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Abstract: The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council
resolution 1828 (2008), by which the Council requested me to report every 60 days
on the deployment and operations of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid
Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the political process, the security and humanitarian
situation in Darfur and compliance of the parties with their international obligations. The report covers the month of June 2009, rather than the typical 60-day
period, in order to ensure that the Council is provided with the most current
information available in anticipation of its discussions on the renewal of the
mandate of UNAMID which expires on 31 July 2009. In addition to the normal
update on key developments, I have included a number of observations regarding
the last 12 months of operations of UNAMID and some recommendations for the
way forward in Darfur, for the Council’s consideration.
Abstract: Those who serve the helicopter fleets of all the Services do a superb job, often under
difficult and dangerous circumstances. We have been unfailingly impressed by all UK
helicopter personnel whom we have met, for their professionalism, dedication and bravery.
Helicopters provide many vital capabilities to the modern Armed Forces, from the
movement of troops and equipment around the battlefield to the detection and
confrontation of submarines at sea. We were concerned both by the proposed reduction in
the size of the fleet, and by the emergence of a ‘capability deficit’ ahead of the introduction
of newer helicopters.
The Ministry of Defence currently plans to extend and sustain the lives of several ageing
helicopter types in an attempt to minimise this capability deficit. Given the age of both Sea
King and Puma and the poor survivability of the Puma, extending their lives at
considerable cost is not the best option, either operationally or in terms of the use of public
money. We do not believe that these LEPs will provide adequate capability or value for the
taxpayer. Only a procurement of new helicopters can meet the original objective of
reducing the number of types of helicopter in service within the UK Armed Forces.
In our Report, we describe how the concept of ‘helicopter capability’ is built upon the four
pillars of manning, equipment, training and support. We were told that, of these, it was the
manning pillar that was under the most strain. The opportunity to train for some
capabilities, in particular amphibious warfare, has suffered as a result of operational
demands. The support structures underpinning helicopters seem actually to be something
of a success story, with closer working between the MoD and industry paying dividends in
terms of available flying hours—one of the key metrics by which the MoD judges
performance in-theatre.
Nevertheless, helicopter capability is being seriously undermined by the shortage of
helicopters, particularly medium-lift support helicopters, capable of being deployed in
support of operations overseas. We believe that the size of the fleet is an issue, and are
convinced that the lack of helicopters is having adverse consequences for operations today
and, in the longer term, will severely impede the ability of the UK Armed Forces to deploy.
Abstract: China Development Institute (CDI) was established in February 1989 upon the approval of State Council as a think tank for research and consulting. It is engaged in economic policy studies and provides economy-related consulting services to government at all levels, to businesses and to other public organizations. Adhering to a spirit of reform and innovation, the institute is manned mainly by young and middle-aged researchers and engaged in economic research and consulting with a preference for the new framework-geared to the market economy-over traditional ones.
Throughout its history, CDI has probed into the leading issues in Chinese economic reform, thus forming a solid platform for further research and studies in China's macroeconomic policy; the southern China, Hong Kong and Macao economies; international economic strategy; China's corporate system; and enterprise reform. CDI has also taken a major role in corporate consulting: Dozens of large domestic and foreign enterprises and public organizations enjoy the institute's consulting service in their economic decision making process and for investment, financing, management, accounting and marketing.
The institute has an extensive cooperation and exchange network with many domestic and international research institutions and consulting firms, including joint PhD and MA in economics programs with the prestigious Tsinghua and Nankai universities, which enables CDI to be a training center for senior talent in Southern China.
Abstract: The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington, DC. Our mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations that advance three broad goals: Strengthen American democracy; Foster the economic and social welfare, security and opportunity of all Americans and Secure a more open, safe, prosperous and cooperative international system.
Brookings is proud to be consistently ranked as the most influential, most quoted and most trusted think tank.
Abstract: Welcome to www.cfr.org, the website of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). It is designed to be an online resource for everyone in these turbulent times who wants to learn more about the complex international issues challenging policymakers and citizens alike.
Thinking about and discussing pressing foreign-policy issues is a long-established tradition at CFR, a nonpartisan and independent membership organization. As you can learn by reading our mission statement, CFR has promoted understanding of foreign policy and America’s role in the world since its founding in 1921. It does this in a variety of ways: by convening meetings at which government officials, global leaders, and CFR members debate major foreign-policy issues; by operating a think tank that is home to the world’s most prominent scholars of international affairs; by sponsoring Task Forces and commissioning books and reports; and by publishing Foreign Affairs, the leading journal of global politics.
We see our site as a way to further that mission. Our goal is to make www.cfr.org the single best website for users searching for information and insights about international politics. Users will, of course, find materials produced at the Council on Foreign Relations: transcripts of on-the-record meetings, books by scholars, Background Q & A’s by our site’s editorial staff, op-eds, and journal articles by CFR fellows, and much more.
But that is only half of the story. Unlike most other think-tank sites, www.cfr.org is not limited to “our” material. Our site is your guide to the best information and analysis, regardless of whether it is produced here at the Council on Foreign Relations or another institution. Website researchers, working with CFR’s library and fellows, scour the Internet for material from other think tanks, government agencies, educational institutions, and nongovernmental organizations in order to deliver the widest range of high-quality information and insight.
Abstract: Chatham House was founded in 1920 and granted its Royal Charter in 1926. It is based in St James's Square in London.
The Chatham House Rule, famous worldwide for facilitating free speech and confidentiality at meetings, originated here.
Our mission is to be a world-leading source of independent analysis, informed debate and influential ideas on how to build a prosperous and secure world for all.
Chatham House pursues this mission: by drawing on our membership to promote open as well as confidential debates about significant developments in international affairs and about the context and content of policy responses; by producing independent and rigorous analysis of critical global, regional and country-specific challenges; by offering new ideas to decision-makers and -shapers on how these could best be tackled from the near to long term.
Abstract: The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) is an independent research institution engaged in research in international affairs.
The institute draws up reports and analyses and follows developments in international affairs continuously in order to assess the security and foreign policy situation of Denmark, e.g. aspects of relevance with regard to development policy.
DIIS also communicates research findings, analyses and knowledge and performs functions concerning documentation, information and library services.
Furthermore, DIIS contributes to the education of researchers, supports the development of research capacity in developing countries and establishes contacts between Danish and international research environments.
DIIS's research and activities are organized in several research units and a few major commissioned works.
Abstract: Human Rights Watch is one of the world’s leading independent organizations dedicated to defending and protecting human rights. By focusing international attention where human rights are violated, we give voice to the oppressed and hold oppressors accountable for their crimes. Our rigorous, objective investigations and strategic, targeted advocacy build intense pressure for action and raise the cost of human rights abuse. For 30 years, Human Rights Watch has worked tenaciously to lay the legal and moral groundwork for deep-rooted change and has fought to bring greater justice and security to people around the world.
Abstract: Amnesty International is a worldwide movement of people who campaign for internationally recognized human rights for all.
Our supporters are outraged by human rights abuses but inspired by hope for a better world - so we work to improve human rights through campaigning and international solidarity.
We have more than 2.2 million members and subscribers in more than 150 countries and regions and we coordinate this support to act for justice on a wide range of issues.
Abstract: This paper investigates the advantages and disadvantages of NGO as opposed to track one
or official state-led peacebuilding. Drawing on empirical research into the Kumasi Peace
Process of the mid-1990s, which followed a large-scale inter-ethnic conflict in Ghana’s
Northern Region, it presents three key findings. Firstly it shows how the nature of the war,
and how it was ended, shaped the peace that was built. Secondly, it outlines in what ways
and by whom the peace process can be seen as a success, from the perspectives of its
beneficiaries and its detractors. Finally, it demonstrates how the contingent nature of
peacebuilding must be harnessed if negotiated peace processes are to leave a lasting
positive impact.
Abstract: Fifty-four testimonies of Israeli combat soldiers who participated in Operation Cast Lead reveal gaps between the reports given by the army following January’s events; the needless destruction of houses; firing phosphorous in populated areas and an atmosphere that encouraged shooting anywhere.
Half a year after Operation Cast Lead, the organization "Breaking the Silence" is announcing the release of a new booklet today (Wed. 7/15) that includes numerous testimonies by soldiers who participated in the operation. The testimonies expose significant gaps between the official stances of the Israeli military and events on the ground.
Among the 54 testimonies are stories revealing the use of "accepted practices," the destruction of hundreds of houses and mosques for no military purpose, the firing of phosphorous gas in the direction of populated areas, the killing of innocent victims with small arms, the destruction of private property, and most of all, a permissive atmosphere in the command structure that enabled soldiers to act without moral restrictions. The booklet compiles the testimonies of about 30 reserve and regular combat soldiers from various units that participated in the fighting. The testimonies demonstrate that the soldiers were not given directives stating the goal of the operation and, as one soldier testifies, "there was not much said about the issue of innocent civilians."
Many soldiers said that they fought without seeing "the enemy before their eyes." "You feel like an infantile little kid with a magnifying glass looking at ants, burning them," one of the soldiers testified that "a 20-year-old kid should not have to do these kinds of things to other people."
"The testimonies prove that the immoral way the war was carried out was due to the systems in place and not the individual soldier," said Mikhael Mankin from "Breaking the Silence." What was proven yesterday is that through the IDF the exception becomes the norm, and this requires a deep and reflective discussion. This is an urgent call to Israel's society and leadership to take a sober look at the foolishness of our policies."
Abstract: Top Russian officials are claiming that the security situation in the North Caucasus is improving. News reports from the region, however, paint a different picture. President Dmitry Medvedev told Ingushetia's acting president, Rashid Gaisanov, during a meeting in Sochi yesterday that "the fight with bandits" in the North Caucasus has achieved "not bad results" recently. Medvedev, who said he had just spoken with Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Aleksandr Bortnikov and "other colleagues," claimed that around 20 rebels had been killed over the last several days, adding that it was necessary to step up those efforts even further.
Gaisanov, for his part, said that the situation in Ingushetia remains tense but is under control. He said that the republic's security forces together with the FSB and interior ministry are continuing to carry out the counter-insurgency operations launched in May by Ingushetia's president, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who was seriously wounded in a suicide bombing in Nazran last month, and that operations in both the republic's mountains and population centers are yielding "good results".
Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev has also expressed optimism about the situation in the North Caucasus, but somewhat more cautiously. He said yesterday that the number of rebel attacks in Chechnya has dropped, so that there is no need to maintain a counter-terrorist operation regime for the entire republic. Nurgaliev added, however, that clashes between militants and security forces are continuing in some districts of Chechnya, meaning that the security forces are still required for those areas and therefore that the Unified Group of Forces in the North Caucasus will not be downsized.
Abstract: In mid-August 2002, Canadian officials were informed by American authorities that Omar Ahmed Khadr, a fifteen-year old Canadian citizen, had been captured by US forces in Afghanistan. A number of Canadian agencies quickly became involved in this matter, including CSIS.
In February and September 2003, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) officials travelled to Guantanamo Bay to meet with Khadr. From the Service’s perspective, there were compelling operational reasons to interview Khadr given the threat posed by Sunni Islamic extremism in the months following 9/11: Khadr’s father, Ahmed, was allegedly the highest-ranking Canadian Al Qaeda member. When the Americans granted Canadian intelligence and law enforcement officials access to Khadr, CSIS seized the opportunity to gather intelligence that would advance its investigation. As such, the goal of interviewing Khadr was to collect intelligence on a potentially serious terrorist threat and to provide advice to the Government of Canada accordingly.
Although SIRC understands CSIS’s position that it had reasonable grounds to travel to Guantanamo Bay to gather threat-related information, we found that its decision to interview Khadr was animated primarily by intelligence considerations; as a result, SIRC believes that CSIS failed to give proper attention to two important extra-intelligence considerations.
Abstract: As the West place more troops in Afghanistan, there are lessons to be learned from history. Avoid making the same mistakes that others made in the past, for otherwise the war will not be won. Western governments are pouring more troops into Afghanistan. But this strategy is doomed to fail unless they can master the far harder tasks of counter-insurgency, state-building and development. Winning the Afghan war is about politics, people and jobs. Although the success of the surge in Iraq and the recent military victory by Sri Lankan government forces over the Tamil Tigers may have emboldened those favouring the military as the principal providers of stability, this is a chimera. In Afghanistan this approach will create at least as many problems as it might solve.
Abstract: The impact of Armed Violence, whether in the context of crime or full-blown conflict, is
widely acknowledged by states and civil society as a major constraint to poverty
reduction and the enjoyment of human rights. This programme policy aims to set out
how DanChurchAid (DCA) can contribute to efforts to reduce armed violence through
focusing on the demand, supply and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW).
The policy suggests that interventions should largely focus on non-conflict settings
where armed violence and crime is so persistent, effectively undermining human rights
and poverty elimination efforts. Responding to current gaps in programming, DCA will
emphasize support to interventions at the national and sub-national levels that target a
measurable reduction in armed violence. The policy will also outline, however, measures
by which DCA can help to prevent or limit armed conflict through targeting the
international supply of SALW to troubled areas and addressing other “softer” triggers.
Abstract: The U.S. program of assistance to Afghanistan is intended to stabilize and strengthen the Afghan
economic, social, political, and security environment so as to blunt popular support for extremist
forces in the region. Since 2001, nearly $38 billion has been appropriated toward this effort.
More than half of U.S. assistance—roughly 54%—has gone to security programs, mostly the
training and equipping of Afghan forces. Another 32% has gone to development and
humanitarian-related activities from infrastructure to private sector support. About 5% has been
targeted at governance and democratization efforts. More than 9% has been directed to counternarcotics
programs.
Key U.S. agencies providing aid are the Department of Defense (56% of aid), the Agency for
International Development (28%), the Department of State (14%), and the Department of
Agriculture (1%).
In June 2009, Congress approved the FY2009 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 111-32, H.R.
2346), closely following the Administration request for Afghanistan aid. The legislation provides
$861 million in the Economic Support Fund (ESF); $133 million in the International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account; $3.6 billion in the Afghan Security Forces Fund
(ASFF); and $453 million in the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the latter
to be shared with Iraq.
On May 7, 2009, the Administration submitted an FY2010 budget request to Congress. It would
provide $2.8 billion in economic assistance under the State, Foreign Operations budget, mostly
composed of $2.2 billion in ESF and $450 million in INCLE funds. The DOD appropriations
request for FY2010 includes $7.5 billion for the ASFF and $1.5 billion for the CERP, the latter
shared with Iraq. On June 26, 2009, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 3081
(H.Rept. 111-187), the FY2010 State, Foreign Operations Appropriations, providing $2.1 billion
in ESF and $420 million in INCLE funds to Afghanistan.
This report provides a “big picture” overview of the U.S. aid program and congressional action. It
describes what various aid agencies report they are doing in Afghanistan. It does not address the
effectiveness of their programs.
Abstract: Filmed and directed by Refugees International Board Member Matt Dillon, this short documentary was developed following a Refugees International assessment to south Sudan in February 2009. It documents the struggles of approximately 2 million south Sudanese refugees who have returned home following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan that ended a 21-year civil war.
South Sudanese are finding their home areas have minimal basic services available to help them reintegrate into their communities. They face extreme poverty and lack of access to water, sanitation, education, health care and jobs. Further conflicts between north and south Sudan, and internal fighting within south Sudan, are displacing many people again.
The U.S. and the international community must support the implementation of the peace process and increase funding for basic social services and income opportunities. A broader regional strategy must be developed that resolves the root causes of conflict throughout all of Sudan.
Abstract: Beyond major conflicts in Africa over the territorial integrity of states such as Sudan and Somalia, many recent conflicts on the continent are ignited by grievances over bad governance and exclusionary political practices. In many cases, flawed or failed elections have either precipitated political disputes or aggravated simmering tensions into an outburst of conflict. For example, in the last five years, violent conflicts have ensued from the competition for political power in Africa as demonstrated by dramatic election-related crises in Ethiopia, Kenya and Zimbabwe. While the magnitude of hostilities in all cases may not rise to the level of armed conflict or civil war, invariably, many lives are lost, property destroyed, societies are further polarized and democratization efforts are either stalled or reversed. In some cases, intense and long drawn-out disputes over electoral processes and outcomes raise questions about the legitimacy of the winning party and candidate through the duration of that candidate’s term of office.
Election-related disputes raise special challenges, particularly around issues such as: how to revive political will and recreate neutral space for citizen participation and confidence in various aspects of the country’s governance process; and how potential mediators from within national boundaries or the international community can walk the fine line of respecting the sovereignty of nation-states while at the same time giving high regard to universal principles such as the responsibility to protect in cases where disputes spill over into full blown conflict.
Abstract: The Iraqi refugee crisis is far from over and recent violence is creating further displacement. Iraqi women will resist returning home, even if conditions improve in Iraq, if there is no focus on securing their rights as women and assuring their personal security and their families’ well being. Reducing support to displaced families could force returns to insecure areas without adequate services and trigger additional instability in Iraq. Budget cuts will hit women the hardest. The U.S. and other donor governments should avoid shifting funds into returns programs without fully funding programs for the displaced. Very few displaced people in northern Iraq and Syria are willing to return in the foreseeable future. 81,000 internally displaced Iraqis returned as of May 2009, but these returns were often not sustainable. Refugees International interviewed families in northern Iraq who had returned to their home areas, but had been displaced again. Only 900 of the 208,030 refugees registered with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in Syria signed up for voluntary return this year. UNHCR in Damascus currently registers around 2,000 new Iraqi refugees every month. It is clear that large-scale returns are not going to happen in the near future given the current uncertainties in Iraq.
Abstract: In the past month, two seemingly unrelated events have turned Central Asia into a potential flashpoint: an aggressively expanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a nascent strategic alliance between Russia and China.
At stake is nothing less than who holds the future high ground in the competition for the world's energy resources. Early this summer, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicted a sharp drop in world oil reserves. According to energy expert Michael Klare, the "era of cheap and plentiful oil is drawing to a close," and is likely to result in "a new era of cutthroat energy competition."
In early July, after a full-court press by Washington and an agreement to increase its yearly rent, Kyrgyzstan reversed a decision to close the U.S. base at Manas, thus giving the United States a powerful toehold in the countries bordering the oil- and gas-rich Caspian Basin.
While Manas is portrayed as a critical base in the ongoing campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the war in Central Asia is less over "terrorism" than it is over energy. "Never reading the words 'Afghanistan" and 'oil' in the same sentence is still a source of endless amusement," says the Asia Times' Pepe Escobar.
Escobar, who has coined the term "Pipelineistan" to describe the vast network of oil and gas pipelines that "crisscross the potential imperial battlefields of the planet," sees Afghanistan "at the core of Pipelineistan," strategically placed between the Middle East, Central and South Asia."
As Escobar points out, "It's no coincidence that the map of terror in the Middle East and Central Asia is practically interchangeable with the map of oil."
Abstract: “Kill two-hundred thousand to obtain twenty years of peace.” Twenty
years after the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 4 June 1989, this quote
attributed to Deng Xiaoping appears to have been off by a great deal. It
took only one-thousand to two-thousand dead for the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) to gain its wished-for two decades of quiet. Beneath the
stable surface, however, the massacre still deeply affects the behavior of
China’s rulers and their opposition alike. The nervousness with which
CCP leaders addressed the approach of Tiananmen’s twentieth anniversary
shows that, despite all efforts to erase this event from official histories
and popular memory, the Party remains haunted by it.
When tanks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rolled into downtown
Beijing on June 4 to force out the students who—with help from
citizens working to block troop movements—had been occupying Tiananmen
Square since mid-May, the CCP and its top leader Deng Xiaoping
were suddenly cast in a harsh new light. Since consolidating his power in
the late 1980s, Deng had come to seem a hero to most Chinese. He had rehabilitated
many of Mao’s victims, allowed youths whom the late Chairman
had consigned to the countryside to come back to the cities, relaxed
controls over the rural economy and daily life, and thus earned much support
from farmers, intellectuals, and young people. He was regarded as
a pragmatist who stood up to the neo-Maoists and wanted to improve
the average citizen’s standard of living. His handpicked CCP secretarygeneral
Zhao Ziyang had been talking about greater dialogue with society
and even separating the Party from the government. Citizens at large were feeling freer to express discontent, while students and intellectuals were
discussing prospects for increased democratization. Student demonstrations
in 1986 had met with a mild official reaction that seemed one more
piece of evidence for the notion that the Party had changed and was led by
figures far less allergic to dissent than the Great Helmsman had been. The
shootings of June 4 and the crackdown that followed shockingly reversed
these impressions and expectations of regime leniency.
Abstract: Taking into account the prior genocide in Rwanda and the current genocide in Darfur, the UN has shown that in its current state, it has failed to deliver on the promises of the post-Cold War era-protecting human rights, preventing genocide and ensuring human security. In turn, this has contributed to the credibility deficit now facing the organization. However, it appears that the general trend within academia and international relations is to sweep the problem under the rug without being able to offer solutions; hoping time will magically come up with an answer. Whilst in the meantime thousands of individuals perish at the hands of such inaction. This paper sets out to look at alternative approaches of how the UN can better deal with genocide and humanitarian intervention. It will examine reform models suggested for the UN’s main limbs - Charter Resolution, the General Assembly, the Security Council, Secretary General and the possibility of creating new divisions within pre-existing UN framework. It will then conclude with a recommended approach of which of the models, if any, can best better the chances of preventing current and future genocides.
Abstract: The war in Somalia goes on. The sentence is so familiar that it could have been written on almost any day since 1991. Yet such familiarity does not lessen the pain of the many thousands hurt by violence and displacement, or by the hunger and poverty that war has also inflicted. Each latest death and injury, each enforced flight and disrupted schooling, hits with the rawness of the first. There is an endless search for movement beyond the chaos, however. Somalis survive and build their lives as best they can amidst it - in the country itself, as well in the diverse (and sometimes flourishing) diaspora. Somalis recreate and sustain their homeland even in the absence of a functioning state - through local institutions and networks, through mobile and virtual connections, through conferences and gatherings, through clan solidarities. In doing so they keep alive the dream of a peaceful, sovereign and secure country where they can live in dignity.
The ongoing conflict in Somalia may overshadow these efforts, but it never entirely eclipses them. At the same time it is hard for Somalis to explain to outsiders what after all this time the war in their country is actually about and why it has lasted so long. How is it that one of the most homogeneous societies in the world created a failed state with its own hands? What is the core problem: money, land, oil, clan, political leadership, the United States, Ethiopia, piracy, terrorism, kidnapping, environmental degradation? There is no simple answer. What then is the solution? Here, the answer is clearer: everything comes back to politics.
Abstract: Is the long-predicted decline of Political Islam about to occur?
Several French scholars, such as Gilles Keppel and Olivier Roy, have been making this argument since the early 1990s. The only trouble was a subsequent string of Islamist electoral victories that seemed to undermine their thesis.
But in light of Islamist losses in recent elections in Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Bahrain, talk of the decline of Political Islam is reemerging. Influential Washington Post journalist David Ignatius recently wrote of a region-wide, anti-Islamist backlash whose central theme, according to a specialist he cited from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, is that "the Muslim parties have failed to convince the public that they have any more answers than anyone else."
The sentiment is hardly confined to Washington. The June 30 episode of the popular Al-Jazeera political talk show, the Opposite Direction, debated the question, "Has political Islam begun to decline?"
So has it? Clearly, Islamists are not winning elections. This does not, however, mean a decline of Political Islam, let alone Islamism as a broader movement. First, given the authoritarian nature of Arab political systems, official election results are not necessarily accurate or even meaningful measures of the influence of Islamist groups.
