Searched the resource database for : All Results AND Topic=Natural Resources and Armed Conflict
Haven't found what you are looking for? To further refine your search: Click on the 'advanced search' menu to filter by title, abstract, source, and/or publication date; to include or exclude multiple resource categories, regions or topics.
Abstract: Global climate change poses serious threats to the Central Asian region's
natural environment, and given the dependence of its socio-economic
systems on natural resources, climate change could pose a threat to the
region’s socio-economic systems. For most countries in the region,
agriculture represents a major sector of the economy and is by far the
largest source of employment. Environmental changes - particularly
changes in the availability of water - puts this critical sector at risk. The
growing concern over climate change in Central Asia is due to the degree
to which climate change affects the region's energy, water, and food
security and how this can lead to political tensions and conflict unless
this issue is carefully, and collectively, managed.
Abstract: This joint publication by the Feinstein International Center and Save the Children in Uganda examines the perspectives and experiences of communities in the southern Karamoja region of Uganda regarding natural resources and conflict. The study set out to better understand local views on this topic in response to the assumption in policy circles that resource scarcity or competition drives the conflict in this pastoral and agro-pastoral area. We found that while sites of natural resource exploitation are often insecure, respondents in the study population did not attribute this to direct conflict over the resources themselves. Rather, violence is common in these locations because opposing groups are most likely to come into contact with each other at these sites. On the flip side, respondents stressed that peace allows for better sharing of resources and better management of resource scarcity in times of stress or hardship.
We found increased and heavy exploitation of natural resources as part of survival subsistence strategies. The collection and sale of firewood by women has become the primary means of supporting households in most study sites. Resources accessed by women (including firewood and wild fruits and vegetables) have gained prominence in household livelihood strategies at the same time that resources important to pastoral livelihoods – namely pasture and watering points for animals —- have decreased in relevance due to the loss of animals to disease, insecurity, or restrictions on mobility. This governance gap in customary systems is mirrored by a gap at the official level caused by lack of capacity, funding, and political will among district authorities. In examining barriers to natural resources, we found that access to resources was perceived as a much greater problem than availability of resources at the local level. Insecurity was the main obstacle to accessing resources, and threat of attack was as substantial a barrier as actual or reported attacks. Men and women had very different perspectives on the importance of different resources, and responses aligned closely with traditional gendered divisions of labor and the associated resources consumed.
Abstract: Over the past ten years, the Israeli military has
gradually expanded restrictions on access to
farmland on the Gaza side of the 1949 ‘Green Line’,
and to fishing areas along the Gaza Strip coast, with
the stated intention of preventing attacks on Israel
by Palestinian armed factions, including firing
projectiles.
This study aims at assessing the scope of these
restrictions, as well as their impact on physical
security, livelihood and access to services. The
information and analysis presented is based on over
100 interviews and focus group discussions carried
out during March-April 2010, and complemented
with analysis of quantitative data available from
other sources.
Abstract: This presentation includes the following sections: Continuing US Dependence on Oil
Imports Through 2035; Iraq’s Changing Role in World Oil
and Gas Supplies: 2008-2035; Iraq’s Current Critical Over-
Dependence on Oil Exports; Recent Trends in Iraqi Oil
Production, Exports, and
Revenues; Trends in Iraq: Oil Production
and Exports.
Abstract: This report focuses on the nexus between security and environmental concerns in Pakistan that
have the potential to affect American security and foreign policy interests. Environmental
concerns include, but are not limited to, water and food scarcity, natural disasters, and the effects
of climate change. Environmental stresses, when combined with the other socio-economic and
political stresses on Pakistan, have the potential to further weaken an already weak Pakistani
state. The report examines the potentially destabilizing effect that, when combined with Pakistan’s
demographic trends and limited economic development, water scarcity, limited arable land, and
food security may have on an already radicalized internal and destabilized international politicalsecurity
environment. The report considers the especially important hypothesis that the
combination of these factors could contribute to Pakistan’s decline as a fully functioning state,
creating new, or expanding existing, largely ungoverned areas. Environmental factors could also expand the ranks of the dispossessed in Pakistan, which could
lead to greater recruitment for radical Islamist groups operating in Pakistan or Afghanistan. The potential for environmental factors to stoke conflict between the nuclear armed states of India
and Pakistan is also a concern. Preliminary findings by experts seem to indicate that existing environmental problems in Pakistan
are sufficiently significant to warrant a close watch, especially when combined with Pakistan’s
limited resilience due to mounting demographic stresses, internal political instability, security
challenges, and limited economic resources.
Abstract: The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) has been engaged in capacity
building and provision of technical support to the Afghan Ministry of Mines since 2007. A part of
this engagement relates to the development of the Afghan Hydrocarbons Law, and
commercialization of gas and oil reserves of the northern Jowzjan province through an international
bidding process.
The Terms of Reference request a conflict study in relation to oil and gas exploration in northern
Afghanistan, including an assessment of the relations between the northern areas and the central
administration, internal relations between northern based ethnic and military organisations and the
role of regional actors. Income division between central and province authorities is to be examined,
as is the view of local authorities on oil and gas extraction and ways to attract local interest; ways to
secure greater focus on the gender dimension; the security situation and potential consequences for
industrial development;
This report is based on three primary sources of information. One is a literature review on issues
relating to governance and income division of natural resources and potential for corruption in such
management. The second is information on the security situation in Afghanistan in general and
north Afghanistan in particular, and the process that is underway for exploring and utilizing Afghan
and regional oil and gas resources. The third source is a series of semi structured interviews with a
wide range of informant conducted in Kabul, Maymane, Saripul and Mazar-e Sharif.
Abstract: This paper sketches a conceptual framework of international conflict dynamics
and resolution, examines the geopolitics of the Bakassi dispute between Nigeria
and Cameroon, and outlines socio-economic implications of its peaceful
settlement. Neglect and subsequent discovery of oil deposits subjected the
Bakassi Peninsula to claims and counter-claims for sovereignty, military
occupation and recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ’s
ruling in 2002 in favour of Cameroon, although based on sound historical
evidence, faced implementation difficulties. However, following mediation by
the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, good faith by protagonists, the
Green-tree Agreement and subsequent instruments, Nigeria completed the
withdrawal of its military, police and administration from the Bakassi Peninsula
by 14 August 2008. Putting aside disruptive activities by social movements,
the entire process could be viewed as a model in peaceful resolution of border
conflicts. Implications of the settlement anchor on expenditure-reducing
and expenditure-switching effects, wealth-generating effects, and enhanced cross-border activities. Infrastructural developments and effective presence are
considered essential elements in border management policies.
Abstract: An intriguing factor in regard to the crisis in the Niger Delta
lies in the fact that there seem to be as many small arms as
there are militant groups. Although uncertainty surrounds
the actual number of such groups that unleash terror in
the region, as a result of a constant mutation in their ranks,
what is certain is the negative effect of their collective
terror on the Nigerian economy. These groups, individually
and collectively, sustained attacks on oil installations that adversely affected oil production outputs, and Nigeria’s
earnings. Often erroneously popularised in the local and
international media as one umbrella group, the Movement
for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MeND) has never
been a cohesive entity; in fact, it derives its essence from the
shifting alliances of other groups and its legendary access to
the world’s media. What is not in doubt, is that these militant groups have
been in a prolonged war with the Nigerian state, operating
under the auspices of the Joint Military Task Force (JTF),
with casualties on all sides. The militants employ a guerrilla
strategy in most of their attacks, targeting oil installations
and foreign oil workers. Their tactics consist of kidnapping,
hostage-taking of both local and foreign employees of
oil companies, and arson against vital oil installations
and pipelines. Their activities have made oil production
dangerous and, as such, have affected Nigeria’s output to the
point where Nigeria is increasingly unable to meet its OPeC
production quota.
The amnesty package of the Nigerian government is a
sleight of hand. Although the injustice in the revenue-sharing
formula and the environmental degradation that has eroded
the traditional means of livelihood in the Niger Delta had
spawned unrest across the region, some analysts suggest
that the upsurge in the activities of militants in the last five
years is traceable to two factors: inter-ethnic wars and the
massive build-up of arms by politicians during the 2003
re-election bid of the Niger Delta governors. It was after these
“empowerments” that the militants became emboldened to
take on the state.
Abstract: The political economy of mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is central to sustaining the conflict in the east of the country. Transforming it is a priority in order to alleviate the conflict and suffering that it fuels. In an attempt to ensure that conflict minerals— minerals sourced from militia-controlled mines—do not enter the legal supply chain, industrial actors, the Congolese Government and outside donors have established schemes to trace minerals such as cassiterite and coltan back to the mines of origin.
However, there are still a number of problems that must be overcome before mineral traceability schemes can have an effect on a larger scale. Mines that are considered ‘conflict free’ need to be completely demilitarized, which means removing both rebels and regular soldiers. Unfortunately, there is little political will to address these issues. The government wants to keep a large army, which continues to prey on local resource-based economies. Fearing that army commanders will drop out of the army integration process, it declines to hold its military to account.
The United Nations and other donors may not be in a position to force the government to undertake the reforms they see as necessary, but can and must use their support for army reform and demobilization to enable the demilitarization of mines. This will be critical for the successful implementation of traceability schemes.
Abstract: In 2008, Zimbabwe’s military launched a bloody crackdown in eastern Zimbabwe after
diamonds were discovered in the fields of Marange (otherwise known as Chiadzwa). Police
and soldiers, deployed by the government, massacred some 200 people as they seized
control of the area. They beat and raped locals, forced them to mine for diamonds, and
carried out other human rights abuses. Those responsible have not been held accountable.
Since revealing these abuses in a June 2009 report, “Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights
Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe,” Human Rights Watch has continued
to research conditions in Marange. It finds that while killings have abated, Zimbabwe’s
armed forces still control most of the fields, despite a commitment by the government to
remove them from the area. Corruption is rife, and smuggling of Marange diamonds by
soldiers in the field is prolific. The diamonds continue to benefit a few senior people in the
government and their accomplices rather than the people of Zimbabwe as a whole.
Abstract: This monograph contains papers that were presented at the International Conference on Climate Change and Natural Resources Conflicts in Africa, 14–15 May 2009, Entebbe, Uganda, organised by the Environment Security Programme (ESP) of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Nairobi Office.
The climate change phenomenon is a global concern, which typically threatens the sustainability of the livelihoods of the majority of the population living in the developing countries. Africa, particularly the sub-Saharan region, is likely to be negatively impacted by climate variability and change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Africa’s vulnerability arises from a combination of many factors, including extreme poverty, a high rate of population increase, frequent natural disasters such as droughts and floods, and agricultural systems (both crop and livestock production) that depend heavily on rainfall. Extreme natural occurrences such as floods and droughts are becoming increasingly frequent and severe. Africa’s high vulnerability to the negative impacts of climate variability and change is also attributed to its low adaptive capacity.
Climate variability and change have further exacerbated the scarcity of natural resources on the African continent, leading to conflicts with regard to access to, and ownership and use of these resources. The scarcity of natural resources is known to trigger competition for the meagre resources available among both individuals and communities, and even institutions, thus affecting human security on the continent.
Abstract: The Kimberley Process rough diamond certification
scheme (KP) is credited by some with ending the
scourge of blood diamonds. However, the extreme
violence that has characterised life in Zimbabwe’s
Marange diamond fields over the past three
years has shattered this myth. Instead of expelling
Zimbabwe, the Kimberley Process has repeatedly
failed to take action, and state-sponsored human
rights abuses and diamond smuggling in Marange
continue, against a backdrop of opaque and
questionable investments.
This report is an update on the situation in Marange.
It calls on the Kimberley Process to take urgent
and decisive action to address Zimbabwe’s noncompliance
with the scheme’s rules, bring to an end
the violence and corruption in the Marange diamond
fields, and restore public faith in the diamond trade. Section one of this report outlines the pattern
of violence in the Marange diamond fields. It
describes how the majority of the diamond fields
are still under control of the army, and how state
security agencies continue to commit human rights
abuses against civilians.
Section two examines the Kimberley Process’s
failure to act. Lack of political will on the part of
some participant governments, as well as weaknesses
in a system in dire need of reform, have left the KP
prevaricating in the face of precisely the kinds of
diamond-related abuses it is supposed to prevent.
Section three reveals that the joint venture
companies awarded mining rights by the
Zimbabwean government in the name of improving
conditions in Marange are in fact directly linked to
the Zanu PF military and political elite responsible
for the abuses.
Abstract: From 1983 to 2005, Sudan was torn apart by a civil war
between the Government and Southern armed groups.
Oil was a factor in the outbreak and exacerbated war
from the mid-1990s. This report is concerned with the
injustice perpetrated on victims and the role of oil companies
and their home governments during the oil wars. Between 1997 and 2003, international crimes
were committed on a large scale in what was essentially
a military campaign by the Government of Sudan to
secure and take control of the oil fields in Block 5A. As
documented in this report, they included indiscriminate
attacks and intentional targeting of civilians, burning
of shelters, pillage, destruction of objects necessary
for survival, unlawful killing of civilians, rape of women,
abduction of children, torture, and forced displacement.
Thousands of people died and almost two hundred
thousand were violently displaced. Satellite pictures
taken between 1994 and 2003 show that the Lundin
Consortium’s activities in Block 5A coincided with a
spectacular drop in agricultural land use.
The actual perpetrators of the reported crimes were the
armed forces of the Government of Sudan and a variety
of local armed groups that were either allied to the
Government or its main opponent, the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Nonetheless, the
evidence presented in this report calls into question the
role played by the oil industry in these events. ECOS believes that Lundin, Petronas and OMV, as a
matter of international law, may have been complicit in
the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Abstract: In the 21st century, the security of nations will
depend increasingly on the security of natural
resources, or “natural security.” The global economy,
developing countries and local economies
throughout the world all rely on the availability of
potable water, arable land, fish stocks, biodiversity,
energy, minerals and other renewable and nonrenewable
resources to meet the rising expectations
of a growing world population. Yet the availability
of these resources is by no means assured.
Stable and sustainable natural resource supplies
influence an array of U.S. security and foreign
policy interests. In Afghanistan, which derives 50
percent of its GDP from agriculture and ranching,
frequent droughts in combination with
unsustainable land use and deforestation have put
75 percent of land area at risk of desertification.
Water scarcity and pollution reduce Pakistan’s
irrigation capabilities and agricultural productivity.
Yemen, often cited as a potential safe haven
for terrorists, is at risk of complete environmental
collapse as both its water and oil reserves decline.
The loss of Mexico’s forests and fisheries has long
influenced economic stability and internal security
dynamics. The Somali government’s inability
to rein in illegal fishing and enforce regulations
has contributed to the pernicious piracy that has
drawn an international military response in the
Gulf of Aden. Not all natural resource pressures
carry consequences for national security, and
many countries possess the means to meet their
resource needs and to adjust to any deficiencies.
However, in cases like those noted above, natural
resources are closely intertwined with political
stability and security.
Abstract: Case studies of Kano, Anambra and Oyo States demonstrate the the relationships between the Nigerian state and religious organizations are often asymmetric and unstable: Christianity and Islam provide groups and individuals with moral frameworks on which to base their demands and critiques of the state; Christian and Muslim organizations both contribute to and challenge state institutions, such as law and education; and religious leaders are not immune from complicity in patronage politics. The ability of religious organizations to participate in politics and governance is strongly related to patterns of inclusion and exclusion based on linguistic, ethnic and regional identity, as well as on intra-Nigerian struggles to limit the political participation of certain groups through the requirement of "indigeneity" at State level. As a result, and given the close links between ethnicity and religion, religious competition is interwoven with the other rivalries that dominate Nigerian local politics and the relationships between the state and religious organizations are non-equitable: in all the States some organizations are excluded from participation in local politics while others have good access to the state. Conflicts over religious participation are closely tied up with disputes over access to material and ideological resources, from access to land to control of the State budget and local radio and television channels.
Abstract: The world's largest humanitarian operation is currently taking place in Sudan. The country has suffered from decades-long north-south civil war and violence in Darfur. Despite the move towards peace and recovery, millions of Sudanese still live in extremely vulnerable conditions, with almost half of the population of South Sudan threatened by food insecurity.
Abstract: 24 May 2010 - Renewed fighting on 19 May between the Government and rebel groups, as well as between tribes near Um Suana in Southern Darfur led to civilian casualties, displacement of communities, and hampered the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Abstract: This map represents the United States Government's humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia based on regional levels of food insecurity, as of 21 May 2010.
Abstract: The hijacking of merchant ships by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has been widely condemned in UN resolutions and news reports, yet illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and the dumping of nuclear and toxic waste in Somali waters by foreign fleets continues to be ignored, writes Andrew Mwangura, in an overview of the origins and scale of piracy in the region. According to Mr Mohammed Waldo, a Somali specialist working with ECOTERRA International, the origin of sea piracy and pirate fishing in Somalia date back to 1991 when the Siad Barre regime fell, resulting into the disintegration of the Somali navy and coastguard services. ‘Following severe draughts in 1973/74 and 1986, tens of thousands of nomads, whose livestock were wiped out by the draughts, were re-settled along the villages on the long, 3,300 km Somali coast,’ says the analyst. The resettled groups were developed into large fishing communities whose livelihoods depended mainly on inshore fishing, as well as the processing of the offshore catch.
From the early beginnings of the civil war in Somalia (as early as 1988) illegal fishing trawlers started to trespass and fish in Somali waters, including in the 12-nautical mile inshore artisanal fishing waters. The poaching vessels encroached on the local fishermen’s grounds, competing for the abundant rock-lobster and high value pelagic fish in the warm, up-swelling 60km deep shelf along the tip of the Horn of Africa. Later, the fishermen armed themselves. In response, many of the foreign fishing vessels armed themselves too and with more sophisticated weapons and began to overpower the Somali fishermen again. It was only a matter of time before the local fishermen reviewed their tactics and modernised their hardware. This escalation and cycle of warfare has been going on from 1991 to the present. It is now developing into fully a fledged, two-pronged illegal fishing and sea piracy conflicts, which in addition soon will become politicised and radicalised if nothing stops the foreign impact.
Abstract: The MiMiKi (Militarised Mining Areas in the Kivus) map constitutes a first systematic attempt to clarify the issue of profit by armed groups from the extractive
industry in the east of the DRCongo. The interactive map contains information on the location of mines, the presence
of armed groups at mining pits and a number of other variables. Although most recent analyses written on the issue
point out that the region’s relative mineral wealth is not the primary cause of the armed conflict in the Kivus, its role in
financing armed groups is indisputable. Because of this situation, Western companies buying ores originating from the
Great Lakes region, have been targeted by international NGOs who are asking them to implement a thorough system
of due diligence. In the light of the loudening call for a stricter regulation of the sector, the listing of mining sites in the
Kivus is essential.
The MiMiKi map is a snapshot of the situation as it was in the period May-July 2009. It has to be noted that the MiMiKi map is not yet complete and should be considered as a work in progress. To date,
more than 200 active mining sites are located on the map, including the most important. There are a few remaining
blind spots (areas on which IPIS has no first hand information) on the map.
Abstract: The following report is the first in a series of at least four inquiries into the motivations of combatants and their leaders. It applies a new methodological approach using cartography as an analytic tool. The report discusses the presence of (ex-) combatants in the Congolese province of Katanga, in other words, the armed men who participated in the consecutive Congo wars. It tries to answer the questions who they are, where they are quartered, why they are quartered there and what should be done to prevent them from causing security problems.
The link between natural resources and armed conflict is high on the current research agenda and the search for profit is without any doubt an important motivation for several armed groups involved in conflicts around the world. However, a tendency has developed within the press to reduce all (Central African) conflicts into bitter fights driven by the desire for diamonds and gold. The “Mapping interests in conflict areas” reports compare the importance of four different motivations: power, greed, grievance and security/survival.
Abstract: Yemen is not a failed state. It is fragile and faces challenges—economic, demographic, political, and security—that would sunder other states. There are those who would write it off as a lost cause, dismiss it as a sinkhole of assistance, outsource the solutions to the neighbors, or turn it into a “Third Front” even though we have not yet completed or been unquestioningly successful in the first two fronts in Iraq and Afghanistan. To write it off is premature. To declare it a sinkhole overstates the quality and consistency of our assistance to date. To outsource to the neighbors is abdication, and a counterproductive one at that, and to open a Third Front is pure folly. The United States, along with international partners, has the ability to help Yemen walk back from a precipice if it is willing to commit sufficient resources—financial and political—to a broad, sustained, coordinated, and strategic engagement that learns the right lessons of the first two fronts, understands the challenges that Yemen faces and the historical context that is still at play, and suppresses the impulse to apply the false templates of other fragile and failed states.
Abstract: In Sri Lanka, land has been a critical factor in the ethnic conflict that intensified and resulted in the outbreak of a
war that spanned over two decades. State aided land settlement projects under development and irrigation
schemes, the failure in addressing key land and development related issues, violence against particular communities
that resulted in the abandonment of properties, and the establishment of ad hoc security restrictions in
areas all contributed to the increasing tensions that ultimately led to the outbreak of war in Sri Lanka. Over the
course of the war, the land problem was exacerbated by increased displacement of entire communities from
their land, occupation of land belonging to private individuals by the military and LTTE, arbitrary seizure of land
belonging to Muslims by the LTTE in the North and East, the establishment of High Security Zones (HSZ), Special
Economic Zones (SEZ) and the loss of documentation. The present report explores the complex web of land issues in the Eastern Province. At the outset, CPA states
that this report only highlights key land issues in the Eastern Province in the post war context and is not a historic
study of the use, management and control of land in the area. The specific time period in focus spans
2007-2010. It provides an overview of the situation soon after the Eastern Liberation to that of the post war
context in Sri Lanka and the status of land within a three year period.
Abstract: Nigeria’s Niger Delta region is not only home to the greater part of Africa’s largest mangrove forest, but
also the source of Nigeria’s oil wealth. Here, in this amazing network of creeks, and an aquatic splendor
comprising marine, brackish and freshwater ecosystems, lie the operational bases of a kaleidoscope of
ethnic militia and insurgent organizations dedicated to the socio-economic emancipation of the Niger
Delta peoples. These have culminated in the Niger Delta Crisis. Thus, the area has become a hot bed of
violence, insurgency, kidnapping, hostage-taking, oil pipeline sabotage, crude oil theft, gang wars,
internecine struggles and so much else by way of anarchy and chaos. Making use of library research
and content analysis methodologies, the paper detailed in a systematic manner the real issues
involved in the struggle, from the perspectives of the Nigerian State, the Niger Delta communities, and
the oil Companies. The paper identified and analysed the major challenges posed by this crisis to the
Nigerian State. It concluded that in spite of the continuing deterioration of the crisis into anarchy, terror
and a revolving criminality, and the militarization of the region by the Nigerian state, the conflict can
still be amicably resolved. It recommended among other things that the commitment of government to
infrastructural development of the region and corporate social responsibility would bring enduring
peace and stability.
Abstract: It has taken nearly eight years for the member countries in ISAF, and International Aid donors, to realize just how critical Afghanistan’s agricultural sector is to many of its people. Food security and distribution is also a major problem and both are sources of vulnerability for the Afghanistan given its 30 year history of violence and given the scale of Taliban and insurgent operations. Moreover, both agriculture and food distribution are caught up in the problems raised by Afghan dependence on opium cultivation, extortion and corruption in aid and transport operations at every level, and manipulation by national and local power brokers. While there are no reliable statistics virtually any aspect of Afghan agriculture, there does seem to be broad consensus about the scale of the problem. A past DoDreport on Afghanistan provided the unintentionally humorous statistic that some 60% of Afghans have enough food some of the time. A form of ―spin‖ that ignored the obvious corollary that 40% of Afghans do not have enough food all of the time, and there was no way to know what part of the 60% had enough food often enough to matter.
