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Abstract: Six actual or potential conflict situations around the world deteriorated and none improved in December 2009, according to the new issue of the International Crisis Group’s monthly bulletin CrisisWatch, released today.
The political crisis in Iran deepened over December, as anti-government protests intensified and met with further brutal crackdowns by security forces. Student protests were held in universities across the country from 7 December, followed quickly by government-staged counter-demonstrations and stern warnings by senior officials against further protests. On 27 December, violent clashes broke out in Tehran and elsewhere in rallies marking the Shiite holy day of Ashura, with 8 killed when security forces opened fire on protestors.
In Yemen, heavy fighting between government forces and rebels continued in the northern region of Saada, fuelling fears of further civilian deaths and displacement. The growth of terrorist networks in the country was underscored late month as Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner by a Nigerian citizen on 25 December.
The situation also deteriorated in Nepal, as the Maoists called a three-day general strike from 20 December that paralysed business and infrastructure across much of the country and led to the largest street protests in Kathmandu since the Maoists quit the unity government in May. The UN condemned the excessive use of force by police against protesters. The Maoist leadership has since threatened to resume the strike indefinitely if a new unity government is not formed by 24 January, a demand Prime Minister Madhav Nepal firmly rejects.
In Nigeria, clashes between the Yan Kala Kato Islamic sect and police in Bauchi State left up to 70 dead in another deadly upsurge in violence in the north. The shooting of junta leader Dadis Camara in Guinea by one of his senior military aides on 3 December underscored the depth of divides within the military and the potential for further potentially violent unrest. In Madagascar, de facto leader Andry Rajoelina’s decision to boycott power-sharing talks dealt a further blow to prospects for a negotiated solution to the ongoing political standoff that has gripped the country since Rajoelina’s unconstitutional takeover in March 2009.
Abstract: The failure of President François Bozizé and his close circle to follow through with many of the concessions agreed on during the Inclusive Political Dialogue risks exacerbating the many conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR) and stalling national reconciliation. Those December 2008 talks made a valuable contribution to both reducing levels of violence and shaping the long-term reform agenda. The promised integration of rebel leaders into civilian political life, the precedent of decision-making by consensus and a concrete set of agreements that included rebel disarmament and security sector reform were welcome steps towards greater stability. To ensure these gains are not undone by another political crisis, however, the president must abandon the uncompromising attitude he displayed through much of 2009 and the government must quickly resolve new conflicts in the north east and prepare credible elections. Otherwise, donors should suspend financial support to a regime that is largely dependent on foreign aid.
Since Bozizé’s coup in March 2003, the CAR has been unable to break the cycle of conflict and poverty in which it has laboured for so long. Elections in 2005, judged relatively free and fair, did not prevent rebellions breaking out in the north directly afterwards. It took two years of difficult negotiations interspersed with more violence to prepare the Inclusive Political Dialogue, but the event itself went relatively well. The participation of the presidential camp, opposition politicians, most rebel groups, civil society and ex-President Ange-Félix Patassé fulfilled a necessary condition for reconciling former adversaries. The main participants all sought to retain or acquire state power, but they arrived at a common plan for political and economic reconstruction.
Abstract: The deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan over the coming months will require
additional funding in Fiscal Year 2010 (FY10). It is difficult to precisely estimate the cost
that will be incurred by the deployment due to a variety of factors including the composition
of the forces deployed and the specific mission they are given. The adversary also has a say
in determining the operational tempo of our forces, and thus the costs incurred in terms
of such items as fuel, ammunition, and equipment. Still, historical trends in the cost of the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can provide a useful guide for making such an estimate. The table below lists the budget authority and average number of troops deployed by
fiscal year for operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Abstract: This datasource presents fatalities related to left-wing extremism throughout India over the course of 2009, broken down by region and by month.
Abstract: In Pakistan, it would be a disservice
to look at this current conflict
solely as an Afghanistan issue because
Pakistan too faces the same wars
within. There is a continuous battle
between what the government of
Pakistan wants, irrespective of its
complexion, and what the people of
Pakistan want. Our history clearly indicates
that whenever we have experienced
long periods of autocratic rule,
particularly military rule, the result is
a stunting of all democratic systems
and institutions of civil society. It is equally critical that we factor
in the economic crisis affecting
Pakistan today. In a highly urbanized
society where the poorest strata spend
up to two-thirds of their income on
food, an inflation rate in the double
digits constitutes a near insurmountable
challenge for the government. In
addition, the country is facing power,
water, and even sugar shortages, as
oligopolist cartels ensconced in government
and in parliament maintain
their hold on scarce resources at the
expense of the common person.
Abstract: This report includes the details of evidence collection, including an annex of photographs of evidence, and witness statements taken in the process of an investigation into the crash of the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994.
Abstract: The attack against the Falcon 50 was perpetrated in an extremely tense political context,
marked by a series of tragic events. Towards the end of the 1980s, the Rwandan regime
found its power declining, with power being monopolised by a close circle, “the Akazu”.
This core was centred around the family of the Head of State, particularly around his wife,
and committed serious abuses denounced by politicians and journalists, prompting, from
1988, organised and targeted murders. With the outbreak of the war between the RPF and
the Rwandan government, on 1st October 1990, the regime was plunged into radical
totalitarianism within the context of which the Rwandan authorities quickly implemented an
ideological framework using ethnicity based on the disinformation and psychological
poisoning of the people, coupled with repression organised within the highest level of the
Government.
Abstract: The strategic and resource-rich Balochistan province continues to remain on the periphery of Pakistan's projects and perceptions. With both the "dialogue with those who are up in the mountains" and the counter-insurgency (CI) operations failing, the Baloch insurrection persists. Worse, subversion from the Taliban-Al Qaeda in the north of the province has added to the region’s complexities.
There has, however, been some reduction in violence during 2009. At least 268 persons, including 148 civilians and 83 Security Force (SF) personnel, have died in the current year (till November 20) according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). Significantly, there has been a dramatic reduction in the number of insurgents killed, an indication that CI operations are not yielding results. espite the reduced levels of violence, the insurgency continues to simmer, with a steady stream of bomb and rocket attacks on gas pipelines, railway tracks, power transmission lines, bridges, and communications infrastructure, as well as on military establishments and Government facilities. While there have been at least 126 bomb blasts and grenade explosions across the province in 2009 [data till November 20 (Source: SATP)], there have also been rocket attacks (numbers for which are not available currently) targeting state installations reported almost on a daily basis in the province. Baloch insurgents have also targeted Government officials and politicians.
Abstract: Meghalaya has witnessed an almost continuous diminution in trends in militant violence since 2003, with a slight discontinuity in 2006. The years 2008 and 2009 saw the progressive marginalization of militant formations in the State, even as overall fatalities declined by 66 per cent, from an already diminished total. Militancy-related incidents decreased by 41 percent, and there was a complete absence of any civilian or Security Force (SF) fatalities in 2009. A total of 4 militant fatalities were recorded. Militancy related incidents were reported from all of Meghalaya's seven Districts in 2009. While the East Khasi Hills was the most affected District, with 18 recorded incidents, Jaintia Hills reported 12 incidents; West Garo Hills, six; East Garo Hills, five; West Khasi Hills: four, Ri-Bhoi, three; and South Garo Hills, one.
The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database records that a total of 62 militants were neutralised in Meghalaya in 2009. Of these, 48 were arrested, 10 surrendered and four were killed.
Abstract: The real history of Tora Bora is far more disturbing. Having reconstructed the battle--based on interviews with the top American ground commander, three Afghan commanders, and three CIA officials; accounts by Al Qaeda eyewitnesses that were subsequently published on jihadist websites; recollections of captured survivors who were later questioned by interrogators or reporters; an official history of the Afghan war by the U.S. Special Operations Command; an investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and visits to the battle sites themselves--I am convinced that Tora Bora constitutes one of the greatest military blunders in recent U.S. history. It is worth revisiting now not just in the interest of historical accuracy, but also because the story contains valuable lessons as we renew our push against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Abstract: Hezbollah is one of the best equipped and most capable militant groups in the world. Its decades-long resistance against Israel served it well, winning it favor among Lebanon's Shia Muslims, who constitute about 40 percent of the population. Although Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000 and Hezbollah has partially transitioned to a political party, Hezbollah leaders remain resolutely anti-Israel for reasons of principle and pragmatism. Meanwhile, its charitable programs and community involvement have further reinforced its domestic credibility.
This situation is not stable. In 2006, for example, even though the Lebanese government never declared war, Hezbollah used its large weapons stockpile to fight Israel for over a month. And in May 2008, when then Prime Minister Fouad Siniora moved to shut down Hezbollah's communications network, the group responded by seizing much of Beirut, which triggered fears of renewed civil war. To end the confrontation, Hezbollah was granted veto power in the Lebanese cabinet. Hezbollah leaders no doubt understood this as affirming their right to keep their weapons.
Abstract: Most Afghans are increasingly optimistic about the state of their country, a poll commissioned by the BBC, ABC News and Germany's ARD shows.
Of more than 1,500 Afghans questioned, 70% said they believed Afghanistan was going in the right direction - a big jump from 40% a year ago.
Of those questioned, 68% now back the presence of US troops in Afghanistan, compared with 63% a year ago.
For Nato troops, including UK forces, support has risen from 59% to 62%. The survey was conducted in all of the country's 34 provinces in December 2009.
Abstract: A variety of regional tensions and festering problems-some of which date back decades-converge today on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Narcotics are significant not only as the chief economic driver among this cluster of issues but also precisely because they represent the single issue in which the greatest number of relevant players in the conflict have a direct stake. As Vanda Felbab-Brown points out in her contribution to this report, "a multitude of actors are deeply involved in Afghanistan's opium poppy production, including the Taliban, all levels of the Afghan government, law enforcement, unofficial power brokers, and tribal elites." This report includes three articles: Vanda Felbab-Brown's "The Drug Economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Military Conflict in the Region"; Louise I. Shelley with Nazia Hussain's "Narco-Trafficking in Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Areas and Implications for Security"; and Ehsan Ahrari's "The Dynamics of 'Narco-Jihad' in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region".
Abstract: As Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi exited the vehicle that brought him onto Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan, on Dec. 30, 2009, security guards noticed he was behaving strangely. They moved toward al-Balawi and screamed demands that he take his hand out of his pocket, but instead of complying with the officers’ commands, al-Balawi detonated the suicide device he was wearing. The explosion killed al-Balawi, three security contractors, four CIA officers and the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) officer who was al-Balawi’s handler. The vehicle shielded several other CIA officers at the scene from the blast. The CIA officers killed included the chief of the base at Khost and an analyst from headquarters who reportedly was the agency’s foremost expert on al Qaeda. The agency’s second-ranking officer in Afghanistan was allegedly among the officers who survived. Al-Balawi was a Jordanian doctor from Zarqa (the hometown of deceased al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Under the alias Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani, he served as an administrator for Al-Hesbah, a popular Internet discussion forum for jihadists. Jordanian officers arrested him in 2007 because of his involvement with radical online forums, which is illegal in Jordan. The GID subsequently approached al-Balawi while he was in a Jordanian prison and recruited him to work as an intelligence asset.
Al-Balawi was sent to Pakistan less than a year ago as part of a joint GID/CIA mission. Under the cover of going to school to receive advanced medical training, al-Balawi established himself in Pakistan and began to reach out to jihadists in the region. Under his al-Khurasani pseudonym, al-Balawai announced in September 2009 in an interview on a jihadist Internet forum that he had officially joined the Afghan Taliban.
Abstract: The Pakistan Index is a statistical compilation of economic, public opinion and security data, and updates every two weeks. This resource will provide updated and historical information on various data, including security, governance, quality of life, economic development, and job creation.
The index is designed to assemble the best possible quantitative indicators of the reconstruction and security efforts underway in Pakistan, to track them over time, and to offer an objective set of criteria for benchmarking performance. It serves as an in-depth, non-partisan assessment of U.S. and international efforts in Pakistan, and is based on data compiled primarily from government and non-government organizations, both in Pakistan and the United States. Although measurements of progress in any counterinsurgency effort – like that of the Pakistan-led and U.S.-supported strategy – can never be reduced to purely quantitative data, a comprehensive compilation of such information can provide a clearer picture and contribute to a healthier and better informed debate.
Abstract: The Afghanistan Index is a statistical compilation of economic, public opinion and security data, and updates every week. This resource will provide updated and historical information on various data, including crime, infrastructure, casualties, unemployment, Afghan security forces and coalition troop strength.
The index is designed to assemble the best possible quantitative indicators of the international community’s counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts in Afghanistan, to track them over time, and to offer an objective set of criteria for benchmarking performance. It serves as an in-depth, non-partisan assessment of American and international efforts in Afghanistan, and is based primarily on U.S. government, Afghan government and NATO data. Although measurements of progress in any nation-building effort can never be reduced to purely quantitative data, a comprehensive compilation of such information can provide a clearer picture and contribute to a healthier and better informed debate.
Abstract: The Iraq Index is a statistical compilation of economic, public opinion, and security data, updated every two weeks. This resource will provide updated information on various criteria, including crime, telephone and water service, troop fatalities, unemployment, Iraqi security forces, oil production, and coalition troop strength.
The index is designed to quantify the rebuilding efforts and offer an objective set of criteria for benchmarking performance. It is the first in-depth, non-partisan assessment of American efforts in Iraq, and is based primarily on U.S. government information. Although measurements of progress in any nation-building effort can never be reduced to purely quantitative data, a comprehensive compilation of such information can provide a clearer picture and contribute to a healthier and better informed debate.
Abstract: Much of the recent debate regarding the war
in Afghanistan has focused on al Qaeda,
specifically, the extent of their operations in
Afghanistan and the Pakistan border region.
Often overlooked in the strategic calculus are
other enemy groups operating in the region
and their ability to challenge the Afghan
government and coalition forces for control
in the war-torn country. It is precisely
these groups that have provided al Qaeda a
sanctuary to train, plan, and launch some
of the most catastrophic terrorist attacks in
recent history. Indeed, their relationships
with key al Qaeda leaders have been forged
over the past quarter-century of resistance.
For much of the past eight years, these
groups have made substantial gains while
the international community pursued a
limited counterterrorism strategy coupled
with insufficient resources. The enemy
has seized the opportunity to expand their
operating environment and have seized the
initiative from the world’s most advanced
fighting forces. However, these are not an
amalgamation of rag-tag fighters. They see
themselves as the legitimate government of
Afghanistan in exile. Among these groups,
one stands out far and above the rest, the
Quetta Shura Taliban (QST).
Abstract: The development of new northern supply routes into Afghanistan, termed the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) by the U.S. government, and the expanded U.S. presence in
Afghanistan has had considerable impact on regional geopolitics in Eurasia. For those states now
involved in the NDN (Latvia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan), this cooperation has added a new dimension to their relations that increases their
stakes in bilateral ties with the United States and vice versa. Washington is engaging these
partners on an issue of utmost priority to U.S. security interests. Together and individually these
states can play a constructive role in Afghan stabilization efforts. But persistent tensions, mistrust,
paranoia, authoritarianism, and a near-exclusive focus on “regime preservation” make some of
them unwieldy and volatile partners. Suspicion of U.S. intentions and commitment further
complicate this calculation. Understanding the dimensions of and knowing how to manage the
geopolitical challenges and opportunities associated with NDN transit states and other key players
is critical for the United States.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to provide our observations and preliminary thoughts concerning the way ahead for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) based on our work as part of the Quick-Look Assessment team from 3-19 December 2009. We both had the pleasure to work closely with members of the command whose professionalism and enthusiasm were deeply inspiring. The command confronts great challenges as it pursues a mission vital to coalition success. We are qualified optimists about the potential success of the mission. The most important source of our optimism for eventual mission success comes from our observations of the tremendous talent and dedication of the individuals assigned to this command. We were also heartened by our interaction with individuals from other commands and with many impressive Afghan partners.
Abstract: The attempted Christmas attack on Northwest Airlines flight 253--traced to an al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen--has brought renewed attention to the dangers posed by the world's "ungoverned spaces." Yemen now joins Pakistan's tribal belt, stateless Somalia, and Africa's trackless Sahel as a perceived haven for the world's most dangerous terror network.
A concern about anarchic zones outside formal state authority is understandable. On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda launched its devastating attacks from one of the world's most war-torn and poverty-stricken nations, convincing the Bush administration that the United States was "now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones." Two years later, CIA Director George Tenet identified fifty lawless zones around the world where terrorists and criminals might set up shop with impunity.
Abstract: Yemen faces a great and growing number of challenges that endanger its political future and threaten its neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula. Economic ruin, an emerging water shortage, the depletion of oil reserves, violent extremism, and a growing secessionist movement all threaten to overwhelm the Yemeni government.
While Yemen has survived crises in the past, these complex and interwoven challenges are unprecedented in both degree and kind. They need to be addressed immediately, or there is a very real risk that the country will collapse, destabilizing its neighbors and the entire gulf region, and ultimately become a safe-haven from which al-Qaeda can regroup and launch attacks on domestic and international targets.
Carnegie’s Christopher Boucek came to Brussels to explain the security situation in Yemen and discuss the options available to the Yemeni government and the international community in their struggle to stabilize the country and prevent it from falling into the hands of extremists.
Abstract: The continuing infighting among the major communities delayed the National Assembly’s
passage of the election law needed to hold the January 2010 national elections, which had been
planned for January 16, 2010. An initial version of the election law was passed by the Council of
Representatives (COR, parliament) on November 8, 2009, but was vetoed by one of Iraq’s deputy
presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, because of what he considered inadequate guarantees of
representation for Sunni Iraqis displaced by recent violence. After continued infighting,
threatened election boycotts, and adoption of another draft law that attracted another veto threat,
all major factions compromised to adopt another draft, similar to the November 8 version, on
December 6, 2009. The next Assembly will have 325 seats, compared to 275 seats in the current
Assembly. However, the election date is delayed until March 7, 2010—well beyond the January
31, 2010, date that had been deemed the required deadline in order to allow 45 days before the
expiration of the COR’s term (March 15). This same difficulty of achieving consensus has
delayed key outstanding legislation considered crucial to political comity going forward, such as
national hydrocarbon laws.
Abstract: Kuwait, which has been pivotal to nearly two decades of U.S. involvement in Iraq, has been
mired for the past three years in internal wrangling between the elected National Assembly and
the ruling Al Sabah family primarily over the political dominance of the Al Sabah. In March
2009, this infighting led to the second constitutional dissolution of the National Assembly in the
past year, setting up new parliamentary elections on May 16, 2009. Among other effects, the
political stalemate has delayed or caused cancellation of key energy projects, including some
projects involving major foreign energy firms, as well as of measures to help Kuwait deal with
the effects of the global financial and economic crisis.
The elections produced many new deputies in the 50-seat Assembly, including four women, the
first to be elected to the Assembly in Kuwait since women were given the vote in 2005. However,
the elections did not resolve the government-Assembly political disputes or produce meaningful
progress on major issues, and there is the potential for yet another dissolution of the Assembly
and new elections.
Abstract: Since the decisive military victory over the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka has made little
progress in reconstructing its battered democratic institutions
or establishing conditions for a stable peace.
Eight months later, the post-war policies of President
Mahinda Rajapaksa have deepened rather than resolved
the grievances that generated and sustained LTTE militancy.
While the LTTE’s defeat and the end of its control
over Tamil political life are historic and welcome
changes, the victory over Tamil militancy will remain
fragile unless Sinhalese-dominated political parties make
strong moves towards a more inclusive and democratic
state. The emergence of retired General Sarath Fonseka
to challenge Rajapaksa in the 26 January presidential
election has opened new space to challenge repressive
government policies. But neither has offered credible
proposals for political reforms that would address the
marginalisation of Tamils and other minorities. Whoever
wins, donor governments and international institutions
should use their development assistance to support reforms
designed to protect the democratic rights of all of
Sri Lanka’s citizens and ethnic communities.
