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Abstract: This paper reports the results of a study undertaken during 2012 by Tufts University for the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), as part of the latter’s “Operational Learning” strand of work. This study is designed to complement the work of ACAPS on strengthening needs assessment by addressing the question of how assessments and other sources of information and analysis are used by humanitarian decision makers. The study is based on a combination of literature review, case studies, and key informant interviews.
The pressure to demonstrate that responses and claims about impact are grounded in evidence has been growing over recent years. Humanitarian donors are increasingly under similar pressures to demonstrate effectiveness and account for impact. This is partly a matter of showing that their decisions regarding policies and programs are well-founded and evidence-based. But, humanitarian contexts are almost by definition ‘‘non-ideal” for gathering data. Decisions often have to be made quickly, sometimes with relatively little access to current information or accurate data. The question about informed decision making may therefore come down to what constitutes a “well enough” informed decision in the circumstances; or what constitutes “good enough” information and analysis on which to base a response. Whatever the quality of information, no assumption can be made that the increased availability of good information and analysis will in itself result in better informed decisions. In reviewing the way decisions are made in practice, the study considers the ways in which such information is used (or not) at different points in the process, which varies across different kinds of decisions in different contexts.
The study is based around three main questions. First, how do decision makers in the humanitarian sector currently use information and analysis? Second, what factors, other than information and analysis, are influential in making decisions? Third, what would enable better-informed response decisions? In order to address these overarching questions, the study looks first at some of the main processes of decision-making in the humanitarian sector and the factors that appear to have most influence on decisions of different kinds. It goes on to look at the way information and analysis is currently generated in the humanitarian sector—both through formal and informal means—and related questions of relevance and credibility. These two topics are then brought together in addressing the question of the use of information by decision makers, and what might enable more informed and evidence-based response decisions.
Abstract: The pact signed on 15 October 2012 between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippine government is a breakthrough in many ways but is far from a final peace. As with earlier texts signed over years of negotiations, this one – the “framework agreement” – defers several tough questions and it is unclear how, if ever, they will be resolved. At stake is the creation of a genuinely autonomous region in Muslim-majority Mindanao for the various ethnic groups collectively known as the Bangsamoro, with more powers, more territory and more control over resources. The framework agreement envisions a new government for the troubled Muslim south that would raise its own revenues and have its own police and judiciary. It maps out a multi-step process to create this new entity by the time President Benigno Aquino III’s term ends in 2016. The obstacles ahead are huge. Politics in Mindanao or Manila could get in the way, and it may be impossible to devolve sufficient power to the Bangsamoro government without running afoul of the constitution. The MILF is unlikely to surrender its arms until the process is complete.
Peace talks with the 12,000-strong MILF, the country’s largest and best armed insurgent organisation, began in 1997. They have moved glacially ever since and were interrupted three times by serious fighting: in 2000, 2003 and 2008. The collapse in 2008 had damaging political implications because it hardened the positions of all stakeholders on critical elements of a final peace. These include the territory for a new Bangsamoro homeland and its powers vis-à-vis Manila. At the centre of the storm was a sweeping text known as the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), whose provisions the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional; it was never formally signed. It was difficult to get the peace process back on track afterwards because the MILF insisted that discussions resume from where they had left off.
Abstract: The war being waged in mineral-rich Mindanao, the southernmost island region of the Philippines, is a perfect storm of contemporary violent conflict. It is about land and resources, religion and clan, sovereignty, governance, and corruption in high and low places. Over a span of four decades, the fighting has resulted in more than 120,000 deaths, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, and more than $2 billion in damages to homes and businesses.
The latest news from Mindanao is big. On October 7, 2012, the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) reached an historic Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro People of Mindanao. The parties agreed that the status quo is unacceptable and that Bangsamoro, a new autonomous political entity representing the Muslim people in the region, will replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
If implemented successfully, this new political arrangement would entail a major re-mapping of competing Catholic and Muslim sovereignties over certain areas and cities that have long been the subject of contention between Muslim and Christian communities.
Abstract: Today the Philippines are making the international news headlines. Not for yet another natural disaster, a new
episode of tensions with China, or an ambush by the Abu Sayyaf. The Philippines are about to settle one of the most
protracted armed conflicts in the world. And the world is taking note.
Be prepared. International organisations, policy-makers, politicians, armed groups, and researchers are going to
be analysing the Mindanao peace process in detail. They’ll be anxious to extract lessons that could be relevant to
making peace in Myanmar, Kashmir, Colombia, the Caucasus and elsewhere. Maybe also Afghanistan.
Abstract: The South China Sea dispute between China and some of its South East Asian neighbours – Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei – has reached an impasse. Increasingly assertive positions among claimants have pushed regional tensions to new heights. Driven by potential hydrocarbon reserves and declining fish stocks, Vietnam and the Philippines in particular are taking a more confrontational posture with China. All claimants are expanding their military and law enforcement capabilities, while growing nationalism at home is empowering hardliners pushing for a tougher stance on territorial claims. In addition, claimants are pursuing divergent resolution mechanisms; Beijing insists on resolving the disputes bilaterally, while Vietnam and the Philippines are actively engaging the U.S. and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To counter diminishing prospects of resolution of the conflicts, the countries should strengthen efforts to promote joint development of hydrocarbon and fish resources and adopt a binding code of conduct for all parties to the dispute.
The extent and vagueness of China’s claims to the South China Sea, along with its assertive approach, have rattled other claimants. But China is not stoking tensions on its own. South East Asian claimants, with Vietnam and the Philippines in the forefront, are now more forcefully defending their claims – and enlisting outside allies – with considerable energy. Crisis Group’s first report in this two-part series, Stirring up the South China Sea (I), described how China’s internal dynamics shape its actions in the region. This second report focuses on factors in the other regional countries that are aggravating tensions.
Abstract: Human Security Research is a monthly compilation of significant new human security-related research published by academics, university research institutes, think-tanks, international agencies, and NGOs.
Articles in this issue:
NATURAL RESOURCES: Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War: Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?
ETHNICITY AND GOVERNANCE: Institutional Conflict Settlement in Divided Societies: The Role of Subgroup Identities in Self-Government
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Violent Conflicts and Risky Sexual Behavior in Uganda
SIERRA LEONE: A Village-Up View of Sierra Leone’s Civil War and Reconstruction: Multilayered and Networked Governance
IRAQ: Resolving Kirkuk: Lessons Learned from Settlements of Earlier Ethno-Territorial Conflicts
CORRUPTION: Risks of Corruption to State Legitimacy and Stability in Fragile Situations
THE SUDANS: Darfurians in South Sudan: Negotiating Belonging in Two Sudans
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Towards a Non-State Security Sector Reform Strategy
MALI: Mali: Five Months of Crisis: Armed Rebellion and Military Coup
REFUGEES: Urban Refugee Protection in Cairo: The Role of Communication, Information and Technology
PHILIPPINES: The Philippines: Local Politics in the Sulu Archipelago and the Peace Process
Abstract: The struggle for self-determination by the Moro people in the Southern Philippines began in 1565 under Spanish colonial rule and is still an unresolved conflict today. Rooted in primordial notions of homeland, indoctrination, social marginalization, and historical displacement, the Moro people and the government have engaged in multiple rounds of negotiations and produced several agreements. Currently, the Moro conflict is one of two large, deeply-rooted, and long lasting insurgencies featuring repeated peace processes in the Philippines; the other being the stop-start process of peace negotiations with the communist insurgents.
The Moro people are composed of Sunni Muslims with varying linguistic groups which lack unity. The fragmented rebel groups, including the Moro National Liberation Front group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, have weak legitimacy and bargaining power because of varying interests. The Muslim community perceives that there is a lack of government commitment to provide public goods in tandem to the latter‘s claim of authority over their territory. Furthermore, even though the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao is richly endowed with natural and human resources, poverty and development remain as large concerns.
The Moro people view territory as a means to securing an identity, while Manila‘s view of territory is directly linked to its physical survival. In addition to territorial claims, the Moro people have experienced social, political and economic discrimination, creating grievances, which, however, are not considered - atypically severe‘ but rather limited to - neglect and remedial policies‘. Opportunities for rebel groups are limited by lack of kin groups outside the region from where they might obtain financial support, and a lack of funding by diaspora. The Moro people‘s motivations stem from desire for increased levels of economic, political, and cultural controls. Full out ethnic war is unlikely since the ethnic groups have indicated acceptance of an agreement short of full independence and the Filipino government is committed to reaching a peace agreement.
To address the conflict between the Moro people and the Filipino government, it is recommended that the state continues on its three-component peace strategy of an agreement with the MILF, reform of the dysfunctional government of the ARMM, and review of the 1996 final peace agreement with the MNLF. In addition, Manila should pay particular attention the area of economical, political, and cultural grievances.
Abstract: "The Search: Protection Space in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, The Philippines and Cambodia" in Practice is a practical guide which will assist other advocates to give accurate information to asylum seekers and refugees about the realities of protection space within the region.
In Southeast Asia, where only three countries, Cambodia, the Philippines and Timor Leste, are signatories to the UN refugee convention the challenges of living in an urban setting are amplified on a daily basis as people struggle to make a living, avoid detention, send their children to school and tend to their medical needs.
This guide covers five broad themes: protection concerns, convention obligations and domestic legal frameworks, refugee-status determination, durable solutions, and finally an outline of the realities of living in the region in relation to employment, education, healthcare and housing. Given the range of challenges, it is essential that those that work with asylum seekers and refugees know as much as possible about the asylum options available in urban areas in the capital cities of Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Jakarta, Manila and Phnom Penh.
The focus of this research has been to emphasise the experience of asylum seekers and refugees, to let them tell their own stories, while at the same time compile the relevant contextual information that presents a broad picture of the current situation in Southeast Asia.
The asylum seekers and refugees who have willingly shared their stories, opened up their homes and lives for the purpose of this guide have done so in the hope that it may ultimately help others on the same journey: the search for protection.
Abstract: The tri-border area [TBA] between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia is a key hub of terrorist and related criminal activity in Southeast Asia, a well-known transit zone for weapons and explosives, and a principal logistical corridor for local and transnational terrorist groups. The authors analyze the security environment in the TBA; evaluate the Philippines' Coast Watch System, designed to improve maritime domain awareness in the Philippine archipelago; and examine the challenges the system must overcome. Finally, they consider the prospects for forming an integrated system of maritime security that would tie together the three states that converge in the TBA.
Abstract: Politics in the Sulu archipelago could be an unforeseen stumbling block for a negotiated peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines. So far the presumed spoilers have been Christian settlers, conservative nationalists, and recalcitrant members of the other insurgency in the Muslim south, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The islands off the coast of Mindanao have been all but forgotten. But the provincial governors of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, although Muslim, are wary of any agreement that would allow the MILF, dominated by ethnically distinct groups from Central Mindanao, to extend its sway and jeopardise the patronage system they enjoy with Manila. The challenge for the government of President Benigno Aquino III is to find a way to offer more meaningful autonomy to the MILF and overcome differences between the MILF and MNLF without alienating powerful clan leaders from the Sulu archipelago with a capacity to make trouble.
The Aquino government’s peace strategy is based on the principle of convergence, bringing three components together: a peace agreement with the MILF; reform of the dysfunctional government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the three archipelagic provinces – Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi – as well as Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur in Central Mindanao; and review of the 1996 final peace agreement with the MNLF. The latter two components are more acceptable to the elite of the archipelago than the first. They see ARMM as a corrupt and unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and administration between them and Manila but as long as they have equal access to leadership positions, they are willing to try reform. From their perspective, the danger of a peace agreement with the MILF is that it would ultimately replace ARMM with a new, expanded, more powerful regional government that would favour Central Mindanao, the MILF’s stronghold, and its clans, over the archipelago and its politicians. At stake is access to power and money.
Abstract: Last year on the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines, many of the ingredients for strategic peacebuilding came together. We were involved in meetings with local Catholic bishops in the Catholic Peacebuilding Network and briefings with local peace negotiators. At the heart of these efforts was the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), an interactive database and research initiative that is increasingly being used as a tool in actual peace negotiations.
In the Philippines, John Paul Lederach and other members of the PAM team have worked for years to facilitate and encourage dialogue among various armed and unarmed factions and government officials in Mindanao. Last year Lederach and Madhav Joshi met in Manila with the Office of the Presidential Advisors on the Peace Process.
Using data and analyses produced by the PAM, they convened panel discussions for the National Democratic Front-Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front—two of the major Philippine opposition parties involved in the armed conflict in Mindanao.
Abstract: Human Security Research is a monthly compilation of significant new human security-related research published by academics, university research institutes, think-tanks, international agencies, and NGOs.
Articles in this issue:
CAUSES OF WAR: Inequality and Identity: Causes of War?
SPOILERS: Spotting the Spoilers: A Guide to Analyzing Organized Crime in Fragile States
DR CONGO: Insecurity and Local Governance in Congo’s South Kivu
CONFLICT MEDIATION: Global Networks of Mediation: Prospects and Avenues for Finland as a Peacemaker
MEXICO: Drug Violence in Mexico Data and Analysis Through 2011
NORTH CAUCASUS: North Caucasus: Views From Within
PEACEBUILDING: A Peacebuilding Tool for a Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Development: A Pilot Initiative in Nepal
PHILIPPINES: Pagpati'ut: Mediating Violence in Sulu
WESTERN SAHARA: Simmering Discontent in the Western Sahara
TERRORISM: Individual Disengagement From Al Qa'ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups: A Rapid Evidence Assessment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism
SRI LANKA: Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of Minority Rights
MYANMAR: “Untold Miseries”: Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s Kachin State
Abstract: This research paper was commissioned by GFN-SSR as part of a helpdesk support to inform HMG to report on its engagement in the context of Nepal. The query asked for illustrative examples and lessons of integration; in particular, examples of integration into armies, integration into non-military forces (police, armed police, intelligence, etc), and creation of new security structures (industrial security forces, border police, etc) into which ex-combatants are then integrated.
One of the most contentious current challenges of the Nepali peace process is related to the future of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) - the military organisation of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – CPN(M). The main parties struggle over the key questions of whether, how and according to what criteria the PLA should be integrated into the Nepali Army (NA) or other security forces. Furthermore, the question of integration of the PLA is linked to other issues, such as the prevalence of other militias and armed groups, and a broader debate on the cornerstone of a national defence strategy.
This paper provides a synthesis of key issues and lessons from academic and policy papers focused on issues relating to the integration of non-state and government military forces, as part of a wider peace settlement following civil war. As well as drawing upon existing studies the paper synthesises themes by examining the data from eight primary and fifteen secondary case studies, drawn from various sources.
An overarching and consistent theme throughout all case studies examined is the requirement, with integration endeavours, to view the process as the outcome. The integration of non-state military forces into the state security apparatus is an element of wider post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and as such the outcome is rarely predictable. An effective and sustainable solution from one context cannot be assumed to represent a template solution for other contexts. Support to the process of decision-making, and bodies established to implement decisions has been seen to be an effective strategy for external assistance.
The paper has highlighted the complex and diverse nature of efforts to integrate ex-combatants into state security forces. There exist as many approaches and solutions as there are contexts in which they have been attempted. An examination of the available case study material has, however, provided some consistent themes that have been highlighted throughout the paper as lessons identified.
Abstract: The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei,
and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to
exploit the region’s possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is
also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military
vessels to operate in China’s two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions
are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China’s military power
and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime
paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by
force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region
at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific.
Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more
generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the
various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily.
Abstract: “Pagpati'ut: Mediating Violence in Sulu” looks at six communities in the Province of Sulu, South of the Philippines, to understand better the triggers of violence in this region and highlight mechanisms and social institutions that have worked to address those and should be supported in doing so.
The goal of the current research is to discover current community practices in mediating violence, and effective policies (customary and
legislated) that support a positive environment for peace building. Its general and overarching intention is to document ‘what works’ given the specific context of Sulu, with the intention of sharing these ‘peace technologies’ to other communities in similar circumstance.
While a number of studies have already been done as regards peace and conflict dynamics in the Philippines, literature specific to the Sulu archipelago remains scarce.
This research does not claim to be a trail-blazing work; instead, it offers to explore the dynamic play of history, institutions, interpretations, and governance in Sulu. In doing so, it attempts to bring to fore positive interventions initiated by community leaders and members, with the end-view of institutionalizing if not strengthening such efforts. It is hoped that such a study may in fact encourage other similar and more comprehensive studies.
The study also offers to determine factors for community resilience that can be replicated in similar challenging environments.
Abstract: The objective of the study was to provide a detailed evidence-base for recovery and development strategies in the conflict-affected areas. The study sought to investigate the nature, scope and impacts of a range of vulnerabilities. In particular, it explored people's experience of displacement, as well as the complex factors that have driven and shaped the settlement decision of IDPs. It asked all respondents their views of state and non-state institutions and what government and donors should prioritize in their efforts to support peaceful, sustainable development. It is hoped that this summery, and the full report it accompanies, can serve to shape the operational choices of humanitarian, recovery and development agencies and improve outcomes for the population on the ground. The findings it presents shed considerable light on the nature and extent of vulnerability in the affected area across provinces, population categories and livelihood groups.
Abstract: Human Security Research is a monthly compilation of significant new human security-related research published by academics, university research institutes, think-tanks, international agencies, and NGOs.
Articles in this issue:
GOVERNANCE: Africa and the Arab Spring: A New Era of Democratic Expectations
NATURAL RESOURCES: Do Giant Oilfield Discoveries Fuel Internal Armed Conflicts?
PRIVATE SECURITY: From Market for Force to Market for Peace: Private Military and Security Companies in Peacekeeping Operations
ARMS: Lessons from MENA: Appraising EU Transfers of Military and Security Equipment to the Middle East and North Africa
STATE-BUILDING: State-Building, War and Violence: Evidence from Latin America
EAST AFRICA: Hostage to Conflict: Prospects for Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the Horn of Africa
DISPLACEMENT: Invisible Refugees: Protecting Sahrawis and Palestinians Displaced by the 2011 Libyan Uprising
IRAQ: The Outcome of Invasion: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq
INTERNATIONAL LAW: From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement
PEACEBUILDING: Recovery and Development Politics: Options for Sustainable Peacebuilding in Northern Uganda
UNITED NATIONS: Shaky Foundations: An Assessment of the UN's Rule of Law Support Agenda
PHILIPPINES: The Philippines: Indigenous Rights and the MILF Peace Process
Abstract: In Sulu, Mindanao (South of the Philippines), the issue of election-related violence is prevalent and deep-rooted. In view of the limited capacity of local authorities to respond to the situation, the HD Centre and the Australian Agency for International Development launched the ‘Prevention Election-related violence -PERV' initiative in 2010. Its purpose is to monitor, assess and report back on election-related violence in the region to the Tumikang Sama Sama, a group of local eminents persons, who then attempts to either resolve those incidents or identify others who can help resolve them. This report presents the PERV initiative and activities carried out in recent months in Sulu, Mindanao.
Abstract: Deadly clashes between government forces and the insurgent Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) broke out in the troubled southern Philippines in October. Violence increased again in Yemen, on the verge of full-scale civil war between security forces loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh and opposition forces. Deadly clashes pitting Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government forces and allied militias against al-Shabaab rebels intensified throughout the month, leaving many dead. A suicide bomb in the capital Mogadishu on 4 October killed over 100 people, marking the deadliest al-Shabaab attack since the 2010 Kampala bombings. Al-Shabaab also carried out attacks in neighbouring Kenya in response to the entry in mid-October of Kenyan troops into Somalia. The Kenyan military operation aims to drive back al-Shabaab from the border and capture the strategic port of Kismayo. Tunisia’s historic elections for the Constituent Assembly on 23 October saw the moderate Islamist An-Nahda Party win 90 of 217 seats. Despite fears of violence before and after voting, the poll was praised by observers as clean and well-run. The leader of Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) declared the country liberated on 23 October, after the death of former dictator Muammar Qadhafi, and the seizure by NTC forces of remaining Qadhafi strongholds. Following the declaration, the UN Security Council terminated its authorisation of international military action and NATO officially ended its seven-month operation.
Abstract: As it has done many times before, Abu Sayyaf is showing its ability to adapt and survive in the wake of predictions of its demise. As recently as May, an Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] spokesperson said that Abu Sayyaf would no longer have the inspiration to carry out terrorist attacks, while the Department of National Defense predicted that the death of Abu Sayyaf’s “principal patron [Bin Laden]” would bring about Abu Sayyaf’s “decimation and total elimination”.
Half a year later the AFP finds itself in the midst of intensified fighting with Abu Sayyaf. October was highlighted by twin bombings in Zamboanga City on October 9 and an ambush on October 18 that killed 19 AFP troops in Al Barka, Basilan. Both attacks were attributed to Abu Sayyaf.
Abstract: The indigenous peoples of the southern Philippines known as the Lumad are in a precarious position as the peace process between Muslim rebels and the government moves forward. If and when a settlement is reached, thorny questions about protecting their distinct identity and land will have to be addressed. Many of the tribes fear that because they lack titles for their traditional territory, they will be unable to claim the resources and exercise their right to self-governance after a deal is signed. The question is what can be done now to reassure them that they will retain control of their land. While the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) may be ill-suited to advancing indigenous rights because its structure and content do not prioritise these issues, the government and the MILF should take steps both within and outside the parameters of formal negotiations to respond more concretely to the concerns of the Lumad.
Abstract: In a much-cited recent article, Obermeyer, Murray, and Gakidou [2008a] examine estimates of wartime fatalities from injuries for thirteen countries. Their analysis poses a
major challenge to the battle-death estimating methodology widely used by conflict
researchers, engages with the controversy over whether war deaths have been increasing
or decreasing in recent decades, and takes the debate over different approaches to battledeath estimation to a new level. In making their assessments, the authors compare war
death reports extracted from World Health Organization [WHO] sibling survey data
with the battle-death estimates for the same countries from the International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo [PRIO]. The analysis that leads to these conclusions is not
compelling, however. Thus, while the authors argue that the PRIO estimates are too low
by a factor of three, their comparison fails to compare like with like. Their assertion that
there is “no evidence” to support the PRIO finding that war deaths have recently
declined also fails. They ignore war-trend data for the periods after 1994 and before
1955, base their time trends on extrapolations from a biased convenience sample of only
thirteen countries, and rely on an estimated constant that is statistically insignificant.
Abstract: This report covers a variety of publications addressing the impact of international development assistance on
insurgent violence. A recent historical review of mid-conflict stabilisation missions published in the journal
Disasters noted that civilian and military actors have provided aid to locations in the midst of conflict for
well over a century. Examining counter-insurgency [COIN] missions in the Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam and El
Salvador from as early as 1898 to as recently as 1992, the authors suggested that stabilisation operations such as
the one currently taking place in Afghanistan have been based on the belief that reconstruction and development
projects as well as financial assistance – hereafter termed “foreign aid” or “aid” – have a beneficial impact upon
security [i.e., reducing violence]. This “security-development nexus” involved, in each of the historical cases as
well as contemporary ones such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the logic of intervention outlined below [see Figure 1].
In short, by promoting the well-being of the local population – in addition to territorial security and sufficiently
legitimate state institutions – stabilisation actors can win the favour of the host nation citizenry and erode
insurgents' ability to operate effectively. The result may either be a military victory for counter-insurgent forces,
the flight and temporary withdrawal of the insurgents or the attainment of a negotiations-inducing stalemate.
Abstract: The nature and extent of the jihadist threat in Southeast Asia was not fully understood until well after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. In the aftermath of those attacks, states in Southeast Asia appeared to move quickly to quash the putative threats in their own countries. Both the Singaporean and Malaysian authorities, for example, detained a number of suspected Islamist militants in late 2001. Nevertheless, official and academic opinion remained for at least another year largely indifferent to the transnational terrorist network that had established itself in Southeast Asia. This indifference and neglect was all the more surprising given the often intrusive intelligence agencies in many Southeast Asian countries. However, these too apparently failed to identify the evolving threat in their midst and the growing danger jihadism posed to regional order. The October 2002 nightclub bombings in Bali, Indonesia, which killed 202 people, changed all of this. Those attacks brought to the world's attention the existence of a sophisticated, regionally-networked web of jihadist activity in Southeast Asia.
Prior to 9/11, regional intelligence cooperation was poor, and there was little awareness of or attention paid to the character and evolution of regional crime and terror networks. In particular, there existed a collective nescience concerning the growing ideological links between the most militant jihadist grouping in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiah [JI], and the globalizing network of networks of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda. One objective of this essay, therefore, is to indicate the process by which al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates attempted to draw localized separatist struggles in Southeast Asia into an evolving but loose network of transnational jihadism. To illustrate how this structure has advanced, we shall show how JI developed through kin groups, marital alliances, cliques, and radical pesantren [religious schools]. Furthermore, we will examine the mix of counterterror strategies that have since 2003 successfully disrupted the organization and its network.
Exploring this evolving, networked organization in Southeast Asia also helps to illustrate a broader point about the character of modern jihadism. Long before it was appropriate to speak of an entity called al-Qaeda or the emergence of Osama bin Laden as its figurehead, those inspired by an Islamist, theo-political vision were already thinking strategically in terms of regional and transnational operations and their political effects. In Southeast Asia, we can trace this vision, if not also the strategy, back to the Darul Islam, or "Islamic Realm," movement.
Abstract: Peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have reached an impasse. The longer the peace process drags on without the government being able to make the movement any substantial concessions, the greater the risk of fragmentation and radicalization of the MILF-led insurgency in Mindanao.
