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Abstract: In a prevailing atmosphere of lawlessness,
racism and xenophobia, undocumented
foreign nationals in Libya are at continuous
risk of exploitation, arbitrary and indefinite
detention in harsh conditions, as well as
beatings, sometimes amounting to torture.
Despite the risks, large numbers of foreign
nationals continue to arrive in Libya through
its porous borders, fleeing war or
persecution or searching for better
economic opportunities. People from
countries such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Niger,
Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan make long,
dangerous and expensive journeys, crossing
into Kufra in the south-east or Sabha in the
south-west. Some embark on further
perilous journeys across the Mediterranean
to reach Europe. Many perish at sea. Others
are intercepted by the Libyan coastguard
and placed in indefinite detention.
Abstract: After gaining power during a 1969 coup, former Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi began amassing a significant arsenal of small arms and light weapons to act as a deterrent to external and internal threats. However, as the opposition to Gaddafi grew over the years, former dictator randomly deposited caches of weapons in public places and office buildings without documenting their locations. During the 2011 civil war, these undocumented locations were abandoned by Gaddafi loyalists as his strongholds were captured by the rebels. Unguarded caches of weapons were subsequently loot- ed by rebels, militias, ordinary civilians and other criminal groups, who took the weapons for various reasons ranging from self-protection to sale on black markets or for use in violent clashes elsewhere. Moreover, Libya’s porous borders allowed the weapons to be transferred to other countries, enabling conflicts in the surrounding regions.
A United Nations (UN) report on the regional impact of the Libyan civil war indicates that the weapons from Gaddafi’s arsenal were smuggled through the Sahel, including Chad, Niger and Nigeria, and have been obtained by terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Some countries in the region reportedly suspect that weapons were smuggled by army regulars and mercenaries who fought for Gaddafi. Furthermore, several states within West Africa have reported an increase in the arms trade.
Abstract: We employ a two‐tier spatiotemporal analysis to investigate whether uranium operations
cause armed conflict in Africa. The macrolevel analysis suggests that – compared to the
baseline conflict risk – uranium ventures increase the risk of intrastate conflict by 10 percent.
However, we find ethnic exclusion to be a much better predictor of armed conflict
than uranium. The microlevel analysis reveals that uranium‐spurred conflicts are spatiotemporally
feasible in four countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Namibia,
Niger and South Africa. We find strong evidence in the case of Niger, and partial evidence
in the case of the DRC. Namibia and South Africa do not yield substantial evidence of uranium‐
induced conflicts. We conclude that uranium may theoretically be a conflictinducing
resource, but to the present day empirical evidence has been sparse as most
countries are still in the exploration phase. Considering that the coming years will see 25
African countries transition from uranium explorers into producers, we strongly suggest
that our analysis be revisited in the coming years.
Abstract: The special feature of this issue of Humanitarian Exchange focuses on the humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region of Africa, where aid agencies estimate that more than 18 million people are affected by food insecurity.
Abstract: État officiellement laïc depuis son indépendance il y a 50 ans, le Niger connaît un fort mouvement de réislamisation. Pour ceux qui n’envisagent ce phénomène qu’à travers un tropisme sécuritaire, c’est une tendance inquiétante. Cela a conduit de nombreux services de sécurité sahéliens et occidentaux à s’interroger sur les vecteurs de diffusion de ces idéologies et de financement des groupes islamistes radicaux. De ce point de vue, la présence d’organisations de secours islamique, véhicule beaucoup de fantasmes. Elles sont soupçonnées de diffuser un islam rigoriste voire radical dans les pays et les sociétés d’accueil, de favoriser un anti-occidentalisme et de répandre des sommes d’argent importantes qui peuvent éventuellement se retrouver dans les mains de groupes violents. Il est cependant important de prendre du recul vis-à-vis d’un angle d’approche uniquement sécuritaire. Une remise en contexte du phénomène de réislamisation montre une attente de religion dans toute l’Afrique de l’Ouest, aussi bien dans les milieux musulmans que chrétiens. La montée en puissance des mouvements réformateurs n’est pas liée qu’à des facteurs exogènes ou à des idéologies « importées ».
Pour éviter tout procès d’intention, il est nécessaire, quand c’est possible, d’observer les actions réellement menées par les dizaines d’ONG islamiques qui travaillent au Sahel. La zone sahélienne comprend des pays dont les indices de développement humain sont parmi les plus faibles de la planète. Pour essayer d’améliorer les conditions de vie de leurs habitants, les pays de la zone ont essayé d’attirer le soutien de la communauté internationale, du mouvement des ONG dans leur ensemble et ont aussi joué sur leur identité musulmane pour obtenir des financements et l’intervention d’ONG islamiques. Ces dernières ont un bilan, apprécié des populations, à présenter dans les secteurs de l’éducation, de la santé, des services sociaux et du développement. Les crises humanitaires et le faible développement de la région leur ont offert un terrain de choix pour montrer leurs compétences mais aussi leurs limites dans le cadre de l’intervention humanitaire au Niger.
Abstract: More than 18 million people are currently struggling through a crisis in the
Sahel region of West Africa. The overarching driver of this crisis is not drought,
nor a food deficit. The most vulnerable families are in crisis because they have
no protection against shocks like grain prices doubling. This is the “resilience
deficit”*, rooted in structural causes, neglected for too long, and exacerbated
by exceptionally high food prices.
Current estimates suggest that over one million children will face severe
and life-threatening malnutrition during this crisis. Even in a “non-crisis”
year, an estimated 645,000 children die in the Sahel of largely preventable
and treatable causes, with 226,000 of these deaths being directly linked to
malnutrition. Acute malnutrition affects 10%-14% of children in Senegal, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso, and more than 15% of children in Chad.
These rates demonstrate that traditional development policies are failing to
save children in the Sahel from a permanent, large-scale nutrition crisis.
This report, a joint initiative by Save the Children and World Vision, aims to
assess progress, lessons learned, and challenges in promoting “resilience” in
the Sahel, with a particular focus on the well-being of children. The study
demonstrates the need for a massive response by governments and partners
in order to tackle child malnutrition – chronic and acute, together. It offers
evidence-based, tangible recommendations for a comprehensive, child-focused
approach to resilience in the Sahel.
People’s access to food at prices they can afford, and their capacity to absorb
or adapt to new shocks have been severely undermined by the Sahel crises in
2005, 2008 and 2010. The vast majority of the most vulnerable households in
the region have had neither the time, nor the necessary support, to get out of
debt, or restore their normal means of making a living.
Abstract: Since the end of February 2011, 790,000 migrant workers and their families have crossed the Libyan border into other countries to escape the conflict and ongoing violence in Libya. Although migration crises of this kind are not new, the massive outflow of migrants fleeing the violence in Libya represents one of the largest migration crises in modern history. Given that there were approximately 1.8 million migrant workers in Libya, a country heavily reliant on migrant workers before the crisis, it is clear that such large-scale movement has significant implications for the neighbouring region and beyond, as well as for the post-crisis reconstruction of Libya itself. The scale of the crisis in Libya has brought to the political foreground the issue of protection and rights of migrants caught in crisis; the role of State actors and international cooperation mechanisms in such situations; and the implications of such crises for migrants’ countries of origin as well as for wider migration management systems.
Migrants Caught in Crisis: The IOM Experience in Libya analyses the effect that the Libyan crisis has had on migrants caught in the crisis and the wider implications for migration in the region, based primarily on the experience of the International Organization for Migration in the evacuation, return and reintegration of migrant workers from Libya. It contextualizes the crisis in Libya from a comparative perspective within the region and takes a brief look back at the socio-economic, political and migration situation, prior to the crisis. It then provides a detailed account of the evacuation of migrant workers from Libya and the central role played by IOM. The effects of the crisis on sending countries and their nationals are also examined, as are the implications for the post-crisis reconstruction of Libya. The report considers the challenges and lessons learned with regard to the following in the international response to the Libyan crisis: the role played by State actors, cooperation mechanisms, evacuation as a form of protection, security and humanitarian access, and resource mobilization. Finally, although the situation in Libya is still evolving after the downfall of the Gaddafi regime, emerging migration policy challenges and future policy considerations are put forth.
Abstract: Transboundary rivers may contribute to increased hostility between riparians. This may contribute to increased hostility between riparians. This article accepts earlier arguments about water scarcity. Structural Scarcity occurs in river basins with unequal resource distribution, often created by geographic asymmetries. Hence, this article argues that the geographic asymmetries present in many river basins are key determinants of conflict risk among riparians. In a river basin the upstream state enjoys an inherent advantage and upstream river use is likely to produce unidirectional externalities that harm the states downstream. This in turn, is likely to produce grievances or claims downstream that may contribute to worsen overall state relations and consequently increase the risk of dyadic conflict.
Abstract: Security threats in Africa’s Sahel region, spanning the northern tier of the African continent, have existed for decades. However, in recent years security analysts have focused their attention on the increasingly sophisticated attacks by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the now al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab based in Somalia and the insurgent group Boko Haram based in northern Nigeria. Increased fighting in this “arc of instability” as well as changing tactics among insurgent and terrorist groups might reveal a growing relationship1 between these groups and as a result pose a greater risk for instability not only in the region but for the international community. The following report will provide a brief review of AQIM, Boko Haram and al Shabaab in the Sahel region based upon open source reports and will also highlight potential linkages.
Abstract: Ce monitoring trimestriel est réalisé dans le cadre d’un projet d’une durée de trois ans (2011-2013) intitulé « Amélioration de la sécurité humaine, prévention des conflits et renforcement de l’État de droit dans huit pays d’Afrique occidentale et centrale » financé par le ministère des Affaires étrangères du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg. Il a pour but de suivre la situation sécuritaire en Afrique de l’Ouest avec un accent plus particulier sur le Burkina Faso, la Côte d’Ivoire, le Mali, le Niger et le Sénégal, et d’autres pays de la région en fonction de l’actualité (le Nigéria pour ce trimestre notamment). Il se penche en particulier sur les questions liées aux tensions régionales, au terrorisme et aux trafics transfrontaliers, à la production et aux transferts d’armements et aux mécanismes de coopération en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité transnationale organisée.
Abstract: The menace of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb Islamique (AQIM) gained particular international attention as a result of the abduction of western foreigners. During the last years AQIM has not only perpetrated attacks in various countries of the region but also diversified its methods and tactics. Mauritania, in particular, has been victim of all types of AQIM attacks: kidnappings, suicide bombings, attacks to Embassies and military bases, and so forth. However, despite the efforts made by AQIM to secure a high profile and affiliation in Mauritania, the organization has not been able to establish permanent cells in the country nor has it been capable of building a strong foundation that would promote an increasing presence. This paper argues that the connection of AQIM and its messages with criminal networks and local tribes is structurally fragile. In fact, the political agenda pursued by AQIM in Mauritania does not match with that of its temporary allies. The actions perpetrated by AQIM on Mauritanian soil had an enormous negative impact on the economy and on the popular perceptions.
Not only radical Islam was thwarted to certain extent by the strong tribalism and the powerful brotherhoods that permeate social and religious structures, but also the links of the organization with trafficking and smuggling is a source of concern by many, who question the consistency of these illegal activities with Islam. Yet, the capacity of AQIM to make strategic regional alliances and benefit from scenarios like the conflict in Libya should not be underestimated.
Abstract: This report presents the main findings of a desk study of experiences with conflict prevention and resolution in natural resource management, and how these can be applied in development cooperation in relation to climate change.
The report briefly discusses the link between climate change and conflict, including the need to see climate change as a conflict multiplier rather than as a major direct cause of conflict in itself. The report then goes on to review approaches and lessons learnt from conflict prevention, management and resolution in natural resource management at the local, national and transboundary levels respectively.
On this basis, the report provides recommendations on how development cooperation can address the potential conflict multiplier effects of climate change, including guiding principles and key entry points for support. The latter include [i] enhancing so-called structural conflict prevention measures, [ii] supporting institutional mechanisms for managing and resolving conflict, and [iii] 'conflict proofing' policies and development interventions.
Abstract: The Niger River is the third longest river in Africa, flowing for 4,200 km from its source in the Guinea highlands, within the humid tropics, through Mali and Niger with their semi-arid Sahelian climates, to the Niger detla in Nigeria. The drainage basin covers a surface area of just over 2.2 million square km, extending into 10 countries. Seventy-six percent of the basin area is located within Mali, Niger and Nigeria. The Niger River and its tributaries are a key source of water for the estimated 100 million people living in the basin, especially for the drier regions within the western Sahel zone.
This report examines the links between environmental stress, climate change, human security, conflict and adaptation at different scales and localities along the Niger River. Despite a growing interest in the possible linkages between climate and conflict, limited evidence on these linkages exists, much of which is contradictory. The Niger Basin has experienced significant climate variability during the 20th century, making it suitable for studying the links between climate and conflict.
This report explores a number of issues. Firstly, it examines how climatic and environmental stresses influence water resources and human security in the Niger Basin. Secondly, the report examines whether climate stress on water resources increases the risk of conflict. Thirdly, it asks what types of adaptations, conflict resolution and governance mechanisms provide resilience to climate stresses and reduce the risk of conflict.
Abstract: Despite growing concerns across the Sahel and Maghreb over the increasing potency of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the diffusion of heavily armed mercenaries from Libya, the expanding influence of arms and drugs trafficking, and the widening lethality of Boko Haram, regional security cooperation to address these transnational threats remains fragmented.
Algeria is well-positioned to play a central role in defining this cooperation, but must first reconcile the complex domestic, regional, and international considerations that shape its decision-making.
Abstract: Despite this commitment from the US government to the Sahara-Sahel, there is no consensus among policy makers, observers, regional governments and locals on-the-ground as to the ultimate rationale for these security initiatives. The primary justification for the US militarization of the Sahel is the existence of a small number of self-proclaimed ‘Islamist’ groups operating in the deserts connecting Mauritania, Mali, Burkina, Niger, Algeria, Tunisia, Chad and Libya, not to mention groups already active in northern Morocco Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Debate has focused on whether or not these armed groups, individually or taken as a dis-articulated whole, present a potential and significant threat to local and international interests. It is hoped that this collection of essays sheds new light and, eventually, brings fresh eyes to a series of securitizing practices occurring on the ‘margins’ of empire, generally, and US hegemony specifically.
Articles in this issue include:
1. From GSPC to AQIM: The evolution of an Algerian islamist terrorist group into an Al-Qa‘ida Affiliate and its implications for the Sahara-Sahel region | Stephen Harmon
2. War on ‘terror’: Africom, the Kleptocratic State and Under-class Militancy in West Africa-Nigeria | Caroline Ifeka
3. Counterterrorism and democracy promotion in the Sahel under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama from September 11, 2001, to the Nigerien Coup of February 2010 | Alex Thurston
4. Western Sahara and the United States’ Geographical Imaginings | Konstantina Isidoros
5. The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Repercussions | Yahia H Zoubir
6. Sahelian blowback: what’s happening in Mali? | Vijay Prashad
7. All quiet on the West Africa front: Terrorism, Tourism and Poverty in Mauritania | Anne E. McDougall
Abstract: Following the fall of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in the autumn of 2011, the EU faced several challenges likely to generate political instability, security and humanitarian issues in the Sahel-Saharan region. These can have substantial impacts on its economic interests in the region but also within its borders. Recognizing the inextricable link between security and development, it provides strategies in various fields in order to support the Sahel States’ national strategies and policies. This Strategy raises several questions: is the Strategy for the Sahel adapted to the challenges faced by the new authorities in the region? Is it a new way to rethink the relationship between the EU and the Sahel or a mere reformulation of former cooperation policies? How can we move beyond words and make this Strategy effective?
Abstract: In February 2011, civil unrest in Libya rapidly evolved into an armed conflict between the Pro-Gaddafi Forces and the rebels of the National Transitional Council with air support from NATO forces. Seven months later, at the end of August, the conflict reached its climax with the fall of the Gaddafi regime ousted out of Tripoli.
By the end of September sporadic battles were still ongoing in Gaddafi strongholds in Syrte and Bani Walid, while most of the country was under the control of the NTC and already planning its reconstruction and political transition, thus marking the end of the emergency phase.
Since the end of February 2011, according to information compiled by IOM from national sources at the Tunisian, Egyptian, Algerian, Chadian, Sudanese and Nigerien borders as well as in Italy and Malta, 706,000 migrants have crossed Libyan borders.
This massive outflow of people fleeing the violence, one of the largest migration crisis in modern history, has been composed of not only migrants directly crossing the border to return to their country of origin including Egyptians, Tunisians, Nigerien, Algerian, Sudanese and Chadians, but also Third-Country Nationals who represented more than 120 nationalities and 45 per cent of the flows.
This report provides an overview of IOM’s emergency response to this major migration crisis over the past 7 months. More specifically, the report provides an overview, the way forward and some country highlights (cross-border movement, evacuations, humanitarian assistance, health and protection) as well as the financial statement including in-kind contributions. The report also depicts the assistance provided to migrants arriving in Italy and Malta, and the assistance at transit and destination airports by IOM teams.
Abstract: Speakers included Robert Fowler, Former UN Special Envoy to Niger, Jérôme Spinoza, French Ministry of Defence, and Dr Knox Chitiyo, Royal United Services Institute. The participants shared their insights on the current political and security situation in the Western Sahel, and discussed the transnational challenges facing the region in the form of radical extremism and drug trafficking.
This is a transcript of an event held on 8 December 2011 at Chatham House.
Abstract: This Policy Brief examines the real and imagined influence of al-Qa‘ida in North Africa and the Sahel. Despite a perception of the transnationalization of terrorist movements in North Africa under al-Qa‘ida’s banner, robust evidence of an effective al-Qa‘ida’s expansion in the Maghreb and the Sahara/Sahel region remains elusive at best. Rather, doubts about al-Qa‘ida’s actual threat and the efficacy of international response in the context of pervasive state failure in the Sahel raise questions regarding the policy objectives of US-led counter-terrorism in the region.
Abstract: The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has witnessed
unprecedented civil unrest since 16 February
2011. As the security situation deteriorated and
casualties mounted, many countries called on
their citizens to leave the country.
Before the crisis, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
reportedly hosted over 2.5 million migrant workers
from neighbouring countries, as well as Africa and
Asia. Thousands of these workers have fled the
country since the outbreak of violence, and many
governments have requested assistance from the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) to
ensure the safe and timely return home of their
nationals. As of 28 May, over 885,600 persons,
including Libyans, have crossed the Libyan border,
with thousands more waiting to cross the border
or stranded at sea and in airports.
The purpose of this report is to provide a cumulative
overview of the evacuation operations of IOM and
its partners over the past three months through
28 May, supplemented with graphs and photos to
provide more detail. In addition to the macro-level
information, highlights of activities and caseload at
the country level are also presented in subsequent
sections. The report’s final section gives a human
face to the crisis through the personal accounts
of migrants and TCNs who benefited from IOM
Abstract: This paper identifies the factors linked to cross-country differentials in growth performance in the aftermath of social conflict for 30 sub-Saharan African countries using panel data techniques. Our results show that changes in the terms of trade are the most important correlate of economic performance in post-conflict environments. This variable is typically associated with an increase in the marginal probability of positive economic performance by about 30 percent. Institutional quality emerges as the second most important factor. Foreign aid is shown to have very limited ability to explain differentials in growth performance, and other policy variables such as trade openness are not found to have a statistically significant effect. The results suggest that exogenous factors ("luck") are an important factor in post-conflict recovery. They also highlight the importance in post-conflict settings of policies to mitigate the macroeconomic impact of terms of trade volatility (including countercyclical macroeconomic policies and innovative financing instruments) and of policies to promote export diversification.
Abstract: I consider it a singular honour to have been invited today by Chatham House
to address this august forum. The Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), which I represent, is a regional organisation which has,
over the years, gained your attention only for the unfortunate reasons of state
implosion and instability caused by bad governance and marginalisation. I
therefore welcome the opportunity to throw further light on its objectives,
challenges, and achievements, which factors have effectively brought
together fifteen West African states in the enterprise of improving upon the
living standards of 230 million people as well as integrating them.
The term ‘Chatham House Rule’ is today an internationally-accepted cliché
that this Institute has contributed to international diplomacy discourse, a
reference norm in rigorous and policy-oriented exchanges on global peace
and security. I therefore view your invitation to lead today’s discourse about
‘Democracy in the context of Regional Integration in West Africa’ as an
unique honour for me personally, and a recognition of ECOWAS as a leading
brand in regional integration.
Ladies and gentlemen, the evolution of ECOWAS can only be properly
understood against the backdrop of the fascinating history and circumstances
of West Africa since establishing contact with the world beyond its borders.
The fact that slavery, colonialism, as well as racial and economic
marginalisation, had left an intrinsic yearning for freedom, unity and solidarity
among peoples of African descent everywhere defines its wish to integrate its
states and peoples.
Abstract: This special research report provides an analysis of a set of new issues that have been emerging in the West African subregion and possible implications for the Security Council in the coming year(s). It identifies some key emerging threats to peace and security in the 16-state subregion and their linkages to existing security challenges. The report points to a key feature: the fact that some of the new threats are essentially criminal rather than political in nature. However, it explains also the growing political and security implications. The report also highlights action already taken by the Council to recognise these threats and considers options available to the Council to tackle these issues going forward.
The raw material for the study was derived from literature research; field research in a number of countries in the West African subregion (including Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria); and interviews in the region with diplomats, government officials and officials of relevant international intergovernmental bodies (e.g. UN Office in West Africa or UNOWA, UN Office for Drugs and Crime or UNODC, the Economic Community of West African States or ECOWAS and the AU), NGOs and academics.
Abstract: This paper reviews the recent literature on processes of violent mobilisation. It highlights
the need to distinguish between conflict and violence, arguing that violence deserves specific
attention, separate from an analysis of the macro-cleavages which lead to social conflict.
It goes on to detail those circumstances which result in political violence. Political violence
is generally initiated by ‘specialists’, people with the specific skills and desire to trigger
such conflict, and we analyse what makes non-specialists follow them. We question the
validity of a dichotomy between greed and grievances as drivers of violent engagement.
Instead we show that participation in violence could be seen, from an individual perspective,
as a constantly changing process of ‘navigation’. However, this makes establishing motivations
for violence difficult, both analytically and empirically. We therefore suggest an alternative
way of studying the causes of the worst forms of collective violence, shifting attention
from the individual to armed organisations. Indeed, these armed organisations are where
the external constraints on insurgency (logistical, political, military) and the internal imperatives
of military cohesion and efficiency are dealt with. The forms of collective violence (of
high intensity or not, targeted or indiscriminate etc.) stem from how such organisational
puzzles are solved. We detail some of the causal mechanisms that could be significant in
shaping the histories and routes taken by such armed organisations. The last section discusses
the policy implications of these findings.
Abstract: Depuis plus de cinq ans, alors que la rébellion armée de
l’Est du Tchad et la crise du Darfour focalisent l’attention,
le Nord-ouest du pays a suscité peu d’intérêts. Cependant,
l’ampleur de plus en plus grande du trafic international de
drogues et du terrorisme dans la bande sahélo-saharienne,
l’émergence d’un islamisme combattant dans les pays
voisins, l’intensification des ressentiments intercommunautaires
et l’érosion des mécanismes de justice traditionnelle,
la sous-administration et l’abandon qui caractérisent
la politique gouvernementale à l’égard de cette région,
risquent de devenir des facteurs de déstabilisation. Les
autorités tchadiennes doivent changer de mode de gouvernance
dans cette région et désamorcer les différentes
sources de tensions ou les risques de déstabilisation avant
que ceux-ci n’atteignent un seuil critique.
Historiquement, la région Nord-ouest a joué le rôle ambivalent
de trait d’union et d’opposition entre les cultures de
l’Afrique du Nord arabo-musulmane et celles de l’Afrique
noire. Actuellement, elle est la cible de tentatives d’infiltrations
de la part de groupes armés et de bandes criminelles
profitant de la porosité du désert saharien pour étendre
leur champ d’activité. L’islamisme combattant qui sévit
au Nord du Nigeria (la secte Boko Haram) et al-Qaeda
au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) qui opère dans certains
Etats du Sahel y font sentir leur influence diffuse mais
réelle. Si jusqu’à présent ce dangereux voisinage n’a pas
eu d’effet déstabilisateur, une plus grande vigilance est
néanmoins de mise.