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Abstract: Since the beginning of 2012, Mali has been faced with the worst crisis of its recent history,
one that has questioned both the integrity of its territory as well as almost 20 years of
political stability.
A Tuareg rebellion, fueled by fighters arriving from Libya after the fall of Mouammar Gaddafi,
launched attacks against the Malian garrisons in the North of the country in early January
2012. The armed groups also committed serious infringements of international humanitarian
law by executing the soldiers they caught in combat. The Malian army responded by bombing
indiscriminately the civilian population.
Northern Mali has been weakened by several factors over the years, in particular: the
disinvestment of the Malian state and the lack of development in this area which has caused
much frustration; the development of all kinds of trafficking [drugs, trade of transnational
migrants, weapons, vehicles, cigarettes]; and the presence of Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic
Maghreb [AQIM] who transformed certain areas of the region into a safe haven where these
groups hold hostages.
Abstract: The
US
and
its
allies
in
NATO
are
now
beating
a
retreat
from
Afghanistan.
Although
there
are
plans
for
a
continuing
US-‐led
counterterrorism
strategy
in
the
region,
the
phased
transfer
of
full
responsibility
for
security,
governance
and
development
to
the
Afghan
government,
its
forces
and
people
is
underway.
But
after
one
year
of
a
transition
process
that
started
in
2011,
and
will
officially
be
completed
by
the
end
of
2014,
concerns
are
mounting
over
the
formidable
challenges
facing
the
transition
and
whether
it
will
succeed
in
delivering
its
objective:
a
self-‐sustaining
Afghan
state.
Abstract: A new phase of the security transition, the third, has been announced. Every Afghan province is now going to be involved, at least partly, in the transfer of security from ISAF troops to the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. This is the case even in areas where foreign troops are no longer present or where Afghan troops are not present in sufficiently large numbers. A new report by AAN ‘Beating a Retreat’ examines the long-term potential impact of transition – also known as enteqal - on security and the economy. Here, AAN analyst, Fabrizio Foschini looks at the more immediate impact, both positive and negative, of the process on the ground, especially in the face of continuing [or resumed] Taleban operations
Abstract: Le Mali est confronté, depuis le début de l’année 2012, à la plus grave crise de son histoire
récente qui remet en cause à la fois l’intégrité de son territoire et près de vingt ans de
stabilité politique.
Alimentée par le retour de combattants venus de Libye après la chute de Mouammar Kadhafi,
une rébellion touarègue a lancé des attaques contre des garnisons maliennes dans le nord du
pays, début janvier 2012, et a commis des infractions graves au droit international
humanitaire en exécutant des militaires tombés entre ses mains. L’armée malienne a
répondu en bombardant de manière aveugle des populations civiles.
Le nord Mali est fragilisé depuis des années par plusieurs facteurs notamment : le
désengagement de l’État malien et des carences de développement qui ont nourri bien des
frustrations ; le développement de toutes sortes de trafics (drogues, traite des migrants
transnationaux, armes, véhicules, cigarettes) ; et la présence d’Al Qaïda au Maghreb
islamique (AQMI) qui a transformé certaines zones de la région en sanctuaires où ces
groupes retiennent des otages.
Abstract: Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, NATO’s irregular warfare and nation-building mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. Put directly, the Alliance and its partners have fallen short of achieving the results needed to create a stable, secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan nation, a particularly daunting proposition given Afghanistan’s history and culture, the region’s contemporary circumstances, and the fact that no such country has existed there before. Furthermore, given the central nature of U.S. contributions to this NATO mission, these shortfalls also serve as an indicator of a serious American problem as well. Specifically, inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in the U.S. Government’s strategic planning processes and products, as well as fundamental flaws in the U.S. Government’s structures and systems for coordinating and integrating the efforts of its various agencies, are largely responsible for this adverse and dangerous situation. This book explores these strategic and interagency shortfalls, while proposing potential reforms that would enable the United States to achieve the strategic coherence and genuine unity of effort that will be needed in an era of constrained resources and emerging new threats.
Abstract: Institutions can contribute to regulating interethnic conflict; however, in many cases they
fail to bring about lasting peace. The paper argues that their negligence of intraethnic factors
accounts for some of this failure. Ethnic groups are often treated as unitary actors
even though most consist of various linguistic, tribal or religious subgroups. This internal
heterogeneity is often obscured by overarching collective ethnic identities that are fostered
by interethnic conflict. However, when such interethnic conflict is settled, these subgroup
differences may come back to the fore. This “resurgence” can lead to subgroup conflict
about the political and economic resources provided through intergroup institutional settlements.
Such conflict can in turn undermine the peace‐making effect of intergroup arrangements.
Different subgroup identity constellations make such destructive effects more or
less likely. The paper focuses on self‐government provisions in the aftermath of violent
interethnic conflict and argues that lasting intergroup arrangements are especially challenging
when they involve “contested” ethnic groups.
Abstract: The current crisis in Mali was not unexpected, although most national and international players were eager to maintain an unrealistic view of political developments in this Sahelian country. This crisis reflects the decay of state institutions and practices: the Malian army collapsed and patronage does not mean democracy. Its crisis is built on four dynamics that have their own effects: the debatable implementation of previous peace settlements with the Tuareg insurgency; the growing economic importance of AQIM activities in the Sahelian region; the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in Libya; and the inability or unwillingness of Algeria to play the role of regional hegemon now that its rival (Libya) has stopped doing so.
While the Tuareg rebellion has been able to gain from the collapse of the Malian army in the north, it should be noted that the many armed groups have different agendas, and position themselves differently towards the local population and the Malian state. What is unclear is whether they will be able to co-exist on the same territory while trafficking and a protection economy are the only sustainable resources.
The jihadi aspect of some components of the insurgency has to be understood in context and should not be seen as erasing social and economic differences in a heterogeneous northern Mali. It proves the successful demonstration effect that small groups such as AQIM and Ansar ed-Din can have. It should also draw more attention to a regional context that could provide radicals with a wider audience and credibility by building opportunistic coalitions.
Abstract: With no agreement on a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in sight, one-state dynamics are gaining momentum – a development that will be difficult to reverse or even contain. In the medium and long term, no one benefits from such a development. Indeed, all might lose: an ugly one-state dynamic has no happy ending, and such a solution is rejected by Palestinians and Israelis alike. Instead, the emerging one-state reality increases the potential for various kinds of conflicts and contradictory impulses. The international community too finds itself unprepared and perhaps unwilling to confront this emerging reality, but in doing so it imperils the prospects for peace in the region – the exact thing it seeks to promote.
While strong majorities of Palestinians and Israelis support the two-state solution, they find themselves living with it; the Israelis comfortably, the Palestinians with a great deal of discomfort. The international community defines the two-state solution as a cornerstone of its Middle East policy, but it too contributes to sustaining the one-state reality by failing to challenge Israeli settlement policy. Palestinians oppose a resort to violence as a means of increasing the costs of occupation; they support non-violence, but take no part in it; and they support Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, but complain very little while disunity entrenches itself. They recognise fully that the two-state solution is dead or dying, but refuse to lend support to dissolving the Palestinian Authority (PA) or to see a one-state solution as an alternative worth fighting for. They support going to the United Nations for statehood, but turn a blind eye to the PA's foot dragging. Israelis, on the other hand, worry little about the emerging reality, as other things, such as Iran, top their agenda. A right-wing government views progress with the Palestinians as a threat to its stability.
Abstract: Since December 2010, the speed, suddenness and scope of events in North Africa and the Middle East have taken everyone by surprise. They nevertheless had to happen. Given the universality of human nature – differences between a European and an Arab are ultimately of minor importance – the processes that began in Europe in the seventeenth century and spread throughout the world would have inevitably reached the Arab countries.
For the past four decades, depending on their level of advancement, the Arab countries have experienced cultural, ideational, demographic and anthropological transformation similar to what Europe had been through since the English (1640–1660) and French Revolutions (1789).
Fertility in some Arab countries is similar to or lower than in Norway, due to a rising age of marriage and the increasing use of contraception. At the same time, secularism is on the rise in society, if not in politics. There is no reason to believe the Arab world would have been an exception, because Arabs are not inherently averse to human progress.
Abstract: A strong momentum is building for armed intervention in Syria, either by channelling arms to Syria's rebels or undertaking direct military assaults on the regime. NOREF director Mariano Aguirre and NOREF contributors Robert Matthews and Reinoud Leenders, - the latter copublishing with Steven Haydemann, have been debating whether to arm or not to arm in Syria. Their articles have been published on the website of openDemocracy and is republished here with a kind permission.
The articles appear in chronological order:
Mariano Aguirre: Syria's crisis: weapons vs negotiations
Steven Haydemann and Reinoud Leenders: Syria’s crisis: a credible threat is what is needed
Mariano Aguirre: The dream of "managing militarization" in Syria
Abstract: The history of laws affecting women’s rights and empowerment in Pakistan involves a complex pattern of advances and setbacks, with the state’s efforts to articulate a definition of women’s rights complicated by the need to balance divergent views on the place of women in Pakistani society.
After General Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 coup, a number of factors, including international perceptions of Pakistan, brought women’s rights, greatly curtailed by General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization project, to the fore. Most critical among the changes to women’s rights during this period was the 2006 revision to the Hudood Laws, resulting in the Protection of Women Act.
The incumbent Pakistan People’s Party government has passed several important pieces of legislation continuing the progress for women’s empowerment made under Musharraf. These new laws focus on sexual harassment at the workplace, antiwomen practices, and acid throwing. Additionally, the National Commission on the Status of Women has recently achieved elevated status.
Despite these advancements, new legislation is needed to address ongoing challenges such as women’s ability to control inherited land and human trafficking. If the Pakistani state is to make lasting improvements on these and other challenges facing the legal status of Pakistani women, it must find solutions that will not only benefit women in the country but create consensus among Pakistanis on the best and most achievable way to prioritize global rights for women while adhering to Islamic precepts.
Abstract: This is a transcript of a speech made by Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, Sierra Leone People's Party, on 10 May 2012 at Chatham House. The speaker, who will be running for the Presidency on behalf of the Sierra Leone People’s Party in November, discussed what policies he would like to see implemented in Sierra Leone.
Abstract: Politics in the Sulu archipelago could be an unforeseen stumbling block for a negotiated peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines. So far the presumed spoilers have been Christian settlers, conservative nationalists, and recalcitrant members of the other insurgency in the Muslim south, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The islands off the coast of Mindanao have been all but forgotten. But the provincial governors of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, although Muslim, are wary of any agreement that would allow the MILF, dominated by ethnically distinct groups from Central Mindanao, to extend its sway and jeopardise the patronage system they enjoy with Manila. The challenge for the government of President Benigno Aquino III is to find a way to offer more meaningful autonomy to the MILF and overcome differences between the MILF and MNLF without alienating powerful clan leaders from the Sulu archipelago with a capacity to make trouble.
The Aquino government’s peace strategy is based on the principle of convergence, bringing three components together: a peace agreement with the MILF; reform of the dysfunctional government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the three archipelagic provinces – Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi – as well as Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur in Central Mindanao; and review of the 1996 final peace agreement with the MNLF. The latter two components are more acceptable to the elite of the archipelago than the first. They see ARMM as a corrupt and unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and administration between them and Manila but as long as they have equal access to leadership positions, they are willing to try reform. From their perspective, the danger of a peace agreement with the MILF is that it would ultimately replace ARMM with a new, expanded, more powerful regional government that would favour Central Mindanao, the MILF’s stronghold, and its clans, over the archipelago and its politicians. At stake is access to power and money.
Abstract: It is surprisingly difficult to get a meaningful estimate of the total cost of the Afghan conflict, total spending on Afghan forces and total spending on various forms of aid. More data are available on US efforts – which have dominated military and aid spending, but even these data present serious problems in reliability, consistency, and definition. Moreover, it is only since FY2012 that the US provided an integrated request for funding for the war as part of its annual budget request. The data for the period before FY2009 are accurate pictures of the Department of Defense request, but there is only a CRS estimate of total spending the previous years.
This report addresses the fiscal cost to the US of the Afghan War from FY2000-FY2013. It provides estimates of total cost, cost to the Department of Defense, and estimates concerning aid costs to State, USAID, and other federal agencies. It also reports on the total cost of international aid when this takes the form of integrated aid to Afghan development and Afghan forces – a fraction of total aid spending. No reliable estimate exists of total international aid to Afghanistan, since so much of this aid has been direct and has not passed through the Afghan Central government.
The resulting figures provide important insights for “transition.” They show the scale of past US efforts, how the aid has been allocated, and the differences between the total aid appropriated during the course of the war, the amount obligated (around 60% of the amount appropriated), and the amount actually disbursed (around 45% of the appropriation).
Abstract: In recent decades, several East Asian nations have undergone democratic transitions accompanied by changes in the balance of power between civilian elites and military leaders. These developments have not followed a single pattern: In Thailand, failure to institutionalize civilian control has contributed to the breakdown of democracy; civil-military relations and democracy in the Philippines are in prolonged crisis; and civilian control in Indonesia is yet to be institutionalized. At the same time, South Korea and Taiwan have established civilian supremacy and made great advances in consolidating democracy. These differences can be explained by the interplay of structural environment and civilian political entrepreneurship. In Taiwan, Korea, and Indonesia, strategic action, prioritization, and careful timing helped civilians make the best of their structural opportunities to overcome legacies of military involvement in politics. In Thailand, civilians overestimated their ability to control the military and provoked military intervention. In the Philippines, civilian governments forged a symbiotic relationship with military elites that allowed civilians to survive in office but also protected the military's institutional interests. These differences in the development of civil-military relations had serious repercussions on national security, political stability, and democratic consolidation, helping to explain why South Korea, Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, Indonesia have experienced successful democratic transformation, while Thailand and the Philippines have failed to establish stable democratic systems.
Abstract: This paper considers lessons that can be drawn from the Canadian effort in Afghanistan, especially the challenges of trying to build security, governance and development in Kandahar. First, it examines how the Canadian Forces [CF] adapted over time, both in Afghanistan and in Ottawa. Second, it looks at the challenges presented by a minority government and what can be learned from this political context. Third, it examines what was learned about the constraining forces on Canadian defence policy — the Opposition and public opinion — and evaluates the consequences for Canada’s next military engagement. The paper concludes by developing the implications for Canada’s future missions.
Abstract: Much of Syria is "in a state of chaos," says Peter Harling, who has been based in Damascus for the International Crisis Group, and has gone back and forth for months. The regime of President Bashar al-Assad is "both well-entrenched and losing control." As for the opposition, the Syrian National Council, based abroad, he says the group "has championed an increasingly radicalized street, over-invested in an elusive international intervention, and eschewed more constructive politics." As for the jihadists, he says that what is surprising "is that foreign fighters and jihadis, for now, have not taken on a bigger role." On the international side, he says Kofi Annan's cease-fire plan "grew out of the international community's inability to agree on anything else," and as long as the "stalemate endures, it will continue to enjoy support, even from states that do not put much faith in it but have no workable alternative to offer."
Abstract: On 26 April 2012, Pakistan took one giant step forward in its long struggle to erect a political structure supported by a legal system in which citizens have full confidence. That will happen when the people’s elected representatives can exercise full authority and when there is respect for the rule of law. On that day, as helicopters hovered over the imposing structure that houses the senior judiciary, the Supreme Court decided to hold Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani guilty for having committed contempt of court. The much anticipated verdict by the court was delivered not by a bench headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry who has shaken up the Pakistani political system on more than one occasion. This time the sentence was read out by Justice Nasirul Mulk, presiding over a bench of seven men. No woman is a member of the 19-man Supreme Court. How will this verdict affect the political development of Pakistan? This “Insight” maintains that the decision to hold the prime minister to account – for contempt of the court – has enormous implications for the development of the Pakistani state.
Abstract: This chapter looks briefly at some of the particular characteristics of drought as a natural hazard. Unlike earthquakes or cyclones, where the date [and even the exact time] of the hazard can be identified, droughts do not become disasters until time has passed.
The summer of 2011 produced one of the worst droughts in 60 years in the Horn of Africa, affecting Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. In late July 2011, the UN declared the situation in parts of southern Somalia to be a famine in which 3.7 million people – nearly half the country’s population –faced a humanitarian crisis, but most of the issues facing the country were not new. This chapter examines of how drought in Somalia, indeed the Horn of Africa generally, led to famine – a phenomenon the world has not seen for years, since the last famine in Somalia in the early 1990s.
The fact that famine emerged in Somalia in mid-2011 serves as an example of the deadly effects of the combination of severe and prolonged drought, ballooning food and water prices, poor governance, ongoing conflict, and an international response that was inadequate, for many reasons, to meet the needs of millions of people.
Abstract: Strengthening the rule of law is widely regarded – among traditional donors, multilateral institutions, and a growing number of middle income and fragile states – as a necessary precondition for sustainable peace, poverty alleviation, and development. Crime and violence deter investment and lower employment, undermine social institutions, and divert resources through direct and indirect costs, all of which hinder development. It is likely to disproportionately affect poor and marginalized populations by limiting access to basic services.
According to the United Nations, the rule of law is “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.” This definition is not universally accepted, however; several middle income countries and emerging economies have enjoyed peace and prosperity without the political liberalism inherent in the aforementioned definition. In the latter model, “the law exists not to limit the state but to serve its power.” Common to both models is an emphasis on the role of formal state institutions in upholding the law.
Abstract: Statebuilding and peacebuilding, while conceptually distinct, are becoming more closely integrated in academic and policy circles. This Topic Guide supplement is one of two supplements that explore this development:
Statebuilding and Peacebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility looks at the links [and tensions] between statebuilding and peacebuilding, how these activities interact, and how they can be approached in practice.
Abstract: Like many African nations, the relationship between Sierra Leone’s state and its citizens is often mediated through rural governance systems that pre-date colonialism. While the state virtually collapsed after 11 years of civil war, these systems headed by local chiefs continued to operate to some degree. This paper discusses why many chiefs hung on to their legitimacy or were quickly restored to power. Based on extensive interviews with communities in Sierra Leone, it analyses how national government and the international community reacted to these local spheres of influence, and makes suggestions for easing the tensions between the different levels of governance.
Abstract: Displacement caused by conflict and human rights violations is typically resolved through the pursuit of three “durable solutions”: local integration, resettlement or voluntary return. It has often been assumed that durable solutions mark the end of mobility for refugees and internally displaced persons. However, in recent years it has become clear that this assumption needs to be reconsidered. Even after the situations that forced them from their homes have been resolved, many former refugees and IDPs remain “on the move,” making choices that subvert the standard durable solutions framework. For instance, they may return periodically to their communities of origin while maintaining permanent residence in a resettlement country, or they may become migrant workers in other countries. The traditional trio of durable solutions may also need to be reconsidered in light of the challenges posed by climate change. In the following piece, we provide some brief reflections on the ways in which displacement linked to climate change may test some of the principles underpinning the durable solutions framework, and necessitate new thinking about solutions to displacement.
Abstract: This report examines in detail eight NATO air strikes in Libya that resulted in 72 civilian deaths, including 20 women and 24 children. It is based on one or more field investigations to each of the bombing sites during and after the conflict, including interviews with witnesses and local residents.
NATO’s military campaign in Libya, from March to October 2011, was mandated by the United Nations Security Council to protect civilians from attacks by security forces of then-Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.
Abstract: Sierra Leone not only has a direct relationship with its citizens as individuals but also a mediated one through the rural governance systems that pre-dated colonialism and often have greater legitimacy than the central state itself. The impact of the civil war in the rural areas was devastating. Nonetheless the pre-war (traditional) leadership structures continued informally to provide whatever degree of governance response was possible. In the 38 communities visited throughout rural Sierra Leone, a third of the chiefs remained with their people (even if in hiding) throughout even the most difficult part of the civil war and most of the rest fled only briefly. During the war chiefs made a major change to include youth and women in their governance practices and this more participatory approach to governance has persisted. Although a large number of chiefs died during the war period, their positions were easily refilled afterward.
During the war most communities in the South and East created local Civilommunity Defensce Forces (CDF) to defend themselves. Chiefs retained at least some degree of direction over 71% per cent of the CDF forces in the areas visited, with the consequence that only a third of these CDFs gave trouble to their communities.
The role of international donors increased significantly as a result of the war as well. Nonetheless, their initiatives have strengthened, not threatened the legitimacy of the state because the army, police and health services have improved and as local citizens do not know how to access the donors directly they tend to credit their activities to various government actors.
The various reforms that have come in the wake of the civil war are incomplete and the institutional boundaries of the newly reconstructed multi-layered governance system are unclear. Not enough attention has been paid to governance at the ‘periphery’.
