of the
Council’s civil-war response strategies. Future
analysis by this project will seek to provide answers
to two questions: To what extent do civil-war
parties comply with demands issued by the Security
Council? And what factor or combination of factors
best explains the variance in the level of compliance—
e.g., conflict settings, conflict management
strategies, or political dynamics within the Security
Council?...
September 8, 2010
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Abstract:
Growing recognition that the Afghan insurgency has learned to exploit government
deficiencies has refocused attention on the importance of local governance. Despite
this, the relationship between Afghan communities and their local representatives is
poorly understood. Currently, provincial council members and members of the Wolesi
Jirga, the only officials elected in sub-national elections, serve as one of the few links
between local communities and the national government. As such, there is significant
debate and competition within communities between various tribes, ethnic groups and
blocs of voters over who their representatives should be and what role they should
play. In light of the 2010 Wolesi Jirga election, this paper takes a closer look at ways in
which members of parliament (MPs) fit into these political systems on a local level and
questions the relationship between elections and stability in Afghanistan....
September 8, 2010
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Abstract:
In the context of deteriorating security and following widely controversial elections in
2009, Afghan voters returning to the polls for the Wolesi Jirga election on 18 September
will be asked to pass judgment on serious political issues at both the national and local
levels. The international press has been widely concerned with how fraud and insurgency
may delegitimise the election, but for most Afghans this has been only half of the story.
Pre-election reports in the media have not considered deeply enough the way in which
the election is part of a continual process of reshaping politics in the context of instability
in Afghanistan.
This paper provides a brief outline into the alternative but fundamental narratives that
were being voiced and heard by Afghans in the run-up to the election. It is based on
qualitative research on constituent perspectives on elections, undertaken in Kabul,
Balkh and Paktia since January 2010. In particular, the paper argues that:
• Insecurity and rumours of violence have benefited certain candidates while hurting
others. Many political actors have been able to use insecurity to their advantage in
the election process, and in some cases they are actually encouraging violence that
is often glossed over as Taliban insurgency.
• Campaigns are dynamic and reveal how voters and candidates have shifted their
understandings of and approaches to elections.
• These campaigns and the election are not simply about winning and losing, but
serve as an opportunity for individuals and groups to increase their political capital
and, perhaps, in some places, to redefine the balance of power.
• Campaigns reveal deep divides in how Afghans conceive of political authority and
reveal the current unsettled state of Afghan politics and feelings about the future
of Afghanistan.
• While there are high levels of dissatisfaction with incumbent MPs, it will be difficult
for new candidates to win seats, given the way that many have solidified their grasp
on power....
September 8, 2010
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
Starting in mid-2003, the government of Sudan responded to an armed rebellion in the western state of Darfur with a massive campaign of killing and expulsion carried out both by regular army troops and by a proxy force known as the Janjaweed. United Nations (UN) sources estimate that this orchestrated effort led to the death of at least 300,000 people, while over two million were forcibly displaced. Extensive documentation by the UN, human-rights organizations and the media leaves no doubt that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, and did so over a period of many years. Yet all attempts to stop the killing, whether by neighbors, regional organizations, Western states or the UN Security Council, proved ineffective. In 2005, states—including Sudan—unanimously agreed that they had a responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocities; but this abstract commitment has had little effect on the Sudanese government or on other UN member states who had made this pledge.
This report from the Global Centre for The Responsibility to Protect examines the entire sequence of events and asks, first, why the world manifestly failed to stem the violence, and, secondly, what ought to have been done in the face of a state apparently determined to perpetrate atrocities upon its own people. Specifically, the study seeks to pinpoint when during the early period action might have either prevented or minimized the violence, and to stipulate what should and could have been done by many different actors who, at various times, engaged with the government of Sudan. Consistent with the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, the report focuses not on scenarios of military intervention, but rather on the vast array of instruments, consensual and coercive, available to the international community—diplomatic engagement and mediation, targeted sanctions, the introduction of peacekeeping forces and international criminal prosecution....
September 8, 2010
STRATFOR
Abstract:
The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq has served to shift attention toward Afghanistan, where the United States has been increasing its troop strength in hopes of forming conditions conducive to a political settlement. This is similar to the way it used the 2007 surge in Iraq to help reach a negotiated settlement with the Sunni insurgents that eventually set the stage for withdrawal there. As we’ve discussed elsewhere, the Taliban at this point do not feel the pressure required for them to capitulate or negotiate and therefore continue to follow their strategy of surviving and waiting for the coalition forces to depart so that they can again make a move to assume control over Afghanistan.
Indeed, with the United States having set a deadline of July 2011 to begin the drawdown of combat forces in Afghanistan — and with many of its NATO allies withdrawing sooner — the Taliban can sense that the end is near. As they wait expectantly for the departure of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan, a look at the history of militancy in Afghanistan provides a bit of a preview of what could follow the U.S. withdrawal....
Armed Conflict
