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Abstract: The Nigerian who attempted to blow up a U.S. airliner on Christmas Day reportedly received weapons training in Yemen, and the al-Qaeda affiliate there has claimed responsibility (AP). Yemen analyst Christopher Boucek, an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says, if confirmed, these latest developments in the country pose a serious challenge to U.S. and regional security efforts. For one, plotting against targets on U.S. soil represents an expansion of the al-Qaeda affiliate's ambitions, he says. The terror group's rise occurs at a time of growing security and economic challenges besetting Yemen's central government--from civil war to a shortage of oil and water. If left unchecked, Boucek says, conditions may ripen for al-Qaeda's further entrenchment in Yemen.
Abstract: Al-Qaeda, an international terrorist network, is considered the top terrorist threat to the United States. The group is wanted for its September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, as well as a host of lesser attacks. To escape the post-9/11 U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda's central leadership fled eastward into Pakistan, securing a safe haven in loosely governed areas there. In July 2007, U.S. intelligence agencies found that the organization was regrouping and regaining strength in these tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan, though targeted killings of senior al-Qaeda leaders have since diminished the group's command and control capabilities. In February 2009, the Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair told lawmakers that the group's core "is less capable and effective than it was a year ago." But a number of affiliated groups have gained prominence in recent years, complicating the task of containing the organization. Topics covered in this Factsheet: What is al-Qaeda?
What are al-Qaeda’s origins?
Where does al-Qaeda operate?
Is al-Qaeda connected to other terrorist organizations?
Who are al-Qaeda’s leaders?
How big is al-Qaeda?
What major attacks has al-Qaeda been responsible for?
Abstract: It is increasingly apparent that effective state-building is critical for global peace and security and that preventing state fragility and supporting state-building are the most important tasks facing the international community today.
Developing Africa into functioning states has become a firm priority of African leaders, African organizations, foreign governments, and multilateral institutions. Yet there is no "one size fits all" road map for African state-building. One of the most pressing challenges for African nations is the question of how to develop systems of governance that are operationally functional and responsive to the needs of African citizens. There is a clear need to support African leadership and vision in state-building processes and to see state-building as a response to state fragility.
To tackle these challenges and to highlight these opportunities, Crisis Management Initiative arranged, together with the Institute for Security Studies, a seminar "An African Perspective on State-building – Institutional Capabilities and Legitimacy of the State" in Brussels on 27 February 2009. The specific purpose of the seminar was to discuss the importance of strengthening institutional capacities for service delivery in fragile countries in Africa in order to consolidate peace and contribute to long-term stability, and also to discuss what European policy makers can do to better direct their support to that end.
Abstract: An informal Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-
International Armed Conflict was convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and Chatham House, bringing together experts with a military, academic, government
and NGO background. The discussion was focused on outstanding legal and operational
issues linked to internment practice. The ICRC’s 2005 position paper on Procedural
Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention and a list of practical
questions prepared by the ICRC served as background documents for the discussion.
The experts took part in their personal capacity. As the meeting was conducted under
the Chatham House Rule the views reflected in this summary report are not attributed to
individual persons or the institutions they represent.
While inevitably touching on both criminal and administrative detention/internment in
situations of international armed conflict, occupation, and situations of violence below the
applicability threshold of international humanitarian law, the debate was focused on security
detention in non-international armed conflict. The report therefore covers only that issue;
expansions into wider areas of discussion will be mentioned only where directly relevant.
Abstract: U.S. departments and agencies contributing to combat or stability operations overseas are relying
on private firms to perform a wider scope of security services than was previously the case. The
use of private security contractors (PSCs) to protect personnel and property in Iraq and
Afghanistan has been a subject of debate in the press, in Congress, and in the international
community. While PSCs are widely viewed as being vital to U.S. efforts in the region, many
Members are concerned about transparency, accountability, and legal and symbolic issues raised
by the use of armed civilians to perform security tasks formerly performed by military personnel,
as well as the adverse impact PSCs may be having on U.S. counterinsurgency efforts.
Contractors working for the U.S. military, the State Department, or other government agencies
during contingency operation in Iraq and Afghanistan are non-combatants who have no combat
immunity under international law if they engage in hostilities, and whose conduct may be
attributable to the United States. Contractors who commit crimes in Iraq or Afghanistan are
subject to U.S. prosecution under criminal statutes that apply extraterritorially or within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or by means of the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). Section 552 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) makes military contractors supporting the Armed
Forces in Iraq subject to court-martial jurisdiction, although the military trial of a civilian
contractor would likely be subject to legal challenge on constitutional grounds. Despite
congressional efforts to expand court-martial jurisdiction and jurisdiction under MEJA, some
contractors may remain outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, civil or military, for improper
conduct in Iraq or Afghanistan.
This report discusses the legal framework that applies to PSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan. After
presenting a general description of the types of law applicable, including international
humanitarian law and relevant status of forces agreements, the report addresses some implications
of international law and a multilateral proposal for the adoption of international “best practices”
regarding the use of PSCs. The report follows up with a discussion of jurisdiction over PSC
personnel in U.S. courts, whether federal or military courts, identifying possible means of
prosecuting contractor personnel who are accused of violating the law overseas in the context of
U.S. military operations, including a listing of known cases that have occurred or are pending.
Finally, the report briefly discusses the possible implication of the roles of private security
contractors with respect to inherently governmental functions.
Abstract: Given the persistent and transnational nature of terrorism in South Asia, the region's countries share a common interest in cooperating on counterterrorism. This report examines the history of terrorism in South Asia, past attempts at counterterrorism cooperation, and challenges facing regional cooperation. Sumit Ganguly also discusses several strategies and policies for a more effective regional approach to counterterrorism in South Asia.
Abstract: The involvement of insurgent and extremist groups in criminal activity is an issue that has been a
concern of U.S. administrations for decades. In recent years, some observers have claimed that
interactions between international terrorists and criminals are increasing. If true, expanded links
between criminal and terrorist networks could increase U.S. vulnerability to attack by terrorist
groups with enhanced criminal capabilities and financial resources. An expanded range of
combined criminal and terrorist activity could also affect the global economy and U.S. foreign
policy goals, undermining licit international commerce and the promotion of good governance
and rule of law. Threats posed by a crime-terrorism nexus may be particularly challenging, as the
scale and nature of their cooperation are believed to vary widely and limited anecdotal evidence
largely serves as the basis for current understanding of the problem. This report provides a primer on the confluence of transnational terrorist and criminal groups and
related activities abroad. It evaluates possible motivations and disincentives for cooperation
between terrorist and criminal organizations, variations in the scope of crime-terrorism links, and
the types of criminal activities—fundraising, material and logistics support, and exploitation of
corruption and gaps in the rule of law—used by terrorist organizations to sustain operations. This
report also discusses several international case studies to illustrate the range of crime-terrorism
convergence and non-convergence, including Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company; the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); the 2004 Madrid bombers; the Taliban; Hezbollah; Al
Qaeda; the 2005 London bombers; Al-Shabaab; as well as known or alleged crime-terrorism
facilitators such as Viktor Bout, Monzer Al Kasser, and Abu Ghadiyah. Policy considerations
discussed in this report include possible tensions between counterterrorism and anti-crime policy
objectives, implications for U.S. foreign aid, gaps in human intelligence and analysis, the value of
financial intelligence in combating the crime-terrorism nexus, impact of digital and physical safe
havens and ungoverned spaces, implications for nuclear proliferation, and effects of crimeterrorism
links in conflict and post-conflict zones. Unless otherwise noted, this report does not
address potential crime-terrorism links in the domestic or border environment.
Abstract: This data source contains a break down of the journalists killed during 2009, organized by country and by method of death (targeted, crossfire, health, accident, total).
Abstract: The US air campaign in Pakistan's tribal areas remains the cornerstone of the effort to root out and decapitate the senior leadership of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other allied terror groups, and to disrupt both al Qaeda's global and local operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
As expected, in 2009 the US well exceeded the number of attacks in 2008, with 53 compared to 36. And with two strikes in the first four days of 2010, one can expect the intensity of the campaign this year to equal or exceed last year's pace.
Although 16 senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed since the air campaign heated up in 2008, the terror groups remain a force in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US has been compelled to surge forces in Afghanistan and revamp its strategy there, while the Pakistani military has been forced to launch military operations in Swat and South Waziristan. Despite some tactical victories by the Pakistani military in Pakistan, the Taliban and its allies are able to carry out suicide attacks and complex assaults on secure military and government targets with regularity.
Al Qaeda's external operations network, which is assigned to carrying out attacks outside Afghanistan and Pakistan, has been a prime target of US airstrikes; three external operations chiefs have been killed since May 2008.
The US air campaign highlights the Pakistani government’s inability to control its own territory and prevent it from becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda, the Taliban, and a host of South Asian jihadi terror groups. The US is forced to conduct airstrikes in territories claimed by a nuclear power that is touted as an ally in the Long War.
Abstract: The majority of those living in the border region of Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda are pastoralists, whose livelihoods are dictated by the upkeep and size of their herds. Harsh environmental conditions force pastoralists to migrate in search of water and pasturelands during the dry season. With limited access to water and competing rights to land, inter-tribal conflict arises when pastoralists from one tribe enter the territory of another. The increased availability of small arms in the region from past wars increasingly makes ordinary clashes fatal. Governments in the region have responded with heavy-handed coercive disarmament operations. These have led to distrust and subsequent violent clashes between communities and security providers. This report reviews the scale, consequences of, and responses to the many pastoral conflicts, utilizing methodological tools such as key informant interviews, retrospective analy¬sis, and a thorough review of available literature.
Abstract: Understanding suicide bombing entails studying the phenomenon on three different dimensions: the suicide bomber, the terrorist organization, and the community
from which suicide bombings emerge. Political and social psychology allow us to establish the reciprocal relationships that underpin the exchanges
between the three dimensions. This method increases our theoretical understanding of suicide bombing by moving away from the unidimensional models
that have previously dominated the terrorism literature.
Abstract: The central theme of last year’s forecast was that al Qaeda was an important force on the ideological battlefield, but that the efforts of the United States and its allies had marginalized the group on the physical battlefield and kept it bottled up in a limited geographic area. Because of this, we forecast that the most significant threat in terms of physical attacks stemmed from regional jihadist franchises and grassroots operatives and not the al Qaeda core. We also wrote that we believed the threat posed by such attacks would remain tactical and not rise to the level of a strategic threat. To reflect this reality, we even dropped al Qaeda from the title of our annual forecast and simply named it Jihadism in 2009: The Trends Continue.
The past year proved to be very busy in terms of attacks and thwarted plots emanating from jihadist actors. But, as forecast, the primary militants involved in carrying out these terrorist plots were almost exclusively from regional jihadist groups and grassroots operatives, and not militants dispatched by the al Qaeda core. We anticipate that this dynamic will continue, and if anything, the trend will be for some regional franchise groups to become even more involved in transnational attacks, thus further usurping the position of al Qaeda prime at the vanguard of jihadism on the physical battlefield.
Abstract: This paper examines the characteristics of suicide bombers as reflected in the Israeli press during the Second Intifada in Israel. The unique contribution of this study lies
in its analysis of the differences between the characteristics
of suicide bombers with religious motives versus those
with nationalist motives. As mentioned, the period of the
second Intifada significantly differs from other historical
periods in Israeli history, because it has been characterized
by intensive and numerous suicide attacks. Thus, it
provides a unique opportunity for comparison with earlier
periods, which shed light on the changes that have occurred
in the characteristics of suicide bombers since the
outbreak of the second Intifada. The analysis
aims to determine whether there were significant differences in the characteristics of suicide bombers with religious motives versus those with
nationalist motives. The findings reveal that gender, education level, and organizational affiliation correlated significantly with motives for carrying
out suicide attacks. Most of the suicide bombers with religious motives were men with elementary education. In addition, the results show that most
of the suicide bombers who were affiliated with the Hamas organization acted out of religious motives. No significant differences were found between
suicide bombers with religious and those with nationalist motives with regard to age, marital status, and prior activity in terrorist organizations.
Abstract: The present combined report
provides an update on major developments in Somalia since my reports of 20 July
2009 (S/2009/373) and 2 October 2009 (S/2009/503), and assesses the political,
security, human rights and humanitarian situation, as well as progress made in
implementing the three-phased incremental approach set out in my April 2009
report. It also covers the operational activities of the United Nations and the
international community’s counter-piracy efforts further to my report of
13 November (S/2009/590). The Transitional Federal Government continued to consolidate and expand its
support base on three fronts. First, the Government intensified efforts to expand its
support base among the main opposition groups in Mogadishu; secondly, the
cooperation between the Government and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) was
consolidated; and thirdly, the Government commenced an in-depth review of its
relationship with the “Puntland” regional authorities. An increasing number of
elements from the armed opposition have renounced violence and opted to work for
peace in partnership with the Government. This includes the defection of Mohamed
Faruq and Ali Hassan Gheddi, two senior Al-Shabaab operatives, together with
some 550 fighters, indicating growing divisions within Al-Shabaab.
Abstract: Pakistan's pick-n-mix approach to counterterrorism highlights not only a defective strategy, but also a country that is woefully unprepared to fight insurgents. Starting in May 2009, the Pakistani army launched a series of offensives against radical Islamist groups in the Swat and South Waziristan regions. More than 6,500 alleged Taliban fighters have been killed since then, and approximately 1,400 Pakistani civilians have died in terrorist attacks.
The international community has applauded the Pakistani army’s decision to take on the Taliban, overlooking the fact that the army’s counterterrorist strategy is highly selective. It only targets Taliban splinter groups that have an explicitly anti-Islamabad agenda and offers other radical Islamists the option of peaceful coexistence.
Such a segmented approach will not advance the objectives of international counterterrorist efforts, except in an indirect sense. Furthermore, implementation of this strategy has thus far failed even to protect Pakistan, due to systemic flaws in counterterrorism capabilities.
Abstract: A long-time buffer zone between Ethiopia and Somalia, the politically and economically marginalized Ogaden region has transformed into a hotspot entangled in wider regional and global politics, albeit shielded from international public attention. The Ogaden National Liberation Front’s (ONLF) recent claim to have captured seven towns and killed 1,000 soldiers in fierce fighting in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali region was, although in substance exaggerated, a stark reminder that Ethiopia’s harsh counterinsurgency campaign is not yielding the results hoped for by Addis Ababa.
On the contrary, the ONLF can build on local grievances of the four million or so ethnic Somali in Ethiopia’s most underdeveloped periphery and is determined to keep up its struggle for national self-determination.
The movement also has once again warned oil searching companies operating in the region under Ethiopian control to halt their plans to exploit oil there.
Such threats are indeed substantial. On 24 April 2007, ONLF fighters were able to overpower Ethiopian troops protecting Chinese oil-exploration workers in Obole, situated in the Degehabur zone. A total of 74 people were killed, including nine Chinese workers. As a result, the Chinese Zhoungyan Petroleum Exploration Bureau suspended its seismic tests for Ethiopian-owned South West Energy in Ogaden.
Abstract: Three years after the end of a Maoist revolt, the South Asian republic’s much-hyped bid to install a new constitution in May is unlikely to bring peace or justice. As Nepali Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal was addressing the UN Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen, drawing developed nations’ attention to the danger global warming posed to his country’s pride – Mt Everest, the tallest peak in the world – another, more imminent danger, menaced the nascent republic.
Nepal’s former Maoist guerrillas, who had waged war against the state for 10 years before signing a peace deal in 2006, were marching in the capital city Kathmandu, proclaiming a new state.
“This is a symbolic gesture,” Maoist deputy chief and coordinator of the ongoing protests, Dr Baburam Bhattarai, told ISN Security Watch. “When we signed the peace agreement, it was decided that Nepal, a Hindu kingdom, would become a secular federal republic. We have abolished Hinduism as the state religion and ended monarchy. However, feudal, regressive forces, who do not want power to be decentralized, are trying to prevent the restructuring of the country. We have begun announcing the formation of 13 states to create public awareness about federalism and pressure the government into keeping its pledge.”
In addition, the Maoists have called for a three-day general strike nationwide starting 20 December, with the veiled threat of more general strikes for an indefinite period in future, though in the peace pact they have pledged not to create any further disruption.
“We have been forced to call the strike as the government betrayed us,” says Bhattarai. “We fought a war to end autocracy and establish people’s sovereignty. However, the army, which helped [deposed King] Gyanendra come to power [through a bloodless coup in 2005] is still calling the shots. Unless the army is brought under the control of an elected government, Nepal remains under the danger of military rule.”
Abstract: Faced with widespread reports of massacres and other serious human rights abuses by Government soldiers and rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Security Council today again called on United Nations peacekeepers to “use all necessary means” to protect civilians from threats from any party.
In a unanimous resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizing the use of force, the 15-member body stressed that ensuring effective protection of civilians is the first priority of the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC), which has been aiding the national army (known as FARDC) with logistics and firepower to keep rebels from reclaiming areas previously under their control.
Extending the 10-year-old mission’s mandate at a strength of some 22,000 military and police personnel until 31 May, with the intention of renewing it then for a further 12 months, the Council called on MONUC to work “in close cooperation with the Government” to continue its coordination of operations with FARDC brigades in the strife-torn east “premised on the protection of civilians as a priority.”
Abstract: As is well known, a Nigerian national named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to destroy a passenger aircraft traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Dec. 25, 2009. The incident drove home a number of points. First, while al Qaeda prime — the organization that had planned and executed 9/11 — might be in shambles, other groups in other countries using the al Qaeda brand name and following al Qaeda prime’s ideology remain operational and capable of mounting attacks. Second, like other recent attacks, this attack was relatively feeble: It involved a single aircraft, and the explosive device was not well-conceived. Third, it remained and still remains possible for a terrorist to bring explosives on board an aircraft. Fourth, intelligence available in Nigeria, London and elsewhere had not moved through the system with sufficient speed to block the terrorist from boarding the flight. From this three things emerge. First, although the capabilities of jihadist terrorists have declined, their organizations remain functional, and there is no guarantee that these organizations won’t increase in sophistication and effectiveness. Second, the militants remain focused on the global air transport system. Third, the defensive mechanisms devised since 2001 remain ineffective to some degree.
Abstract: There is currently no indication of an early improvement in the security situation in Afghanistan, which deteriorated last year – dramatically so in Kabul, the capital – and a better coordinated international effort is crucial to reversing overall negative trends.
The report focuses on the flawed presidential election and the adverse effects of increased Taliban suicide and other attacks both for the Government’s ability to deliver basic services and that of the international community to provide aid.
“The situation cannot continue as is if we are to succeed in Afghanistan. Unity of effort and greater attention to key priorities are now a sine qua non. There is a need for a change of mindset in the international community as well as in the Government of Afghanistan. Without that change, the prospects of success will diminish further," Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon tells the Security Council in the report.
Mr. Ban calls on the Government and world community to make the best possible use of the coming months to focus on agreed priorities, with a reinforced international coordination structure under a UN umbrella that will meet the principal needs of delivering services to the Afghan people and developing an economy that can gradually carry more responsibility for the people’s well-being. He cites insufficient resources as one cause of the current lack of such coordination but singles out a lack of political readiness in donor countries to adapt their thinking to meet these needs.
Abstract: Congo’s mineral wealth continues to play a central role in the country’s conflict dynamics.
Despite the upsurge in displacement and atrocities during 2009, multinational companies
continue to purchase minerals from the war zone, providing crucial fuel for the violence. Both
the opportunities for Congo to escape from its catastrophic crisis cycle and the threats that could
plunge it into renewed all-out war are directly connected to the fate of the mineral sector and the
manner in which natural resources are utilized during the coming months.
The latest report of the U.N. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo lays out
in detail the prominent role of the minerals trade in the financing of Congo’s ongoing conflict.
Findings confirm the impressions we gleaned during recent travel to North and South Kivu,
where the pursuit of mineral resources by armed elements on all sides of the conflict has only
accelerated under the accord between Rwanda and Congo and the Kimia II military offensive
against the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda, or FDLR, by the Congolese army, which
has the United Nations’ support.
Contrary to critics who argue that the militarization of mining in eastern Congo is purely
symptomatic of a dysfunctional security sector and poor governance, conflict minerals are both
a cause and consequence of Congo’s dilapidated state apparatus. The easy availability of lootable
natural resources, especially tin, tantalum, tungsten, or the 3Ts, and gold, with their well-developed
trade routes and willing international buyers, foments the fragmentation of armed groups
in eastern Congo.
Abstract: Yemen is the only country on the Arabian Peninsula to ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention,
but it has interpreted the term “refugee” in a way that strips the convention of its core
principles. The government of Yemen has displayed an extraordinary generosity towards
Somalis, granting all of them prima facie refugee status because of the conflict raging in
their country. But for Ethiopians the opposite is true. Whether they are economic migrants or
asylum seekers in need of protection, the policy of the central government is to track them
down, arrest them, and deport them. The authorities do not recognize Ethiopians as legitimate asylum seekers, a discriminatory policy that violates international law. Even the few who make it to the offices of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) without being arrested by the security
forces and who then secure UNHCR recognition as refugees, do not receive official status
from the Yemeni authorities. This leaves them vulnerable to serious continuing abuse.
The Yemeni government is in a genuinely difficult position—the tens of thousands of Somali
refugees it has already welcomed represent an enormous strain on the country’s fragile
economy. Yemen is also under strong pressure from Saudi Arabia and other neighboring
states to stop the flow of migrants who use Yemen as a transit point to reach their countries.
Human Rights Watch is particularly concerned about UNHCR’s failure to press the Yemeni
government more forcefully and consistently to allow asylum seekers to seek refugee status
in Yemen regardless of their nationality. UNHCR has had modest success in negotiating
better treatment of Ethiopians who arrive along the Arab Sea coast, but has failed to push
hard enough at all levels of the agency and using all means at its disposal for an end to the
government’s systematic refoulement of Ethiopian asylum seekers arriving on the Red Sea
coast. UNHCR says that it has repeatedly raised the issue privately at high levels with the
Yemeni government. But Human Rights Watch’s research has found that these quiet
interventions have been entirely ineffective.
Abstract: Each year, the US government sends officials to refugee camps
overseas to interview thousands of people displaced by persecution
and conflict, classifies a select number as refugees in need of
resettlement, and brings those refugees to live in the United States.
After one year in the United States, every resettled refugee is required
to apply for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, more familiarly
known as a “green card.” However, refugees’ limited English,
ignorance about the requirement, confusion over the legal process,
and lack of resources, as well as the government’s failure to notify
them of the requirement, often prevents them from timely filing to
adjust their legal status. In some parts of the country, the consequence
of not applying can be lengthy, indefinite and arbitrary detention by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The purpose of this report
is to encourage legislative and policy changes that will eliminate the
potential for indefinite detention of resettled refugees for failure to file
for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status after one year in the
US.
Abstract: The present report is submitted pursuant to the request of the Security Council
contained in the statement issued by its President on 26 September 2001
(S/PRST/2001/25), in which the Council requested me to continue to keep it
regularly informed about the situation in the Central African Republic and about the
activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country
(BONUCA).
The report provides an update on the political, socio-economic, security,
humanitarian and human rights developments in the Central African Republic and
on the activities of BONUCA since my last report, of 12 June 2009 (S/2009/309).
The report also summarizes the efforts to put in place the structure and resources
required for the operationalization of the future United Nations Integrated
Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA).
Abstract: The Security Council today renewed for another six months the 45-year-old United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, citing “a rare opportunity to make decisive progress in a timely fashion” to reunify the Mediterranean island after a history of fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.
In a resolution adopted by 14 votes to one, with only Turkey opposing, the 15-member body strongly urged the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders “to increase the momentum in the negotiations to ensure the full exploitation of this opportunity to reach a comprehensive settlement based on a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality.”
Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat have been meeting regularly for more than a year under UN auspices in a bid to establish a Federal Government with a single international personality, along with a Turkish Cypriot Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which would be of equal status.
The Council extended the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 15 June, 2010. Now mustering 926 uniformed personnel – 858 troops and 68 police – supported by 40 international civilian staff, the mission was first established in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. After hostilities erupted again in 1974, its responsibilities were expanded to supervise ceasefire lines, maintain a buffer zone and undertake humanitarian activities.
