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Abstract: The present document is part of the second phase of the Democratisation and Transitional Justice Cluster of
the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) project. The paper focuses on the case study of Angola and aims to analyse
whether the international community’s engagement in Angola is transforming, or rather reinforcing, the current
status quo of state-society relations.
The study is based on the results of the first phase of research on the situation of state-society relations in Angola.
The objective is to analyse the international community’s contribution, with particular attention to the EU, to
improving (or reinforcing the existing) state-society relations in Angola; taking into account official development
cooperation, especially projects aiming to promote good governance, as well as economic engagement and
political relations.
The paper argues that the impact of international donors’ engagement in the field of governance and state-society
relations appears to be quite limited and driven by the Angolan elite’s interests, rather than being supportive of
concrete governance reforms or improving the political and economic participation of the population and more
fluent state-society relations. Furthermore, the economic interests of foreign actors in Angola seem to override the
commitment to achieve good governance and transparency. In particular, the international community’s diplomatic
and economic engagement appears to reinforce, rather than doing anything to improve, the current state-society
relations in the de-facto authoritarian system. Although there are important entry points for international actors
to exert a positive influence, what is crucial but still absent is a deeper level of donor commitment; from global
powers and diplomatic representations as well as private and public companies and financial entities, in order
to overcome the huge gap between state elite and population and bring about real democratic change and
consolidation in Angola.
Abstract: The Angolan peace process was far from typical, and the country’s road to reconstruction is also unlike that of other African conflicts and post-conflict scenarios. The government has had a firm grasp on the process, exerting leadership from the very start, and no formal reconciliation process was required for two primary reasons: firstly, the war ended with a clear military victory by one side, and, secondly, the population was exhausted after decades of conflict, creating a widespread desire for peace. Although the context of “energy realpolitik” undermines the capacity of foreign actors to influence state-society relations, another factor needs to be taken into account: Angola’s internal will to improve the country’s international image and to become a regional power.
Abstract: The will and the capacity of the United Nations (UN)
and Member States to deal with natural resource fuelled
conflicts is weak. In eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), civilians die on a daily
basis because of a war that is stoked by the
international trade in minerals. The conflict’s
economic dimension and the identity of those
fuelling it have been known for many years; yet
increased awareness of the problem has not triggered
effective action. When the UN Security Council
passes resolutions concerning DRC – on targeted
sanctions for example – Council members and other
governments decline to implement them.
Global Witness believes that these failings on the
DRC reflect the lack of a coherent and committed
international approach to tackling natural resourcefuelled
conflicts. For two decades, the UN, other
intergovernmental bodies and individual
governments have been forced to respond to these
kinds of self-financing wars in countries such as
Angola, Cambodia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte
d’Ivoire. Different policies have been tried, with
varying degrees of success, but no serious attempt
has been made to distil from these experiences a
common understanding of the problem and a
strategy for dealing with it.
Reviewing these cases, we find that the international
peace and security system is poorly equipped to deal
with the challenges they pose. When considered
together, the four key entry points for international
action – sanctions, peacemaking, peacekeeping and
peacebuilding – should offer the basis for effective
action. However, despite progress in some areas, the
overall picture is one of ad hoc decision making
and yawning gaps in institutional capacity and
coordination.
Global Witness is calling on the UN to establish
a High Level Panel to draw up a comprehensive
strategy for tackling self-financing wars. This
High Level Panel should review existing
international experience of responding to such
conflicts. It should also examine potential threats
in countries such as Guinea, Somalia and Central
African Republic.
Abstract: In order for fragile states and the concept of state weakness to be properly understood, they need to be considered in the contexts of political economy and world history.
Four apparently disparate cases – Guatemala, Haiti, Kosovo and Angola – show surprising similarities, and highlight common lessons for international state-building efforts. In all four cases, behind a façade of ‘normal’ state institutions, public life and development are increasingly subject to shadow economies and shadow forces with strong international linkages.
There are unfortunately no existing remedies for state weakness. However, methods of improvement should include autonomous non-state actors, sustained efforts to build state capacities and restore the fabric of society, and significantly improved governance of global flows.
Abstract: By all indications, and from the evidence gathered
for this year’s Diamonds and Human
Security Annual Review, the Kimberley Process
(KP), designed to halt and prevent the return
of “conflict diamonds”, is failing. The cost of a
collapse would be disastrous for an industry
that benefits so many countries, and for the
millions of people in developing countries who
depend, directly and indirectly on it. A criminalized
diamond economy would re-emerge
and conflict diamonds could soon follow. The
problems can and must be fixed.
Accountability is the primary issue. There is no
KP central authority. The “chair” rotates annually
and has virtually no responsibility beyond a
convening function. Problems are shifted from
one “working group” to another; debates on
vital issues extend for years. “Consensus” in
the KP means that everyone must agree; a single
dissenter can block forward movement.
Nobody takes responsibility for action or inaction,
failure or success; the Kimberley Process
has no core body apart from its annual “plenary
meeting” and thus nobody is held responsible
for anything.
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
(KPCS) has a peer review mechanism which
reviews each member’s compliance roughly
once every three years. Some reviews are thorough
and recommendations are heeded. In
many cases, however, recommendations are
ignored, and there is little or no follow-up —
this has been the case in the past with DRC
and Angola. And, as this Annual Review notes,
some reviews are completely bogus. In 2008, a
bloated, nine-member team visited Guinea, a
country beset by corruption, weak diamond
controls, and almost certain smuggling. The
team spent less than two hours outside the
capital and its report remained unfinished for
almost 11 months. A team visited Venezuela in
2008 but its makeup, agenda and itinerary
were dictated entirely by the Venezuelan government.
NGOs were barred and there were no visits to mining areas or border towns.
Zimbabwe, rife with smuggling and gross diamond-
related human rights abuse, consumed
months of ineffectual internal KP debate. In the
end, the KP agreed on a review mission, but only
after being publicly shamed into action by NGO
and media reports. The result is a lowest-common-
denominator “consensus” and continuing
inaction.
Abstract: This project argues that the current model of state-building is deeply flawed and
that an alternative model may work better. It hews to a middle ground between the critics:
successful state-building may be possible, but only if the international community adopts
a different framework. Key to successful state-building, I argue, is restoring the
legitimacy of the state’s monopoly of violence. The current model implicitly rests on a
formal-legal conception of legitimacy in which law or institutions confer authority on
officials, who then employ that authority to create a social order. But a formal-legal
approach, however well suited to established states governed by a rule of law, is
inappropriate in the anarchy of a failed state. Precisely because the prior regime has lost
its legitimacy, there is no accepted legal or institutional framework that can confer
authority on a nascent government, no matter how democratic. I develop an alternative,
relational conception of legitimacy drawn from social contract theories of the state.2 In
this approach, authority derives from a mutually-beneficial contract in which the ruler
provides a social order of benefit to the ruled, and the ruled in turn comply with the
extractions (e.g., taxes) and constraints on their behavior (e.g., law) that are necessary to
the production of that order. The contract becomes self-enforcing – or legitimate – when individuals and groups become “vested” in that social order by undertaking investments
specific to the particular contract. In this way, legitimacy follows from social order, not
the other way around as in the current model. This implies that providing security,
protecting property rights, and adjudicating disputes within society should be the first
step in any state-building process. This paper proceeds in five principal sections. The first examines the concepts of
state failure and state-building, arguing for a new focus on rebuilding state legitimacy.
Section II probes and criticizes the intellectual foundations of the current model and
practice of state-building. I then develop an alternative analytic foundation and model that rests of a relational conception of authority in Section III. I develop the role of
international trustees in the state-building process and examine further the tensions
identified above in Section IV. The final section examines the case of Somalia. Other
cases are planned for future research.
Abstract: For many decades, war and other kinds of violence brought
wretchedness and early death to millions of Angolans. What
difference has Western action or inaction made for the war affected?
Have donors helped or hindered their empowerment?
This short paper explores these questions. Its findings should
be read as approximate and provisional, however, given the low
and uneven quality of available information. Some findings are
valid only for specific historical moments. In recent decades,
Angola has passed through several ‘post-conflict’ situations.
Donors responded differently to each one, as their political
purposes changed and their leverage grew weaker.The terrain
of victimisation shifted as tides of overt and structural violence
left sedimentary layers of disadvantage and privilege. This
paper, therefore, offers an analysis of today’s post-war trends
in empowerment and disempowerment against a backdrop of
earlier waves of conflict in Angola’s troubled history.
Abstract: For years, as a former Cold War battleground, Angola has stood out on world league tables of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states. Yet its army has a formidable record of domestic and foreign combat. Its national oil company is of world class. In recent years its economy has grown at a feverish annual rate of 18 percent. Its government has successfully ended 40 years of violent conflict, consolidated its political base and negotiated profitable deals with major public and private bodies of the United States, Europe and China. For such a country, how valid is the label ‘failed state’?
In light of this seeming paradox, this paper addresses several critical questions. What are the historical roots of conflict in Angola, and of its weak and uneven state and political institutions? How deeply is Angola’s political economy integrated into international systems, and what aspects of that integration help explain both the weaknesses and strengths of state and political institutions? What formal and informal forces and incentives are at work in Angola’s territorial political economy that affect state and political resilience and weakness?
It concludes by suggesting ways European and other international decision-makers might look afresh at notions of state weakness in general, and their relevance to the case of Angola in particular.
Abstract: This fourth edition of the Yearbook on Peace Processes analyses the conflicts in which
negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations
are formalised, are in the exploratory phases, are bearing fruit or, to the contrary, are stalled or
enmeshed in crisis. It also analyses certain cases in which the negotiations or explorations are
partial, that is, they do not encompass all the armed groups present in the country (as is the case
of Afghanistan and Iraq, for example). The majority of the negotiations are linked to armed
conflicts, but other situations are also analysed in which despite the fact that there are currently
no armed clashes taking place, the parties have yet to reach a permanent agreement to put an end
to the hostilities and disputes still pending. Thus, the negotiations are relevant for preventing the
beginning or resurgence of new armed confrontations.
The way of organising the analysis of almost every case follows a standard pattern, namely: 1) a
brief synopsis of the background of the conflict, with a short description of the armed groups and
the main players participating in the conflict; 2) the lead-up to the peace process; 3) the events
that took place throughout 2007; 4) a table displaying the most noteworthy events in the year in
summarised form; and 5) a list of websites where the conflict can be monitored. At the start of
each country there is a small insert with basic information on the conflict in question; in the
section entitled “Armed Actors” in this insert, the governmental armed forces are not included.
Abstract: The intensity of the armed conflict in Cabinda has declined as a result of large-scale counterinsurgency operations in 2002-2003, and the government publicly claims that the Cabinda conflict came to a close in 2006, when a peace agreement was signed with a faction of the rebel Liberation Front for the Independence of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). But the campaign for independence remains unresolved, and sporadic guerrilla attacks have been ongoing. Despite its insistence that the insurgency is no longer active, the military’s systematic arbitrary detention and torture of people in Cabinda suggests that the government has resorted to unlawful means to retaliate against people with perceived sympathy for the FLEC’s armed independence campaign. Angolan military and intelligence services have a widespread presence in the small territory, and they have intimidated and harassed people with perceived dissident views. This report extends that work with new first-hand, field-based information and shows a disturbing pattern of human rights violations during pre-trial detention of persons accused of state security crimes in Cabinda. In most of the 38 cases that Human Rights Watch investigated, those accused of security crimes endured arbitrary arrests, lengthy incommunicado detention, and interrogations under torture in military custody. All 38 detainees were eventually brought to the judicial authorities and a civilian detention facility. But trial records in several cases show that due process rights were violated.
Society in Statebuilding: Lessons for Improving Democratic Governance Initiatve for Peacebuilding // Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior // International Alert // International Center for Transitional Justice // Partners for Democratic Change International
Abstract: Many experts, inside and outside of development agencies, are trying to improve donor support to democratic
governance in fragile and conflict-affected countries. They are beginning to look much more closely at power
dynamics and incentives for change. Yet, as a whole, aid institutions tend to promote better governance
by promoting capacity in executive government, representation and accountability through parliament, an
autonomous civil service, and an active civil society. These are largely conceived out of western experience
and can be overly “supply-driven”. The goals are articulated through nebulous concepts such as “legitimacy”
and “effectiveness”.
Not only do the concepts remain open to wide interpretation, but western agencies cannot escape a fundamental
paradox – that, although physical proximity and personal contact may give local political leaders a certain capacity
and popular legitimacy, these local political ties may also be the main drag on the more open and equitable sociopolitical
“orders” to which donor agencies aspire. At the same time, notwithstanding the inequity sustained by the
local political ties, they may still be the best place to begin when looking at how to make leaders accountable in
specific contexts.
In all contexts, the dilemmas are multiple and the right trade-offs will depend, as always, on the time and the
place. The country analyses (Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC, Georgia and Pakistan) produced
by the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) in this cluster aim to shed light on the nature of these governance issues
in conflict-affected countries and make recommendations on how best to tackle them.
Abstract: From Angola to Sierra Leone, Rwanda to Guinea Bissau and Congo DR to Mozambique, two defining elements unite all peace agreements brokered after the Cold War to end civil wars in Africa. The trend runs round the world, from Bosnia to El Salvador and Afghanistan to East Timor. Liberal democracy and free market systems are two elements fastened to the heart of states recovering from violent conflicts, ostensibly to assist these countries make the transition to peace from a state of anarchy and bloodbath.
Indeed, fundamental values of the global agenda in the last two decades have hinged on multi-party democracy and laissez faire capitalism. Weaving democracy and free market economy into peace agreements are based on a number of assumptions. Democracy, unlike other forms of governance, has inherent checks and balances to mitigate the inclination to resort to violence to resolve political differences. Central to the assumption underlining free market economy is that markets (and not states) are better guarantors of development (defined as material prosperity) for all because, adherents argue, the benefits will trickle down even to the weakest and most disadvantaged in society. But it is also the case that multi-party democracy and free market are the dominant political and economic models of development in the new world order, in which there’s substantively still only one global policeman.
Historically, there have been many forms of legitimacy but surely in the 21st century, the only serious form of legitimacy is democracy. Thus, multi-party elections are today about the only internationally acceptable route to power. However, elections have turned out to be one of the ways to appease top echelons of feuding factions to a conflict in states rebuilding after long periods of civil war. In effect, elections may produce outcomes that may be described as ‘democratic’ but may not necessarily lead to peace or development.
Many studies around the world have established links between development and democracy. However, the causal relationship, if any, between Africa’s marginally improved economic performance and the democratisation wave that swept across Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century remain a hugely contested issue. Nevertheless, the value and significance of open, free and fair elections in countries transitioning from conflict to peace or consolidation of peace can hardly be underestimated. Successful political and governance transition is central to any post-conflict nation-building project. Rebuilding public institutions such as roads, hospitals, schools, law courts, prisons and regulatory agencies is fundamental to sustainability of the state.
Abstract: It is not possible to understand the meaning of, or the need for, transitional justice in
Angola without understanding the country’s broader socio-economic and political
landscape. In contrast with other countries in the region, such as Namibia, South Africa
and Mozambique – where peace came through negotiated settlement – Angola’s
transition from war to ‘peace’ was the result of a clear and definitive military victory by
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the government of
Angola. The military victory of the MPLA, which had effectively been the ruling party
since 1975, meant that the 2002 peace agreement did not result in a regime change. The
ultimate cessation of conflict was marked by the signing of the Luena Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) in 2002, itself built on the foundation of two previous attempts at
negotiated settlements in the post-independence period; namely the Bicesse Accords of
1991, and the Lusaka Protocol of 1994. The Luena MoU devotes a single paragraph to
‘national reconciliation’, framing it solely in terms of a global and general amnesty for
crimes and human rights violations committed during the armed conflict.
General amnesty was accepted as the only viable option, given the intensity and duration
of the conflict, as well as the perception that the majority of Angolans had in some way
participated in or supported the war. Given this perception of deep and widespread
involvement of the population in the conflict, the question many interviewees asked was,
‘Who would then testify at something like a TRC?’ As a result of this confluence of
factors, the ruling party has not engaged in a formal recognition of or inquiry into past
human rights atrocities, whether committed by the opposition or by its own forces; in
other words, there has been a conscious decision not to pursue the route of a public truth
and reconciliation process. Across the spectrum of people interviewed, there was an
overwhelming expression of war fatigue; the opposition to any form of truth commission
seemed to stem not only from not wanting to talk about the past, but also not wanting to
open up old wounds.
Abstract: In researching this phase, the Ford Institute expanded its database
to examine eight current or recent African countries in
conflict, examining 16 factors with a potential impact on the protection
of civilians in the armed conflicts. The cases studied
consisted of Angola (1999-2002), Burundi (1993-2006), Chad
(2004-), Sudan (2004-), the DRC (1997-), Liberia (1989-1997,
1999-2003), Sierra Leone (1994-2001), and Uganda (1995-).
For each conflict, Ford Institute researchers identified the location
of IDP and refugee camps, recorded the population of
these camps for the duration of the conflict, and analyzed data
pertaining to each incidence of violence against civilians – including
any attacks on or near camps. As in the second phase
of its study, Ford Institute researchers utilized geographic information
systems (GIS) software to produce a series of maps that
both chart the migration of civilian populations and locate attacks
on camps. The Ford Institute hopes that its database, GIS
mapping, and the findings of this report will contribute to the international
community’s efforts to craft policy that will enhance
civilian protection through the efforts of peacekeeping forces.
The findings of the study suggest that peacekeeping operations
may be critical to the reduction of violence and attacks
against civilians, particularly those living in IDP and refugee
camps. While the size of a force and the expanse of area inevitably plays a role in mitigating violence, the research identified
four other factors that play a crucial role in determining a
peacekeeping operation’s effectiveness in preventing attacks,
consisting of the following:
• The timing of the introduction of a United Nations peacekeeping
force.
• The composition of a United Nations peacekeeping
force, fundamentally its distribution between African and
non-African personnel.
• A United Nations peacekeeping mission’s ability to effectively
patrol volatile borders.
• A United Nations peacekeeping mission’s ability to initiate
and implement disarmament, demobilization, and
rehabilitation (DDR) programs.
In sum, the results of this phase of the project indicate that
peacekeeping missions are often undermanned relative to the
number of civilians and size of the area that they have to protect;
they are introduced too late into a conflict situation; and
are too reliant on regionally trained forces. Furthermore, they
lack the necessary mandate and resources to implement demobilization
programs effectively or to secure borders that
would help stop the spread of violence into neighboring states.
Abstract: The illicit trade in rough diamonds is one of the greatest
threats facing the Kimberley Process (KP) certification
scheme. The KP was created to halt and prevent the
trade in conflict diamonds that cost so many lives
during the last two decades. At the end of the scheme’s
fifth year, the trafficking of conflict and illicit stones is
looking more like a dangerous rule than an exception.
Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness have long
argued that the Kimberley Process should be more
proactive in monitoring infringements, and tougher in
curtailing this illicit trade. The situation today is getting
worse. In Venezuela, rampant diamond smuggling
continues while the government flouts the certification
scheme. Despite a UN embargo on Ivorian conflict
diamonds, stones are still mined in northern Côte
d’Ivoire, smuggled into international trading centres and
sold on to consumers. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
governor Gideon Gono recently stated that over 10,000
people were visiting the border town of Mutare every
month for illegal activities involving diamonds. Gono
said that over 2,000 local syndicates were smuggling
diamonds out of the country.
This paper reviews the issues around illicit flows of
rough diamonds, particularly in countries facing serious
challenges in controlling the artisanal mining sector.
We present the results of a survey assessing how
participant countries are enforcing KP controls and
monitoring the diamond industry, and we put forward
specific recommendations for changing the way the KP
is managed and implemented. We hope that the
procrastination and denial that have gripped the
Kimberley Process on these issues in recent years can be
replaced at the forthcoming Plenary Meeting in New Delhi
with a proactive and dedicated response to the problems.
Abstract: The problem of civilians becoming unintentional victims of landmine detonation in the world today is one that cannot be underestimated in terms of its importance to global and local humanitarian efforts. The human-life and financial costs associated with landmine detonation are paramount, and are being addressed by the Global community via the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping and its associated agency UNMAS (The United Nations Mine Action Service). In terms of human-life cost, the current statistic is that every 28 seconds a person steps on a landmine, resulting in 6500 – 20,000 new casualties per year. These tragic events are happening in at least 84 states, and every world region is affected. It is the intent of this literature review to enlighten the reader in two main topic areas. The first is that of mine action and our understanding of it, with specific regard to what is generally understood to be the most affected continent: Africa. A comprehensive description and discussion of the geo-political status of mine action in Southern Africa and its relation to development will be set out.
The second topic area that will be reviewed is that of predictive GIS modeling, as it applies to mine action. The intent is to put forth the scientific (i.e.: based on peer-reviewed publications) background information that justifies and supports an experiment that will be conducted. The goal, in general lay terms, will be to see whether it is possible to predict with a reasonable, usable, and repeatable amount of accuracy the delineating outlines of where minefields are located in a specific geographical study area. It is hoped that the effort with predictive GIS modeling will yield a technique that is valid for use across a variety of study areas. Having said this, the study area that is the concentration of this review is the region of Southern Africa and it must be acknowledged that the results, if positive, may not be transferrable to different Geo-political regions.
Abstract: Young people are potentially a tremendous force for change in conflict-affected countries
for both good and bad. Directing the energy of youth towards reconstruction is
a challenge and requires rapid interventions in the areas of education, family life and
health, economic empowerment and civic participation.
Abstract: IPI is pleased to introduce a new series of working papers on regional capacities to respond to security
challenges in Africa. The broad range of United Nations, African Union, and subregional peacekeeping,
peacemaking, and peacebuilding initiatives in Africa underscore a new sense of multilayered partnership in the
search for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa. As the total number of conflicts on the continent has
been significantly reduced in the past decade, there is widespread recognition of the opportunities for a more
stable and peaceful future for Africa. But there is also a profound awareness of the fragility of recent peace
agreements, whether in Kenya, Liberia, or Côte d’Ivoire. Furthermore, continued violence in the Sudan, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe; the long absence of a viable central government in Somalia;
and continued tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea—to name only a few cases—reflect the legacy of
unresolved historic disputes and ongoing power struggles...The southern African region is now
generally defined in political terms as
those countries that are members of the
Southern African Development
Community (SADC) (the geographic
definition is usually somewhat more
limited). Currently there are fifteen
member states of the SADC: Angola,
Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.
These countries are disparate in many
ways: they vary greatly in size, population,
and levels of economic growth, and
include some of the poorest countries in
the world, but also some of the richest in
Africa. Six of them are landlocked; two of
them are Indian Ocean islands. They
share a common history of colonization—variously
involving French, British, Belgian, and German
imperial powers—and this continues to impact
significantly on the nature of governance and
politics in the region. Many, but not all, of the
countries of the region experienced periods of
European settler colonialism, resulting in armed
liberation struggles for independence. Several of
them also endured apartheid or various forms of
racial segregation and oppression as a result of that
history of settler colonialism.
Conflict and war has marked the region considerably,
particularly conflicts over apartheid and
colonialism, which engulfed most of southern
Africa and led to millions of deaths. Angola and
Mozambique suffered further from post-independence
civil wars, fueled in part by South Africa and
Rhodesia. After a bloody civil war following the
collapse of Mobutu Sese-Seko’s authoritarian
regime in the DRC in the second half of the 1990s,
however, the region is, for the first time in forty
years, almost completely at peace, except for
residual conflicts in the east of the DRC.
Nevertheless, there remain profound threats to
human and state security, many of them fueled by
poverty, marginalization, and the weakness of
states.
Abstract: This report forms part of a broader HPG research
project that assesses the role of land tenure in
conflict and post-conflict situations, and how
humanitarian organisations tackle these issues in
their programming. It aims to provide a basis for
discussing how human rights and humanitarian
organisations have responded to the principal land-related
challenges in Angola, and sets these in the
context of the broader problems facing the country
as it makes the transition from emergency relief to a
process of longer-term development.
Abstract: Across African conflicts, peacekeepers have faced persistent difficulties
in trying to fulfill their mandate of tempering hostility and protecting
civilians in internally displaced person (IDP) and refugee
camps.
In a series of policy briefs, to be published over the next four months,
the Ford Institute will examine the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping
operations in recent and current African conflicts in an attempt to
understand the conditions under which their deployment actually
serves to enhance the protection of civilian populations. This first
brief will examine the significance of three critical aspects of peacekeeping
operations: 1. a force’s mandate, 2. the ratio of the displaced
population to peacekeeping forces, and 3. the relative density
of the force’s coverage in relation to the geographic area of a
country. Future policy briefs in this project will examine related issues
such as the composition and function of peacekeeping forces, their
operational capability, and the deployment timeframe necessary to
maximize effectiveness.
Abstract: One of the most significant violations of human rights is the recruitment of children, defined under international law as people under 18 years of age, into armed forces such as national armies or armed groups such as the opposition groups that fight government forces in more than 20 countries. This violation of children’s rights takes an enormous toll on children and societies. Although the physical damage to children garners the most attention, extensive harm arises also from the interaction of physical, psychological, social, and spiritual factors. This damage to children weakens an important source of social capital, particularly because children in war-torn societies are half the population. Also, child recruitment produces damage at the societal level, enabling continuing war. In some societies, children comprise a significant percentage of the fighting forces and commanders are able to continue fighting by recruiting children. Often, societies suffer damage through inter-generational fighting, as the socialization of children into fighting and systems of social division and hatred sets the stage for ongoing cycles of violence. In this respect, child recruitment is not only a human rights issue but also an issue of peace and human development.
Until relatively recently, the study of child soldiers was, in effect, the study of boy soldiers, as girls who had been recruited by armed forces and groups were either invisible or marginalized. The emphasis on boys probably reflected the patriarchal values that pervade most societies and that systematically privilege males over females. Also, the concern with boys reflected a concern over building security in the post-conflict environment, where important tasks are to stand down opposing armies, reform the security sector, and enable former combatants to integrate into civilian life. This security lens, with its emphasis on former combatants, relegated to the margins the girls who had not been fighters but had filled roles such as servants, porters, cooks, and concubines. Regarded as “camp followers,” girls were typically left out of the programs of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) that boys and men participated in.
Abstract: Africa’s natural resources have for many decades
been a source of power and wealth for the continent’s
ruling elites and multinational corporations,
and less often for Africans themselves.
Tragically and repeatedly, competition for control
of revenues from natural resources has fueled
cycles of corruption, conflict and poverty, forestalling
opportunities to spur economic growth
and social development.
As global mineral and petroleum resources grow
scarcer on other continents, and new African
sources come into production, resource-rich
African nations are earning rising profits from
their natural wealth. If these resources are to be
used effectively and harnessed for development,
more accountable and transparent mechanisms
must be developed and supported by governments,
multinational corporations, legislative
bodies, political parties, civic organizations and
the media.
This report is an effort to help elected political
officials – particularly those in the legislative
branch of government – serve as constructive
leaders in improving the oversight and management
of their countries’ natural resources.
Abstract: The illicit trade in rough diamonds is one of the greatest
threats facing the Kimberley Process (KP) certification
scheme. The KP was created to halt and prevent the
trade in conflict diamonds that cost so many lives
during the last two decades. At the end of the scheme’s
fifth year, the trafficking of conflict and illicit stones is
looking more like a dangerous rule than an exception.
Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness have long
argued that the Kimberley Process should be more
proactive in monitoring infringements, and tougher in
curtailing this illicit trade. The situation today is getting
worse. In Venezuela, rampant diamond smuggling
continues while the government flouts the certification
scheme. Despite a UN embargo on Ivorian conflict
diamonds, stones are still mined in northern Côte
d’Ivoire, smuggled into international trading centres and
sold on to consumers. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
governor Gideon Gono recently stated that over 10,000
people were visiting the border town of Mutare every
month for illegal activities involving diamonds. Gono
said that over 2,000 local syndicates were smuggling
diamonds out of the country.
This paper reviews the issues around illicit flows of
rough diamonds, particularly in countries facing serious
challenges in controlling the artisanal mining sector.
We present the results of a survey assessing how
participant countries are enforcing KP controls and
monitoring the diamond industry, and we put forward
specific recommendations for changing the way the KP
is managed and implemented. We hope that the
procrastination and denial that have gripped the
Kimberley Process on these issues in recent years can be
replaced at the forthcoming Plenary Meeting in New Delhi
with a proactive and dedicated response to the problems.
Abstract: Just as peace is not simply the absence of war,
an end to conflict diamonds does not necessarily
mean that diamonds will create prosperity
or that human security will prevail in the
areas where they are mined. The campaign to
halt conflict diamonds has largely succeeded,
although the phenomenon continues in Côte
d’Ivoire, seemingly beyond the ingenuity and
the powers of the 75 governments represented
in the Kimberley Process (KP) and the
world’s entire diamond industry. But the KP
challenge today is not just Côte d’Ivoire; the
larger challenge is to ensure that diamonds are
controlled and tracked in ways that prevent a
return of the much more deadly diamondfuelled
wars of the past.
Diamonds are not just symbols of love, fidelity
and purity, they are the most concentrated
form of wealth on earth, and because of that,
they attract problems. A raid on a Damiani
showroom in Milan netted thieves as much as
$30 million in diamond jewellery in February.
That was just one of many diamond heists. If
you Google “diamond theft 2008” you will
find more than five million articles. It stands to
reason, therefore, that conflict diamonds could
return to countries where development is
stunted and governance weak. That is why
organizations like the Diamond Development
Initiative (DDI) are so important, and why
efforts to bring greater transparency to the
extractive sector need all the support they can
get. The intergovernmental Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative and the NGOled
Publish What You Pay Campaign are key
elements in this.
Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) has been a
leader in the campaign against conflict diamonds
since 1999. It has been, and remains an
active member of all Kimberley Process meetings
and working groups. We have produced
several background studies on diamond-related
issues, 17 occasional papers and a quarterly newsletter, "Other Facets". All are available on
the PAC website (www.pacweb.org).
Starting in 2003, we began to publish standalone
Annual Reviews of the Diamond Industry
on Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Angola. The Annual Reviews,
published in English (all), French (DRC) and
Portuguese (Angola) aimed to provide governments,
civil society and investors with information
that would be helpful in the promotion of
greater transparency and more positive developmental
outcomes. The Annual Reviews have
been widely quoted and have become documents
of record on the diamond industries in
those countries.
For 2008 we have taken a different approach,
expanding the project to cover more countries,
but producing one report rather than three.
This report — Diamonds and Human Security
Annual Review 2008 — concentrates on the
three countries most seriously affected by diamond-
fuelled conflict – Angola, DRC and
Sierra Leone – but we have also included articles
on countries touched by those conflicts, or
where internal controls over diamonds, and
where development considerations, remain
problematic.
Abstract: Humanitarian mine action refers to activities undertaken to reduce the effect caused by land-mines and other explosive remnants of war in terms of social, economic and environmental impact of mines. The objective is the reduction of risk to a level where people can live safely and where economic, social, and health development can occur without hindrance from land-mines. This report documents how Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) are working in humanitarian mine action. Case studies are presented include Bosnia Herzegovina, Cambodia and Croatia, Ethiopia and Iraq and Malawi.
The document recommends that the mine action community needs to develop, implement and standardise new globally accepted methods and approaches to de-mining. Full mine and battle area clearance is costly and time consuming; hence such activities should be a last option, only to be used when the presence of land-mines and/or explosive remnants of war has been confirmed by technical survey. The immediate objective of mine action programmes should be to release land suspected to be hazardous as cost efficiently as possible and with a quality that meets the requirements of international and national mine action standards. NPA believes that land can be released through three different actions:
* cancellation: the process in which an area is released based on information gathered and analysis only
* reduction: the process in which one or more mine clear- ance tools have been used to gather information about the presence/absence of mines
* clearance: "full clearance" according to International and National Standards for Mine Action.
