In fall 2012, there is a stalemate punctuated by acts of terrorism in Aleppo and Damascus. Syrian and foreign Jihadists continue in their attempts to create a humanitarian crisis, especially in Aleppo, in order to induce the Arab-Muslim intervention. That the Syrian people are paying a huge price for these political maneuvers still matters to none. Presently, the dominant dynamics of the crisis in Syria are the inner-relations within the main camps and not just the interaction between the multiple warring sides. Official Damascus and Bashar al-Assad are not one and the same. The urban-economic elite is also divided into several sub-groups that stay together because of a general common interest and for fear of the dire ramifications of the unchecked rise of the opposition. The rest of the Syrian population is almost exclusively Sunni Arab. Significantly, even the Islamist and Jihadist population is vehemently anti-Muslim Brothers.
There is a widening gap between the “outside” opposition and the key forces and trends inside Syria. Significantly, the Free Syrian Army has always been - and even when reincarnated as the Syrian National Army will continue to be – a hollow shell with no following inside. Whatever fighting inside are conducted by predominantly Jihadist forces that are increasingly beholden to foreign volunteers. The primary perpetrators of the fighting in Aleppo are Jihadist forces sponsored from across the Turkish border that are increasingly joined by local criminal gangs who now claim higher motiva-tions. These Jihadist forces are waging their Jihad for the establishment of an Islamist-Jihadist Syria and not for the toppling of the Assad regime and the establishment of a westernized government in its stead. Further complicating the Jihadist scene are the Sunni Jihadist forces sponsored by Iran’s Quds Forces. These conduct special operations under the banner of al-Qaida and similar Jihadist forces and break the thrust between the people and their ostensible liberators. With such prevailing trends, the indigenous armed opposition to the Assad administration will not last for long. Given the destitute of the vast majority of the Syrian population - the opposition might not even survive a harsh winter.