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Résumé: This paper presumes the effectiveness of the program [Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund that would facilitate the demobilization and reintegration of Taliban and other insurgent fighters back into Afghan society] and then assesses the logically probable effects. I present the case for the numerous negative effects that could follow from the successful implementation of the proposed Fund. The primary difficulty is that the development of this Fund, with its narrow focus on incentives targeted towards Taliban fighters, has, on the face of it, overlooked the possible ramifications that it could have within civilian society as well as the potential response of the insurgency. This range of neglected considerations is the focus of this paper. In particular, I emphasize how the program could possibly swell the ranks of the insurgency, further disillusion Afghan society towards the ISAF effort, waste coalition resources even while the insurgency persists, result in more vicious Taliban tactics, and distribute the insurgency throughout Afghanistan. I conclude with some policy recommendations that call for temperance in actions surrounding this program.
Résumé: From July 9th to July 21st, 2009, the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion
Research (ACSOR) Surveys conducted a survey of public opinion for UNDP-Afghanistan
on the subject of Police Performance and Public Safety perceptions. The main purpose
of this study was to provide insight into the opinions of the people of Afghanistan with
regard to various policing issues. ACSOR interviewed 5,156 Afghan respondents (2,827
males and 2,329 females), age 18 or older, across all 34 provinces of the country. In Afghanistan, security is the responsibility of several different groups. These include,
but are not limited to, local law enforcement officials, Afghan National Police (ANP),
Afghan National Army (ANA) and the National Department of Security (NDS). While
questions pertaining to the security of Afghanistan as a whole are addresed, the majority of
the questions focused on police in regard to local performance.
Résumé: Karachi is not only the largest metropolis of Pakistan and its commercial hub, it is also known
as a ‘mini-Pakistan’. This is a reference to the ethnic and religious diversity of Karachi’s
population. The paper begins with a description of the conflict and violence that has become associated
with Karachi. Trends and patterns in conflict and non-state violence are identified here, as
outcomes that require explanation. The second section provides relevant background
information on the city’s placement within the national polity and economy. Some of the
main explanations for Karachi’s trends and patterns of conflict and violence − relating to
ethnic identity, organisations, economic frustration, and political conspiracies − are reviewed
in the third section. The role of external factors such as migration and the influences of the
war in Afghanistan are also highlighted. An alternative approach focusing on two
incontrovertible aspects of Karachi’s urbanity – migration and informality − is outlined in the
fourth section. It is proposed here that the analysis of conflict and violence in Karachi can
benefit from an understanding of the very processes that made Karachi an open city in the
first place.
Résumé: Somalia has been a failed state for the better part of two decades; bereft
of central government, cantonized into clan fiefdoms, and wracked by
deadly spasms of violence. Repeated efforts to create a viable national
government have failed. For the United States, the principal concern,
especially since 9/11, has been the fear that Somalia might become a
safe haven for al-Qaeda to launch attacks in the region and even conceivably
against the U.S. homeland. U.S. efforts to prevent that from
happening, however, have been counterproductive, alienating large
parts of the Somali population and polarizing Somalia’s diverse
Muslim community into “moderate” and “extremist” camps. Several
indigenous militant Islamist groups have emerged and grown stronger
in recent years. One coalition, headed by a radical youth militia known
as the Shabaab, now controls most of southern Somalia and threatens
the survival of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)—the
latest UN-brokered effort to establish a functioning authority in the
capital city of Mogadishu.
Résumé: The March 2005 report of the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) estimated that approximately four
million people had been displaced from (or within) Southern Sudan by the 1983 to 2005 civil war
between northern and southern Sudan. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) in January 2005, IOM calculates that both North-South and South-South return movements stand
at 2 million.
The estimated numbers of return by year are 744,080 in 2006, 732,369 in 2007, 362,049 in 2008 and
161,501 in 2009. Since the beginning of IOM’s involvement in the tracking project, IOM has physically tracked 260,827
returnees during their return journey of which around 77,000 are state organised returnees (En-route
Tracking); the system has also captured 1,256,859 returnees in their villages of return (Area of Return
Tracking).
From this data, in combination with other village level data gathered through IOM’s Village Assessment
Programme, IOM estimates the total number of successful returns since the CPA until the end of
December 2009 to be 2 million returnees. This figure takes into account secondary displacement (i.e.
people not remaining in their place of return) of an estimated of more than 200,000 individuals.
Based on the estimated figure of 2m returnees, IOM estimates, Northern Bahr el Ghazal has received the
largest number of returns with an estimated 450,000 returnees (22 %) followed by Southern Kordofan
with 275,000 returnees (14%). Western Bahr el Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria states received the lowest
number of returnees with 60,000 returnees and 55,600 returnees respectively.
Résumé: The illicit drug trade remains a challenge to the overall U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces over 90 percent of the world’s opium, which competes with the country’s licit agriculture industry, provides funds to insurgents, and fuels corruption in Afghanistan. Since 2005, the United States has allotted over $2 billion to stem the production, consumption, and trafficking of illicit drugs while building the Afghan government’s capacity to conduct counternarcotics activities on its own.
In this report, GAO (1) examines how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan has changed; (2) assesses progress made and challenges faced within the elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and drug demand reduction program areas; and (3) assesses U.S. agencies’ monitoring and evaluation efforts. To address these objectives, GAO obtained pertinent program documents and interviewed relevant U.S. and Afghan officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
Résumé: This paper explores the implementation of the prevention pillar of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, and assesses its relevance to protection of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). A political analysis of the recent R2P debates show that the doctrine is at a juncture, and there are costs and benefits to the overall goal of refugee and IDP protection by aligning with the R2P campaign. This paper challenges the proposition that stronger international acceptance of the R2P doctrine leads inevitably to stronger refugee and IDP protection.
The R2P doctrine as set out in General Assembly resolution 60/1 (2005) subscribes to the conception of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (Deng et al 1996), and therefore advocates an enhanced role for the international community in relation to states who are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens from the most egregious crimes under international law, specifically; genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, as well as ethnic cleansing.
Résumé: Throughout history, diasporic communities have been susceptible to a variety of forms of radicalization. Indeed, even in the pre-Christian era, ethnic and religious diasporas were prone to religious and separatist radicalization. Since the end of the Cold War, ethnonationalism has continued to fuel radicalization within some diasporic communities. With respect to contemporary global terrorism, militant Islamism, and in particular, its Salafist-Jihadist variant, serves as the most important ideational source of radicalization within diasporas in Western Europe and North America. Within the global North, this radicalization has frequently
pitted the political desirability of relatively liberal immigration politics against the core requirements of internal security.
Résumé: For almost two decades, United Nations peacekeeping missions have routinely set up local radio stations that almost immediately have become the dominant national broadcasters of those post-conflict countries. From Cambodia to Liberia, these UN stations have helped end violent conflict and make political transition possible. They have provided citizens with trusted local news programs and nonpartisan discussion forums, often for the first time. The UN radio stations were also often the first to reach all corners of these warravaged countries. In national elections after peacekeeping interventions, the UN stations were the main if not the only source of nonpartisan voter information and campaign coverage, crucial for any functioning democracy.
Résumé: If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not exist today,
the United States would not seek to create it. In 1949, it made sense
in the face of a potential Soviet invasion to forge a bond in the North
Atlantic area among the United States, Canada, and the west European
states. Today, if the United States were starting from scratch in a world
of transnational threats, the debate would be over whether to follow liberal
and neoconservative calls for an alliance of democracies without
regard to geography or to develop a great power concert envisioned by
the realists to uphold the current order.
The United States is not, however, starting from scratch, and NATO
should not disappear. While the bonds across the Atlantic may be
frayed, they are stronger than those tying the United States to other
parts of the world. Common history and values matter, as do the
resources (both financial and military) that Europe possesses. The
NATO allies share a common interest in preventing disruptions to the
global economy, including attacks on freedom of navigation. As a community
of democracies, the member states are threatened by forces such
as Islamic extremism and the rise of authoritarian states. For the United
States, the alliance is a source of legitimacy for actions in places like
Afghanistan. For Europe, NATO is a vehicle for projecting hard power.
Résumé: In recent months Bangladeshi authorities have waged an unprecedented campaign of arbitrary arrest, illegal expulsion, and forced internment against Burmese refugees. In this emergency report Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) presents new data and documents dire conditions for these persecuted Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. PHR's medical investigators warn that critical levels of acute malnutrition and a surging camp population without access to food aid will cause more deaths from starvation and disease if the humanitarian crisis is not addressed.
Résumé: If economics is the original dismal science, then climate
change could be its understudy.
Hardly a day goes by without a new scientific
report revealing more worrying news about the
rapid progress of climate change. Reports on climate
change typically make for grim bedtime
reading – full of worrying statistics and doomsday
scenarios. Sometimes it feels like the only question
left is whether the rising sea levels, tornadoes
or forest fires will get you first.
As the meteorological picture comes into focus,
campaigners have begun to argue that climate
change holds potentially serious implications for
international security. The basic argument is that
climate change – by redrawing the maps of water
availability, food security, disease prevalence and
coastal boundaries – will reduce the available food
and water, increase migration, raise tensions and
trigger new conflicts.
Résumé: Confused about the recent slew of arrests and/or deaths of al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Here's a roundup of who, what, where, and when.
Résumé: The U.S. government’s reliance on contractors, including the State Department’s and Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of private security contractors in Iraq, has been well documented. We and others have examined many of the challenges the government faces using contractors in Iraq, including issues related to the scope of private security contractors’ activities, the challenges in providing sufficient oversight, the appropriate accountability processes, and difficulties in conducting background screenings of foreign national contractor employees. (A list of related GAO products can be found at the end of this report.) What has not been so well examined is the comparative cost of using civilian employees or military members versus the cost of using contractors, particularly private security contractors, during contingency operations such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. Generally, when costs have been discussed, the focus has been on the daily rate paid to contractor employees, rather than on the total costs of using State Department or DOD personnel. However, in October 2005, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a study that compared the cost of using military personnel, federal civilians, or contractors to provide logistic support for overseas operations.
Résumé: New data from centrist Democratic pollsters shows President Barack Obama and the party losing ground on national security with key voters, and they urge him to toughen up his rhetoric on terrorism, but it’s a prescription that ignores an important point the president has been trying to make. The poll, conducted by veteran Democratic political consultants Stan Greenberg and Jeremy Rosner, found that President Obama had strong personal approval ratings among voters in most areas of national security - higher indeed than his approval rating overall, which was 47 percent approving and 48 percent disapproving.
Conducted in late February, the poll surveyed 851 adults who voted in 2008 and said they were likely to do so again in 2010.
More than half of the likely voters approved of the president’s handling of Afghanistan (58 percent to 37 percent disapproving); national security (57 percent to 40); “leading America’s military” (57 percent to 38); fighting terrorism (54 percent to 41); and Iraq (54 percent to 40).
These numbers, though still strong, are down from the 60 percent plus territory they were in when the pollsters ran their survey in May last year.
Nonetheless, the president’s approval ratings are currently in negative territory on only two national security issues: Iran (42 percent approving to 49 percent disapproving) and the “prosecution and interrogation of terrorism suspects.”
Résumé: [...] Facing comparatively few restrictions, U.S. legal residents and citizens can travel abroad, connect with terrorist groups to gain explosives or weapons training, and return here to plan and execute attacks. Particularly troubling are homegrown extremists who possess facility with both American and foreign cultures, including language skills. Such multi-cultural familiarity could allow them to operate freely both at home and overseas and to elude—far more easily than foreign nationals—U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials. Combating these tendencies requires action at the local, state, and federal levels. Local governments, supported by federal agencies like the Department of Homeland Security, must continue to build strong partnerships with Muslim communities. This type of cooperation is important because the friends and family of suspected extremists often are the best resources for law enforcement officials.
The federal government also must continue to support official partnerships among local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Such efforts—embodied in Joint Terrorism Task Forces and fusion centers—are crucial to apprehending domestic extremists because they combine local expertise (knowledge of neighborhoods and communities) with federal expertise (national intelligence and counterterrorism tools) to form a comprehensive approach to the threat.
Policymakers and officials at the national level also must address two key issues that play heavily in the five cases discussed here. First, they must consider new ways to interdict the growing trend of “Internet radicalization.” Many of last fall’s suspects connected with transnational terrorist recruiters via the Internet; stopping this sort of activity is crucial to stemming domestic extremism in the United States.
Second, several of those arrested last fall seemed to harbor the belief that the United States is at war with Islam. This is a “narrative” that al Qaeda and other global terrorist groups actively promulgate; it holds that U.S. counterterrorism efforts signify a “clash of civilizations” between the West and Islam. The United States must continue to work to puncture this narrative. White House officials already have discarded phrases like “war on radical Islam.” But ultimately, the United States needs to go further than this, because al Qaeda seizes on more than just U.S. rhetoric to galvanize support for its agenda; the group also points to America’s military presence in Muslim countries as evidence for its preferred narrative. The United States, then, should consider how to balance the need to combat global terrorism with the drawbacks of large-scale, direct military intervention. Doing so will require the United States to forge stronger partnerships with states plagued by extremist violence.
Résumé: In the run-up to today's historically significant parliamentary polls in Iraq, a volume of commentary has been offered on the complex internal dynamics in play and their critical import for the future direction of the country.
But a question that begs asking is where do Iraq's neighbours stand on these critical elections. Given the volatile reality of the Middle East and its tortuous geopolitics, states in the region have an intimate interest and much at stake in how their neighbours are run.
With much at risk for the stability of Iraq and its concomitant effects on bordering states, today's elections will be watched with great anxiety in capitals across the Middle East.
Tehran, in particular, will be following electoral developments over its western border in Iraq. Iranian foreign policy vis-à-vis Iraq is not necessarily ideological in its underpinnings. It is misleading to analyse Iran-Iraq relations through the prism of a Shia alliance.
Résumé: As Afghanistan contracting surges, US agencies fail to coordinate, inviting waste and abuse. In the past eight years, the United States has allocated $51 billion to rebuild and stabilize Afghanistan. But tracking that money sometimes seems as challenging as finding the leaders of the Taliban.
No one keeps an exact count of the number of private contractors working in Afghanistan -- even though Congress ordered that be done more than two years ago. There’s no central list of all the contracts now in force. Government auditors cannot determine with confidence if the reconstruction money is being properly spent or meets the stated objectives. And efforts to improve coordination among the key U.S. agencies managing the money -- the Pentagon, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development -- have lagged at best.
That is the picture that emerges from dozens of interviews with auditors, contractors, congressional aides and inspectors general, who echo the findings of independent government reports over the past decade. Without rigorous record-keeping, they say, the contracting process is vulnerable to waste, duplication of effort and fraud.
Résumé: A growing number of rape reports, including against very young girls and gang rapes, fill
Cambodian newspapers. Most police, NGO workers and public officials working with the issue
agree that rape is on the increase. The lack of appropriate services for victims of rape is
acute, and reflects social attitudes about rape and sexual violence.
Cambodia’s new Penal Code will enter into force late 2010. Amnesty International urges the
Cambodian government to seize this opportunity to address inadequate law enforcement in
cases of gender-based violence. The government has plans and strategies to tackle genderbased
discrimination, with a clear focus on human trafficking and domestic violence. They
need to incorporate rape and other sexual violence into these efforts, ensuring political will to
address this problem. The government’s limited public condemnation of rape echoes a lack
of social sanction. The lack of services – and policy discussions – may be interpreted as an
implicit acceptance of sexual violence on the part of the government and vast swathes of
society. The limited access to adequate medical and social services is a further indication
that the authorities do not acknowledge the severe trauma experienced by victims.
Résumé: Transatlantic cooperation on the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy
was bound to become easier with President Obama in charge.
And so it did, at least at first. Obama’s demands for a greater European
role in ‘AfPak’ were initially met. European governments deployed more
troops and agreed to a new NATO training mission for the ANSF. $500
million in additional civilian assistance to Afghanistan was pledged at the
NATO meeting in April 2009.
Looking back over Obama’s first year in office, however, one can discern
two phases of transatlantic cooperation. One started in January
2009 and lasted until mid-year, during which time US-European
cooperation was close. Another ongoing period began in autumn
2009, during which US-European policy began to falter, a US
Afghanistan-Pakistan policy re-examination ensued and transatlantic
cooperation decreased.
This is not to say that Europe was content with US strategy in one
period and dissatisfied in another. Throughout, European governments
have happily declared NATO’s Afghan mission vital to their
own security, but in practice have continued to treat it as a US
responsibility. Together, they have undertaken little joint strategising
– as opposed to national planning – and have generally used their
troops to curry favour with the US administration.
Résumé: This backgrounder provides an update on the political landscape in Iraq on the eve
of parliamentary elections. The paper begins with a brief overview of the electoral
process. The second part of the backgrounder documents the Shi’a, Sunni, and
Kurdish political landscapes. This paper concludes with some considerations on the
post-election period of government formation. Roughly 18.9 million Iraqis are registered to vote in the upcoming election, at more than 10,000 polling centers across the country. Each polling center comprises one or more polling stations, of which there are more than 50,000 in total. More than 300,000 domestic election observers and observers from various political parties will monitor the election; in addition, eight diplomatic missions and international organizations have been asked to participate as international election monitors. Security for the polling sites will be provided by the Iraqi Security Forces, with some planning assistance and enablers provided by U.S. forces.
Résumé: A concern over the potential for resource competition to serve as a driver for conflict has
established the need to more fully examine the relationship between energy resources and
conflict. This exploratory correlational study examined the relationship between oil resources,
armed conflict and stability. The ability of abundant oil resources to attract conflict and the ability of oil resource deficits to compel participation in armed conflict abroad were both explored. Since instability may be a precursor to conflict, the relationship between oil resources and stability was also examined. Overall, no statistically significant relationships were found between oil resources and either armed conflict or stability. However, stability was significantly related to both hosting and participating in conflict, although with opposite polarities. Results indicate that in today’s global environment oil resources alone may be insufficient as an indicator of energy’s contribution to active, armed conflict.
Résumé: The demands of counter-insurgency have sparked much discussion about the need for
army reform. But it is also the case that government, as a whole, must adapt to the
present campaign. Britain has lagged behind the US in this regard, and it is not clear that
sufficient political will exists in the UK for real change. However, British capacity is only
ever the first step: ultimately, what matters for successful stabilisation is the capability
and legitimacy of the host government.
Résumé: Islamic private schools are part of the national fabric of Palestinian society and represent a grass-roots movement that is not about assuming power over the state or recruiting 'Islamic militants.' Instead, their function is to assert the role of Islam in contributing to Palestinian national development, a function that may or may not be politicised but is neither dramatic nor sinister. In fact, they may be seen as important contributions to building a viable civil society in Palestine. However, the struggle between Fatah and Hamas for political power, as along with international counterterrorism measures, has seriously affected a number of Islamic charities and the schools they run. The result is economic problems and a weakening of these institutions in Palestinian society. Based on empirical study of local Islamic private schools in the West Bank and Gaza, this report analyses their activities and relation to Islamism. This fills a gap in literature about Islamic movements, where education is often mentioned, but seldom taken seriously or studied in detail.
Résumé: Yemen has become one of the most important strongholds and safe havens for al-Qaeda. The impact of Yemen’s Salafi-Jihadist movement is no longer limited to that nation and its national security alone. The threat posed by Yemen’s militant Salafists has spread to neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia and more distantly to the United States, as indicated by the failed Christmas Day suicide bombing of a Northwest Airways passenger plane by Nigerian Umar al-Faruq Abd al-Mutalib, who received his training in Yemen. Given the pivotal role that Yemen’s militant Islamists are playing as a host for al-Qaeda and a magnet for jihadis from abroad, this article seeks to analyze the structure of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and identify the social and ideological structures that led to its success
