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Résumé: Recent events in Iran involving the questionable election results that placed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad into his second term as president have raised the levels of public outcry and consternation both inside Iran and internationally. The political pundits and policymakers are speculating on what this means for the future of Iran and how this situation will end. The debate is premature and largely facile at this point, but what is interesting is that the initial Iranian government reaction to the potential insurgency bubbling up from disgruntled Moussavi supporters provides a well-suited test case for some of the commonly accepted counterinsurgency (COIN) tenants. An embryonic insurgent movement borne of deep resentment against the Iranian government and the de facto rulers of Iran, the Supreme Council, coupled with an extremely harsh COIN reaction creates an experimental situation which allows scholars, practitioners, and policymakers a rare opportunity to analyze, in real time, COIN theory.
Résumé: How has such a diversely used and fiercely contested concept as ‘human security’ retained
and redirected so much attention? The paper looks at the emerging concept, as variously
articulated and used in UNDP, Japan, Canada, Norway, and elsewhere, with reference to
various roles that such a concept plays in establishing a discursive field: 1) to provide a
shared language, to highlight and proclaim a new focus in investigation; 2) to guide
evaluations; 3) to guide positive analysis; 4) to focus attention in policy design; and 5) to
motivate action. It looks at how the concept is used differently, according to the context of
the analyst and the case which is analysed; and it identifies and critically reviews some major
criticisms of the concept, notably the attack by MacFarlane and Khong on the broad UN
version.
Résumé: The nexus between development, governance and security has become
the central focus of the international effort to manage transitions, and
peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective approach under
which the dimensions of conflict management, security, humanitarian
action, governance, rule of law, human rights and development can be
brought together under one common framework. The international debate about the need for, and appropriate role of, peacebuilding culminated,
as the centrepiece of the UN reform proposals of the 2005
World Summit, in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.
This paper is a modest attempt to take stock of what we know about
peacebuilding in general, and the UN Peacebuilding Commission in
particular. It aims to suggest how, in the context of the 2010 review
process, the United Nations peacebuilding community can identify a
few priority areas on which to focus.
This paper argues that our understanding of the peacebuilding concept
is closely interlinked with our notion of sustainability. It will focus on
three challenges that have the potential to significantly improve our
peacebuilding practice. These three areas for review are:
(1) Improving our understanding of the peacebuilding concept
through encouraging formal and informal debate, and the institutionalisation
of a specific peacebuilding model in the United
Nations;
(2) Significantly stepping up efforts to improve system-wide
coherence, including our understanding of the limits of coherence;
and
(4) Meaningfully operationalising the principle of local ownership,
including finding more creative ways to balance the need
for predictable international models on the one hand, and local
context on the other.
Taken together, these three challenges represent opportunities for policy
action that have the potential to enhance our collective ability to
facilitate more sustainable peacebuilding processes.
Résumé: Does the liberal peace critique still constitute an undiscovered message
in a bottle or does it represent the proverbial elephant in the room
when peacebuilding practitioners go about their daily work? There is
by now a vast literature ‘out there’, which seeks to uncover and denaturalise
the values underpinning contemporary peacebuilding and
the activities derived from these particular values. Nevertheless, the
peacebuilding enterprise carries on as if the values promoted are indisputable
or simply common sense. Regardless of definitional nuances
in terms of scope, peacebuilding is seen as synonymous with
activities such as the introduction of multiparty elections, security sector
reform, rule of law programming, human rights promotion and the
introduction of market-based economies.
This suggests that there is a glaring gap between the insights from the
liberal peace critique on the one hand and the actual peacebuilding
practices on the other. Whether the explanation is that these insights
have not yet been made available to practitioners or that they have
been deemed irrelevant or uncomfortable, is not for me to say. The
aim of this paper is merely to start bridging this gap, by way of discussing
how some of the central tenets of this academic literature can
be brought to bear on the practices of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture
(PBA). Intended as input into the discussions of the 2010 PBA
review, the paper will investigate the following question: what would
the process of developing so-called integrated peacebuilding strategies
(IPBS) look like, if insights from the liberal peace critique were made endogenous to the practices of the PBA? The hope is that this discussion
can constitute a humble contribution to making the PBA’s work
geared towards more sustainable outcomes.
Résumé: A critical question surrounding the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq
is Iraq’s internal security and stability. Although the U.S. withdrawal
plan is designed with care to avoid weakening Iraq’s security, the end
of U.S. occupation may alter the strategies of the main Iraqi political
actors, each of which has enough armed power to be able to shatter
Iraq’s domestic peace. In view of the potential for insecurity in Iraq,
the United States cannot afford to take a passive or reactive stance.
To anticipate dangers and act purposefully, U.S. policy-makers need a
dynamic analytic framework with which to examine the shifting motivations
and capabilities of the actors that affect Iraq’s security. This
monograph offers such a framework.
Résumé: This paper argues that if the PBC and the PBSO are to avoid longterm
institutional decline, they will, over the next five to ten
years, need to position themselves to play new roles – in terms of
mandate, resources, procedures, and partnerships. Four potential roles
are discussed. First, the PBA could seek to lead an integrated approach
to conflict prevention – not just lessening the risks of war recurring
in countries ‘emerging from conflict,’ but also reducing the
chances of an initial outbreak in countries facing an array of destabilizing
forces. Second, the PBA could occupy a more central niche in
the stabilization and recovery planning process by managing an otherwise-
decentralized international civilian-response capacity. Third,
the PBA could be tasked with ensuring that donors and aid-receiving
post-conflict states live up to commitments found in country-specific
peacebuilding ‘compacts,’ which must be arrived at through a more
streamlined process. And, fourth, the PBA’s work plan could be tied
to the process by which countries ‘graduate’ from the Security Council’s
agenda (as distinct from the PBC’s agenda, where such countries
may remain for a longer period). The paper identifies the pedigree of
all four proposals, which have surfaced from time to time, and assesses
the chances that future circumstances might prove more conducive
to their enactment.
Résumé: Different theories of international relations, institutions, and organizations
have insights into both the constraints the new UN peacebuilding
architecture is likely to face, as well as potential ways of overcoming
some of them. Emphasising that the UN remains a state-centric organization
marred by political frictions, political realists would focus on
the importance of leadership, interestingly echoed in the June 2009
Secretary-General’s report. Rational institutionalists tell us that issue
linkage should be pursued in heterogeneous institutions, something
the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) should explicitly try to foster.
Public choice analysts would advise that one recognize, and try to
work within, the structure of institutional interests, by developing indicators
of performance that are outcomes, rather than processoriented.
Organization theorists highlight the limited repertoire of possible
policy options and the means-driven nature of many decisionmaking
processes, calling for outside appraisals and deliberate efforts
to break routines and engage in forms of broad-based self-reflection.
Constructivists emphasize the importance and potential power of ideas
in framing discourse and shaping debates, and would advise that the
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the Working Group on Lessons
Learned (WGLL), or some other entity might become locations
for the generation of new ideas about peacebuilding. In the final
analysis, the success of the UN peacebuilding architecture will not be
determined by the number of countries requesting its institutions’ assistance
or the size of its operating budgets, but by the added value it
provides. There is an extraordinary wealth of experience concerning
the challenges of peacebuilding within the UN system, if it could only
be mobilized in a systematic manner.
Résumé: Efforts underway to address the 2008 Kenyan post-election crisis and the conditions that
caused it have provided the country with a unique opportunity to address its long history of
human rights violations. From the unspeakable atrocities of the pre-independence State of
Emergency period, to the dark years of the repressive one-party state, to the emergence of
state-sponsored ethnic violence in the 1990s, Kenya’s democratic institutions and its framework
for human rights enforcement have tended to be unable to stem the tide of human
rights problems. In some cases, democratic institutions, such as the police and the judiciary,
have even been co-opted into the service of repression.
The post-election crisis has brought into sharp focus the urgent need to fundamentally review
the entire edifice of governance in Kenya as it relates to security, human rights, the rule
of law, and democracy. The cornerstones of this ongoing reform process are the interlinked
issues of transitional justice and constitutional change. While transitional justice refers to
the set of activities and processes that can bring closure to the memory of past injustices and
atrocities, constitutional change speaks to the need to create a new, democratic and human
rights-responsive framework of governance. The two processes are now running concurrently
as stipulated by Agenda IV of the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition
Government (popularly known as the National Accord), which brought an end to the
post-election violence (PEV). [...] This briefing paper is a synthesis and analysis of the eight presentations and the ensuing
debate which took place among the broader group of 25 participants. It explores several
questions among them: What is the state of security and the security sector in Kenya? What
have been the outcomes of SSR measures undertaken so far? What approaches for security
sector transformation are desirable for Kenya and how might they be pursued? What kind of
linkages are policy-makers making between SSR and other issues in the governance realm?
Résumé: The 2009 Afghanistan presidential and provincial council elections were a signi cant setback in
the development of democracy in Afghanistan. They were the rst to be run entirely by Afghan
institutions, although with signi cant international nancial and technical support. Yet despite
$490 million in donor funds (including the 2008-09 voter registration exercise) and signi cant
input by dozens of international advisers, the elections struggled to meet minimum standards of
credibility and acceptability.
The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), which was mandated to adjudicate all electoral
violations, invalidated more than 1.2 million fraudulent votes in the presidential election—
resulting in a less than 50 percent majority for any candidate and requiring a runo between the
incumbent President Hamid Karzai and the runner up Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. (The second round
was not held because Dr. Abdullah withdrew from the race, citing the lack of fraud reduction
mechanisms as one of his main reasons.)
Résumé: By the end of the 1990s, Bahrain appeared to have cast off what had been a well-deserved
reputation as a country that routinely tortured detainees. The government had taken
significant steps to curtail the use of torture and other ill-treatment by its security officials,
and reports of such practices became a rarity. This report concludes, however, that since the
end of 2007, officials again have used torture and ill-treatment, particularly during the
interrogation of security suspects. Human Rights Watch’s conclusion is based on interviews
with former detainees and others, as well as its review of government documents.
This reversion to past practices came as political tensions rose in Bahrain. Street
demonstrations involving young men from the country’s majority Shia Muslim community
protesting alleged discrimination by the Sunni-dominated government deteriorated with
increasing regularity into confrontations, sometimes violent, with security forces. Arrests
often followed. Security officials appear to have utilized a specific repertoire of techniques
against many of those arrested designed to inflict pain and elicit confessions.
These techniques included the use of electro-shock devices, suspension in painful
positions, beating the soles of the feet (falaka), and beatings of the head, torso, and limbs.
Some detainees also reported that security officials had threatened to kill them or to rape
them or members of their families. Many detainees were subjected to more than one of
these practices. The use of these techniques, separately and in combination, violates
Bahrain’s obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture)
and other international treaties, as well as the prohibition of torture in Bahraini law.
Résumé: This report provides an overview of current issues in U.S.-Palestinian relations and. It also
contains an overview of Palestinian society and politics and descriptions of key Palestinian
individuals and groups—chiefly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian
Authority (PA), Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestinian refugee population. [...] The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state
neighbors, but to many countries and non-state actors in the region and around the world—
including the United States—for a variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. U.S. policy
toward the Palestinians since the advent of the Oslo process in the early-1990s has been marked
by efforts to establish a Palestinian state through a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and establish norms of democracy,
accountability, and good governance within the PA. Congressional views of the issue have
reflected concern that U.S. bilateral assistance not detrimentally affect Israel’s security by falling
into the hands of Palestinian rejectionists who advocate terrorism and violence against Israelis.
Résumé: Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that
perpetrated the September 11, 2001, attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a
core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets, with a centralized leadership
structure, made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organization’s plots either emanated from the
top or were approved by the leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al Qaeda as akin to a
corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile Chief Executive Officer issuing orders and
soliciting ideas from subordinates.
Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Out of necessity, due to
pressures from the security community, in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse
global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees
of independence. The core leadership, headed by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, is thought to
live in the mountainous tribal belt of northwest Pakistan, where it continues to train operatives,
recruit, and disseminate propaganda. But Al Qaeda franchises or affiliated groups active in
countries such as Yemen and Somalia now represent critical power centers in the larger
movement. Some affiliates receive money, training, and weapons; others look to the core
leadership in Pakistan for strategic guidance, theological justification, and a larger narrative of
global struggle. Over the past year senior government officials have assessed the trajectory of Al
Qaeda to be “less centralized command and control, (with) no clear center of gravity, and likely
rising and falling centers of gravity, depending on where the U.S. and the international focus is
for that period.” While a degraded corporate Al Qaeda may be welcome news to many, a trend
has emerged over the past few years that some view as more difficult to detect, if not potentially
more lethal. [...] The focus of this report is on the history of Al Qaeda, actions and capabilities of the organization
and non-aligned entities, and an analysis of select regional Al Qaeda affiliates. This report may be
updated as events warrant.
Résumé: The microfinance sector in Afghanistan is going through a period of reform. This is due largely to the consequences of an early emphasis on rapidly achieving operational sustainability through growth in client numbers and loans made. This focus reduced attention given to issues of portfolio quality, accountability, and meeting client interests, and was coupled with a lack of acknowledgement of the existing informal credit market. All of this laid the foundation for the current problems that microfinance institutions (MFIs) are facing with increasing client default rates and, in some cases, fraud.
AREU research on the impact of microcredit on informal credit systems and rural livelihoods illustrated the viability challenges MFIs were facing. These challenges were linked to having invested little effort in determining the viability of clients by understanding the social and economic contexts in which they were to invest their loans or in offering loan products meeting client needs. This showed a lack of understanding of the interconnections between MFI viability and that of clients. Based on a growing understanding of these connections and recent lags in growth and performance, the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) has introduced a series of reforms at the sector level to refocus MFIs on quality instead of growth. These reforms include requiring partner MFIs to prepare more reliable business plans, have a trainer on staff to address capacity gaps in management and credit operations, and create internal audit units to improve control systems and reduce opportunities for fraud. To track MFI progress in implementing these reforms, MISFA has institutionalised an MFI report card system.
Résumé: Despite the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 9 January 2005, which formally ended the 22-year civil war in Southern Sudan, the frequency and severity of local conflicts increased during 2009. These conflicts are threatening the stability of the South, and ultimately the peace process itself. Widespread insecurity will also make it difficult to hold the planned national elections in April and the 2011 referendum on secession.
Land and natural resources are increasingly contested in Southern Sudan and these issues trigger and fuel local violence. The return of internally displaced persons and refugees is also a source of controversy. In addition, partially incompatible interpretations of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army policy of “land belongs to the people” combined with institutional fragmentation further complicate the situation.
The underlying drivers of the increased insecurity in Southern Sudan are: a tense political setting; a highly militarised society in terms of access to weapons and a lowered threshold for using violence to settle disputes; and finally, lack of institutional capacity to provide security and to prevent, contain and solve conflict in Southern Sudan. This situation foments the use of violence as a means to further the interests of groups and individuals.
The solution lies in a two-stage process starting with short-term robust interventions (combining military deterrence and local systems of negotiation), and effective planning of long-term measures (such as disarmament, land legislation and reform) addressing the underlying factors to this predicament. Only when this first stage is finalised will long-term measures have the desired effect.
Résumé: Calls for increased Western military support to
Yemen to prevent the spread of terrorism are alarming. The cause of Yemen’s political crisis is not the rise of al-Qaeda or a lack of military power, but a gradual erosion of state authority. Kjetil Selvik
argues that the survival strategies of the Yemeni regime have contributed to the weakening of the state, triggering a Zaydi Shia rebellion in the north and separatist currents in the south. Seeking to fight al-Qaeda by propping up Ali Abdullah Saleh’s repressive regime is therefore likely to produce counterproductive results. Western governments would be wise not to deepen the country’s crisis by intervening militarily or further strengthening the repressive apparatus of the regime. Trying to
enforce state authority in the absence of national unity and political legitimacy is what created the impasse in the first place.
Résumé: Pakistani leaders often project Jammu & Kashmir as Pakistan’s jugular vein in justification of their supporting jihadi terrorist groups against India in an attempt to change the status quo in J&K. It is not.
Karachi is Pakistan’s jugular vein. It is the economic capital of Pakistan contributing a substantial part of Pakistan’s industrial production and tax revenue. It has Pakistan’s only functioning international port. The Gwadar port, on the Mekran coast of Balochistan, constructed with Chinese assistance and commissioned three years ago, has so far failed to come up to expectations as an alternative to Karachi as an international port due to the continuing Baloch freedom struggle and the inability of the Pakistani authorities to develop the subsidiary infrastructure to connect Gwadar with the other economic centres of Pakistan, particularly in Punjab.
Karachi is also of strategic significance not only to Pakistan, but also to the NATO troops fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is still Pakistan’s most important naval base. Gwadar is being developed as an alternate naval base to reduce the vulnerability of the Pakistan Navy in Karachi, but it is estimated that it will take another five to eight years before Gwadar as a naval base starts functioning in a satisfactory manner.
Résumé: This Paper describes Israel’s process for investigating alleged violations of the Law of
Armed Conflict. It focuses in particular on investigations, legal proceedings, and lessons
learned in relation to the actions of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in Gaza from 27
December 2008 through 18 January 2009 (the “Gaza Operation,” also known as
“Operation Cast Lead”). Israel’s system for investigating alleged violations of the Law of Armed Conflict is
comparable to the systems adopted by other democratic nations, including the United
Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and Canada. The Paper notes that Israel has
demonstrated its ability and its commitment to pursue serious criminal charges to uphold the Law of Armed Conflict, a commitment which has been confirmed by outside observers
and foreign legal systems.
Résumé: CST recorded 924 antisemitic
incidents in 2009. This is the
highest annual total since
it began recording antisemitic
incidents in 1984, and is 55
per cent higher than the previous
record of 598 incidents in 2006. The total of 924 incidents
is an increase of 69 per cent
from the 2008 total of 546
incidents, and follows two
years of falling incident totals
in 2007 and 2008. The main reason for this record
high is the unprecedented
number of antisemitic incidents
recorded in January
and February 2009, during
and after the conflict between
Israel and Hamas in Gaza.
The number of incidents
recorded did not return
to relatively normal levels
until April, some three months
after the conflict ended. 212 of the 924 antisemitic
incidents reported to CST in 2009,
or 23 per cent of the total,
included a reference to Gaza
alongside the antisemitic content,
motivation or targeting. 158
of these occurred during January
Résumé: Q General, can you give us an update Marja offensive, the plans? Have the operations begun? Where does that stand?
GEN. MCCHRYSTAL: What we're doing in the Helmand River valley writ large, we really started last summer increasing security in a number of areas. You saw where the Marines went in. And British forces, Danish forces, Estonian forces went in.
And they started to create a series of secure -- bubble security zones -- pretty classic counterinsurgency. But they were not contiguous, not connected. So what we're doing is, we're expanding that, increasing the areas that will be under government of Afghanistan control.
The big thing that I am most happy about where we are now is the progress with Afghan national security forces being in the lead. I probably misspoke there, because it's more than Afghan national security forces. It's Afghan government.
So the planning that we've gone for here has actually been led by the governor, supported by the aligned ministries. And they started from rear to front, in terms of operation.
They started with the build, planned the build, planned the hold, planned the clear and then the shape, which is actually the way you need to think through, so you don't get partway.
So the planning is in great shape. I went through a number of recent planning events with them. And I'm very confident and very impressed with where they are, particularly the partnership.
Résumé: The United States has been pressuring Pakistan for several months to extend its counterinsurgency operations to North Waziristan. The U.S. perspective is that strong militant entities, especially the Haqqani group, the Hizb-i-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmaytar and Taliban forces under Hafiz Gul Bahadur are using the safe haven of North Waziristan to conduct raids on American, NATO and Afghan troops. Pakistan is resisting the immediate expansion of the conflict due to several factors, one of which is that Islamabad feels its military is already overcommitted in South Waziristan, Swat and Malakand and needs time to consolidate the gains it has achieved in these places before undertaking any further operations. More than 150,000 military and paramilitary forces are currently deployed in the tribal agencies and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in order to clear pockets of resistance, prevent the recurrence of militant attacks, and hold the territory that has been cleared until it stabilizes. The military has claimed the capture and killing of hundreds of militants during the operations, but the Taliban’s top leadership and many hard-core militants managed to escape in thickly forested areas or flee to adjoining tribal agencies. Conditions in Bajaur and Momand remain fairly volatile and clashes between security forces and militants are frequently reported. Remote areas of South Waziristan close to the border with North Waziristan continue to provide sanctuary to the Taliban and other militant entities that are now the target of U.S. drones.
Résumé: In the early days of jihad in Kashmir, between 1988 and 1990, more than 150 groups surfaced on the jihadist scene. Some of these groups united to form bigger groups such as Hizb ul-Mujahideen, but most of them simply disappeared. Some of those which still exist are mere shadows of their past and have very few followers. None except the Hizb ul-Mujahideen have the capability of carrying out militant operations inside Indian-administered Kashmir on their own. Some of these groups collaborate occasionally with Pakistani groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba to justify their existence. This factsheet includes a brief description of: Hizbul Mujahideen; Ansar ul-Islam and Jamiat ul-Mujahideen; Sectarian Jihadist Groups; Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami and its Deobandi Offshoots; Jaish-i-Mohammad; 9/11 and the Deobandi Jihadist Groups; Markaz Dawat wal Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Résumé: Can brief, foreign-funded efforts to build local institutions have positive effects on local patterns of governance,
cooperation, and well-being? Prior research suggests that such small-scale, externally driven interventions are
unlikely to substantially alter patterns of social interaction in a community, and that the ability of a community
to act collectively is the result of a slow and necessarily indigenous process. We address this question using
a randomized field experiment to assess the effects of a community-driven reconstruction (CDR) project
carried out by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in northern Liberia. The project attempted to build
democratic, community-level institutions for making and implementing decisions about local public goods.
We find powerful evidence that the program was successful in increasing social cohesion, some evidence that
it reinforced democratic political attitudes and increased confidence in local decision-making procedures, but
only weak evidence that material well-being was positively affected. There is essentially no evidence of adverse
effects.
Résumé: A top United Nations official today urged a comprehensive, cohesive and broad-based strategy to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia, noting that the continued spread of the scourge points to the limits of a solely sea-based approach.
In recent years, pirates operating from Somalia have been hijacking ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean and holding their crews and cargo for ransom.
Charles Petrie, the UN's Deputy Special Representative for Somalia, told a meeting of the Contact Group on piracy off the coast of Somalia that improved coordination between the international maritime community and military forces in the region, among other elements, has contributed to a decline in the rate of successful pirate attacks and raised the cost of pirate operations. “And yet piracy continues to expand further out to sea, at times more than 1,000 nautical miles from the coast of Somalia,” he told the meeting at UN Headquarters.
Mr. Petrie added that the rising costs of these attacks are met by ever more innovative financing mechanisms, including the establishment of stock exchanges which allow local investors to earn returns on their ‘investment’ in piracy operations.
“These developments highlight the limits of an exclusively sea-based approach and emphasize the need for the international community to continue to deal with the issue of piracy in a comprehensive, cohesive and broad-based approach.
“The United Nations remains committed to addressing the problem of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia holistically, in close coordination with the international community,” he added.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in a report issued last November, called for an integrated approach that would strengthen the capacities of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on land.
Résumé: The Security Council today extended the mandate of the United Nations mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), and the French forces supporting it, for another four months to help support the staging of free, fair and transparent elections in the West African nation.
Originally intended to be held as far back as 2005, the polls have been repeatedly postponed. Last scheduled for November 2009, they are now slated for March.
The Council, in a unanimously adopted resolution, urged the relevant Ivorian actors “to ensure the publication of the final voters list, to announce the official date of the first round of the presidential election and to meet their commitments in full.” UNOCI’s mandate was also extended through 31 May.
To reinforce security ahead of the elections, the 15-member body expressed its intention to raise UNOCI’s current troop level of 7,450 by up to 500 additional personnel for a limited period of time when the final voters list will be made public.
Last week the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Côte d’Ivoire, Choi Young-Jin, told the Council that the publication in November of the provisional electoral list was among the significant gains made in recent months towards holding the elections.
Résumé: The war in Iraq may be winding down but it is scarcely over. Iraq is still the scene of major attacks on ongoing violence. Equally important, Iraq is still far from political stability, faces major problems in political accommodation, and must both conduct a major election and develop far more effective patterns of governance. Iraq must take the lead in these efforts and shape its own destiny, but it has not had stable or effective governance for more than half a century, and only began to emerge from some four decades of external and internal conflict in 2009. [...] This reports shows that Iraq has made major progress in many areas, but still faces critical challenges. It will be at least five years before Iraq can develop the kind of economy it needs, achieve stable security and political accommodation, and create a fully effective mix of governance and rule of law. In practice, it is probably far more realistic to think of 2020 than 2015, or the completion of US troop withdrawals by the end of 2011.
The key to a successful US policy will be to establish an enduring strategic partnership that can help Iraq make progress. This must involve continuing US support in helping Iraq deal with the underlying causes of ethnic and sectarian tension in Iraq, in helping Iraq create an effective government and strong security forces, and in helping Iraq make the structural changes in its economy necessary to use its potential oil wealth to help all of its people.
