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Résumé: This paper examines the history of civil wars in Uganda through the concept of 'elite bargains', arguing that allowing a biased access to positions of state power fails to accommodate the dominant social cleavages and is more likely to lead to civil war. Drawing on the definition of 'elite bargains' as developed at the Crisis States Research Centre, as well as on the wider literature surrounding issues of state power and the distribution of rights and entitlements, the paper draws a distinction between 'inclusive' and 'exclusionary' bargains and their differential outcomes.
Résumé: This paper considers the reasons behind Zambia's avoidance of civil war, despite persistent regional instability, focusing on the inclusiveness of the country's 'elite bargain', i.e. the inter-group distribution of access to positions of state power. The author hypothesizes that, although colonial rule left Zambia with high levels of social fragmentation - evident in pronounced tribal, linguistic and class cleavages - the country's post-colonial governments have all managed to accommodate the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation by forging and maintaining inclusive elite bargains. The paper argues that this achievement can be directly related to the avoidance of civil war since independence in 1964.
Résumé: The paper examines the relationship between conflict and entrepreneurial activity in Afghanistan, drawing upon a unique data set, the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment household survey 2005. Afghanistan is severely underdeveloped and poor. Conflict has persisted in vast swathes of the country for decades, so that Afghanistan may be more appropriately described as an in-, rather than post-, conflict country. At the same time, qualitative (and anecdotal) evidence suggests that entrepreneurial activity is ubiquitous, although mainly due to survival strategies rather than a spirit of entrepreneurialism. We empirically explore whether conflict affects the likelihood of a household to engage in entrepreneurial activity, proxied by sources of income coming from holding a small business. We control for the household characteristics and those of the environment, such as social capital, access to resources and infrastructure, as well as the presence of a minimal institutional governance system, to isolate the impact of conflict on household entrepreneurial behaviour. We find that the direct negative effect of the conflict on entrepreneurship is very small. The results on the control variables suggest that (i) the generation of entrepreneurship has seen conflict and instability for a whole life,( ii) a small business is a mean of surviving in a situation where any other support is lacking, (iii) it is a viable strategy when the household can cover some of the associated risks, (iv) there is no indirect effect of conflict via institutions and infrastructure, and (v) entrepreneurial activity may substitute for lacking markets and governance institutions. These results call for further and more in-depth research on Afghanistan as an overlooked area of study by the academic and development research community despite representing a priority for internationally supported reconstruction.
Résumé: Rule of law reforms in Liberia over the past five years serve as a clear example of how the international community has failed on this point, as the country’s own practices have been generally neglected in the process. Characteristically, there is little updated information on the customary law and traditional practices of Liberia. In investigating how the international community addresses SGBV in Liberia, we found within the liberal peacekeeping/building paradigm few analytical tools that could be used to gain a solid understanding of the host country ‘from below’. This area of society remains a professional blind-spot and represents a gap in the efforts of the international peacekeeping/-building community to build a sustainable peace in the country.
Résumé: Following the U.S.-led attack against Afghanistan in October 2001, Taliban sympathizers in Pakistan’s western tribal areas quickly pledged support and provided additional manpower and resources to help the Afghan Taliban resistance. The Pashtun tribes who dominate the western tribal agencies of Pakistan share ancestral lineages with many of Afghanistan’s Pashtun tribesman and both have long resisted colonial attempts of occupation. Even in a modern context, the core of the Afghan resistance movement against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was based in these same areas, using Peshawar as a de facto capital and the tribal agency’s of North and South Waziristan as training areas and key junctions for transiting personnel and weapons into Afghanistan. Presented in this overview is an operational snapshot of the TTP and its influential leaders throughout eight tribal regions in located in western Pakistan: North and South Waziristan, Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Orakzai Agency, Kurram Agency Khyber Agency and Darra
Adamkhel.
Résumé: At the end of July 2010, the UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the
African Union/United Nation Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID).The forthcoming renewal will
mark the end of the third year of UNAMID existence and the beginning of the fourth year. The
establishment of UNAMID is provided for by UN Security Council resolution 1769(2007) adopted
on 31st July 2007 with the overall objective of protecting civilians in Darfur, in addition to facilitating
the humanitarian relief operations and providing an environment conducive to the attainment of
peace and security in the region. Realization of these ambitious objectives required mobilization of
vast human and material resources and, above all, the necessary political will to enable robust
response and action. So far UNAMID has achieved little success in any of these three vital areas.
UNAMID has great potential to succeed but also all the ingredients to fail. The
unprecedented attention accorded to the humanitarian situation in Darfur by high-level regional
and international decision-making bodies is a clear signal of the world’s determination to put a halt
to the commission of massive atrocities by States against their own citizens thus giving effects to
the universally acclaimed concept referred to as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The
mobilisation of massive human and material resources for relief operations in Darfur saved the
lives of millions of war-affected communities and played a major role in averting a humanitarian
crisis of a much larger scale. Yet UNAMID works against many odds in Darfur. It operates in
difficult conditions in a hostile, dangerous and insecure environment that lacks sufficient
infrastructure. UNAMID has also been left without choice but to collaborate with unwilling and
intransigent local stakeholders some of them manifestly have no interest to see the peacekeeping
operation comes to a successful conclusion. This Briefing Paper attempts to provide critical
analysis of the role of UNAMID in Darfur and to advocate for measures to enhance its work.
Résumé: Global climate change poses serious threats to the Central Asian region's
natural environment, and given the dependence of its socio-economic
systems on natural resources, climate change could pose a threat to the
region’s socio-economic systems. For most countries in the region,
agriculture represents a major sector of the economy and is by far the
largest source of employment. Environmental changes - particularly
changes in the availability of water - puts this critical sector at risk. The
growing concern over climate change in Central Asia is due to the degree
to which climate change affects the region's energy, water, and food
security and how this can lead to political tensions and conflict unless
this issue is carefully, and collectively, managed.
Résumé: Sudan faces multiple crises. The CPA, which ended the southern conflict, has not been fully implemented. International support has been patchy. Demarcation of the North/South border has again been postponed. Preparations for the southern and Abyei referenda, due to be held in January, are well behind schedule, as are the popular consultations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, where state elections have been put off until November. Inter-tribal conflict troubles the South. Opinion is increasingly polarized as the southern referendum approaches and the risk of renewed conflict grows, with damaging implications for the region and Africa as a whole. The two papers published here reflect the views of their authors only, but we believe that they will make a useful contribution to the policy debate, not least because they are written from very different perspectives.
Prendergast and Jones argue that past US Sudan policy of pressure on Khartoum has been successful and plead for more leverage and more effective use of leverage, especially on the NCP, which they judge keen to repair its relations with the US. Satti, on the other hand, writing during a visit to Sudan, contends that past US policy has served only to reduce Sudanese faith in US promises and US influence in Khartoum. Basing himself on a shrewd analysis of the NCP and its objectives, he suggests a policy of constructive engagement. Both papers, however, agree on the need for the US to work closely and harmoniously with the international community, especially the UN and AU, and for more US diplomatic effort on the ground.
Résumé: This essay proposes to briefly describe and analyze the evolution of the Army and Navy’s role in
drug interdiction, focusing on the patterns that have emerged since 1995, when the Army
accepted responsibility for that task without any internal opposition. I will argue that Mexican
national security priorities have shifted significantly, focusing on domestic security issues,
specifically drug-related criminal activity and violence. In response to the government’s
emphasis on drug-related crime, civil authorities have relied increasingly on the armed forces to
carry out an aggressive anti-drug mission. The increased role of the military in carrying out these
assignments has produced significant changes within the Mexican Navy and the Army, and in
their relationship with the American armed forces. Citizen views of the Mexican armed forces as
an institution, its performance of the anti-drug mission, and its reactions to increased levels of
personal insecurity, have altered Mexican perceptions of national sovereignty and the United
States’ role in their country. Finally, the role of the Catholic Church as an increasingly influential
actor in government attempts to curb the drug cartels, as well as the source of potential conflict
with the armed forces over growing numbers of human rights abuses, are essential to
understanding the consequences of the military’s anti-drug mission.
Résumé: This paper explores two fundamental questions pertaining to Mexico’s ongoing public security
crisis. First, why has Mexico experienced this sudden increase in violence among trafficking
organizations? Second, what are the current efforts and prospective strategies available to
counter Mexican drug trafficking networks? In the process, we explore the development of
Mexico’s DTOs, with particular emphasis on the relatively stable equilibrium among such
groups in the 1980s and the subsequent fracturing of that arrangement. We also identify and
consider the merits of four conceivable scenarios for managing drug use —complicity with
traffickers, confrontation of traffickers, prevention and treatment, or tolerating consumption—
all of which have significant limits or undesirable effects.
Résumé: As stories of crime and violence play out in the headlines, Mexico is in the midst of a major
transformation of its judicial sector. Mexico has been gradually implementing a series of
reforms that advocates hope will dramatically improve public security and the administration
of justice over the next decade. Central to the process of judicial reform in Mexico is a
package of ambitious legislative changes and constitutional amendments passed by the
Mexican Congress in 2008, and to be implemented throughout the country by 2016.
Together, these reforms touch virtually all aspects of the judicial sector, including police,
prosecutors, public defenders, the courts, and the penitentiary system. The reforms include
significant changes in Mexican criminal procedure, new measures to promote greater access
to justice (for both criminal defendants and crime victims), new functions for law
enforcement and public security agencies in the administration of justice, and tougher
measures for combating organized crime. This paper helps to fill the gap in our current
understanding of these problems by explaining Mexico’s justice sector challenges, the
specific changes proposed under the 2008 reform package, and the challenges that lie in store
for Mexico as it implements judicial sector reforms over the next decade.
Résumé: While Mexico is having some limited success dealing with its spiraling conflict, vulnerable
States in Central America are struggling to keep the organized criminal groups at bay, even while
they face other challenges such as widespread gang activity. Problems are particularly acute in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, three States with vast
coastlines, large ungoverned spaces and the greatest proximity to Mexico. However, geography
is only part of the problem. Armed conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador and parts of Honduras
between 1960 and the mid-1990s laid the foundations for the weapons trafficking, money
laundering and contraband traffic that we are witnessing today. This chapter is about drug trafficking organizations (DTO) operating in Central America. It is
broken down by theme rather than by country. It provides a brief history of DTO activity in the
region; descriptions of who operates the DTOs, both locally and internationally, and their modus
operandi; the use of street gangs in DTO activities; DTO penetration in government and security
forces; local, regional and international efforts and challenges as they try and combat DTOs. The
chapter is centered on the three countries where the problem of DTOs appears to be the most
acute: Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras.
Résumé: The Yemeni authorities, facing growing internal and external pressures, are abandoning human rights in the name of security. Internationally, tough action is being demanded to combat al-Qa'ida based in Yemen. Inside Yemen, the state is being challenged by a secessionist movement in the south, an intermittent conflict in the north, armed tribes that effectively control large areas of the country, and a desperate economic situation. This report highlights how the government is increasingly resorting to repressive laws and illegal methods in response to the challenges it faces and to silence its critics.
Résumé: In the name of security, the Yemeni authorities are rolling back human rights gains – with terrible consequences for the people of Yemen. Challenged by growing calls for secession in the south, an intermittent conflict with a rebel movement in the north, and the presence of al-Qa’ida in the country, the government has increasingly resorted to repressive and illegal methods. Amnesty International calls on the international community put a different kind of pressure on the Yemeni authorities and other governments involved – pressure based on the understanding that by violating human rights, security is jeopardized, not enhanced.
Résumé: The development of geopolitical processes over the past decade demonstrates that Central Asia has become one of the key Eurasian regions, with major impact on the overall climate of the continental and global security.
Central Asia’s influence is felt on several fronts, primarily those of combating international terrorism and supplying oil and natural gas.
At the same time, the region’s growing importance carries certain risks. As the region becomes an integral part of the global system of security and the economy, it also becomes sensitive to the effects of the multiple factors and processes that traditionally determine the course of global political, economic, cultural, and ideological development. Today we can distinguish at least three areas that are located at the junction of these two tensions: the problem of Afghanistan; the issue of increasing supplies of oil and gas, taking into account the diversification of routes; and the transformation of Central Asia as the continental transportation hub. All three of these areas carry a powerful geopolitical component, characterized by the involvement of a large number of regional and global players.
Résumé: The role of civilians in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding
missions has shifted from a peripheral support
role to the core of contemporary peacekeeping
and peacebuilding missions, and the number of
civilians
have steadily increased over the years to approximately
22,000 in 2010. Civilians now constitute
20% of UN peacekeepers, and approximately 60%
of the top twenty civilian contributing countries are
from the Global South.
Whilst the UN finds it difficult to identify candidates
in certain specialised categories, in
general
it has an oversupply of candidates.
The main challenge facing the UN when it comes to
recruitment, is processing the large number of applications
it receives, selecting the most deserving
candidates, and the time it takes to process an application
from the moment a vacancy is announced
until a person is deployed to take up the post. The
linkages between training institutions, rosters and
the UN recruitment system are underdeveloped.
The aim of investing in training and rostering, namely
shortening the time it will take to fill an urgently
needed post with a suitably prepared candidate, is
not being realised under the current relationship
between the UN, training institutions and rosters.
Résumé: The Post 2007 Election Violence (PEV) led to destruction of property, loss of lives, 663,921 people displaced and about 78,254 houses destroyed country wide. An additional 640 households fled into Uganda.
A total of 350,000 IDPs sought refuge in 118 camps whereas about 313,921 IDPs were integrated within communities across the country. This factsheet provides details on: the number of IDPs from each province; the return rates of IDPs; the number of households in each transitional camp remaining for IDPs; disbursement of humanitarian funds; number of IDP households resettled; peace and reconciliation initiatives; psycho-social counseling services; a summary of achievements and of requirements for continuing progress.
Résumé: Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been ravaged by civil war intermittently
for four decades. More than 2 million people have died in Southern Sudan over the past two
decades due to war-related causes and famine, and millions have been displaced from their
homes. There were many failed attempts to end the civil war in Southern Sudan. On January 9, 2005, the government of Sudan and the SPLM
signed the final peace agreement at a ceremony held in Nairobi, Kenya. In April 2010, Sudan held
national and regional elections. In January 2011, South Sudan will hold a referendum to decide on
unity or independence. Abyei is also expected to hold a referendum in January 2011 to decide
whether to retain the current special administrative status or to be part of South Sudan. The crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two rebel groups emerged to challenge the
National Congress Party (NCP) government in Darfur. The crisis in Darfur in western Sudan has
led to a major humanitarian disaster, with an estimated 2.7 million people displaced, more than
240,000 people forced into neighboring Chad, and an estimated 450,000 people killed. In late October 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new Sudan policy. The new Sudan
policy focuses on three policy priorities: the crisis in Darfur, the implementation of the North-
South peace agreement, and counter-terrorism. The new policy links the lifting of sanctions and
incentives to verifiable progress on the ground.
Résumé: About 150 leading policymakers, scholars, diplomats, and nongovernmental organization (NGO)
leaders participated in a conference entitled “Preventing Violent Conflict: Principles, Policies and
Practice,” organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention on
July 1, 2010. This Peace Brief summarizes the presentations from each panel discussion. The central
focus was on the unique challenges and opportunities associated with preventing the initial onset
of large-scale violence, i.e. primary prevention. Conflict prevention is widely endorsed in principle—including in the 2010 U.S. National
Security Strategy— but too rarely put into serious practice. It is thus important to narrow the
gap between rhetoric and action in preventing violent conflicts.
The interest of elites in exploiting ethnic differences for political gains, the absence of well-established
mechanisms for prevention in certain regions, and the destabilizing role of external
meddling continue to impede the development of effective prevention strategies.
Yet, much progress has been made in the field of conflict prevention, both at the normative
and the operational levels.
As a crucial actor in conflict prevention, the United States should work with others to forge
a consistent approach to countries at risk, urge countries to deal with arbitrary borders
through negotiation rather than violence, and support greater cooperation between regional
organizations.
Résumé: This policy brief provides a synopsis of the Darfur crisis; analyses the implications of the indictment
of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir on peace, security and stability
in Sudan, and Darfur in particular; and addresses the impact of the indictment of Bashir on
Africa’s continental and regional interests. It concludes by offering broad-based recommendations
on the future role of the International Criminal Court (ICC). - Conflict in Darfur has historically been based on
disputes over resources, particularly land, water
and livestock, as well as on what the Darfurians
consider to be deliberate and consistent policies of
marginalisation and discrimination imposed on
them by the successive governments in Khartoum.
The current confl ict which led to the indictment of
Bashir began in 2002 and escalated in 2003, following
the attacks on police and military installations
by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) in Darfur, mainly in Gulu, El Fashir and
Mellit, and which, since then, has spread to other
areas. The demands of the rebel movements,
SLM/A and JEM include, among others, greater
autonomy and socio-economic and political rights
for the people of Darfur. The government of Sudan
responded by deploying the Popular Defence Force
(PDF), the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the
Janjaweed (meaning, an armed man on horse or
camel), a militia group trained and equipped by
Sudan.
Résumé: In 2005, the Taliban and other insurgent groups began one of the most impressive comebacks against a U.S.-led military coalition in history. By the time Obama came into office, the United States had to develop a new strategy for a largely new war -- and one it was losing. Such was the context for the Obama administration's fall 2009 policy review. The Bush administration had already tried a light-footprint approach in Afghanistan, and it had resulted in the Taliban's comeback -- including at least a fivefold increase in violence since 2005. Since 2005, the Taliban and other insurgent groups -- such as the Haqqani network, another extremist Pashtun movement straddling central parts of the Afghan-Pakistani border -- had substantially improved their battlefield tactics. The U.S. approach -- originally crafted by General Stanley McChrystal, now being implemented by General David Petraeus, and supported by such civilians as U.S. Ambassador Eikenberry; Mark Sedwill, NATO's senior civilian representative in Afghanistan; and Staffan de Mistura, the UN special representative in Afghanistan -- focuses on the south and east of the country, where insurgent activity has been greatest and where local populations have been most inclined to support or tolerate the insurgency. The Afghan government has limited reach across its territory because it is hampered by a lack of human capital and an excess of corruption.
Résumé: Building Afghanistan's domestic security forces to the point that they can effectively take over the country's security is critical to the eventual departure of U.S. troops--a fact that U.S. President Barack Obama stressed in 2009 in his strategy for the beleaguered Afghan military campaign. But despite the promises and ongoing commitments, analysts say the process will likely take more time than expected. In July 2010, NATO nations agreed to support Afghan President Hamid Karzai's goal of Afghanistan assuming sole responsibility for its security by 2014, but even that goal may be lofty. Top military leaders in Afghanistan, such as former commanding Army General David McKiernan, say the handover of security to indigenous forces is "years away." And the new commander of international forces in the country, General David H. Petraeus, has quietly scaled back plans (Guardian) to hand over provincial security operations, a sign that confidence in Afghan units--while increasing--still lags far behind expectations. Afghanistan's National Security Forces consist of three principle components: the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Air Force, and the Afghan National Police. The growth of the security forces is presenting its own set of difficulties.
