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Abstract: The North Caucasus experienced another deadly summer (May 1 – August 31, 2010). Although Chechnya and Ingushetia saw comparatively less violence than they did in Summer 2009, we observed a troubling rise in the level of violence in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. Dagestan proved the most deadly republic in the region, while Kabardio-Balkaria, normally a relatively quiet republic, incurred levels of violence surpassing Chechnya.
Since 2008, CSIS staff has tracked, on a daily basis, incidents of violence occurring in the North Caucasus. We have released seven previous reports, the last of whichillustrated the dramatic rise in violence in Spring 2010.
In this report, we present our data for Summer 2010 (May 1–August 31), paying particular attention to the geographic spread of the violence across the North Caucasus, most notably into Kabardino-Balkaria.
Abstract: This issue includes the following articles: Building a Strategic U.S.-Pakistan
Nuclear Relationship, by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen; Beyond the Moscow Bombings: Islamic
Militancy in the North Caucasus, by Christopher Swift; After Pune, Details Emerge on the
Karachi Project and its Threat to India ,by Animesh Roul; Assessing the Recent Terrorist Threat
to the Malacca Strait, by Peter Chalk; The Philippines Chips Away at the Abu
Sayyaf Group’s Strength, by Zachary Abuza; Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb:
A Case Study in the Opportunism of Global Jihad, by Jean-Pierre Filiu; No Silver Bullets: Explaining Research
on How Terrorism Ends, by Audrey Kurth Cronin;
Abstract: Doku Umarov’s attempt to resign has revealed a schism in the leadership of North Caucasus-based insurgency and terrorism networks, but whether he stays or goes will have no long-term impact on the network’s capabilities, Simon Saradzhyan comments for ISN Security Watch. Two days after the internet release of a video showing the leader of the North Caucasus-based insurgency and terrorism networks, Doku Umarov, querying fellow warlords about his resignation, the self-styled emir of ‘Imarat Kavkaz’ (Emirate “Caucasus”) ordered a new video in which he denied plans to step down.
“In the current situation in the Caucasus I believe it is impossible for me to step down from the post of the emir of Imarat Kavkaz,” Umarov said in a video uploaded on the networks' news portal Kavkaz Center on 3 August. “This statement of mine makes the previous statement void. That previous statement was completely fabricated,” the Chechen warlord claimed, referring to the video of his resignation uploaded two days earlier by the same Kavkaz Center. [...] The appearance of two videos clearly illustrates the divisions among the networks’ leaders, regardless of the real reasons behind Umarov’s decision to seek the emirs’ approval for his replacement by Vadalov.
Abstract: Several Jordanian newspapers and websites published details in early June about 24-year-old Jordanian Anas Khalil Khadir, stating that he was killed in Chechnya after joining the jihad there. Khadir’s family members, who live in Zarqa (a city located east of Jordan’s capital city of Amman), told journalists that Khadir was very attached to the Chechen cause, leading him to abandon his medical engineering studies at Zarqa’s Hashemite University and depart for Chechnya a week before his final exams (Khaberni [Amman], June 7; al-Sabeel [Amman], June 3; Bab al-Arab, June 7).
A few days after the news of Khadir was reported, newspapers announced the death of another Jordanian in Chechnya, Yasser Ammara. Described as “a prominent Jordanian-born warlord,” Ammara was one of nine militants killed during a battle in the mountainous forests of the Vedeno region during the government’s “Operation Vengeance” (Interfax, June 11). The author’s sources confirmed that unlike Khadir, Ammara had been in Chechnya since early 2000.
The story of Khadir was more alarming than that of Ammara in terms of developments in the North Caucasus because Khadir first travelled to Chechnya on December 21, 2008, long after the 2003 to 2004 decline of the Arab fighters in Chechnya phenomenon. The timing was also significant because it coincided with increasing interest in the North Caucasus and Chechnya on Salafi-Jihadis websites and internet forums and a period of rare postings on the topic.
The revival of Salafi-Jihadi interest in the North Caucasus comes in the context of two strategies that al-Qaeda and affiliated Salafi-Jihadist groups are implementing: seeking safe havens and creating a local, grass-roots jihad that will sustain such safe havens.
Abstract: Russia has been the victim of a number of horrendous terrorist attacks at the hands of endemic actors, such as networks of radical separatists and terrorists based in the North Caucasus. The Russian authorities have dealt these networks a number of serious blows thanks to the strengthening of the Russian state and its security and law-enforcement apparatus, as well as to the increased involvement of local populations, including former rebels, in counter-insurgency and policing efforts. Nevertheless, these networks remain not only willing, but also capable of executing terrorist attacks in Russia with high impact and dramatic visibility. This paper begins by identifying those actors that have the capacity and motivation to commit acts of maritime terrorism against Russia. The article then reviews Russia's maritime and freshwater infrastructure and activities before outlining selected scenarios of terrorist acts that could take advantage of vulnerabilities in this infrastructure and facilities. It then offers an overview of the Russian government's response to terrorism, including the flaws that have existed in this response. The paper concludes that the threat of maritime terrorism, including catastrophic terrorism, remains serious, and offers selected recommendations on how to minimize the likelihood of such attacks.
Abstract: After the Russia-Georgia war, tensions grew in the relationship between Russia and the West. These tensions have occasionally led some to argue that a New Cold War may be on the horizon between Russia and the West. Others have even claimed that the Old Cold War has not really ended. This work investigates such arguments by examining Western ties to Georgia, Russia’s power resurgence, and Georgia’s role in that war. The authors claim that those, who interpret the Russia-Georgia war within a Cold War paradigm, neglect the complexities of that conflict. During similar conflicts, the Cold War is an easily comprehendible and adoptable paradigm for the West, particularly the US. Adopting a Cold War perspective, however, ignores that Tbilisi had a significant role to play in defining the 2008 war. Russia versus West tensions can no longer be characterized by the ideological rivalries of the Cold War. Moreover, the Russia-Georgia war appears to indicate a return to older forms of international rivalry.
Abstract: Spring 2010 (Jan 1 – Apr 30, 2010) was more deadly than the same period in 2008 and 2009 with more than 200 fatalities due to incidents of violence. Most alarming, suicide bombings remained a regular occurrence, with six carried out in just twelve days – including the two in the Moscow Metro. In this report, “Violence in the North Caucasus: Spring 2010, On the rise, again?” we present our findings, all of which illustrate the scope and scale of instability in the region.
Abstract: For the main Eurasian great powers, Russia, China, India, and Iran, the
Afghan issue has become an increasingly significant element of their
foreign policy, power projection and mutual relations. Indeed, the
difficulties in stabilizing Afghanistan after three decades of
uninterrupted conflict and the involvement of the U.S.-led international
coalition has had a strong impact on its surrounding areas, namely,
Central Asia, Xinjiang, Baluchistan and Kashmir. It has also affected the
balance-of-power relations in Eurasia. A growing informal economy
across the region, mainly in the form of drug trafficking, is also argued as
one of the major long-term issue. Today there is growing recognition that
the Afghan problem requires a concerted regional effort. This could give
a more prominent role to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Abstract: The August war of 2008 in Georgia shows that unresolved territorial conflicts in the
countries of the former Soviet Union remain a security risk for the states concerned as
well as for Europe, as they can flare up at again. Further unresolved conflicts of this kind
exist between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh as well as in Moldova
concerning Transnistria. External actors are involved in all of these conflicts. While the
risk of a military conflict in Moldova remains low, the heightened arms dynamic between
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh on one side and Azerbaijan on the other point to an
increased risk of war, even though it was diminished after the August war due to the intensified
political efforts of the Minsk Group and the process of normalization in Turkish-
Armenian relations.
In light of these developments the question arises of what contribution military confidence
building and arms control can make to prevent wars and stabilize crises as well as
normalize the situation in these territorial conflicts.
Abstract: President Obama made decisive changes to U.S. policy in Afghanistan—increasing forces on the ground, modifying the original goals, and placing a greater emphasis on the need for a regional approach. Leading experts analyze the interests of Afghanistan’s neighbors, what they mean in practice, and what it could mean for U.S. policy. The countries analyzed are: Pakistan, by Frédéric Grare; India, by Ambassador Gautam Mukhopadhaya; Iran, by Karim Sadjadpour; Saudi Arabia, by Christopher Boucek; Central Asian Republics, by Martha Brill Olcott; China, by Michael D. Swaine with Tiffany Ng; Russia, by Dmitri Trenin; Afghanistan, by Haroun Mir, and coalition partners, by Gilles Dorronsoro. Ashley J. Tellis concludes in the final chapter: “the regional approach to Afghanistan—understood as an effort to incorporate all of Kabul’s major neighbors into a cooperative enterprise led by the United States, and aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan through successful counterterrorism, reconstruction, and state-building—is unlikely to succeed, first and foremost, because the key regional stakeholders have diverging objectives within Afghanistan.”
Abstract: In 2002, perennial pessimist of American power, Paul Kennedy, made a remarkable reversal. He boldly declared that “in global military terms only one player on the field now counts—the US.” Having been stunned by the 9/11 attacks, he wrote, the US went on to wreak “appropriate oblivion” on the foes in Afghanistan. More impressive yet is that the US intervened with allied contributions described as “mere tokenism.” The lesson was instructive: American military power was unrivaled compared to friend and foe alike. Unilateralism appeared to be a logical byproduct of unipolarity, a world in which all power indicators favored the United States. In this world, allies would be less meaningful than they were in shifting the balance of power during the great wars of the previous century. Moreover, relying on multilateral institutions, their most strident critics had pointed out, was tantamount to “reacting to events or passing the buck to multilingual committees with fancy acronyms.” Even defenders of multilateral institutions had to admit that multilateralism in a unipolar world meant less autonomous decision-making, leading them to wonder “why multilateralism might ever be preferred to an architecture where the hegemon could more directly exercise dominance?” Put another way, why would the most powerful states need help from their friends?
Abstract: The Afghanistan problem has many angles, but a view from
the North—the perspective of Russia—has been missing from
many previous analyses. The ten-year-long Soviet military
involvement in the country is too often dismissed as having
little in common with NATO’s current mission. The Soviet Union,
after all, has failed, and NATO still plans to succeed. For the
Russians themselves, the “Afghan syndrome” continues to
be very powerful and warns against any new engagement in
Afghanistan. While many in Russia still see developments in
Afghanistan in a historical context, however, Russia is entwined
in a complex web of relationships with the Afghan parties,
neighboring states, and the West. Moscow is an important
part of the Afghan equation. Foreign forces in Afghanistan have the
important role of hunting down terrorists and degrading the
power of those who harbor them, but becoming too involved
in a domestic conflict is a recipe for failure. President Obama
has correctly seen the limits and constraints of U.S. involvement
in Afghanistan. The issue now is whether this insight is
followed up with a credible strategy that leaves Afghanistan
to the Afghans, while making sure that they pose no threat
to the region, or the world.
Abstract: “Many perceived that the ending of the counter-terrorist operation (KTO) in Chechnya meant the conclusion of the war against the bandit underground in the North Caucasus”. However, as recent events have shown, the bandit underground is still alive in Chechnya and increasingly active throughout the North Caucasus. The purpose of this paper is to enlarge upon certain negative, underlying trends which are gathering momentum as a result of an increasing cycle of violence.
Several negative trends spring to mind. This paper concentrates on the widening cycle of violence and the departure of ethnic Russians to more peaceful regions, which impacts on the economies of the eastern republics in the North Caucasus through the loss of skilled workers. There are indications of an upsurge in Cossack militancy in Krasnodar and Stavropol’ Kraya. Not unconnected to this, there is growing concern amongst the smaller republics, such as Ingushetia, about the possible creation of an enlarged oblast’ based on Rostov-on-Don which would come under Cossack control. This would make it more difficult for the indigenous Muslim peoples to preserve their own way of life, customs and languages.
Abstract: The world has become normal again. The years immediately following the end of the Cold War offered a tantalizing glimpse at a new kind of international order, with nations growing together or disappearing altogether, ideological conflicts melting away, cultures intermingling through increasingly free commerce and communications. But that was a mirage, the hopeful anticipation of a liberal, democratic world that wanted to believe the end of the Cold War did not end just one strategic and ideological conflict but all strategic and ideological conflict. People and their leaders longed for “a world transformed.” Today the nations of the West still cling to that vision. Evidence to the contrary — the turn toward autocracy in Russia or the growing military ambitions of China — is either dismissed as a temporary aberration or denied entirely. The world has not been transformed, however. Nations remain as strong as ever, and so too the nationalist ambitions, the passions, and the competition among nations that have shaped history. The world is still “unipolar,” with the United States remaining the only superpower. But international competition among great powers has returned, with the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Iran, and others vying for regional predominance. Struggles for honor and status and influence in the world have once again become key features of the international scene. Ideologically, it is a time not of convergence but of divergence. The competition between liberalism and absolutism has reemerged, with the nations of the world increasingly lining up, as in the past, along ideological lines. Finally, there is the fault line between modernity and tradition, the violent struggle of Islamic fundamentalists against the modern powers and the secular cultures that, in their view, have penetrated and polluted their Islamic world.
Abstract: A key event in early March, was the death of one of the chief ideologues of the armed resistance in the North Caucasus, Said Buryatsky (Aleksandr Tikhomirov) (www.1tv.ru, March 5). He was killed in the village of Ekazhevo in Ingushetia’s Nazran district during a major Russian joint siloviki operation that involved units of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the interior ministry (MVD) and defense ministry, targeting militants discovered in the home of the Kartoyev family. The operation itself, which lasted two days, spoke volumes about the significance of the situation. Usually, such government endeavors lasting days are a sign that top leaders of the militant underground are among those targeted, which explains their fierce resistance. The militants involved in the resistance have no chance of being given a fair and democratic trial. In accordance with the traditions of Russian jurisprudence, the captured militant is blamed for all possible actions undertaken against the authorities in recent years. The authorities have their own reasons for doing this, since it allows the police to write off multiple attacks and shootings that remain unsolved. Therefore, it is not surprising that the besieged militant is taken into FSB custody alive. The militant has no choice, and he chooses death. Multiple MVD, FSB, and defense ministry units were involved in the Ekazhevo village operation. Over the course of the two-day operation, four Kartoyev brothers were killed: Tukhan, Nazir, Akhmed and Magomed. Several more brothers –Tarkhana, Tatarkhana and Beslan– were detained. Additionally, two other village residents were killed, presumably the Dobryev’s. According to eyewitnesses, all three houses of the Kartoyev brothers were destroyed. Two residents of the village were detained –Yakub Aushev and his son. Eyewitnesses report that gunfire was returned only from the Dobryev house, where a firefight broke out between the occupants and members of the security services (www.ingushetia.org, March 3).
Abstract: The conflict in Iraq has reverberated across the Middle East, affecting the balance of power between neighboring states, their internal political dynamics, how their publics view American credibility, and the strategies and tactics of al-Qa'ida. No matter how the internal situation in Iraq evolves, its effects on the broader region will be felt for decades, presenting new challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy. A better understanding of how regional states and nonstate actors have responded to the Iraq conflict will better prepare the United States to manage the war's long-term consequences. To that end, the authors conducted extensive fieldwork in the region and canvassed local media sources to inform their analysis. Among their key findings: The war has facilitated the rise of Iranian power in the region, but Iran faces more limits than is commonly acknowledged; the war has eroded local confidence in U.S. credibility and created new opportunities for Chinese and Russian involvement; the war has entrenched and strengthened neighboring Arab regimes while diminishing the momentum for political reform; and the war has eroded al-Qa'ida's standing in the region, but the network and its affiliates are adapting with new tactics and strategies.
Abstract: The conflict in Chechnya is one of secession and not Islamic fundamentalism. The objective of the resistance is the creation of an independent Chechnya and not a fight against the West. Foreign Jihadists first arrived in Chechnya during the first Chechen war in 1994. They had previous fighting experience from the Jihadi arenas of Afghanistan and Bosnia. The Chechen arena provided the foundation for Wahabist influence in the Caucuses. In 1999 the second Chechen war began. The reason for the Russian invasion was ostensibly to fight terrorism and the Jihadist rebels. The true reasons are thought to be the prevention of Chechen secessionism, to avenge the previous Chechen victory and to maintain Russia's geo-political influence in Central Asia and the Middle East. The current leader of Chechnya is Ramzan Kadyrov. There are allegations of violent human rights abuses under Kadyrov's rule
Abstract: The historically coveted region of Abkhazia has become
even more dependent on Moscow since Russia’s controversial
recognition a year and a half ago. Russia is financing
half the region’s budget, and against vigorous
Georgian protests, it is spending $465 million to refurbish
existing and build new military installations in the picturesque
Black Sea coastal area. Virtually the entire population
holds Russian citizenship, and almost all trade is with
the northern neighbour. It will take constructive, creative
thinking on the part of Georgian, Russian, Abkhazian
and international actors alike to restore even a modicum
of confidence between the parties to the conflict. Given
Abkhazia’s unrealistic insistence that Georgia recognise
it as independent and the equally unrealistic prospect
that Sukhumi will acknowledge Georgia’s sovereignty,
the two parties should focus on creating economic and
humanitarian links without status preconditions in order
to benefit both, build stability and give momentum to a
long reconciliation process. This report gives a snapshot of the state of affairs in
Abkhazia today, particularly the extent of Russian involvement.
Abstract: We face nation states, terrorist networks, organized criminal groups, individuals, and other
cyber actors with varying combinations of access, technical sophistication and intent. Many
have the capabilities to target elements of the US information infrastructure for intelligence
collection, intellectual property theft, or disruption. Terrorist groups and their sympathizers have
expressed interest in using cyber means to target the United States and its citizens. Criminal
elements continue to show growing sophistication in their technical capability and targeting.
Today, cyber criminals operate a pervasive, mature on-line service economy in illicit cyber
capabilities and services, which are available to anyone willing to pay. Globally, widespread
cyber-facilitated bank and credit card fraud has serious implications for economic and financial systems and the national security, intelligence, and law enforcement communities charged with
protecting them.
Abstract: The phenomenon of ‘Islamic radicalism’ is an extremely significant one for
Russia because of the large numbers of Muslims living in Russia, and the ethno-political
conflicts with an apparent confessional component that have arisen since the collapse of
the USSR. This article outlines the situation of Muslim radicalisation in Russia. It looks
at the recent dynamics of the spread of radicalism; the participants and activities of
radical groups; Muslim leadership; radicalist texts; violence and manifestations of
tension; the response of the state and society to radicalism; and the influence of the
international situation. In the last few years, a new, previously unknown ‘neotraditionalist’
trend has been noted in Russia – namely, the radicalisation of traditional
Islam, whose major figures have always been conformist-minded towards the state and
have sharply criticised their opponents. Islamic radicalism in Russia will not disappear; it
will remain a factor of the political and religious life of its Muslim community and of
relations between Muslims and the rest of the country’s citizens. It may grow stronger
under the influence of the internal situation, acting as a form of protest ideology. The
radicals’ activity also depends, among other things, on the international situation –
especially on relations between the Muslim world and the West.
Abstract: This paper addresses the situation in Russia's Northern Caucasus 10 years after the beginning of the second Chechen War and Vladimir Putin's subsequent rise to power. It explores the situation in Chechnya after the official end of the counterterrorist operations, discusses social-political instability in Ingushetia and looks at the relations between Dagestan and the Russian state. One of the authors argues that after the lift of the counterterrorist operations regime in Chechnya in spring 2009, the situation in the Caucasus deteriorated dramatically.
Abstract: The year 2009 was especially violent in the North Caucasus. In those twelve months, CSIS tracked more than 1100 incidents of violence – compared to 795 in 2008 – many of which were deadly. Most alarming: the number of suicide bombings in the North Caucasus nearly quadrupled from 2008, with the majority occurring in Chechnya. In this report, we present our findings, all of which illustrate the scope and scale of instability in the region.
Abstract: The development of new northern supply routes into Afghanistan, termed the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) by the U.S. government, and the expanded U.S. presence in
Afghanistan has had considerable impact on regional geopolitics in Eurasia. For those states now
involved in the NDN (Latvia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan), this cooperation has added a new dimension to their relations that increases their
stakes in bilateral ties with the United States and vice versa. Washington is engaging these
partners on an issue of utmost priority to U.S. security interests. Together and individually these
states can play a constructive role in Afghan stabilization efforts. But persistent tensions, mistrust,
paranoia, authoritarianism, and a near-exclusive focus on “regime preservation” make some of
them unwieldy and volatile partners. Suspicion of U.S. intentions and commitment further
complicate this calculation. Understanding the dimensions of and knowing how to manage the
geopolitical challenges and opportunities associated with NDN transit states and other key players
is critical for the United States.
Abstract: Despite the official end of Russia’s counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, armed clashes and terrorist attacks continue to plague the region. Open conflict in Russia’s North Caucasus is on the verge of becoming inevitable. A number of factors contribute to rising tensions:
Economic: Growing inequality and unemployment.
Ethnic: Competing clan interests and disputed borders between and within republics.
Societal: Rampant corruption and the increasing divide between the ruling elites and the general public. he federal authorities have achieved some results over the last decade, namely ending the war in Chechnya and replacing a number of unpopular regional leaders with new faces. “As a result,” Malashenko writes, “the federal authorities have managed to achieve at least a fragile peace by offering the local elites an implicit agreement that can be summed up as follows: you give us your loyalty and obedience, and we will not meddle in the way you run your internal affairs.”
But Moscow’s policies and approaches have also brought continued instability and permanent political crisis, diminished political institutions and parties, an exaggerated emphasis on the power of individual leaders and a reliance on force, all of which threaten constantly to spin violently out of control. “The authorities’ biggest failure has been in institutionalizing instability,” Malashenko writes.
Abstract: The Humanitarian Agenda 2015 project of the
Feinstein International Center undertook field
research in September 2008 and August 2009
to examine the humanitarian situation in Georgia, South
Ossetia, and Abkhazia and the responses to it. The
research was prompted by renewed fighting over South
Ossetia in August 2008 and was informed by the
author’s extensive previous research in the region. This
Case Study assesses the humanitarian landscape. The humanitarian fallout from the August 2008
war over South Ossetia is just one part of a
much larger and much longer story that continues
to unfold more than a year after the official ceasefire
between Georgia and Russia. Threats to the safety,
welfare, and dignity of many thousands of Georgians,
Ossetians, and Abkhaz have festered like old wounds
since the earlier wars over Abkhazia and South Ossetia
in the early 1990s that occurred amid the political,
social, and economic tumult that followed the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The longstanding failure of local and
international politics, diplomacy, and conflict resolution
continues to result in violence, and the threat of it, for
tens of thousands of vulnerable people in Georgia,
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
