Japan and the Challenge of Human Security

The Founding of a New Policy 1995–2003

Bert Edström

Institute for Security & Development Policy

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PREFACE

Early in 2002 I received an invitation to participate in the conference 'Japan's Pursuit of a Human Security Agenda' at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London that was going to take place in March. The organizers wanted me to prepare a presentation on human security as an element of Japan's foreign policy. The presentations and roundtable discussions during the conference were enlightening and demonstrated that human security was a topic that should be looked into, much more than I could do in a fairly hastily prepared presentation. I was struck by the way the Japanese ambassador to the Court of St. James's, Orita Masaki, who was invited as a keynote speaker, described the position of his government towards human security. He started off his opening remarks by making a claim that was astonishing: 'I am very pleased to be here today, at the opening of this important workshop entitled "Japan's Pursuit of a Human Security Agenda". Indeed, the word "pursuit" is quite appropriate, since Japan has been very active – I may even say aggressive – in promoting Human Security in its diplomacy in recent years.'[1]

That one of Japan's top diplomats characterized activities of his government as 'aggressive' was a bit unusual – to put it mildly. Human security had been officially declared to be 'a key perspective' in Japanese foreign policy from 1998 and had been promoted since then by the Japanese government – but 'aggressive'? Ambassador Orita's wording indicated that the topic of the conference was 'timely' – as often conferences and seminars are said to be – but in this case very much to the point. It was obvious that something had happened since the days, not long ago,

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[1] Ambassador Orita Masaki, Opening remarks at the conference 'Japan's Pursuit of a Human Security Agenda', organized by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the British Association for Japanese Studies, London, 21 March 2002. Transcript provided by the Embassy of Japan, London.

when the renowned Japanese economist Iida Tsuneo found it fitting to state: 'By nature the Japanese are not good at making "clever speeches" or talking loudly over their performance'[2]; and the influential *Asahi shimbun* journalist Funabashi Yōichi characterized Japanese diplomats by 'three Ss: silent, smiling and sleeping'.[3]

Listening to and participating in discussions during the conference gave the impression that one of the rallying cries heard in Japan's domestic political battles had also begun to influence Japan's international behaviour. The collapse of the bipolar Cold War world order epitomized by the US–Soviet confrontation had greatly reduced the possibility of a major war but also opened up the prospect of a more assertive Japanese foreign policy. In the aftermath of the ending of the Cold War, leading politicians in Japan had begun, it seemed, to throw off the shackles that had limited Japan's international activities since the early post-war years. The presentations made at the conference by the confident Japanese ambassador and the NGO representatives as well as experts of Japanese foreign policy testified that a new and important area of research had emerged.

Note on Names

Japanese names are given in traditional Japanese order: surname first, given name second, with the exception of quotations and works by Japanese authors in languages other than Japanese. In transcription of Japanese words, macrons are used to denote long vowels with the exception of well-known place-names.

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[2] Iida Tsuneo, '"Sekai senryaku" o kataru nakare: Japan-manē no shōgeki' [Don't talk about 'global strategy': The impact of Japan money], *Voice* 137 (May 1989), p. 63.
[3] Yoichi Funabashi, 'Structural Defects in Tokyo's Foreign Policy', *Economic Eye* 14:2 (Summer 1993), p. 26.

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Abbreviations

AAR	Association for Aid and Relief, Japan
AMF	Asian Monetary Fund
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CHS	Commission on Human Security
CMAC	Cambodia Mine Action Center
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
EAEC	East Asian Economic Caucus
EU	European Union
FY	Fiscal year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HSU	Human Security Unit
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JANIC	Japanese NGO Center for International Cooperation
JCP	Japan Communist Party
JCIE	Japan Center for International Exchange
JEN	Japan Emergency NGOs
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JIIA	Japan Institute of International Affairs
JOCV	Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
JRCS	Japanese Red Cross Society
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MeRU	Medical Relief Unit, Japan
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIRA	National Institute for Research Advancement
NPO	Non-profit organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECF	Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SDF	Self-Defense Forces
SDPJ	Social Democratic Party of Japan
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
START	Strategic Arms Treaty
TFHS	Trust Fund for Human Security
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNV	United Nations Volunteers

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of how human security was introduced into Japan's foreign policy. Human security is a security idea that came into the limelight in 1994 when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) issued its annual report. In a speech in the United Nations the following year Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi of Japan endorsed the concept and three years later Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō declared that human security was going to be a key element of Japan's foreign policy. Subsequently, the Japanese government began to put in what has been described by a pundit as 'a considerable effort' to implement this new priority. [1] Soon after Obuchi's announcement, the concept was part and parcel of Japan's foreign policy liturgy. As Eva Block has pointed out in her discussion of the heavily ritualized communications that constitute the foreign policy liturgy of a country, certain things 'must' be said, even if the concepts behind them have little substantive import, and certain other things 'must not' be said despite the fact that they could be justified. [2] In Japan, human security became a buzz-word and showed up in official declarations and statements to such a degree that the country began to be described as a leading proponent of human security.

The aim of the present study is to trace how human security was added to the Japanese political agenda and made part and parcel of governmental policies; to clarify the theoretical context and historical background of the new policy that positioned human security as a key consideration of policies pursued by the Japanese government; to analyze how its introduction

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[1] Minami Hiroshi, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō to Nihon gaikō' [Human security and Japanese foreign policy], *Kokusai mondai* 530 (May 2004), p. 50.
[2] Eva Block, *Frihet, jämlikhet och andra värden: Svensk inrikespolitisk debatt på dagstidningarnas ledarsidor 1945–1975* [Freedom, equality and other values. Swedish domestic political debate on the editorial pages of newspapers, 1945–1975] (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1982), p. 30.

into Japanese foreign policy was implemented in practice; and to study how it impacted on and resulted in modifications of policies pursued by Japan.

The focus of the present study is an analysis of what became in reality the introductory phase of this pursuit of human security. This phase can be seen as having ended in 2003 when two key reports were released. The first was presented on 1 May 2003 by an international commission which the Japanese government had taken the initiative to establish and which was working under the aegis of the UN. Developing new ideas and summarizing prevailing ideas on human security, this report set the stage for forthcoming policies for human security. Subsequently, the Japanese government acknowledged that it intended to heed what was proposed in the report. The second report presented a revision of one of the most important instruments in Japan's foreign policy toolbox, its official development assistance (ODA), and made human security one of the underpinnings of its ODA policy. This report was accepted by the Japanese government and adopted by the Japanese parliament, the Diet, later in the year. The acceptance of these reports by the Japanese government and the announcement that their proposals would be implemented implied the coming of age of Japan's policy for human security.

The introduction of human security into Japan's foreign policy can be seen as a belated response to the end of the Cold War. The sea change in international politics that this event signalled was announced by the Soviet leader Michail Gorbachev and US President George H. W. Bush at their summit meeting in December 1989, one month after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although the structure of what was generally seen as a new international order was not clear-cut, it was obvious that international institutions based on the post-war settlement were out of tune with contemporary political and economic realities.

The end of the Cold War was a conspicuous event in international affairs. Paraphrasing John F. Kennedy on the advent of nuclear weapons, a scholar captured its meaning by stating that it had changed 'all the answers and all the questions.'[3] Epitomizing a transformation of interna-

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[3] Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 'The Neorealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 37:2 (June 1993), p. 141.

tional affairs with the world moving away from the rigidly controlled Cold War structure, the disappearance of the antagonistic ideological blocs was confirmed by the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The Soviet economic and military collapse and the dwindling power exhibited by its successor Russia, made the United States the undisputedly pre-eminent world power; it became 'the only country with the military, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself.'[4] The gap in power between the United States and other countries was so unprecedented that it was perceived to result in an international structure unique to modern history – unipolarity.

One thing seemed certain after the end of the Cold War – things were not the same as before for Japan. When Anthony Giddens gave his Reith Lectures in 1999, he put his finger on a dilemma that countries faced in the post-Cold War world. It is a contentious point, he said, but nations no longer had enemies. 'Who are the enemies of Britain, or France, or Japan?' he asked polemically and continued:

Nations today face risks and dangers rather than enemies, a massive shift in their very nature. [...] As the changes I have described in this lecture gather weight, they are creating something that has never existed before, a global cosmopolitan society. We are the first generation to live in this society, whose contours we can as yet only dimly see. It is shaking up our existing ways of life, no matter where we happen to be. This is not—at least at the moment—a global order driven by collective human will. Instead, it is emerging in an anarchic, haphazard, fashion, carried along by a mixture of economic, technological and cultural imperatives.[5]

That Giddens mentioned Japan was not fortuitous. The repercussions of the disappearance of the two mutually hostile ideological blocs of the world could but have an impact on Japan. With the Soviet Union gone, gone also was Japan's erstwhile enemy. Not only had the Soviet Union been Japan's adversary in wars in recent history but it was also a country professing an ideology that was repulsive to most Japanese. But what many Japanese could not help but note was that the disappearance of the Soviet Union also meant that the foundation of Japan's foreign and secu-

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[4] Charles Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', *Foreign Affairs* 70:1 (Winter 1990/91), p. 24.

[5] Anthony Giddens, 'Globalisation', 1999 Reith Lectures, http://news.bbc.co.ukhi/ english/static/events/reith_99/week1/week.htm (downloaded 12 September 2003).

rity policies was shattered, based as they were on the Japan–US Security Treaty. The premise and starting-point of this treaty – signed in 1951 and renewed in 1960 – was the partition of the world into two ideologically hostile blocs and the perception that world communism led by the Soviet Union was the common enemy of both countries. Simply put, the Soviet demise rendered the presumed Soviet threat moot and, in fact, meant the annihilation of the *raison d'être* of the security treaty as it was conceived when it was concluded.[6]

There was a seemingly more reasonable claim, however. Wasn't Japan safer than ever before? The emerging world order replacing that of the Cold War era made Japan's security situation extraordinarily favourable because of the security treaty that the country had with the pre-eminent power of the world, the United States. The Japan–US relationship has often been characterized in terms of being 'the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none', a catchphrase coined by former Senator Mike Mansfield, US Ambassador to Japan 1977–88.[7] The treaty anchored Japan solidly to the United States both politically and militarily and made its relationship with the United States the fundamental reference point of Japan's foreign and security policies.

Still, feelings of insecurity prevailed among the Japanese. Despite the disappearance of Japan's erstwhile enemy, the Soviet Union, Japan clung to what was generally termed its 'alliance' with the United States. Gone were the days in the 1980s when the use of this term was seen to be inappropriate or even 'taboo' by many in Japan, even prime ministers and other political heavyweights.[8] What worried many Japanese during and after the crisis that unfolded in 1990–91 in the Middle East was that Japan's actions deepened the negative view of Japan held by many Americans. That Japan contributed money but no troops to the US-led efforts in the 1991 Persian Gulf War strained relations with the United States. After a decade of US wariness caused by bilateral trade conflicts and economic

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[6] Bert Edström, 'Japan och stormaktspolitiken' [Japan and great power politics], *Internationella studier* 1992:4, pp. 30f; Akihiko Tanaka, 'Japan's Security Policy in the 1990s', in Yoichi Funabashi, ed., *Japan's International Agenda* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1994), p. 42.

[7] Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.–Japanese Relations throughout History* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1997), p. 363.

[8] See, e.g., 'Gaikō rongi no shōten' [Issues in the foreign policy debate], *Rippō to chōsa* 105 (1981), pp. 19–20.

disputes with Japan in 1980s, its unwillingness to show its flag on the battlefield reinforced US scepticism towards Japan. In March 1990, 32 per cent of Americans polled saw the Soviet Union and eight per cent Japan as the greatest threat to the United States, while a February 1992 poll showed that 13 per cent saw Russia and 31 per cent Japan as the greatest threat.[9] These cool feelings towards Japan were reciprocated with a noticeable Japanese estrangement from the United States. Public support of the security relationship with the United States began to wane in Japan, when the security threat to Japan lessened with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the perceived costs of hosting US forces increased. A November 1991 poll showed that 32 per cent of the Japanese did not feel any intimacy with the United States.[10] Questions were raised about the utility of the alliance in the face of increasingly vocal opposition to US military presence in Japan; in November 1989, 39.1 per cent of the Japanese felt that US troops should be either reduced or withdrawn from Japan, while later polls showed sharply increased figures, to 63 per cent in December 1993.[11] Thus, scepticism grew on both sides of the Pacific Ocean about the viability of, and even the need for, the security treaty. The tense relations lingering beneath the surface erupted in Japan when a girl was raped by US soldiers in 1995. This incident resulted in public uproar, with country-wide protests against what was seen as the nationally demeaning way that this incident was handled by the US government. For a while the security relationship between Japan and the United States seemed threatened.[12]

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[9] Igarashi Takeshi, *Nichibei kankei to higashi Ajia: Rekishiteki bunmyaku to mirai no kōsō* [Japanese–US relations and East Asia: Historical context and future structure] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1999), p. 9.

[10] Naikaku sōridaijin kambō kōhōshitsu, ed., *Yoron chōsa nenkan Heisei 4 nempan: Zenkoku yoron chōsa no genkyō* [Yearbok of opinion polls, 1992 ed.: The present situation of national opinion polls] (Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsukyoku, 1993), p. 486.

[11] Naikaku sōridaijin kambō kōhōshitsu, ed., *Yoron chōsa nenkan Heisei 2 nempan: Zenkoku yoron chōsa no genkyō* [Yearbook of public opinion polls, 1989 ed.: The present situation of national opinion polls] (Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsukyoku, 1990), p. 542; Naikaku sōridaijin kambō kōhōshitsu, ed., *Yoron chōsa nenkan Heisei 5 nempan: Zenkoku yoron chōsa no genkyō* [Yearbook of public opinion polls, 1993 ed.: The present situation of national opinion polls] (Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsukyoku, 1994), p. 436.

[12] Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 296–324.

With the Japanese way of looking at the world frozen in the Cold War antagonisms, Japan's response to the landslide change of world politics was cautious, however. The leading Japanese foreign policy scholar Iokibe Makoto has noted that the perceptions of Japan's security at the time 'had not progressed beyond the heated and ideological debates of the bifurcated 1950s, a time of black-and-white arguments over whether it was to be war or peace, revival of militarism or democracy, aggression or self-defence.'[13] Japan's cautious stance can be seen to have been well founded, with large-scale conflicts like the Korean and Vietnam Wars as well as a number of smaller-scale conflicts and skirmishes in recent history. The end of the Cold War did not mean that peace broke out in East Asia. While the Cold War might be over in Europe where the Soviet collapse unleashed a wave of democratization in Eastern Europe, the tense situation continued in East Asia with relations between China and Taiwan, the uncertain future of the divided Korean Peninsula, the difficult Cambodia problem, serious encroachment on human rights in Myanmar, the uncertain future of East Timor, etc.[14] Vital elements with a Cold War flavour continued to pester inter-nation relations in this part of the world with China, North Korea and retaining their communist and authoritarian political and social systems.[15] East Asia turned out to be an exception to the trend seen when the Cold War was over and most countries began to slash military expenditure. According to data presented by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), world military expenditures decreased for some years after the end of the Cold War but figures for East Asia moved in the opposite direction, from US$99.8 billion in 1993 to US$122 billion in 2002. It was an increase that was greater in both

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[13] Iokibe Makoto, ed., *Sengo Nihon gaikōshi* [A history of post-war Japanese foreign policy] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1999), p. 229.

[14] Kokubun Ryōsei, 'Higashi Ajia ni okeru reisen to sono shūen' [The Cold War in East Asia and its last moments], in Kamo Takehiko, ed., *Ajia no kokusai chitsujo: Datsureisen no eikyō* [The Asian international order: The impact of the departure from the Cold War] (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1993), p. 60; Gomi Toshiki, 'Aidentiti kara mita anzen hoshō ron' [On national security seen from identity], in Naya Masatsugu and Takeda Isami, eds, *Shinanzen hoshō ron no kōzu* [The structure of the new debate on national security] (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1999), p. 21.

[15] Kimie Hara, 'Rethinking the "Cold War" in the Asia–Pacific', *The Pacific Review* 12:4 (1999), p. 516.

absolute and percentage terms than that of any other region except South Asia and the Middle East.[16]

Turning Point?

In a succinct analysis of the strategic environment facing Japan in the post-Cold War world, Kawashima Yutaka, a former Japanese ambassador and vice-minister for foreign affairs, pointed out that when Japan's security is appraised, attention tends to focus on developments in East Asia, such as tension on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Straits, or the persistent Soviet military build-up in the Far East during the Cold War. Yet, he reminds the reader, critical events with a defining impact on Japanese perceptions of security have taken place also outside that part of the world; and he points to the 1973 Yom Kippur War with the ensuing oil crisis which resulted in an acute sense of vulnerability among the Japanese; the Persian Gulf War of 1991 when Japan's political leaders failed in their attempt to deal with the repercussions of an international crisis on a global scale; and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.[17] The pervasive impact of historical events of the kind listed by Kawashima has made them often characterized in Japanese lingo as *shokku*. This 'shock' mentality, to cry wolf, resembles the 'genuine cult of vulnerability' that Reinhard Drifte ascribed to Japan's political leaders after the oil crises of the 1970s.[18]

In Japan, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War are often said to be turning points of modern history. In the Japanese context, a reason for looking at 1989 as a turning point is that this was the year when Emperor Hirohito, Japan's emperor since 1926, passed away. His

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[16] *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* [online edition], Appendix 10A, Table 10A.1 and Table 10A.3, http://projects.sipri.org/milex/mex_wnr_table.html, 17 June 2003 (downloaded 5 November 2003).

[17] Yutaka Kawashima, 'Japan's Security Environment', The Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, *CNAPS Working Paper* (March 2002), http://www.brookingsedu/fp/cnaps/papers/2002_kawashima.pdf (downloaded 22 May 2003).

[18] R. Drifte, 'Diplomacy', in J. W. M. Chapman, R. Drifte, I. T. M. Gow, *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence–Diplomacy–Dependence* (London: Frances Pinter [Publishers], 1983), p. 92.

63-year reign had been given the name *Shōwa*, or Enlightened Peace, but rather than peace, it was a period that evolved in the shadow of war. The first twenty years were marked by wars, the following decades by the need to handle their legacy. The new emperor, Akihito, chose *Heisei* as the name of his reign, signifying peace in heaven and on earth. This carefully selected name became a mental and psychological symbol that the war and post-war period was over. It was fortuitous in that the starting year of the *Heisei* era coincided with the end of the Cold War.

Certainly, a shift of trends was seen at the time but its direction was quite unexpected. For decades after the Second World War, the Japanese economy reaped success after success. The 1964 Olympic Games was a showpiece of regained national pride and purpose, and Japan was generally recognized as an international economic powerhouse already by the end of the 1960s.[19] In the 1970s and 80s, the Japanese continued to amass wealth at a rapid pace. The sheer size of Japan's economy made the country a sizeable international actor. The days of milk and honey ended abruptly, however, when a crash of real estate and stock prices in 1990 brought an end to Japan's economic fairy-tale story and a period of recession, rising unemployment and business failures began. Mounting expectations of the 1980s were replaced with pessimism at home and exasperation abroad.

Under the influence of the sea change of the international order that the end of the Cold War signified and the economic downturn that hit Japan, its domestic political system followed suit and went through a period of upheaval. In the 1990s, alternation between stagnation and recession of the Japanese economy was matched by a domestic political system marked by a loss of confidence in institutions and uncertainty over national purpose. A series of scandals and corruption incidents upset voters and when a largely unknown politician, Hosokawa Morihiro, founded a new opposition party in May 1992, it won instant popularity. As a result of the general election in July 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had to step down after 38 years in government. Hosokawa formed a coalition government which brought together all former opposition parties except the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Hosokawa's grand coalition unified conservative, middle-of-the-road, and left-wing forces for a single

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[19] Hosaka Masayasu, *Shōwashi o yomu 50 no pointo* [Fifty points for understanding the history of the Shōwa era] (Tokyo: PHP kenkyūsho, 1988), pp. 168–71.

common purpose – political reform (or, more precisely, to bring down the LDP). The downfall of the LDP meant the end of 'the 1955 system' which was essentially a party system with a single dominant governing party, the LDP, and a major party in permanent opposition (the Japan Socialist Party, JSP) and three or four other minor political parties. The on-going economic crisis and turbulent party politics with shifting coalition governments and party alliances resulted in growing dissatisfaction with the government. The situation worsened when the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake hit the Kōbe area on 17 January 1995 and the authorities proved their incompetence in handling its effects by their bureaucratic and inept response.[20] The volatility of the domestic political situation lingered on throughout the decade. Eight Japanese prime ministers replaced each other in quick succession and only two political parties survived intact: the LDP and the JCP.

The burst in 1990 of what was described afterwards as an 'economic bubble' and the dramatic changes of Japan's domestic political system are often described as turning points of its modern history. Yet, events perceived to be historic turning points may be no such thing. In 1980, one of Japan's leading economists and economic historians, Nakamura Takafusa, described how measures taken to curb inflation in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis meant 'the complete end of the rapid economic growth which had continued for a period of over twenty years since the 1950s.'[21] To him, the 1973 oil *shokku* was an important event qualifying as a historical turning point in all senses of the term. Writing seven years after this event, it remained to be seen whether Nakamura was right; historical interpretations of events are a child of their time, and only history can corroborate claims that a specific event constitutes a historical turning point. Nowadays, with Japan's economic predicament of the 1990s in mind, even such a dramatic event as the 1973 oil crisis with its far-reach-

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[20] Noda Nobuo, 'The Great Hanshin Earthquake and Dysfunctional Japan', in Masuzoe Yōichi, ed., *Years of Trial: Japan in the 1990s* (Tokyo: Japan Echo, 2000), p. 219.

[21] Takafusa Nakamura, *The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 233. The Japanese original appeared in 1980.

ing repercussions has faded and might even be seen as an 'apparent' rather than a 'real' turning point.[22]

It seems the political scientist Soeya Yoshihide argues in this way in an article published shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. He characterizes the 1991 Persian Gulf War as 'traumatic' for Japan and maintains that '11 September' will be remembered as signalling 'a historic turning point' after which things 'will never be the same again'. Regardless of his assessment of the impact of these events, this leading political analyst finds that the Persian Gulf War and the terrorist attacks have not been sufficient to convince the Japanese government and its society 'to grope for a new security approach and concept'.[23] The fact that such a groping for security has taken place in Japan is, however, the topic of the present study.

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[22] The useful distinction between apparent and real turning points is introduced by Maçiej Kanert in his '*Bukkyō Denrai*: The True Turning Point', in Bert Edström, ed., *Turning Points in Japanese History* (Richmond: Japan Library, 2002), pp. 17–24.

[23] Soeya Yoshihide, 'Showing the flag', *Look Japan* 549 (December 2001), p. 23.

HUMAN SECURITY: A NEW APPROACH TO THE SECURITY PROBLEMATIQUE

A New Security Agenda

In his contribution to a festschrift in honour of Inoki Masamichi, the dean of defence policy studies in Japan, Kumon Shumpei points out that there is no agreement among Japanese scholars what 'security' means.[1] This, however, is a general truth. Security is one of the scientific concepts described by the British philosopher W. B. Gallie in a famous essay as 'essentially contested concepts' in the sense that they 'are said to be so value-laden that no amount of argument or evidence can ever lead to agreement on a single version as the "correct or standard use".'[2]

Then, what is security? The structure of security is identified, in one attempt to come to grips with this elusive concept, as consisting of four elements. These are identified by answering a number of questions that make security an analytically and prescriptively useful term. This approach is based on an influential article by David Baldwin that takes his starting-point in Arnold Wolfers's idea that security is 'the absence of threat to acquired values'. Security policies are actions taken to reduce or

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[1] Kumon Shumpei, 'Anzen hoshō to wa nani ka: Gainen bunsekiteki shiron' [What is security? Attempt at a conceptual analysis], in Etō Shinkichi et al., eds, *Nihon no anzen – sekai no heiwa: Inoki Masamichi sensei taikan kinen rombunshū* [Japanese security, world peace: A collection of essays on the occasion of Professor Inoki Masamichi's retirement] (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1980), p. 44.

[2] For his classic article, see W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S.* 56 (1956), pp. 167–98; quote on p. 168.

limit the probability of damage to one's acquired values. But who is the 'one' in focus? Thus, the first question for security studies is – 'Security for whom?' Who or which entity is to be secured, that is, who is the *referent* of security? And which are the acquired values to be secured? What values and goals of the referent are considered vital and should be protected? Thus, the second question is – 'Security for which values?' What are the *core values* of the referent that are being threatened? And what are the types of threats against which core values have to be protected? Thus, the third question is – 'Security from what threats?' – what types of *threats* must core values be protected against? How is a threat or threats to core values to be averted? What are the means, instruments and strategies that can be used in order to divert or avoid a threat directed to a referent's core value? Thus, the fourth question is about strategy to be used – 'Security by what means?'[3]

During the Cold War, national security was seen almost by definition as equal to the absence of military threats to the state or the ability of the state to reject such threats, and military force was used by states to counter security threats. International developments showed, however, that even tremendous military power was not always enough; there is an 'illusion of omnipotence'.[4] When the United States was forced to leave Vietnam in 1975, its departure was telling evidence that overwhelming military power and sophisticated weaponry had not been particularly effective in the encounter with peasant soldiers of a small country armed with a belief in the righteousness of their cause. Even the most powerful weapon of all, namely nuclear, could not be used, because of its intolerable effects.[5]

In the heyday of the Cold War, the international discourse on security was fertilized by commissions set up to ponder international problems on a global scale. The report of the Club of Rome, *The Limits to Growth*

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[3] Mutiah Alagappa, 'Introduction', in Mutiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 16f. For Baldwin, see, e.g., David A. Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security', *Review of International Studies* 23:1 (January 1997), pp. 5–26.

[4] Nagai Yōnosuke, *Heiwa no daishō* [Price for peace] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1967), p. 73.

[5] See, e.g., Christer Jönsson, 'The Paradoxes of Superpower: Omnipotence or Impotence', in Kjell Goldmann and Gunnar Sjöstedt, eds, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence: Problems in the Study of International Influence* (London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 63–83.

(1972), argued that economic growth could not continue indefinitely because of the limited availability of natural resources. When the first global oil crisis erupted the year after the report was released, its predictions of the gloomy prospects for the world seemed validated. The Japanese member of the commission Ōkita Saburō, Japan's most renowned authority on international economics and later foreign minister, did not tire of throwing his considerable prestige behind the message that resources were limited and that Japan and the Japanese had to act responsibly.[6]

Other commissions continued to enrich the international discourse on security. In his introduction to *The North–South Report* (1980), the former chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt, wrote: 'Our Report is based on what appears to be the simplest common interest: that mankind wants to survive, and one might even add has the moral obligation to survive. This not only raises traditional questions of peace and war, but also how to overcome world hunger, mass misery and alarming disparities between the living conditions of rich and poor.'[7]

One of the members of the Brandt Commission was Olof Palme, who chaired another international commission, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues which presented its report in 1982. Palme was guided by his conviction that the atomic bombings could not be allowed to be repeated, since nuclear weapons posed a threat to the survival of mankind.[8] The icy winds sweeping the world during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis had proved that the world balanced on the brink of disaster. The nuclear sword of Damocles was raised above the head of all and sundry. The Palme Commission argued that the notion of security had

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[6] See, e.g., Ōkita Saburō, *Yūgen na chikyū to Nihon no shōrai* [Limited earth and Japan's future] (Tokyo: Daiyamondosha, 1973); Ōkita Saburō, *Shigen no nai kuni Nihon to sekai* [Resource poor Japan and the world] (Tokyo: Daiyamondosha, 1975).

[7] Independent Commission on International Development Issues, *North–South, A Programme for Survival: Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1980), p. 13.

[8] Palme's introduction to the report of the Commission takes its starting-point in the visit to Hiroshima made by the Commission. See his 'Introduction', in *Common Security: A programme for disarmament. The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the chairmanship of Olof Palme* (London and Sydney: Pan Books, 1982), pp. vii–xiii. The impact that the visit to Hiroshima made is acknowledged in Olof Palme, 'Hiroshima', in his posthumously published *En levande vilja* [Living will] (Stockholm: Tiden, 1987), pp. 328–31.

to move away from traditional geopolitical concepts. The Commission launched a new security concept, common security, which incorporated the idea that security rests on a commitment from countries to joint survival and that both the East and the West had legitimate security concerns. Unilateral security for one block based on superior military resources was not feasible in a world of incomprehensibly destructive nuclear potential: 'Our alternative is common security. There can be no hope of victory in a nuclear war; the two sides would be united in suffering and destruction. They can survive only together. They must achieve security not against the adversary but together with him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction.'[9] The Palme Commission saw not only military issues and national security but also non-military factors such as poverty and deprivation as threats to security. The Commission noted that '[a] secure existence, free from physical and psychological threats to life and limb, is one of the most elementary desires of humanity. […] It is a right shared by all – regardless of where they live, regardless of their ideological or political convictions.'[10]

The analysis was brought further in the report issued by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987, generally known as the Brundtland Commission after its chair, Gro Harlem Brundtland, prime minister of Norway. The Commission did not focus on military matters in its analysis but on a large number of factors seen as relevant to the extended security concept that the Commission employed. This concept comprised the degradation of the global environment, its causes, and its implications for the security of individuals, countries and the planet, the role of the international economy, population growth, sustainable energy, industrial development, peace and disarmament. Governments and international agencies were recommended to 'assess the cost-effectiveness, in terms of achieving security, of money spent on armaments compared with money spent on reducing poverty or restoring a ravaged environment.'[11]

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[9] *Common Security*, p. ix.
[10] Ibid., p. 8.
[11] World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 19.

The Brundtland report was referred to when the Palme Commission finalized its work by issuing a Final Statement in 1989, three years after Olof Palme's assassination. There is a shift in its analysis of security. In the 1982 report, the discussion of international security had been coloured by pervasive fears of thermonuclear war breaking out, maybe by mistake or as the result of the situation getting out of control. In 1989, the individual human being is at the centre of attention: 'Poverty itself is insecurity. For the individual, poverty is insecurity because of the fear of hunger, disease and early death that afflicts the hundreds of millions who live on the margin of existence in subsistence agriculture and urban slums. […] Common security can be transformed from an idea, a concept, into the common condition of human beings everywhere.'[12]

The end of the Cold War was proof that world politics had changed. International relations were restructured. During the Cold War, the cleavage of the world into two opposing and hostile blocs with neutral countries sandwiched in between seemed engraved into the very fabric of the international system. This split was dangerous at the same time as it, in a sense, was lulling people into feeling secure.[13] The superpowers were aware of the tremendous destructive power that they and their enemy possessed and were cautiously observing and stopping local skirmishes because of the fear that minor conflicts could get out of hand and escalate into larger-scale conflicts. Although interstate and sub-state conflicts occurred, they were geographically limited; erupting conflicts did not mean all-out war. The irony was that the threat of a nuclear holocaust masked other threats to security. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the closure of this era.

The New Face of War

With the partition of the world gone, gone also was the lid that had been put on regional and international conflicts.[14] The ending of super-

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[12] The Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *A World at Peace: Common Security in the Twenty-first Century* (Stockholm: [Norstedt], 1989), pp. 27, 30.

[13] Virginia Carmichael, *Framing History: The Rosenberg Story and the Cold War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 126.

[14] Volker Franke, 'The Emperor Needs New Clothes: Securitizing Threats in the 21st Century', *Peace and Conflict Studies* 9:2 (December 2002), p. 5.

power conflict made deadly and intractable aspects of war emerge. A new generation of violence and misery was added to older conflicts stemming from decolonization and the Cold War. While some conflicts were short-lived, others developed into prolonged armed conflicts. In 1999, Ogata Sadako, at the time the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), assessed the situation: 'Although inter-state wars have not disappeared – think of the Horn of Africa, or, in a less direct fashion, of the Great Lakes region – conflicts today tend to be internal. Their consequences, in particular, continue to require humanitarian responses, especially by UNHCR and agencies working in partnership with us.'[15] Increasingly, the front lines of war changed with the proliferation of armed conflicts occurring more frequently within state borders than across them. Armed conflicts shifted from wars to intermediate and minor conflicts, with an increasing number of conflicts involving control of territory and the break-up of states. Of 108 armed conflicts 1989–98, only seven were primarily inter-state, nine others were intra-state conflicts with foreign intervention and the remaining 92 were intra-state in nature.[16] The effects of these conflicts were appalling. A development was seen where technological progress and weapons proliferation made conflicts increasingly deadly with the widespread use of sophisticated, highly destructive weapons. The asymmetry of military capabilities with air-strikes resulted in large-scale casualties, when civilians were exposed to the risk of death or injury by the explosion of unexploded bombs even after the cessation of hostilities.[17] The ability of national splinter groups, minority governments, militia groups, etc., to cause damage increased with the larger quantities available of increasingly lethal weapons. The Program Associate of the World Federalists Movement Lenore M. Hickey argued: 'Unlike previous decades, the world is now faced with armed conflicts where the sole aim is directed at victimization of civilians. Therefore, the world's concerns have

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[15] Sadako Ogata, 'Human Security: a Refugee Perspective', keynote speech at the Ministerial Meeting on Human Security Issues of the 'Lysoen Process' Group of Governments, Bergen, Norway, 19 May 1999, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/.../open doc.htm?tbl=ADMIN&id=3ae68fc00&page=admin (downloaded 5 September 2005).

[16] Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflict, 1989–2000', *Journal of Peace Research* 38:5 (2001), pp. 629–44.

[17] Hatsuse Ryuhei, 'National Security and Human Safety', *Social Science Japan* 26 (May 2003), p. 35.

had to shift focus to the protection of individuals as civilian lives have become increasingly threatened.'[18]

For much of the Third World, conflicts and wars resulted in famine, disease and refugee movements. Concurrent with the increasing number of internal wars, the nature of war changed. Many low-level conflicts within states involved civilian casualties and displacement on an agonizing scale. In 1999, Olara A. Otunnu, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflicts, reported:

Over the last decade, 2 million children were killed in conflict situations, over 1 million were made orphans, over 6 million have been seriously injured or permanently disabled, and over 10 million have been left with grave psychological trauma. A large number of children, especially young women, have been made the targets of rape and other forms of sexual violence as a deliberate instrument of war. At the present moment, there are over 20 million children who have been displaced by war within and outside their countries. Some 300,000 young persons under the age of 18 are currently being exploited as child soldiers around the world. And approximately 800 children are killed or maimed by landmines every month.[19]

The new face of war was alarming. The horrific situation that civilians in conflicts found themselves in and the perpetration of crimes against human rights were appalling. Wars were not what they used to be.[20] The changing nature of crises and wars and the factors shaping the international responses to them influenced how security was viewed. Not only did the plight of civilians increase, but suffering became more widely reported. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) expressly recognized in 1992 that non-military threats to peace required urgent action just as much as conflicts between states and within states.[21]

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[18] Lenore M. Hickey, 'Human Security: From Debate to Action', http://www.world federalist.org/congress/humansecurity.doc (downloaded 20 September 2002).

[19] Olara A. Otunnu, 'Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Introductory Statement', United Nations General Assembly, Third Committee, 27 October 1999, http://www.iansa.org/issues/GA99_statement.pdf.

[20] Mary Kaldor, 'Introduction', in Mary Kaldor, ed., *Global Insecurity: Restructuring the Global Military Sector, Volume III* (London and New York: Pinter, 2000), pp. 3–8.

[21] UN Security Council statement, Note by the President of the Security Council, Project on Chemical and Biological Warfare, S/23500, 31 January 1992, http://

The new face of war and the obliteration of the ideological cleavage of the world influenced the international debate on security. It was apparent that threats to the life and well-being of peoples and nations were interpreted differently than when security was looked at through the prism of national security. Governments were groping for policies and ideas that would enable them to cope with new challenges in a world no longer the same as during the Cold War. Increasingly, voices were heard to say that the security *problematique* had altered. The 'old' agenda dominated by considerations of nationalism, war, and the distribution of wealth was seen by many in need of being replaced by a 'new' agenda with an alternative view of the agency of international relations.[22] 'New' threats were seen as more salient than the 'old' ones. An increasing number of perceived threats to security could not be countered by military measures.[23] Events like the aids epidemic, the outbreak of SARS, the pollution haze from Indonesia, not to mention the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, have been reminders that dangerous threats do not necessarily come from invasion or insurgency.

The Emergence of a New Concept of Security

In the post-Cold War period, the unrelenting human costs of violent conflict became one of the reasons why the discussion on the nature of security resurfaced. With the focus shifting towards threats so far neglected in the discourse on security, the security concept itself employed in analyses and studies, national security, seemed increasingly dysfunctional. A redefinition of security was seen to be required by the near-disappearance of conventional military threats to the major powers and by an increasing awareness of the costs of the new wars, both for affected

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www.sipri.org/contents/cbwarfare/cbw_research_doc/cbw_historical/cbw-unsc 23500.html (downloaded 5 December 2005).

[22] For the terms 'new' and 'old' agenda, see Fred Halliday, 'International Relations: Is There A New Agenda?', *Millennium* 20:1 (Spring 1991), pp. 57–72.

[23] David A. Baldwin, 'Security Studies and the End of the Cold War', *World Politics* 48:1 (October 1995), p. 130.

countries and for the international community.[24] A progressive shift in the idea of what the concept of security implied could be noted with the appearance of new conceptualizations like comprehensive security, common security, collaborative security and human security.[25] A seminal contribution to the debate on international security was made by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. His report *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) was an effort to lay the foundation of a new international regime of conflict resolution and peace-keeping. He presented one of the first systematic elaborations of the idea that security was defined by the threats to people's well-being rather than inter-state conflict. Boutros-Ghali argued that threats to global security were not only military in nature and that it is the individual rather than the state that should be the focus of security and that this broadened definition of security had to include also environmental, health, demographic, economic and political aspects.[26] According to him, the foundation of the work for peace and security under the UN Charter 'is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international pro-gress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the need for good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interde-pendent world.'[27] This raised a tricky question. Sacrificing human values for the sake of the sovereignty and territorial inviolability of the state resulted in national security being achieved at the expense of human secu-rity.[28] What had often been seen as a guarantee of the security for those

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[24] Joanna Macrae, 'Analysis and synthesis', in Joanna Macrae, ed., *The New Huma-nitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action*, Overseas Devel-opment Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group, HPG Report 11 (April 2002), p. 5.

[25] Nakanishi Hiroshi, *Kokusai seiji to wa nani ka: Chikyū shakai ni okeru ningen to chitsujo* [What is international politics? People and order in global society] (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha, 2005), p. 123.

[26] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-Keeping*, 17 June 1992, UN A/47/277 - S/24111, §16, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html (downloaded 5 September 2005).

[27] Ibid., §17.

[28] Bjørn Møller, 'National, Societal and Human Security: General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans', in UNESCO, Division of Human Rights, Democra-cy, Peace and Tolerance, Social and Human Sciences Sector, ed., *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?* Proceedings from the First Interna-

living within the borders of a state, the state itself, was now seen to be quite the opposite in many cases. Voices began to be heard claiming that national security is all too often equated with the security of the regime in power. If the state is controlled by an unscrupulous regime, it is not always a protector of its citizens. The security of individuals can be threatened by the state abusing its power by political suppression, violating human rights, excessive policing and prosecution.[29]

The debate initiated by Boutros-Ghali's report was developed further when the UNDP presented what was soon seen by many as a viable alternative to the concept that had been in focus of much of the thinking and writing on security after the Second World War: the military realist national security concept. In the wake of Boutros-Ghali's report, the UNDP argued in its annual report the following year that there was a need for a new security concept: 'The concept of security must change – from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people's security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security.'[30] In what subsequently has been cited over and over again, the UNDP wrote:

For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with the threats to a country's borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security.

For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world. […] Human security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor. The threats to their security may differ – hunger and disease in poor nations and drugs and crime in rich

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tional Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, UNESCO, Paris, 27–28 November 2000 (Paris: UNESCO, 2000), p. 46.

[29] Jamil D. Ahsan, 'Main Challenges Facing the Promotion of Human Security in Asia', in UNESCO, ed., *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century*, p. 101.

[30] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1993* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 2. It should be noted that the concept of human security was used by Boutros-Ghali in his report, albeit only once.

nations – but these threats are real and growing. Some threats are indeed common to all nations – job insecurity and environmental threats, in particular.[31]

The new thinking on security that the UNDP outlined was captured by the new security concept, human security. The novelty and freshness of this concept lies in the fact that it has its roots not only in the discourse on security but also in the discourse on development. That the UNDP introduced development into the discourse on security was not strange, since it is a development organization; the main author of the report was one of its leading officials, the developmental economist Mahbud ul Haq.[32]

Human security as outlined in the UNDP report is a global and inclusive concept dealing with a universal concern for which national boundaries are irrelevant like poverty, terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, illegal immigration and aids. It reflects the idea that security and development are different sides of the same coin.[33] In contrast to national security which focuses on 'freedom from fear', the human security concept revolves around the two legs of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. According to the UNDP report, it is not possible for the community of nations to achieve any of its major goals – peace, environmental protection, human rights, democratization, fertility reduction, and social integration – except in the context of sustainable development that leads to human security.[34] The UNDP argued that while human development and human security are often mixed, they are not synonymous: 'Human development is ... a process of widening the range of people's choice. Human security means that all people can exercise these choices safely and freely – and that they can be relatively confident that the

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[31] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 3

[32] Shinoda Hideaki, 'Anzen hoshō gainen no tagika to "ningen no anzen hoshō"' [The proliferation of the meaning of the national security concept and 'human security'], in Hiroshima daigaku heiwa kagaku kenkyū sentā, ed., *IPSHU kenkyū hōkoku 31: Ningen no anzen hoshō no saikentō* [IPSHU research report 31: A reassessment of human security] (Hiroshima: Hiroshima daigaku heiwa kagaku kenkyū sentā, 2004), p. 79.

[33] Sara Edson, *Human Security: An Extended and Annotated International Bibliography* (Cambridge: Centre for History and Economics, King's College, University of Cambridge, 2001), p. 85.

[34] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, p. 1.

opportunities they have today are not lost tomorrow.'[35] So influential were these ideas that Joanna Macrae wrote later: 'Throughout the 1990s, there was an emerging consensus that security is not just about bombs, bullets and elite politics, but also about development.'[36] But the authors of the report were eager to remind readers that the new security idea was consistent with the original mission of the United Nations as conceived back in 1945 and found in President Roosevelt's four ideals declared in 1941 and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[37] They quoted approvingly what US Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. reported to his government after the San Francisco conference by which the United Nations was founded: 'The battle for peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace. […] No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs.'[38]

The UNDP Human Security Concept

The 1994 report issued by the UNDP shifted the focus of the international discourse on security. The security concept presented in this report became a benchmark for a 'new' security agenda. The UNDP security conception has a structure that differs from the predominant idea of national security in several respects. Using the new security concept gives radically different answers to Baldwin's questions than when security is looked at using national security as the prism. The new security concept is multilayered with security having to be considered from the level of the state down to the level of the individual. Human security is a universal, global, and indivisible concern dealing with (1) security of people, not just

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[35] Ibid., p. 23.

[36] Macrae, 'Analysis and synthesis', p. 5.

[37] Yusuke Dan, 'Human Security and Regionalism in Northeast Asia: Quo Vadis, national sovereignty?', paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, 3 March 2005, p. 4, http://64.112.226.77/one/isa/-isa05/index.php?click_key=2 (downloaded 21 January 2007).

[38] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, p. 24.

security of territory; (2) security of individuals, not just security of their nations; (3) security through development, not security through arms; and (4) security of all people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, and in their environment.[39] According to the UNDP report, traditional security notions are concerned with 'security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy, or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust.' The report argues that these notions overlook 'the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives'.[40] Later, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan voiced his opinion that 'No shift in the way we think or act is more critical than that of putting people at the centre of everything we do. That is the essence of human security.'[41] This observation leads to the answer to Baldwin's first question – the security referent is people. The new security concept is not 'state centred' but 'human centred'. This contrasts with the traditional interpretation of security as national security. While human security is a bottom-up concept addressing threats to people and ways to overcome them, national security is a top-down concept with security commensurate with national survival, dealing with protection of the state and not those living there. Maybe the most well-known formulation with the nation or state as the centrepiece of security is Walter Lippman's definition of security as equal to state security: 'A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.'[42] Similarly, Hans Morgenthau defined national security as 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions'.[43]

Also the answer to Baldwin's second question about core values makes the new security concept differ from national security with its focus

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[39] Mahbub ul Haq, *Reflections on Human Development: How the Focus of Development Economics Shifted from National Income Accounting to People-centred Policies, Told by One of the Chief Architects of the New Paradigm* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 39–43.

[40] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, p. 22.

[41] Kofi Annan, 'Foreword', in Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds, *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), p. xx.

[42] Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), p. 32.

[43] Hans Morgenthau, *The Purpose of American Politics* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 562.

on perceived threats of external origin and of a military nature.[44] The new security concept does not stress values like territorial integrity and national interest. Instead, values like safety, well-being, and dignity are emphasized. In a formulation that has been quoted many times by advocates of the new security concept but derided equally often by dissenters, the UNDP report writes that 'human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. […] It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace.'[45]

The answer to Baldwin's third question about threats to security turns out differently than when security is interpreted as national security. Seven constituent parts of human security are identified in the UNDP report: (1) economic security which refers to an individual's enjoyment of a basic income, either through gainful employment or from a social safety net; (2) food security which refers to an individual's access to food via his or her assets, employment, or income; (3) health security which refers to an individual's freedom from various diseases and debilitating illnesses and his or her access to health care; (4) environmental security which refers to the integrity of land, air, and water, which make human habitation possible; (5) personal security which refers to an individual's freedom from crime and violence, especially women and children who are more vulnerable; (6) community security refers to cultural dignity and to inter-community peace within which an individual lives and grows; and (7) political security which refers to protection against human rights violations. For each of these constituent parts, threats are specified: (1) threats to economic security are lack of productive and remunerative employment, precarious employment, absence of publicly financed safety nets; (2) threats to food security are lack of food entitlements including insufficient access to assets, work, and assured incomes; (3) threats to health security are infectious and parasitic diseases, diseases of the circulatory system and cancers, lack of safe water, air pollution, lack of access to health care facilities; (4)

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[44] Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 5.
[45] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, pp. 22f.

threats to environmental security: declining water availability, water pollution, declining arable land, deforestation, desertification, air pollution, natural disasters; (5) threats to personal security are violent crime, drug trafficking, violence and abuse of children and women; (6) threats to community security are breakdown of the family, collapse of traditional languages and cultures, ethnic discrimination and strife, genocide and ethnic cleansing; and (7) threats to political security: government repression, systematic human rights violations, and militarization.

To these threats related to the seven constituent parts are added six groups of threats that are of a global or transnational nature and whose spread or effects go beyond national boundaries: population growth which increases the pressure on non-renewable resources and is linked to global poverty, environmental degradation, and international migration; growing disparities in global income leading to overconsumption and overproduction in the industrialized countries and poverty and environmental degradation in the developing world; increasing international migration because of population growth, poverty, and the policies of the industrial countries which have contributed to the flow of international migrants and increase in refugees and internally displaced persons; various forms of environmental decay (causing acid rain, skin cancer, global warming) as well as reduced biodiversity, drug trafficking, which has grown into a global, multinational industry; and international terrorism.[46] This numbing parade of perceived threats made some commentators accuse the UNDP of broadening the idea of security to encompass virtually all kinds of threats to human existence.[47]

Given this extensive list of perceived threats, what is the answer to Baldwin's question about means by which security is sought? It is evident that the use of military force will in many cases not be effective to counter threats identified by the human security approach. If threats are human rights violations, poverty, economic underdevelopment, political instability, terrorism, environmental degradation, ethnic and religious violence, etc., it is only too apparent that instruments traditionally employed in

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[46] Ibid., pp. 34–37.
[47] See, e.g., Roland Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?', *International Security* 26:2 (Fall 2001), p. 89; Franke, 'The Emperor Needs New Clothes', p. 4.

national security policy – like soldiers and weapons – will not be useful or, even, may impinge upon security interpreted as human security.[48]

How distant the new security concept is from the traditional concept of national security can be grasped from the British writer and broadcaster Sue MacGregor's observation that human security made security expand 'to include the personal well-being of individuals and their ability to feel secure in the basic needs that affect their day-to-day existence: food, health, employment, population, human rights, environment, education, etc.'[49] The 'etc.' is a telling marker of the plenitude of aspects seen as relevant to security by human security advocates.

The Evolving Debate about the Human Security Concept

The launch of human security as an alternative security concept triggered a lively debate. The number of protagonists increased by the day. A plethora of contributions discussed the new security concept and what it entailed. Human security became, as Bjørn Møller observed, 'something of a catch-phrase, used both by the United Nations agencies, national development aid agencies and international as well as national non-governmental organizations (NGOs).'[50] After the publication of the UNDP report, a new scholarly field emerged dealing with human security and problems of its definition, measurement and implementation. Pundits and protagonists lined up on the barricades. Human security became the buzz-word of a rapidly expanding epistemic community, to use the handy term introduced by Peter Haas to describe the international combination of professionals, who believe in the same cause and effect relationships and have a common understanding of the problem and its solution.[51]

Human security established itself rapidly as a key concept on the international security agenda. The disparate group of human security advocates made vagueness a contentious aspect. In actual practice, the human secu-

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[48] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, pp. 37–40.

[49] Sue MacGregor, 'A concept paper on human security, the human family and human potential', December 2000, http://www.consultmcgregor.com/PDFs (downloaded 12 March 2002).

[50] Møller, 'National, Societal and Human Security', p. 41.

[51] Peter M. Haas, *Saving the Mediterranean. The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 55.

rity concept functioned as an 'overarching frame' used by like-minded advocates to build support.[52] The leading economist Amartya Sen made the pertinent remark that human security was a concept 'that has been invoked astonishingly often in recent discussions. As a new "buzz" expression, it is in some danger of being summoned too often and too loosely, as is the fate of many such newly favored terms.'[53] The conceptual discourse became a field that flourished or, as Sverre Lodgaard put it more bluntly, became 'overcrowded'.[54]

The evolving debate did not increase conceptual stringency. The blame for the confusion caused by vagueness that characterizes much of the discourse on human security rests partly with the authors of the 1994 UNDP report. The drafters of the original formulation of the UNDP concept were carried by a will to orchestrate a breakthrough for the human security approach to security. To broaden the support of their ideas, they argued for an all-encompassing and integrative concept and did not define its boundaries.[55] To them, achieving human security was almost by definition a collaborative effort which involved not only governments but also civil society groups and institutions, commercial, nongovernmental and international organizations, and individuals.[56] All who wanted to further the cause of human security were welcome on board. Whether they agreed on what 'real' human security meant or implied was not important. The UNDP claimed that '[m]ost people instinctively understand what security means'.[57] 'Looking back', Jennifer Leaning and Sam Arie wrote in 2000, 'there seems to be great consensus on the value of the human security

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[52] Rodger A. Payne, 'Human Security and American Foreign Policy', paper prepared for conference on Human Security in the New Millennium, European Union Center, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, 4–5 March 2004, p. 3.

[53] Amatya Sen, Statement at the workshop 'Basic Education and Human Security', organized by the Commission on Human Security, UNICEF, the Pratichi (India) Trust, and Harvard University, Kolkata, 2-4 January 2002, http://www.human security-chs.org/activities/outreach/index.html (downloaded October 1, 2003).

[54] Sverre Lodgaard, 'Human Security: Concept and Operationalization', paper presented at the conference Security with a Human Face: Expert Workshop on the Feasibility of a Human Security Report, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1–2 December 2001, p. 6, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop (downloaded 6 October 2002).

[55] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, p. 24.

[56] Ibid., chap. 4.

[57] Ibid., p. 3.

approach but little agreement on what that approach should entail.'[58] The meaning of human security was often taken for granted in the way the authors of the UNDP report did. A leading scholar, Caroline Thomas, told participants at a conference: 'For those of us attending this conference, the meaning of human security probably seems perfectly clear. People matter.'[59]

According to the Japanese scholar-diplomat Ogata Sadako, who was later appointed co-chair of an international commission on human security, the new security concept 'can mean all and nothing; it is as elusive as it is appealing. As a most general observation, human security can be considered as freedom from death, poverty, pain, fear or whatever else makes people feel insecure. In this sense, almost any matter concerning people's lives can fall within the scope of human security, rendering it conceptually vague and of little practical use.'[60] This approach has resulted in the situation where human security appears in a bewildering array of robes; alternatively portrayed 'as a new theory, concept, paradigm, analytic starting point, world view, political agenda, normative benchmark, and policy framework.'[61]

The prominence in the international discourse that the new security concept gained was bound to have repercussions, since ideas 'serve as road maps' for foreign policy decision-makers.[62] A problem was that the

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[58] Jennifer Leaning and Sam Arie, 'Human Security: A Framework for Assessment in Conflict and Transition', Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, *Working Paper Series* 11:8 (September 2001), p. 7, http://www.wcfia.harvard. edu/paper/764__JL-Arie WorkingPaper.pdf (downloaded 5 September 2005).

[59] Caroline Thomas, 'African Human Security and US–Africa Relations', paper presented at New Patterns of Strategic Encounter: US–Africa Relations in an Era of Globalization, UCLA Globalization Research Center, 30 April 2004, http://www. globalization-africa.org/papers/34.html (downloaded 26 December 2005.

[60] Sadako Ogata, 'Enabling People to Live in Security', keynote speech at the International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo, 28 July 2000, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ReliefWeb, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/ dbc.nsf/doc100?OpenForm (downloaded 17 September 2005).

[61] Paul Evans, 'Asian Perspectives on Human Security: A Responsibility to Protect', in *International Conference on Human Security in East Asia, 16–17 June 2003, Seoul, Republic of Korea*, p. 35.

[62] Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, 'Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework', in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 11.

direction of the road was not altogether clear because proponents had sometimes different ideas about what the concept means. The concept was criticised by those who believed that the more components included in the concept, the less useful it became as a policy tool. A leading spokesman for human security, Lincoln Chen, argued that the concept was too vague to be effectively implemented and untested in terms of its relevance to diverse local and national contexts.[63] A widely distributed concept paper presented in 1999 by the Canadian government, a key promoter of the new security idea, found that the very breadth of the UNDP concept made it 'unwieldy as a policy instrument'.[64] To Heather Owens and Barbara Arneil, human security was 'too broad and vague a concept to be meaningful for policy-makers, as it has come to entail such a wide range of different threats on one hand, while prescribing a diverse and sometimes incompatible set of policy solutions to resolve them on the other.'[65]

Attempts at Precision

The view that human security was 'normatively attractive but analytically weak'[66] resulted in attempts to make the concept more precise and therefore, presumably, more useful. These attempts amounted often to selecting some components without providing any compelling rationale for why certain aspects were taken into consideration and not others. In a celebrated attempt to operationalize human security, Gary King and

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[63] Lincoln C. Chen, 'Health and Human Security: Translating Theory into Action', paper presented at the International Symposium on Development, Tokyo, 24 June 1999; as referred to in Josefa S. Edralin, 'Human Security and Peace-Building: Focus on Local Capacity and Institutional Building', p. 3, http://www.uncrd.or.jp/res/hsp/resfocus.pdf (downloaded 1 October 2003).

[64] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999), http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/safety_changingworld-en.asp (downloaded 1 September 2005).

[65] Heather Owens and Barbara Arneil, 'The Human Security Paradigm Shift: A New Lens on Canadian Foreign Policy?', in Majid Tehranian, ed., *Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global Governance* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris in association with the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, 1999), p. 2.

[66] Edward Newman, 'A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept', *Security Dialogue* 35 (2004), p. 358.

Christopher Murray included only elements which were 'important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk.' What they proposed was a 'simple, rigorous and measurable definition of human security' expressed as 'the number of years of future life spent outside a state of "generalized poverty". Generalized poverty occurs when an individual falls below the threshold in any key domain of human well-being.'[67] The problem of the attempt to operationalize human security is that human security à la King and Murray is a rather different creature than the UNDP concept. In his comments, Roland Paris is critical:

> their decision to exclude indicators of violence from their composite measure of human security creates a de facto distinction between human security and physical security, thereby purging the most familiar connotation of security – safety from violence – from their definition of human security. Under the King-Murray formulation, individuals could find themselves in the strange position of enjoying a high level of human security (low poverty, reasonable health care, good education, political freedom, and democracy), while facing a relatively high risk of becoming victims of deadly violence. One need only think of residents of certain neighbourhoods in Belfast, who might not consider themselves very 'secure.'[68]

Paris himself does not fare much better, however. In his article, human security is described as a 'quicksilver concept' with definitions tending to be 'extraordinarily expansive and vague' and even 'slippery by design'.[69] The multitude of concerns taken into account by various interpretations makes him claim that human security as a new conceptualization of security is so vague that it 'verges on meaninglessness'.[70] The frustrated Paris goes so far as to claim that 'the most ardent backers of human security appear to have an interest in keeping the term expansive and vague' and that the idea of human security is 'the glue that holds together a jumbled coalition of "middle power" states, development agencies, and NGOs.'[71] According to him, vagueness and ambiguity inherent in the human security concept makes it offer little practical guidance to policy-makers. Still, he notes that the political coalition which 'uses human security as a rally-

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[67] Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, 'Rethinking Human Security', *Political Science Quarterly* 116:4 (Winter 2001/2002), p. 593.
[68] Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?', p. 95.
[69] Ibid., pp. 88, 97.
[70] Ibid., p. 102.
[71] Ibid., p. 88.

ing cry has chalked up significant accomplishments, including the signing of an anti-personnel land mines convention and the imminent creation of an international criminal court.'[72]

As is easy to see, this reasoning is contradictory. On the one hand, Paris describes the concept as being of little use but, on the other, he claims that it has led to significant achievements. He finds the vagueness of this new international buzz-word unsatisfactory and tries to save it by making it more precise. Finding vagueness of the concept endemic, he disregards it as not being useful for policy-makers but argues that it has potential value for scholars:

Human security does not appear to offer a particularly useful framework of analysis for scholars or policymakers. But perhaps there are other avenues by which the idea of human security can contribute to the study of international relations and security. I would like to suggest one such possibility: Human security may serve as a *label* for a broad category of research in the field of security studies that is primarily concerned with nonmilitary threats to the safety of societies, groups, and individuals, in contrast to more traditional approaches to security studies that focus on protecting states from external threats.[73]

The problem with Paris's attempt to narrow down what is meant by human security is that left in the shambles of his analysis is a concept to be used by scholars, while human security as a concept useful for policy-makers is eliminated. His operationalization of human security is precise but does not have much in common with the UNDP concept. He throws out the baby with the bathwater.

The worries of scholars caused by the vagueness of the human security concept seem a bit exaggerated. Despite the diversity, the various definitions employed in policy debates and the scholarly literature share several key elements.[74] The concept is considerably broader in comparison with the national security concept but even the early inclusive conceptions have limitations. As noted above, the 1994 UNDP report specified seven broad categories of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. No doubt these categories subsumed under the umbrella term 'human security' are broad – but not

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[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid., p. 96.

[74] Matt McDonald, 'Human Security and the Construction of Security', *Global Society* 16:3 (July 2002), pp. 277–95.

limitless. Since there is no generally agreed-upon definition of human security and the concept became an international buzz-word, many definitions were proposed in attempts to rectify the situation. Complaints over 'inconsistent' and 'poor' definitions seem to have been caused to some extent by the plethora of definitions. To vagueness inherent in human security as outlined by the UNDP was added the impression of vagueness created when different interpretations of the concept were lining up and a whole array of 'definitions' were presented.[75]

Definition Debate in Japan

The career diplomat and later head of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) Satō Yukio has argued that the Japanese translation of human security as *ningen no anzen hoshō* made people think either that human security should have priority over national security or made them dislike the concept. This is a mistake according to Satō who saw national security as a precondition for human security and as important in the defence of the survival and dignity of people; in his eyes the core idea of the Japanese conceptualization of human security.[76] Albeit some human security advocates saw it as all-embracing, comprehensive and replacing national security, the international discourse on security indicated that few were of the opinion that its introduction made the traditional military backed national security policies superfluous. Even the most ardent backers of human security could not fail to note that the 1994 UNDP report did not discard the national security concept. That leading Japanese advocates of human security agreed was made clear by Takasu Yukio, a high-ranking official of Japan's Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MOFA), at a conference in Ulan Bator in 2000:

Human security efforts will not replace national security arrangements – the protection of territory and the life and property of the people remain the responsibility

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[75] Cf. Hideaki Shinoda, 'The Meaning of "Human Security" for the United States and Japan', *Center for Global Partnership, CGP NewsOnline*, 7 September 2004, http://www.cgp.org/index.php?option=article&task=default&articleid=238 (downloaded 20 April 2006).

[76] Satō Yukio, 'Hyūman sekyuritii' [Human security], *Sekai shūhō*, 20 April 2004, p. 3.

of government. While national security is prerequisite for ensuing security – that is, the survival and dignity of the individual – it is not the only requirement. Even if a state becomes rich and strong, there is no guarantee that the individuals who live in that state will be safe and rich. The role of government is to provide a foundation or environment that will enable individuals to take care of themselves and to develop their capabilities without undue restrictions.[77]

The human security specialist Kurusu Kaoru concurred with this view and argued that the largest-scale threat to human security is military conflict or war between states. Defending the nation is the same as defending the people, at least in situations of war.[78] A leading diplomat, Owada Hisashi, commented upon the situation facing countries:

By enlarging the scope of the traditional concept of national security, the concept of human security should reflect the emerging truth that the issue of security in human terms can no longer be adequately dealt with by simply concentrating on the issue of national security in sovereign terms, that is to say, the security of a nation to be ensured by the hands of a nation state. Increasingly, complex social conditions created in an age of globalization can bring about a situation where these conditions can come to threaten the security of people in human terms, without necessarily endangering the national security of a nation in sovereign terms.[79]

Satō and Owada did not agree with the views of the influential social and political analyst and commentator Satō Seizaburō, who had been an

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[77] MOFA, 'Statement by Director-General Yukio Takasu at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan-Bator, 8 May 2000', http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human–secu/speech0005.html (downloaded 12 March 2002).

[78] Kurusu Kaoru, 'Kokka no henchō no anzen hoshō kara no dakkyaku: Hyūman-sekyuritii no fukkatsu ni mukete' [Emerging from state biased security: Towards a revival of human security], *Kaikakusha* 469 (July 1999), p. 29.

[79] Hisashi Owada, 'The World & East Asia in the 21st Century', keynote speech at Zonta International District 26 Conference, 11 November 1999, http://www2.jiia.or.jp/report/owada/zonta.html (downloaded 12 September 2005). Interestingly, half a year later Owada gave another speech to a US audience that was more or less a carbon copy of this speech. In one respect, it differed, however. Instead of mentioning 'threats of international terrorism and drug trafficking' as he did in 1999, he disregards them and replaces them by 'threats of growing disparity in economic and social condition among people in the world'. See Hisashi Owada, 'On the Front Lines: Partnerships in Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Resolution', speech at the conference The UN and Business: A Partnership for the New Millennium, 31 May–1 June 2000, Jacob Javits Center, http://216.221.185.195/UNOPS/21/Speeches/owada.pdf (downloaded 12 March 2002).

adviser to former Prime Ministers Ōhira Masayoshi and Nakasone Yasu-hiro. Satō argued that there is an inherent contradiction in the idea of human security if it centres on people at the level of the individual: 'If individual safety were of utmost importance, it would be impossible to demand soldiers, policemen and firemen to risk their lives. As a result, we would be responsible for our own safety from foreign aggression, crime or fire, and individual safety would no longer be guaranteed.'[80] Satō Yukio did not agree. He contended that there is not an 'either or' but a 'both and' situation if the two security concepts are seen as complementary with measures taken for national security important also for human security.[81] What is more, a leading Japanese international relations scholar-turned diplomat, Inoguchi Kuniko, rejected Satō Seizaburō's view with the argument that human security cannot exist without national security: 'The minimum requirement for attaining human security is to attain national security, since there would be no human security if the nation was at war and/or national security [is] unavailable.'[82]

Concluding Remarks

After the idea of human security was launched by the UNDP in 1994, the concept began to be referred to in the international discourse on secu-rity. Many organizations, NGOs, opinion leaders, politicians, and private individuals turned into advocates of the new security idea. Conferences and workshops were organized with human security as their topic. Aca-demic research commenced and university programs on human security were introduced. The prolific discussion of theoretical and empirical issues related to the new security concept made it soon a central idea on the international security agenda. Analyzing security with human security as the prism resulted in a new view of the nature of security. The many interpretations holding sway make pertinent a comment by the Grand Ol'

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[80] Seizaburo Sato, 'Why "National Defense" Became "Security"', *Gaiko Forum*, Summer 2000, http://www.gaikoforum.com/2000summer.htm (downloaded 3 Feb-ruary 2005).

[81] Satō, 'Nihon no kokuren gaikō to ningen no anzen hoshō', p. 8.

[82] Kuniko Inoguchi, 'Disarmament and Human Security', Discussion Paper on Disarmament and Human Security, 41st Session of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Geneva, 16–18 July 2003, p. 2.

Man of security studies, Arnold Wolfers. In a classic article, he describes the implications of political formulas gaining popularity and warns that 'they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus they may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favours with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.'[83]

The pertinence of Wolfers's warning could be clearly observed in the case of human security. The diffuse and all-encompassing nature of the concept made its critics claim that the new security concept was not of much help to policy-makers. Often, proponents and protagonists had their own agenda, policies were formulated in a national political context and views and opinions were coloured by national endeavours and proclivities. It could not be denied that a problem existed for a country like Switzerland, when its foreign ministry had departments using the human security concept but did not agree on its meaning.[84]

The criticism launched at the human security concept by scholars because of its analytical ambiguity and disputed political usability did not impress its advocates. What researchers saw as the greatest drawback of the concept, namely its vagueness and the lack of a clear consensus as how to render it, was regarded as a strength by many backing the new security idea. One reason for the wide support of human security that could soon be registered was its normative underpinnings to which few states do not confess a commitment.[85] Rapidly expanding numbers of adherents and protagonists found it intuitively attractive. Human security evokes, as Astri Suhrke noted, 'progressive values'.[86] It is a positively-laden term, like peace. Who could be against this Mr Nice Concept?

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[83] Arnold Wolfers, '"National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol', *Political Science Quarterly* 67:4 (December 1952), p. 481.

[84] Daniel Traschler, 'Menschliche Sicherheit: Klärungsbedürftiges Konzept, vielversprechende Praxis', *Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik 2003*, p. 95. This was also the situation in Japan for a start, when the meaning of human security was described differently in governmental reports as pointed out in Yusuke Dan, 'A Brief Review of Human Security', *Human Security* 4 (1999/2000), pp. 325f.

[85] Lodgaard, 'Human Security', p. 13.

[86] Astri Suhrke, 'Human Security and the Interests of States', *Security Dialogue* 30 (1999), p. 265.

JAPAN'S POST-WAR FOREIGN POLICY: BETWEEN NON-INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION

Laying the Foundations

The period which is nowadays designated 'post-war' is labelled with what must be said to be a misnomer. The period after 1945 has certainly had its fair share of war and upheaval. The memories of Japan's militarism that eventually led to war and defeat, millions of dead, ravaged families and atomic bombings left people beset by a deep distrust of the military and a resolve not to repeat past mistakes, rejecting anything related to the military as a tool of national policy.[1] This deep-seated popular attitude is one reason why the pre-war great power, Japan, has pursued in the post-war period what must be said to be a foreign policy at variance with other countries. It was a policy that took its starting-point in the situation prevailing after the Second World War. An opinion found among Japanese in its aftermath was that Japan was no longer the same as before but *Shin-nihon*, 'New Japan', a country re-born at what was post-war Japan's

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[1] Matake Kamiya, 'Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?', *The Washington Quarterly* 26:1 (Winter 2002–03), p. 66.

Stunde Null, the moment of defeat.[2] A Japan had been born that differed from pre-war and war times. When the foundations of Japan's foreign and security policies were laid in the aftermath of the Second World War, a key input was the United States' priorities. The over-riding goal of US Japan policy after the war was to eradicate Japanese militarism, which was seen as the root cause of the country's aggressive policies before and during the war. Seeing war as a key element of its aggression during the pre-war and war years, Japan's military forces were disbanded. In order to eliminate the danger of militarism appearing again, reforms were instituted by the Occupation. One measure was to work out a new constitution to replace the 1889 Meiji constitution. The new constitution was promulgated in 1946. It embodied and signified the break with Japan's militaristic past. It is generally called the Peace Constitution because of its famous Article 9, which declares that Japan forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and rejects the use of violence or threat of use thereof as a means of solving international conflicts. The constitution turned the former military great power into a pacifist country, laying the foundation of the elements of pacifism and idealism running through the history of post-war Japan.

Despite the fact that it is quite reasonable to claim that the new constitution was enforced on Japan by the Occupation, it was greeted enthusiastically by large numbers of Japanese. The promulgation of the constitution was seen as a relief by them since it was a guarantee that militarism would not be allowed to interfere with the life of Japanese and others again.

A corollary of the pervasive anti-militaristic feelings found in Japan after its defeat and the pacifism nurtured by the new constitution was 'UN centrism'. In the early years of the post-war period, different options for national security were discussed in Japan. It is largely forgotten now but in the situation immediately after the war when armaments had been abolished and the right of belligerency was renounced, a primary option for the war-fatigued Japanese and their government was security guaranteed by the United Nations, based on a highly idealistic perception of the UN as a

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[2] Carol Gluck, 'The Past in the Present', in Andrew Gordon, ed., *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1993), p. 64; John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 199.

guarantor of peace and security.[3] Fairly soon, they had to conclude that hopes that the UN was going to shoulder the responsibility for Japan's security was but a fantasy. In his memoirs, the Japanese prime minister at the time, Yoshida Shigeru, writes that during the discussions resulting in the security treaty with the United States, the Japanese negotiators stated clearly that 'so long as the United Nations was not yet capable of fully enforcing the terms of its charter, the Japanese people desired the security of their country to be guaranteed by the United States.'[4] Nevertheless, the UN constituted an integral part of Japanese security thinking even during the period when Japan was not a member of the world organization.

Yoshida Shigeru

Prime minister at the time the new constitution was adopted was Yoshida Shigeru (prime minister 1946–47, 1948–54). He defended its adoption despite the fact that the document produced by the Americans was hardly to his liking. But the situation he found himself and his occupied country in was such that he saw no choice but to back the introduction of the new constitution.[5] Yoshida had been appointed prime minister after a one-year stint as foreign minister. In hindsight Yoshida has emerged as Japan's most important politician in the post-war period, since the basis of Japan's post-war political system was laid during his years as prime minister. In his evaluation of Yoshida's deed, the former British Ambassador to Japan, Sidney Giffard, argues:

The clarity of Yoshida's perception of Japan's national interests, especially throughout the harsh and joyless period of the Occupation, and of the limits placed on his tenacious pursuit of those interests, later won for him a place of great honour in his country's history. His achievement in working for and securing the resumption of independence in 1952 was uniquely the product of his character and personality. He saw and persuaded others of the possibility of a great national recovery,

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[3] Yokota Kisaburō and Otaka Tomō, *Kokusai rengō to Nihon* [The United Nations and Japan] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1956), p. 365.

[4] Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (London, Melbourne, Toronto: Heinemann, 1961), p. 265.

[5] J. W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979), pp. 328f.

and of the need to work with the former enemy, up to the limit of the tolerable and the practicable.[6]

Yoshida had worked as a diplomat already in the Meiji period (1868–1912) and subscribed to the thinking that guided Japanese leaders of that era.[7] Policies pursued by Japan from the Meiji period until the end of the Second World War were driven by a 'sense of inferiority' and feelings of belonging to a special group, which cultivated a nationalistic pride.[8] Another concern was world recognition and elevation of status implying a 'fear of being isolated internationally'.[9] This fear stands out as one of the strongest psychological factors behind Japan's foreign policy. The basis of this fear held by Japan's political leaders is captured in a famous memorandum written by one of the most influential and knowledgeable Japanese of the early Meiji era, Iwakura Tomomi:

Although we have no choice in having intercourse with the countries beyond the seas, in the final analysis these countries are our enemies. Why are they our enemies? Day by day those countries develop their arts and technology with a view to growing in wealth and power. Every foreign power tries to become another country's superior. Country A directs its efforts at country B, country B at country C – they are all the same. That is why I say, all countries beyond the seas are our enemies.[10]

The fear that a powerful, aggressive state would emerge and threaten Japan influenced its external policies during the Meiji era and gave birth to Japan's alliance with Great Britain (1902–23). The Meiji leadership was driven by resource-poor Japan's need for securing the supply of oil and

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[6] Sydney Giffard, *Japan Among the Powers, 1890–1990* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 146.

[7] See, e.g., Kitaoka Shin'ichi, 'Yoshida Shigeru ni okeru senzen to sengo' [Yoshida Shigeru's pre-war and post-war], Kindai Nihon kenkyūkai, ed., *Sengo gaikō no keisei* [The creation of post-war foreign policy], Nempō kindai Nihon kenkyū 16 (1994), pp. 105–31.

[8] Seizaburo Sato, 'The Foundations of Modern Japanese Foreign Policy', in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 376, 379.

[9] Ibid., p. 379.

[10] Quoted in Oka Yoshitake, 'Kokuminteki dokuritsu to kokka risei' [National independence and the formation of the state], in Itō Sei et al., eds, *Kindai Nihon shisōshi kōza* [Lectures on the history of thought of Modern Japan], 7 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1961), p. 12.

other resources. Hunting for resources, hungry for status and prestige and later in an attempt to solve the problem of overpopulation, Meiji Japan set out on the same path as Western great powers, engaging in expansionist policies marked by imperialism and aggression. It was a fateful choice that won wide acclaim when victories over China in 1895, Russia in 1905, and the annexation of Korea in 1910 made Japan take on the mantle of a great power. In the end this strategy led to defeat and disaster, however. After defeat and surrender in 1945, Japan's pre-war and wartime policies were roundly condemned in Japan, but it must be noted that denunciations were not of the policies *per se* but the fact that they had ended in defeat.

One of the harshest critics of pre-war and war-time policies was Yoshida Shigeru, Japan's longest serving premier in the post-war period. He was a steadfast guardian of the heritage of the Meiji leaders and denounced the militarists, who had 'distorted' and smeared the achievements of the Meiji statesmen.[11] Like the Meiji leaders, Yoshida was acutely aware of the fact that Japan's problems of feeding the population, its dependence on trade and the precarious security of sea lanes made the country vulnerable. Having failed in its bid for security through empire in pre-war and war times, Japan's objectives had to be pursued through other means than military in the post-war period. What Yoshida's biographer Kōsaka Masataka denoted *keizai chūshinshugi*, or 'economics first-ism', was a key tenet of Yoshida's thinking of what should guide Japan in the post-war world.[12] In the aftermath of defeat, he devised a strategy based on his conception of the nature of the Japanese state as a merchant state, *tsūshō kokka*, whose survival depended on its ability to trade based on the fact that Japan is surrounded by sea and thus a maritime nation, *kaiyō kokka*.[13] His vision of post-war Japan was based on this insight, and his polices were shaped in accordance with this understanding of the nature of the Japanese state and nation and the situation the country found itself in after the war. In his memoirs, Yoshida writes: 'The grand principle [*daigensoku*] of basing Japanese foreign policy principally on friendship

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[11] John Dower, 'Yoshida in the Scales of History', in John Dower, *Japan in War and Peace. Essays on History, Culture and Race* (London: Fontana Press, 1996), p. 221.

[12] Kōsaka Masataka, *Saishō Yoshida Shigeru* [Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1968), p. 67.

[13] Kōsaka Masataka, *Kaiyō kokka no kōsō* [Japan as a maritime nation] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1965).

with the United States will in all probability not be changed in the future, nor should it be changed. It arises not simply from the temporary situation after the war but is defending the great cause [*daidō*] of Japanese foreign policy since the Meiji era.'[14]

A national priority of Modern Japan has been to catch up with the West in every aspect of civilization so that the country would become a 'first-class country', *ittōkoku*. According to the leading international relations scholar Kōsaka Masataka, the Japanese attitude towards rank and norms is hierarchical so that 'at any given time, there is a definable rank order between any two nations, whereby one is higher, the other lower. […]. In the Meiji period the Japanese tended to classify the countries of the world as 'highly civilized,' 'semideveloped,' or 'backward.' In a later version the categories became 'first-rate power,' 'second-rate power,' and 'third-rate power,' and now they are 'super-power,' 'middle-power,' and 'small power.' Although such classifications can be found everywhere, the Japanese seem to be more intensely conscious of them.' Kōsaka's conclusion is that '[w]hatever its roots, the hierarchical concept of international society is still the basic framework within which Japanese classify their nation.'[15]

The process of catching up and surpassing has been an ingredient of Japan's modernization ever since the Meiji period. Notably, Yoshida Shigeru was an ardent believer in the wisdom of pursuing this national goal. It is linked to a quest for status and prestige that also pervades Japan's modern history.[16] The Meiji-inspired aspiration to hold a seat in the top echelon of nations is codified in the preamble of the post-war constitution, which declares that Japan wants to occupy 'an honoured position' in international society. The difference between pre-war and post-war times is that the military path chosen by the Meiji leaders in their search for an honourable position and international recognition of Japan was relinquished and replaced by the economic path by Japan's post-war political leadership.

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[14] Yoshida Shigeru, *Kaisō jūnen* [Recollections of ten years], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1957), p. 32.

[15] Masataka Kosaka, 'The International Economic Policy of Japan', in Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, p. 223; for a similar view, see Sato, 'The Foundations of Modern Japanese Foreign Policy', p. 378.

[16] R. P. Dore, 'The Prestige Factor in International Affairs', *International Affairs* 51:2 (April 1975), pp. 190–207.

During a brief period in the immediate post-war period some of Japan's die-hard nationalistic politicians expressed their longing for Japan to wield international leadership. The difference from pre-war times was that their quest was based no longer on military power but on moral and universal values embodied in Japan's new constitution.[17] Considering Japan's defeat in war and the fact that the country was occupied, this ambition was no more than the die-hard reaction of pre-war leaders, who returned to power after the war. As Yoshida pointed out maliciously in his memoirs, these politicians were leftovers from the pre-war period talking as if they had forgotten that Japan had lost the war.[18]

Yoshida Shigeru, the Realist in Action

Yoshida prided himself on being a realist and from this viewpoint, he could do no better in the aftermath of the war than write off for the time being Japan's claim of being an international leader of global stature to the detriment of its quest for status and prestige, which had been a lodestar of its political leadership since the early Meiji period. In a meeting with former Prime Minister Suzuki Kantarō, Yoshida had been reminded that:

[…] it was important to be a good winner in a war but equally important to be a good loser, and that he wanted me to remember carefully that cardinal fact. It was good advice, and I decided then and there to follow it throughout in my dealings with GHQ.

Being a good loser does not mean saying yes to everything the other party says; still less does it mean saying yes and going back on one's word later. It was obviously important to co-operate with the Occupation authorities to the best of one's power. But it seemed to me that where the men within G H Q were mistaken, through their ignorance of the actual facts concerned with my country, it was my duty to explain matters to them; and should their decision nevertheless be carried through, to abide by it until they themselves came to see that they had made a mistake. My policy, in other words, was to say whatever I felt needed saying, and to accept what transpired.[19]

Since Yoshida was first and foremost a realist, he took Suzuki's advice but this did not stop him from being carried by the vision of a

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[17] Bert Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 19.
[18] Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, p. 57.
[19] Ibid., p. 58.

future Japan regaining its status as a respected member of the international community.[20] In Yoshida, the longing of the Meiji statesmen that Japan would become a power on a par with the leading countries was as real as ever. A famous anecdote states that when he was appointed premier, he self-confidently told a friend that 'there are cases in history of winning by diplomacy after losing in war.'[21]

To quell Japan's urge to have a say in international affairs and its quest for international status and prestige in the way Yoshida accepted in order for Japan to regain its sovereignty went against what had guided Japan's leadership since the Meiji Restoration. He realized that post-war Japan had to accept and endure a submissive role in international affairs. This understanding of Japan's status as a defeated nation guided him during the negotiations with the US government over the conditions on which a peace settlement could be concluded. He took advantage of the fact that the US policy guiding the Occupation changed direction with the onset of the Cold War. The drive to clamp down on Japanese financial conglomerates, militarists and reactionaries, real or alleged, ceased to be a priority for the US government and its key objective became to secure economic and political stability and bolster Japan as a bastion against world communism. While leftists and pacifist circles in Japan opposed these policies, Japan's political leaders then in power, among them Yoshida, were vehement anti-communists and found the new course much more palatable than the political opposition's proposed policy of neutrality, which was a non-starter to Yoshida, who had spent many years as a diplomat and seen the great powers in action. To him, the new world situation with the sharp confrontation of ideological blocs became a blessing in disguise and presented Japan with an opportunity to prove its value to the United States by becoming an 'ally in training', *kenshūchū no dōmeikoku*.[22] His ideas had been shaped by the thinking of Meiji states-

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[20] See, e.g., Yoshida Shigeru, policy speech in the Diet, 8 November 1949, reprinted in Naikaku seido hyakunenshi hensan iinkai, ed., *Rekidai naikaku sōridaijin enzetsushū* [Collection of prime ministerial policy speeches] (Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsukyoku, 1985), p. 467.

[21] The source of this oft-told story gives his own version in, e.g., Takemi Tarō, *Senzen senchū sengo* [Pre-war, war, post-war] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1982), p. 195.

[22] Watanabe Akio, 'Yoshida Shigeru – jōkyō shikō no tatsujin' [Yoshida Shigeru – the expert on situational thinking], in Watanabe Akio, ed., *Sengo Nihon no saishō-tachi* [The prime ministers of post-war Japan] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1995), p. 53.

men but he also descended from samurais and knew the value of their lodestar, *nagai mono ni makareyō*, 'move with the powerful' – the clever samurai served a strong and victorious lord, while the stupid samurai worked for a weak lord and got killed.[23]

The negotiations in San Francisco over the peace treaty resulted in the conclusion of two treaties, which laid the foundations of Japan's foreign and security policies. The key document is the security treaty with the United States signed on 8 September 1951. The same day, a few hours earlier, a peace treaty had been signed by Japan and 48 other countries. The peace and security treaties were an indivisible unity with the bilateral security treaty *quid pro quo* for the peace treaty. A peculiar aspect of these negotiations that would bring an end to the Allied Occupation was that not all participants signed the peace treaty. The Soviet Union (joined by Poland and Czechoslovakia) refused to do so, which meant that Japan continued technically to be at war with the USSR. The lopsided treaty was described as 'partial' in contrast to the 'total' peace settlement that would have included all the countries that Japan had been involved in war with.

The security treaty was the result of secret negotiations with the Americans pursued by Yoshida and a few trusted assistants. Signed in 1951 and revised in 1960, the security treaty defined Japan as a junior partner in a bilateral security arrangement with the United States as Japan's ultimate military security underwriter against external threats.[24] It is no exaggeration to say that the security treaty was a life-line for Japan in the eyes of Yoshida. Japan obtained security protection from the United States in a situation where Japan's military power was virtually nil. The treaty became highly controversial when it was made public, but was 'nothing other than a realistic choice measured against the predominant Pax Americana' made by Yoshida.[25] Policies outlined in this document

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[23] John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1988), p. 2.

[24] Hosoya Chihiro, *Nihon gaikō no kiseki* [The track record of Japan's foreign policy] (Tokyo: Nihon hōsō shuppan kyōkai, 1993), p. 125.

[25] Yoshihide Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 21. Since Yoshida 'knew the security treaty was not popular in Japan', he was the only member of the Japanese delegation to the San Francisco peace conference who signed it. See Miura Yōichi, *Yoshida Shigeru to San Furanshisuko kōwa, gekan* [Yoshida Shigeru and the San Francisco peace agreement, latter vol.] (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1996), p. 276. Afterwards, Yoshida claimed that the reason he alone signed the treaty was because he wanted to shoul-

and adhered to by the Yoshida cabinet and later Japanese governments integrated Japan into the anti-communist camp and allowed the United States to have military bases in Japan even after the occupation. The security treaty provided forward positions for the United States for actions on the Asian mainland.

The US bases on Japanese soil created a permanent structure of control over Japan. John Foster Dulles, who was chief negotiator for the US government, described the 1951 security arrangements with Japan as 'a voluntary continuation of the Occupation'.[26] The implications of the security treaty were crystal-clear to Japan's political leadership and general public; Japan's subordination under the United States was a fact of life that the Japanese would have to live with for the foreseeable future. The political independence that Japan gained on 3 May 1952, when the peace treaty came into effect, was an illusion, since the price of the United States for extending its defence umbrella over its former enemy implied that Japan would not be able to pursue an independent foreign policy. This was a price that Yoshida was willing to pay in order to enable the Japanese to make his long-term dream come true − restoration of Japan's international position. He was carried by a vision of a future Japan, and since it went well with US policies after the change of policy instituted with the onset of the Cold War, he saw no reason to object too much to US policies. Instead, resistance to the treaties was mounted by an unlikely assemblage of Japanese radical-liberals and conservatives.[27]

The Yoshida Doctrine

Policies that took shape in the initial period after the Second World War were devised in such a way that they satisfied the basic but sharply diverging interests of the United States and Japan. In the aftermath of the war, it was of key importance for the US government to eliminate the possibility of a revival of Japanese militarism, while Prime Minister

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der full responsibility for the treaty. See Yoshida Shigeru, *Sekai to Nihon* [The world and Japan] (Tokyo: Banchō shobō, 1963), p. 159.

[26] LaFeber, *The Clash*, p. 297.

[27] Tetsuya Kataoka, *Waiting for a 'Pearl Harbor': Japan Debates Defense* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), p. 14.

Yoshida was obsessed by the problem of how to deal with the perennial problem of state security, in a situation when Japan was demilitarized and did not have military power to counter aggression from abroad or handle domestic unrest. Despite sometimes derisive criticism by pundits and laymen alike, Japanese governments from Yoshida onwards have pursued foreign and security policies guided by what is, in reality, a grand strategy since the early 1950s. The basic ideas comprising this grand strategy – retroactively baptized the Yoshida Doctrine – emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Despite its prominent place in standard works on Japan's modern history and foreign policy, there is no definition of the Yoshida Doctrine and even a lack of unanimity as to what constitutes this 'doctrine'. There is no document where Yoshida has penned this doctrine, and he denied even that he was the father of any doctrine.[28] In a standard work the political scientist Nagai Yōnosuke describes how the guiding principles of Japan's post-war foreign policy emerged during Yoshida's negotiations with the US government over the peace treaty and, in hindsight, claimed that these principles comprise a doctrine.[29]

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[28] Kenneth B. Pyle, 'Japan, the World, and the Twenty-first Century', in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds, *The Political Economy of Japan. Volume 2: The Changing International Context* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 550. Texts dealing with the history or political history of Modern Japan often describe the Yoshida Doctrine as if not only the ideas that comprise the doctrine emerged but also that the doctrine as such was formulated in the early postwar years. This is a historical rationalization *post festum*. The idea that there is such a doctrine became prominent at the beginning of the 1980s, when Nakasone Yasuhiro revived the attempts to eliminate this 'doctrine' as the basis of Japanese foreign and security policies. See, e.g., Takubo Tadae, *'Shinsekai chitsujo' to Nihon: 21 seiki e no yochō* ['The new world order' and Japan: Heralding the twenty-first century] (Tokyo: Jiji tsūshinsha, 1992), pp. 213f. Nakasone is well-known for his long-term resistance to Yoshida's policies and tried to get rid of Japan's 'passive' foreign policy à la Yoshida, when he became premier. For a discussion, see Pyle, 'Japan, the World, and the Twenty-first Century', p. 469. Illuminating of Nakasone's intentions is his *Rīdā no jōken: Becoming a leader* [The leader's condition: Becoming a leader] (Tokyo: Fusōsha, 1997), pp. 244f.

[29] Nagai Yōnosuke, 'Anzen hoshō to kokumin keizai: Yoshida dokutorin wa eien nari' [National security and national economy: The Yoshida Doctrine is eternal], in Nagai Yōnosuke, *Gendai to senryaku* [The contemporary era and strategy] (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1985), p. 63. Who first coined the term 'Yoshida Doctrine' is not entirely clear but it is often claimed that it was Nagai; when I asked him at a conference in 1991 who came up with the concept, he did not deny that he was its inventor. See Bert Edström, 'Yoshida Shigeru and "the Yoshida Doctrine"', *The*

The results of attempts to pin down the Yoshida Doctrine vary. According to Michael Green, it is equal to 'economic strength with minimal remilitarization'[30]; which is close to Igarashi Takeshi's 'policy of prioritizing economic restoration and opting for light armament'[31]; and Kawashima Yutaka's version that the doctrine is the decision when Yoshida 'opted to create a lightly armed mercantile state'[32]. These descriptions are too rudimentary, however. They miss what must be seen to be the key aspect of the Yoshida Doctrine – to the extent that such a doctrine actually exists – the key role played by Japan's relationship with the United States. This is the central aspect of the definition presented by Kōsaka Masataka, until his death Japan's leading international relations scholar. This devoted Yoshida disciple described the Yoshida Doctrine as consisting of three elements: (1) the basis is the alliance relationship with America which is a guarantee for national security; (2) which enables Japan to remain lightly armed; and (3) resources made available should be used for economic purposes by Japan as a trading nation.[33] Another influential attempt at a definition has been presented by the historian Kenneth Pyle who describes its tenets as: (1) Japan's economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal; political and economic cooperation with the United States is necessary for this purpose; (2) Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues; not only would this low posture free the energies of its people for productive industrial development, it would make it possible to

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Stockholm Journal of East Asian Studies 4 (1993), p. 131. While Nagai is certainly one of the most prolific proponents of the doctrine, it seems to be Nishihara Masashi who came up with the term and the idea that a bundle of ideas held by Yoshida constituted a doctrine. See, e.g., Masashi Nishihara, 'Wie lange hält die "Yoshida-Doctrine" noch? Japan vor der Notwendigkeit außenpolitischen Anpassungen', *Europa-Archiv* 33:14 (1978), pp. 441–52.

[30] Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 10.

[31] Igarashi, *Nichibei kankei to higashi Ajia*, p. 159.

[32] Yutaka Kawashima, *Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 9.

[33] Kōsaka Masataka, 'Nihon gaikō no benshō' [Scrutinizing Japanese diplomacy], in Aruga Tadashi et al., eds, *Nihon no gaikō* [Japanese foreign policy], Kōza kokusai seiji 4 [Lectures on international relations 4] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1989), p. 299.

avoid divisive internal struggles; and (3) to gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for the US army, navy, and air force.[34]

The lack of unanimity as to how the Yoshida Doctrine should be formulated, at the same time as there is general agreement that it constitutes the basis of Japan's foreign and security policies, indicates that it is more an expression of ideology than a well-defined body of ideas. It is an exaggeration to claim that it was Yoshida single-handedly who devised the policies from which the existence of this doctrine is derived, but he has become the symbol for policies that took shape during the Occupation when the Americans were in full control.[35]

The foundation of Japan's foreign policy that Yoshida Shigeru laid has been ingeniously characterized by Susan Pharr as a 'low-cost, low-risk, benefit-maximizing strategy', defensive in nature and skilful to the degree to which US needs were exploited for Japan's gain.[36] Japan's political leaders and broad strata of the population accepted US policies aimed at preventing the resurgence of Japanese militarism. In decades to come, the two countries quarrelled occasionally but the bones of contention were not of a political but of an economic nature. Adhering to the Yoshida Doctrine, Japanese governments have sided with the US government on important issues of international affairs. This policy line had obvious advantages. Policies pursued by the Japanese government based on the Yoshida Doctrine have allowed Japan to enjoy peace in the post-war period that resembles the more than two and a half centuries long Tokugawa period (1603–1868), when Japan had peace and did not have to arm for national defence purposes.[37] Another important aspect is that the claim that policies are based on the Yoshida Doctrine implies that policies pursued by Japan's post-occupation governments can be blamed on, or credited to, Yoshida.

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[34] Pyle, 'Japan, the World, and the Twenty-first Century', p. 454; Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1992), p. 25.

[35] Dower, 'Yoshida in the Scales of History', p. 210.

[36] Susan J. Pharr, 'Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing', in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 235f.

[37] Sakakibara Eisuke, *Atarashii kokka o tsukuru tame ni* [In order to build a new state] (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha, 2001), p. 144.

Yoshida's decision to jump on the American bandwagon and forego a peace deal with the Soviet Union solved one of the perennial problems of states, that of security, but the corollary was that the treaties signed in San Francisco caused the East–West Cold War antagonism to be introduced into Japanese domestic politics. Yoshida introduced into Japanese domestic politics antagonisms of world politics, digging a chasm between the ruling conservative and the opposition camps in domestic politics that would haunt Japanese political life for decades. Security policy became the key bone of contention in domestic politics and a source of ideological divide in post-war Japan.[38] Japan's fate did not resemble that of Germany – to be divided – but division cut deep into its body politic.

The Evolution of Japan's Post-war Security Thinking

During the years when Prime Minister Yoshida was negotiating with the US government to end the Allied occupation, a two-tiered Japanese foreign policy system took shape. On the one hand, Japan tried to live up to the lofty pacifism laid down in the constitution and, on the other, relied on US support and protection and placed itself squarely behind the United States in international affairs. Such a two-legged stand in international affairs is unusual – to say the least. In pacifism as preached and practised in Japan, 'undertones of isolationism, unilateralism and free-ridership' can be discerned.[39] The Japanese became used to ascribing to the philosophy of 'fire across the river', *taigan no kasai*, referring to a major event not affecting them directly.[40] Aloofness is often interpreted as a result of the outcome of the Second World War. This is not correct, however, since its roots go back to the Tokugawa period, when the ruling Shogunate decided

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[38] Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Nihon ni okeru kokusai reisen to kokunai reisen' [The international Cold War and the domestic Cold War in Japan], in Sakamoto Yoshikazu, *Kakujidai no kokusai seiji* [International politics in the nuclear era] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1983), pp. 81–121. Originally published in *Iwanami kōza Gendai 6: Reisen – seijiteki kōsatsu* [Iwanami lectures, The contemporary period 6: The Cold War – political considerations] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1963).

[39] Takashi Inoguchi, *Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), p. 21.

[40] Thomas R. H. Havens, *Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965– 1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. vii.

to cut off Japan from contacts with countries overseas and largely succeeded in doing so. This policy of seclusion – in posteriority known as *sakoku*, lit. 'chained country' – was adopted as an effort to legitimize and strengthen the authority of the ruling Shogunate and lasted for more than two centuries; it is a sobering fact that Japan's modern foreign policy dates back only to 1868.[41] The centuries-long history of *sakoku* had implications for post-war policies. According to Mayumi Itoh, 'the *sakoku* mentality constitutes a cultural impediment to Japan's internationalisation […] Since the *sakoku* mentality is deeply rooted in the Japanese psyche, it is extremely difficult to remove and hence is the most fundamental barrier to Japan's overall *kokusaika* [internationalization]. Despite their modern outlook, most Japanese retain the *sakoku* mentality.' Itoh argues that post-war pacifism in Japan is one of the attributes of the *sakoku* mentality and has been a major obstacle to expanding Japan's role in the maintenance of international peace and security.[42]

Aloofness and unwillingness to get involved in international affairs combined with pacifism created in Japan a unique blend of *ikkoku heiwashugi*, or 'one-country pacifism', a notion implying that everything is all right if only Japan is at peace. Inoguchi Takashi has described this idea as meaning that 'Japan alone is unarmed, Japan alone has no intention to aggrandize territory militarily', which will make foreign countries respect Japan's sovereignty.[43] It resulted in a tendency of Japan to pursue 'its own' peace with little or no regard to the security of other countries. The corollary of the perceived need for keeping the world at arm's length was fear that Japan would be entangled in war or dragged into international conflicts by virtue of its ties to the United States, the so-called *makikomare* thesis.[44]

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[41] Kase Toshikazu, *Watashi no gendai gaikōshi: Taiketsu kara taiwa e no chōryū* [My history of contemporary foreign policy: The trend from conflict towards dialogue] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1971), p. 199.

[42] Mayumi Itoh, *Globalization of Japan: Japanese sakoku mentality and US efforts to open Japan* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 35, 47.

[43] Inoguchi Takashi, 'Japan's images and options: not a challenger, but a supporter', in Inoguchi Takashi, *Japan's International Relations* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), p. 27.

[44] Pharr, 'Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing', p. 239; Nakanishi, *Kokusai seiji to wa nani ka*, p. 118.

Prime Minister Yoshida was succeeded in 1954 by Hatoyama Ichirō (prime minister 1954–56), who was replaced by Kishi Nobusuke (prime minister 1957–60) after the brief interlude of Ishibashi Tanzan (prime minister December 1956–February 1957). Both took an entirely different stance than Yoshida to policies introduced by the Occupation. Once in power, they tried to pursue assertive policies and regain a say for Japan in security matters. Both Hatoyama and Kishi failed in this respect but are noted for two accomplishments. First, the Hatoyama government succeeded in obtaining UN membership for Japan in 1956, after a number of unsuccessful bids. It symbolized Japan's return to the community of nations. It was a moving moment for a country which only a decade earlier had been a defeated and devastated nation and singled out in the UN Charter as an 'enemy country'. UN membership was a proof that the wounds caused by the misdeeds perpetrated by the Japanese military during the pre-war and war years had begun to heal. It was an early example of how membership in international organizations was seen by the Japanese as opening up the avenue for their country to play a role in the world again.

After UN membership had been granted, *kokuren chūshinshugi* or 'UN centrism' was declared a pillar of Japan's foreign policy and nucleus of its 'UN diplomacy', *kokuren gaikō*. The latter was held in high esteem but is a vague concept.[45] *Kokuren chūshinshugi* implies that Japan should conduct its foreign policy in line with the objectives and principles of the UN, which are seen as basically identical with those of the Japanese constitution.[46] This 'principle' was announced by Foreign Minister Kishi in a speech in the Diet on 4 February 1957. Soon after its launch, *kokuren chūshinshugi* had been 'relegated to occasionally used rhetoric'.[47] That

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[45] Although *kokuren gaikō* was said to be a 'pillar' of Japanese foreign policy, scholars were quick to point out the lack of a definition of this concept already from the start. See, e.g., Makiuchi Masao, 'Kokusai rengō to Nihon' [The United Nations and Japan], *Kokusai seiji* (Summer 1957), p. 49.

[46] Yasuhiro Ueki, 'Japan's UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism', in Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, p. 349.

[47] Ibid. In fact, the concept of UN centrism disappeared from the *Diplomatic Bluebook* already with its third issue issued in 1959. See Shinjo Takahiro, *Shinkokurenron: Kokusai heiwa no tame no Kokuren to Nihon no yakuwari* [On the new United Nations: The roles of the UN and Japan for international peace] (Tokyo: Ōsaka daigaku shuppankai, 1995), p. 266. The importance of the UN for Japan's enunciated foreign policy doctrine should not be underestimated. The United Nations as the

this declaration was rhetoric to a large extent was demonstrated when a conspicuous gap between Japan's declared and actual policy emerged. In 1958, the Japanese government refused to comply with a request from UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to send ten observers to Lebanon.[48] It was a flagrant violation of the solemn pledge given by the Japanese government in 1952 when it handed in Japan's application for UN membership, that it accepted the obligations found in the UN Charter and 'undertakes to honour them, by all means at its disposal, from the day when Japan becomes a member of the United Nations.'[49]

Kishi's feat was that he was able to reach agreement with the Americans to get rid of the most glaring inequalities inherent in the 1951 security treaty. When the revised treaty was submitted to the Diet in 1960, nation-wide demonstrations took place and a planned visit to Japan by US President Dwight Eisenhower had to be cancelled. The political unrest

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guarantor of Japan's security is a hope that has not been altogether abandoned in Japan. See Hoshino Toshiya, 'Nihon no Kokuren gaikō to Nichibei kankei: Maruchi no sentaku–bai no sentaku' [Japan's UN diplomacy and the Japan–US relationship: The multilateral vs the bilateral choice], in Kusano Atsushi and Umemoto Tetsuya, eds, *Gendai Nihon gaikō no bunseki* [An analysis of contemporary Japan's foreign policy] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1995), p. 11. The security treaty signed in 1951 with the United States and renewed in 1960 states that the treaty is pending the UN taking responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as pointed out in Muroyama Yoshimasa, 'Nichibei ampō taisei no kōzō to ronri: Kyōdō bōeiron to tadanori ron' [The structure and logic of the Japan–US security system: On mutual defence and free ridership], in Tōkyō daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyūsho, ed., *Gendai Nihon shakai 7: Kokusaika* [Modern Japanese society 7: Internationalization] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1992), p. 277. The security treaty of 1951 declares that Japan 'as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense', while the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States states that the treaty 'shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.'

[48] Tanaka Akihiko, *Anzen hoshō: Sengo 50 nen no mosaku* [Security: Fifty years of groping in the post-war period] (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1997), p. 210.

[49] The relevant document delivered to the UN by Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo in 1952 is reproduced in a book by the former director of the Cabinet Security Affairs Office Sassa Atsuyuki, *Poritiko-miritarii no susume: Nihon no anzen hoshō gyōsei no gemba kara* [Politico-military advance: From the scene of Japan's national security management] (Tokyo: Toshi shuppan, 1994), p. 77.

toppled Kishi who was replaced by a Yoshida disciple, Ikeda Hayato. True to the teachings of his mentor, Ikeda concluded that Japan had to abstain from whatever smacked of ambitions in international affairs and leave the United States to handle matters of international security. He did so in a way worthy of a Yoshida devotee. Having abandoned the ambitions of Hatoyama and Kishi to regain Japan's independence in security affairs, Japan under Ikeda and his successors indulged in an avid search for national prosperity, resembling in its intensity the desire to be recognized as 'a first-class country' that guided the Meiji leadership in the early decades of modernization. The Japanese dedicated themselves single-mindedly to economic pursuits, which made many describe Japan as a *chōnin kokka*, 'merchant state'. Yoshida would not have had any objections, since it was very much the essence of his conception of the Japanese state.

Ikeda's decision to give up international political ambitions and opt for economic growth resulted in a single-minded pursuit of economism, also called *GNP shugi* or 'GNP-ism', which turned Japan into an international economic powerhouse in a few years. Already at the end of the 1960s, the country was described as an economic great power and by the 1990s it was talked of 'routinely' as an economic superpower.[50] Japan's way of participating in world affairs was deeply coloured by the economism that Yoshida and his political disciples nurtured. On the other hand, offended nationalists found to their consternation that Yoshida's policies had turned Japan into what they saw as 'a half-nation', *hankokka*, a country guided by a constitution emasculating defences, single-mindedly dedicated to economic pursuits.[51] Such arguments pro et contra notwithstanding, a few years after Yoshida discarded the possibility of Japanese rearmament, his government began what was in fact such a process.

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[50] Glenn D. Hook et al., *Japan's International Relations: Politics, economics and security* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 4.

[51] See, e.g., Sassa Atsuyuki, 'Posuto-Maruta ni okeru Nihon no chii' [Japan's position after the Malta summit], *Chūō kōron* 1268 (March 1991), pp. 52f; Ibe Hideo, *Hankokka-Nihon: Sengo gurando dezain no hatan* [Japan as a half nation: The breakdown of the post-war grand design] (Kyoto: Minerva shobō, 1993), pp. 102–16.

Rearmament

Given Yoshida's economistic leanings, one important aspect of the post-war system established during his time in power is economic. As much as the signing of the security treaty was his way of providing for Japan's security, the decision to join the US camp also paved the way for the reconstruction and development of the Japanese economy. One of the key measures taken by the Occupation immediately after the war was to demilitarize Japan and disband its military forces. When the US changed this policy and pushed for a large-scale, rapid Japanese rearmament programme, Yoshida refused to comply. A major argument used by him was that the country could ill afford a large budget for military purposes. He succeeded in not having to give in to US pressures after the onset of the Cold War, and Japan had to allocate comparatively few resources to military defence. Instead, it could invest in building up its industry, paving the way for Japan's economic 'miracle'. Nevertheless, the Japanese government began what in reality amounted to rearmament roughly at this time, despite the fact that Yoshida abhorred the 'waste' of expenditure for military purposes and that the security treaty framework agreed upon in 1951 made Japan enjoy security guarantees from the United States and shielded it from adverse events in the international environment.

When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the United States sent troops stationed on its bases in Japan to the war front. The resulting vacuum had to be filled. Soon after the dispatch of troops to Korea, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Douglas MacArthur gave what was in reality an order to the Japanese government to augment Japan's police force by a national police reserve of 75,000 men. Based on the security treaty which stipulated that Japan would 'increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression',[52] Japanese rearmament got a boost in 1954, when the reserve police force was renamed the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), a euphemism for what was in reality the basis of a military force.[53] It was composed of an army, a navy and an air force, officially named the Ground, Maritime and Air

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[52] *Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan*, 8 September 1951, §3.
[53] Iokibe, ed., *Sengo Nihon gaikōshi*, p. 66.

Self-Defense Force, respectively. If it had not been realized before, by this time it was evident that rearmament had started.[54]

Given the history of Japanese aggression in the recent past, rearmament initiated by the Yoshida government advanced with little fanfare. It was a highly controversial issue both domestically and in Japan's external relations. Its pre-war and war-time atrocities had resulted in a cataclysm of death and destruction that cast a long shadow.[55] Rearmament only a few years after Japan's defeat was bound to worry neighbours who had been exposed to Japanese aggression. Signs of Japan seeking a proactive and independent security role invited suspicions among its neighbours, albeit Japanese defence expenditure was modest in comparison to other countries. Its highest level was recorded in 1955 when it accounted for 1.78 per cent of Japan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but subsequently sank steadily, eventually stabilizing at slightly less than one per cent.[56]

Since Japan's GDP increased rapidly from the beginning of the 1950s, this 'one per cent' meant nevertheless a sizeable expansion of defence expenditure. Already by 1969, Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi described Japan's Self-Defense Force as 'considerable' and, in fact, stronger than Japan's Imperial Army at its peak.[57]

The increase of Japan's military expenditure worried even conservative politicians, and in 1976 the Miki Takeo government established one per cent of GDP as a lid on the expansion of the defence budget. This ceiling was removed in 1986 after a stubborn fight by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, a nationalistic politician who was determined to build

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[54] Etō Shinkichi and Yamamoto Yoshinobu, *Sōgō anzen to mirai no sentaku* [Comprehensive security and future options] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1991), p. 106.

[55] Takashi Inoguchi, 'Japan and Pacific Asia: Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II', in Takashi Inoguchi and Lyn Jackson, eds, *Memories of War: World War II and Japanese Historical Memory in Comparative Perspective* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998), p. 48.

[56] J. C. Campbell, '"Hikettei" no Nihon no bōei seisaku' ['Nondecisions' in Japan's defence policy], in Tomita Nobuo and Sone Yasunori, eds, *Sekai seiji no naka no Nihon seiji: Takyokuka jidai no senryaku to senjutsu* [Japanese politics amidst world politics: Strategy and tactics in the era of multipolarization] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1983), p. 74.

[57] Article by then Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi, as quoted in Kaihara Osamu, *Anzen hoshō-Nihon no sentaku: Nihonjin wa kuni o mamoreru no ka* [National security-Japan's choice: Can the Japanese defend their country?] (Tokyo: Jiji tsūshinsha, 1996), p. 150.

up Japan's military capability.[58] While no particular increase of the defence budget as a share of the GDP was seen after the ceiling had been lifted, Japan's rapidly increasing GDP led to a swelling defence budget. Compared to other countries, 'one percent' allowed sizeable defence expenditure (see Table 1).

Table 1. Total Defence Expenditure, selected countries

	Expenditure ($m constant 2000)			Rank	
	1985	2001	2002	1985	2002
United States	380,899	299,917	329,616	1	1
China	21,616	42,335	48,380	3	2
Russia	368,327*	44,813	48,040	2	3
Japan	20,139	39,365	37,070	4	4
India	10,948	13,967	13,073	6	5
South Korea	6,861	11,077	12,615	9	6
Canada	11,164	8,326	7,771	5	7
Australia	6,613	6,832	7,549	10	8
Taiwan	9,295	7,872	7,479	7	9
Indonesia	3,674	5,419	6,245	11	10
North Korea	7,761	4,374	4,728	8	11
Singapore	1,567	4,247	4,334	16	12
Malaysia	1,748	3,223	3,260	15	13
Burma	1,475	2,236	2,837	17	14
Pakistan	2,669	2,414	2,541	12	15
Vietnam	2,079	2,311	2,286	14	16
Kazakhstan	...	1,847	1,986	...	17
Uzbekistan	...	1,750	1,797	...	18
Thailand	2,296	1,861	1,730	13	19
Philippines	633	1,123	1,511	19	20

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. *Value is for the Soviet Union.

Source: Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds, *Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power* (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), p. 506.

Cork in the Bottle

The security treaty rested on the tacit understanding that US troops at bases in Japan would guarantee the prevention of Japan's military resurgence, and functioned as a kind of 'cork in the bottle' making a revival of Japanese militarism impossible, and mitigating the fears of countries in the

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[58] Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Atarashii hoshu no ronri* [The logic of new conservatism] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1978), pp. 239ff.

region.[59] Thus, the treaty framework was not only a defence mechanism handling threats *against* Japan's security but also an arrangement dealing with threats *from* Japan. A corollary was that the security treaty served to ease the fears of other Asian countries of a revival of Japanese militarism. The cork-in-the-bottle argument surfaced in the talks that US President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger held with Chinese leaders in the early 1970s, when distrust of Japan harboured by neighbours was still vivid.[60] According to Nixon, 'If the United States is gone from Asia, gone from Japan, our protests, no matter how loud, would be like firing an empty cannon. We would have no effect, because thousands of miles away is just too far to be heard.'[61] Another widely reported incident that showed the viability of the cap-in-the-bottle argument was when the *Washington Post* reported a statement in 1990 by the top Marine Corps general in Japan, Major General Henry C. Stackpole III, that US troops must remain in Japan at least until the beginning of the twenty-first century in large part because 'no one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan. So we are a cap in the bottle, if you will.'[62] Commenting on General Stackpole's statement, the political scientist Watanabe Akio noted that the general described the security treaty 'as a most reliable device to restrain or, if you like, contain Japan.'[63] What might seem a bit peculiar is that this view was accepted by one of Japan's most outspoken nationalists, former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who subscribed to the view that the security treaty was 'preventing the resurgence of Japanese militarism'.[64] Not surprisingly, the cap in the bottle idea incensed Japanese national-

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[59] Yukio Satoh, 'Emerging trends in Asia–Pacific security: The role of Japan', *The Pacific Review* 8:2 (1995), p. 277.

[60] Yoshihide Soeya, 'The U.S.–Japan Alliance', in *The Future of the U.S.–Japan Security Relationship*, Asian Perspectives Seminar, Washington, DC, 20 November 2003, p. 4, http://www.tafjapan.org/english/asia/pdf/apsjapan.pdf (downloaded 8 March 2006).

[61] Richard M. Nixon, *RN: the memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 567.

[62] *Washington Post*, 27 March 1990; quoted in Pyle, *The Japanese Question*, p. 16.

[63] Akio Watanabe, 'Japan's Role in the Changing Northeast Asian Order', *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 22:2 (Summer 1991), p. 260.

[64] 'Nakasone Says Security Treaty Helps Keep Japanese Militarism in Check', *The Japan Digest*, 21 February 1992, p. 2; quoted in Chalmers Johnson, 'Japan in Search of a "Normal" Role', University of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, *IGCC Policy Paper* 3 (July 1992), p. 3.

ists.[65] In a comment, a *Yomiuri shimbun* columnist took offence when some US officials argued that US forces in Japan were needed to contain Japanese rearmament at the same time as the US government insisted that Japan pay more for those forces: 'Some Japanese cannot feel good about paying for a watchdog that watches them.'[66]

The Yoshida Doctrine and Japan's Foreign Policy

After having regained sovereignty in 1952, Japan was solidly placed within the defence perimeter of the United States and insulated from adverse world events. Having handed over its defence against external enemies to the United States, Japan was placed in a US 'greenhouse', to use a phrase coined by a leading authority on Japan's foreign policy.[67] The greenhouse refers to the fact that the United States took *de facto* responsibility for Japan's defence against external threats. A similar assessment was presented by a senior Japanese ambassador and later head of a think tank, Okazaki Hisahiko, according to whom Japan could stay in a 'cocoon', since it had limited sense of an external threat and saw little reason to build a military force during the Cold War.[68] For military security, the Japanese government deferred to the US strategic view of the world and eschewed development of a view of its own.[69] The inherently asymmetrical security treaty framework has been a straight-jacket for Japan in the sense that its foreign policy has been subordinated to the bilateral relationship with the United States. With US bases on Japanese territory and *de facto* placed under US control, Japan's ability to act as a major power in East Asia became severely restricted. But as noted by Inoguchi Takashi, 'as long as the United States gives its security umbrella

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[65] Yukio Okamoto, 'Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance', *The Washington Quarterly* 25:2 (Spring 2002), p. 61.

[66] Quoted in Pyle, 'The Japanese Question', p. 138.

[67] Donald C. Hellman, 'Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy within an American Greenhouse', in Inoguchi and Okimoto, eds, *The Political Economy of Japan. Volume 2: The Changing International Context*, pp. 356ff.

[68] Hisahiko Okazaki, *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense* (Lanham, New York, London: Abt Books, 1986), pp. 75f.

[69] Tsuneo Akaha, 'Three Faces of Japan: Nationalist, Regionalist and Globalist Futures', in Yoshinobu Yamamoto, ed., *Globalism, Regionalism & Nationalism: Asia in Search of Its Role in the 21st Century* (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), p. 177.

to Japan [...] the Japanese do not see their semi-sovereign status as a problem. Indeed, it is a gift from heaven, a golden opportunity of which best use should be made.'[70]

Japan's bifurcated security policy resulted in a low-key approach to world affairs, and the country has often been said to lack not only a grand strategy but even a foreign policy. Such claims were seen time and again throughout the 1970s and 1980s and have lingered on until today.[71] Back in 1979, Gerald Curtis argued that foreign policy was seen by the Japanese as a problem of moving Japan between the Scylla and Charybdis of international political and economic affairs, with success dependent on a combination of skill, fortitude and luck, and he concluded that '[t]his psychological orientation is not conducive either to bold initiatives or to grand strategy.'[72] Similarly, Reinhard Drifte has argued that there is no 'master plan' for Japan's foreign and economic policies.[73] Japan's leading foreign policy scholar Kōsaka Masataka did not hesitate in an essay published in 1994 to state that 'Japan does not have any foreign policy in a real sense' [*shin no imi no gaikō ga sonzai shinai*].[74] In a recent contribution, one of Japan's no doubt most sharp-eyed political observers, Kitaoka Shin'ichi, states that Japan has little 'in the way of an independent foreign policy stance'.[75]

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[70] Takashi Inoguchi, 'Japan: Reassessing the Relationship between Power and Wealth', in Ngaire Woods, ed., *Explaining International Relations since 1945* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 251. The 'gift from heaven' alludes to a famous statement by Yoshida, who argued that the constitutional ban on the use of military force was actually 'heaven-bestowed good fortune' for Japan; quoted in Miyazawa Kiichi, *Tōkyō–Washinton no mitsudan* [Secret talks between Tokyo and Washington] (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1956), p. 10.

[71] For illustrations, see Bert Edström, 'Some Prevalent Perceptions of Japan's Foreign Policy in the *World Press Archives*, 1969–1984', *The Stockholm Journal of East Asian Studies* 1 (1988), pp. 96–119.

[72] Gerald L. Curtis, 'Domestic Politics and Japanese Foreign Policy', in William J. Barnds, ed., *Japan and the United States: Challenges and Opportunities* (New York: New York University Press, 1979), p. 70.

[73] Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century: From Economic Super-power to What Power?* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 5.

[74] Kōsaka Masataka, *Kōsaka Masataka gaikō hyōronshū: Nihon no shinro to rekishi no kyōkun* [Collected essays by Kōsaka Masataka: Japan's path and lessons of history] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1996), p. 394.

[75] Kitaoka Shin'ichi, 'Reform in Japanese Foreign Affairs: Policy Reform Long Overdue', *Gaiko Forum* 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 3f.

Views resembling those exemplified above have not been uncommon even among Japan's leading politicians. The existence of ambitions has been hinted at, but claims that Japan should pursue a grand strategy have been phrased modestly. A security specialist has noted that it 'is difficult to infer a grand strategy from the official Japanese documents or practice. For several reasons, much is left unsaid, and intentionally or otherwise, left to interpretation.'[76] Researchers do not seem to consider grand strategy a concept relevant to their analyses of the foreign and security policies of post-war Japan. When the world-renowned historian Paul Kennedy edited a book on grand strategies published in 1991, Japan was not among the countries taken into account.[77]

This treatment of Japan is representative of contemporary journalism and scholarship. Strategy is first and foremost a military term and there are solid reasons why such a concept can be seen as not applicable to Japan. The country has a pacifist constitution and has kept its military expenditure at a comparatively low level. This fact notwithstanding, it is hard not to find that post-war Japan has been guided by a grand strategy. In his classic study of strategy, Edward Mead Earle writes: 'The highest type of strategy – sometimes called grand strategy – is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.'[78] With such a definition, Japanese governments in the post-war period must be said to have been guided by a grand strategy, albeit this fact has not been loudly and proudly proclaimed. What is clear is that the Yoshida Doctrine illustrates a case of a grand strategy as defined by Earle in the sense that it 'integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is rendered unnecessary'.

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[76] Mutiah Alagappa, presentation at the panel 'Revolution in Security Affairs', in 'Japan's Emerging Security Role and East Asia', Fifth annual CNAPS Spring Conference, 14 June 2005, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC (transcript), http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/center.htm (downloaded 20 April 2006).

[77] Paul Kennedy, ed. *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991). The countries dealt with are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

[78] Edward Meade Earle, 'Introduction', in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. xiii.

Japan as 'A Great Power of a New Type'

The idea that Japan could be not only the economic power that it had grown into but also a political power began to surface at the end of the 1960s, when Japan was moving rapidly upwards in the international pecking order as a result of years of rapid economic growth. In 1969, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku argued in the Diet that Japan had developed into 'one of the world's economically prominent countries…able to play a leading role in international society', but he did not specify what role he had in mind.[79] Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo was equally vague a decade later, when he spoke of Japan being 'strongly called upon to fulfil a leading role' but, like Satō, did not specify what kind of leadership he was thinking of.[80] Prime ministers after Fukuda avoided announcing any leadership ambitions in their policy speeches in the Diet until Miyazawa Kiichi did so in 1991, the nadir of Japanese self-esteem in the aftermath of the debacle of its foreign policy in the Persian Gulf War, which created a need for Japan's political leaders to show resolve in order to keep face. What Miyazawa had in mind when he spoke out in favour of Japanese leadership meant a difference compared to his predecessors in that he foresaw Japan playing a role in an area of high politics but with the important qualification that Japan was to share responsibilities with the United States.[81] Anything else would be hard to expect since he was a trusted disciple of Yoshida Shigeru and a faithful defender of the Yoshida Doctrine and careful not to challenge US leadership.

In an apt characterization, Kōsaka Masataka captured Japan's nature as an international actor by describing it as an 'unbalanced great power', *anbaransu na taikoku*.[82] Japan had economic muscle but pursued a low key foreign policy. Kōsaka's essay pointed to a problem that has been with Japan ever since it began to be seen as an international power. Even by the 1970s Fukuda Takeo wanted to turn Japan's identity of being an

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[79] Satō Eisaku, policy speech in the Diet, 27 January 1969, in Naikaku seido hyaku-nenshi hensan iinkai, ed., *Rekidai naikaku sōridaijin enzetsushū*, p. 798.

[80] Fukuda Takeo, policy speech in the Diet, 20 September 1978, in Naikaku seido hyakunenshi hensan iinkai, ed., *Rekidai naikaku sōridaijin enzetsushū*, p. 985.

[81] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, p. 154.

[82] Kōsaka Masataka, *Heiwa to kiki no kōzō: Posutoreisen no kokusai seiji* [Peace and the structure of crisis: Post-Cold War international politics] (Tokyo: Nihon hōsō shuppan kyōkai, 1995), pp. 43f.

'unbalanced great power' into something positive. He described Japan on one hand as a 'resources-small power' [*shigen shokoku*], and, on the other, as a great power basing its power position not on military might as traditional great powers but on other factors, primarily economic ones. Realizing the constraints against Japan being a 'normal' great power, he argued that Japan should opt for being a peaceful great power, *heiwa taikoku*. Japan should acquire great power status not based on military might as traditional powers but on economic power, moral virtues, and humanitarianism. It was an idea that he launched during his prime ministerial campaign in 1972.[83] In his eyes, this would make Japan 'a great power of a new type'. Fukuda was not a lone voice, however; this idea had been in vogue since the end of the 1960s.[84]

Fukuda's dream of Japan as a power was true to the teachings of the Yoshida Doctrine but also represented an adjustment to reality, since the traditional avenue for a country to become a great power based on military factors was closed to Japan for psychological, historical and constitutional reasons. Consequently, there was a genuine sense of achievement among Japanese, when Japan was asked to participate in the G-7 summit of the major industrial powers, the first of which took place in Rambouillet in 1975. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone's impressive stature when he was standing shoulder to shoulder with towering international figures like US President Ronald Reagan and Great Britain's Iron Lady Margaret Thatcher demonstrated to the Japanese that their country had joined the ranks of power.[85] To many Japanese, it signified the conclusion of the process of catching up.

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[83] Urata Susumu, *Hyōden Fukuda Takeo* [Fukuda Takeo: A critical biography] (Tokyo: Kokusai shōgyō shuppan, 1978), p. 146. Fukuda's speech is reprinted in Fukuda Takeo, *Hoshu saisei ni tatsu* [Amidst the conservative revival] (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1977), pp. 198–205.
[84] Bert Edström, *Japan's Quest for a Role in the World: Roles Ascribed to Japan Nationally and Internationally, 1969–1982*. Stockholm University Department of Japanese and Korean Studies, Japanological Studies 7 (Stockholm 1988), pp. 88–91.
[85] Tanaka Naoki, *Nihon seiji no kōsō* [A vision of Japanese politics] (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbunsha, 1994), p. 256.

Comprehensive Security

The hefty increase in Japan's defence expenditure did not soothe the shrill accusations from leading US politicians that Japan was a 'free rider' in security matters, which had been heard from the time Japan began to be seen as an economic power in its own right. Severe criticism was heard from disgruntled US politicians and the US government that Japan did not shoulder enough of the defence burden. To refute these accusations and make credible its claim that the budget for security and defence purposes was larger than conventional assessments indicated, the Japanese government launched the concept of comprehensive security, *sōgō anzen hoshō*. It was argued that Japan's aid, debt rescheduling, and contributions to international organizations – called 'comprehensive security cost', *sōgō sekyuritii kosuto* – should be seen as contributions to international security.[86] The idea behind this concept proceeded from an awareness of the need to respond to not only military but also non-military challenges to national security.

The idea of comprehensive security was a response to Japan's experiences of the damaging effects of the 1973 oil crisis, which revealed the impotence for security purposes of military instruments and the crucial importance of factors like energy and food.[87] The oil crisis was a reminder of the pertinence of the teachings of the Yoshida Doctrine and the accuracy of Yoshida's insight of the vulnerability of the resource-poor merchant state Japan. That a country's national survival and well-being are dependent on its ability to trade was forcefully argued in a book by the economist Ōkita Saburō the year before he became foreign minister in 1979. For Ōkita, Japan was 'a trading nation' and it was sheer folly to try to act as 'a samurai nation'. He had been a member of the Club of Rome and coined the catch-phrase that Japan had to pursue 'an economic strat-

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[86] Inoguchi, 'The ideas and structure of foreign policy', p. 20. The origin of the idea of comprehensive security cost was a report by the Nomura Research Institute, which also came up with the idea of comprehensive security. See Nomura sōgō kenkyūsho, *Kokusai kankyō no henka no taiō – 21 seiki e no teigen* [Change of the international environment – a declaration for the 21st century] (Tokyo: Nomura sōgō kenkyūsho, 1977), pp. 123–49.

[87] Kubo Takuya, *Kokubōron: 80 nendai, Nihon o dō mamoru ka* [On national defence: How can Japan be defended in the 1980s?] (Tokyo: PHP kenkyūsho, 1979), p. 207.

egy of being defenceless on all sides', *happō yabure no keizai senryaku*.[88] This term alludes to the name of a posture in Japanese fencing, *kendō*, called *happō yabure no kamae*, which is the position where all the weapons are broken, and one stands 'defenceless on all sides'. To Ōkita, because of Japan's dependence on oil and other resources, its diplomacy had to be formed in a way that did not make enemies who could threaten supply lines.[89]

A guiding idea behind Ōkita's *happō yabure* strategy and the Yoshida Doctrine is the insight that military means do not suffice to secure national survival and well-being. This is an insight going back to the modernization process that Japan underwent in the Meiji period. Ever since Japan opened up to intercourse with the surrounding world in the mid-nineteenth century, the Japanese have never subscribed to the view that their country can be defended by military means only. The insight of the inextricable linkages between economics and security was captured by the idea of *fukoku kyōhei* or 'a wealthy country and strong army', a rallying cry that guided the Meiji leadership. This concept has its roots in the traditionally agrarian and feudal Japanese society. It entails the unadorned yet persuasive perception maintaining that a nation can assure its autonomy through economic power, *fukoku*, but also embraces the insight of the Japanese leaders – based on the confrontation with the West – that strong military power, *kyōhei*, plays a predominant role in relations among states. The *fukoku kyōhei* concept was transposed from its traditional setting to the progressive one of modernization, whereupon it was adopted as the official program of the Meiji government.[90] The idea of *fukoku kyōhei* was the ideological foundation of Meiji Japan and has continued to inform Japanese thinking on security ever since.[91] The importance of factors other

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[88] Ōkita Saburō, *Happō yabure no keizai senryaku* [The economic strategy of being defenceless on all sides] (Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shimpōsha, 1978).

[89] Most famous is an article he published in the *Foreign Affairs* in July 1974: 'Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy'.

[90] Bert Edström, 'Japan's Fight for Great Power Status in the Meiji Period', *University of Stockholm Center for Pacific Asia Studies Working Paper* 12 (February 1989), pp. 4ff.

[91] Richard J. Samuels, *'Rich Nation, Strong Army': National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 35.

than military for the security of the country has never been underestimated, much less denied, in Japan.[92]

The comprehensive security concept was adopted by prime-minister-to-be Ōhira Masayoshi as one of his political trademarks in his campaign for the LDP presidency in 1978.[93] Based on the increasing multidimensionality of threats encountered by countries, Ōhira concluded that a balanced mix of economic strength, information, political power, and diplomatic strength was crucial for national security.[94] This idea resembles Harold Lasswell's argument that '[o]ur greatest security lies in the best balance of all instruments of foreign policy, and hence in the co-ordinated handling of arms; diplomacy, information, and economics and in the proper correlation of all measures of foreign and domestic policy.'[95]

The idea of comprehensive security was studied by the Comprehensive National Security Group appointed by Ōhira and headed by the former president of the National Defense Academy, Inoki Masamichi, a prominent scholar and devoted Yoshida disciple. The main author of the report issued by the Inoki group was another Yoshida devotee, Kōsaka Masataka.[96] The definition of security put forward is wide: 'Security is to protect the people's livelihood from various threats.'[97] Security is dichotomized into 'security in a narrow sense', *kyōgi no anzen hoshō*, and 'economic security', *keizaiteki anzen hoshō*. The former deals with military threats, while the latter takes into account the protection of people's lives and well-being from various types of threats, including the collapse of the

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[92] Peter Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 121–24.

[93] Seizaburō Satō, Ken'ichi Kōyama, Shunpei Kumon, *Postwar Politician: The Life of Former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira* (Tokyo and New York: Kodansha International, 1990), p. 453.

[94] Statement by Ōhira at his first press conference as prime minister, quoted in Iwami Takao, 'Ōhira Masayoshi naikaku (Dai 68 – dai 69)' [The Ōhira Masayoshi governments: [Japan's] 68th and 69th], in Shiratori Rei, ed., *Nihon no naikaku (III)* [Japanese governments, III] (Tokyo: Shinhyōron, 1981), p. 230.

[95] Harold Dwight Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 75.

[96] Tanaka, *Anzen hoshō*, p. 277.

[97] Seisaku kenkyūkai sōgō anzen hoshō grūpu, 'Sōgō anzen hoshō grūpu hōkokusho' [Report by the comprehensive security group], in *Ōhira sōri no seisaku kenkyūkai hōkokusho* [Reports of Prime Minister Ōhira's policy research groups] (Tokyo: Jiyūminshutō kōhō shuppankyoku, 1980), p. 304.

free trade system, scarcity of energy and industrial resources, and earth-quake disasters. Thus, the wider definition employed by the Inoki group does not take solely military aspects into account but expands security in a way that resembles the Meiji insight of the key role that economic factors have for defence and security. In a sense, the Inoki group's conceptualiza-tion of security is a modern variant of *fukoku kyōhei*, complemented with a consideration of earthquakes. Of considerable interest is the fact that the above definition of security found in the beginning of this report is modi-fied later. In the main text, the definition of security reads: 'Security can be defined as protecting the livelihood of the people of [our] own country [*jikoku no kokuminteki seikatsu*] from various threats.'[98] That is, the Inoki group presents a definition which is not only a precursor of the idea of human security taking into account not only threats to security in a mili-tary sense but also heavily tinged by the idea of 'one-country pacifism', *ikkoku heiwashugi*.

Japan's Foreign Policy at a Crossroads

Japan's ambition to participate in world affairs was expressed as an aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. If money could talk, Japan seemed a natural choice for a seat, in Japanese eyes at least. In a book on Japan and the United Nations, a prominent Japanese official working in the world organization, Ogata Sadako, had already in 1980 seen no reason to hide that it was Japan's financial contri-bution that was a key inspiration for its wish to become a permanent member of the Security Council.[99] This ambition has not diminished over the years. The money argument led to criticism that Japan was trying to buy a seat in the Security Council yet not willing to contribute through policies and ideas as well.[100] Despite declarations that UN centrism is a principle of Japanese foreign policy and – according to its foreign policy liturgy – has been so ever since this principle was launched in 1957, Japan

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[98] Ibid., p. 308.

[99] Ogata Sadako, *Kokuren kara no shiten: 'Kokusai shakai to Nihon' o kangaeru* [From the UN viewpoint: Thinking about 'the international system and Japan'] (Tokyo: Asahi ibuningu nyūsusha, 1980), p. 23.

[100] Reinhard Drifte, 'Japan's Quest for a Permanent Seat on the Security Council', *Asia–Pacific Review* 5:2 (January 1998), p. 100.

was not willing to participate in international peace operations conducted by the United Nations.

By contributing economically to international organizations and to the solution of international crises, Japan did not have to spill blood or show its flag on the battlefield and still be seen as an actor. It was a strategy that worked well in the 1970s and 80s, increasing Japan's international status and prestige. The impression spread among Japanese that Japan was one of the countries that took part when the fate of the world was discussed. But what seemed an increasingly impressive success story was to go down the drain. Tokyo's inability to take prompt action in international crises was exposed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Japanese uneasiness was clearly not unfounded. Opinion polls at the end of the 1980s showed that many Americans viewed Japan as a threat because of the inroads made into the US market by Japanese companies.[101] Citing constitutional restraints, Japan took up the fight not by sending soldiers to participate in the military actions of the UN-authorized US-led war against Iraq but by shouldering a sizeable part of the cost of the war effort, contributing US$13 billion to the military campaign against Iraq. To the consternation of the Japanese government and the Japanese in general, Japan was assailed by derisive criticism rather than earning praise for financial generosity. Japan's actions were criticized as too little, too late and its so-called chequebook diplomacy, *kogitte gaikō,* was ridiculed. President George H. W. Bush and other US luminaries made no attempt to hide their displeasure over Japan's lack of will to show its flag on the battlefield. It was humiliating to the Japanese when the government of Kuwait after the war expressed its gratitude in large US newspapers to countries that had helped Kuwait and Japan's name was not on the list.[102] Nakayama Tarō, Japan's foreign minister at the time recollected later that this advertisement showed Kuwait's assessment of Japan's contribution.[103] Japan's finance minister at the time, Hashimoto Ryūtarō (prime minister 1996–98), saw the advertisement as a

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[101] Saburo Okita, 'Japan's Role in Asia-Pacific Cooperation', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 513 (January 1991), p. 31.
[102] Takai Susumu, 'Japan's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping', *Social Science Japan* 6 (February 1996), p. 8.
[103] Nakayama Tarō, *Futatsu no haisen kokka: Nihon to Doitsu no gojūnen* [Two defeated nations: 50 years for Japan and Germany] (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1995), p. 137.

reflection of a negative worldwide view of Japan's role in the Persian Gulf War.[104] This outcome was later described by Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō's foreign policy advisor Okamoto Yukio in quite straightforward terms: 'The near-humiliation that Japan endured at that time filled the Japanese government with an undeniable sense of failure.'[105] Soeya Yoshihide went even further and described the outcome for Japan's foreign policy of the 1991 Persian Gulf War as 'absolute humiliation' resulting in a 'trauma'.[106]

The outcome of the Persian Gulf War meant a day of reckoning for Japan according to a leading commentator on international affairs, Funabashi Yōichi: 'The outcome was shocking, awakening Japan to its inability to cope with a crisis affecting its vital interests. The lesson was that the international environment in the 1990s will no longer allow Japan to follow the same one-dimensional economic strategy it has single-mindedly pursued for the past forty years.'[107] As the economist Edward Lincoln pointed out, Japan realized that 'not all of the world's problems are economic' and had to find out how to participate in solving international problems or crises.[108] The failure of Japan's chequebook diplomacy seemed to mark the end of 'the most important hallmark of Japan's security policy'[109] – its reliance on economic instruments in foreign policy.

The impact that the change of Japan's security situation had is revealed by a startling volte-face presented by one of Japan's most distinguished diplomats. In May 1990, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Kuriyama Takakazu argued that Japan should contribute to international security through non-military means; what was required of Japan was to pursue 'a diplomacy of a great power without appearing to be a great power' [*taikokuzura shinai taikoku gaikō*].[110] Ten months later, after the

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[104] Hashimoto Ryūtarō, *Vision of Japan: Waga kyōchū ni seisaku arite* [Vision of Japan: Politics is in my heart] (Tokyo: Besutoserāzu, 1993), p. 102.

[105] Okamoto, 'Japan and the United States', p. 61.

[106] Yoshihide Soeya, 'Japan's Enhanced Security Role and the Implications for Trilateral Cooperation', *Issues & Insights* 3:9 (November 2003), p. 70.

[107] Yoichi Funabashi, 'Japan and the New World Order', *Foreign Affairs* 70:5 (Winter 1990/1991), p. 59.

[108] Edward J. Lincoln, *Japan's New Global Role* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 201.

[109] Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*, p. 10.

[110] Kuriyama Takakazu, 'Gekidō no 90 nendai to Nihon gaikō no shintenkai: Atarashii kokusai chitsujo kōchiku e no sekkyokuteki kōken no tame ni' [The turbulent

Persian Gulf War, Kuriyama was back with a strikingly different message. He argued that this war would have considerable influence on Japan's diplomacy and that Japan had to act scrupulously [*kichin to*] to avoid damage to its foreign policy. He urged the Japanese to abandon their 'one-country pacifism' and participate actively in building a new world order. In pointed opposition to mainstream thinking captured by Ōkita Saburō's slogan *happō yabure no keizai senryaku*, which had been a key idea for decades, Kuriyama stated that Japan was no longer allowed to pursue *happō bijinteki gaikō*, that is, a diplomacy of being nice to all and sundry. Whilst Japan was renowned for its faceless [*kao ga mienai*] stance, this would no longer do.[111]

In a policy speech delivered the year after the Persian Gulf War, Miyazawa Kiichi (prime minister 1991–93) showed that he was aware of expectations that Japan's role and responsibilities should correspond to what he said was its 'considerable economic power and influence'. He did not hesitate to declare that '[we Japanese] must bring our collective wisdom to bear in taking a positive, independent, and creative part in building the new order for peace and in proving ourselves worthy of this grand historic mission.'[112] These rhetorical heights notwithstanding, Miyazawa's statement came not long after the Japanese government had refused to send personnel to the UN-led efforts against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, which revealed that Japan's 'considerable economic power and influence' was accompanied by an equally considerable lack of political will to become involved tangibly. Much was in limbo. The pervasive feelings of insecurity and uncertainty were captured by the political scientist Inoguchi Takashi, when he sat down to write an introduction to the English translation of his book *Nihon: Keizai taikoku no seiji un'ei* [Japan: the governing of an economic great power] (1993). Penning his comments after the Upper House election in June 1998, Inoguchi characterized the

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1990s and the new development of Japanese foreign policy: For a positive contribution towards building a new international order], *Gaikō fōramu* 20 (May 1990), p. 17.

[111] Kuriyama Takakazu, 'Wangan mondai to Nihon no yakuwari: Nihon no heiwa-shugi to wa nani ka, ima towarete iru' [The Gulf problem and the role of Japan: Now, it is questioned what Japan's pacifism is], interview published in *Gaikō fōramu* 30 (March 1991), pp. 5, 10.

[112] Miyazawa Kiichi, policy speech in the Diet, 24 January 1992, in MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* [Diplomatic bluebook] 36 (1992), p. 354.

political situation as one where 'real changes are taking place, strongly suggesting that Japanese politics is entering *terra incognita* unlike anything it has known over the last five centuries.'[113]

Concluding Remarks

The policies founded in the early post-war period proved so well adapted to Japan's geopolitical situation that they are still in place. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru who is generally seen as the 'father' of these policies was a veteran diplomat, who started his career in the Meiji period. A reason for Yoshida's undeniable success in the sense that the policies founded by him were to prevail was that he had studied the great powers in action for decades and was carried by a pervasive insight of the need for realism but also had a vision of Japan of the future. His success in not only skilfully balancing the interests of the United States and Japan but also pacifying his domestic political opposition by digging a chasm between the ruling conservative and the opposition camps resulted in a bifurcated foreign policy system. The government was marching under the banner of support for the United States and the opposition was preaching unarmed neutrality and pacifism based on the new constitution. The policy pursued by the Japanese government in the 1970s and 1980s appeared for a while to make Japan a power. But it was an unusual power in that its status was based on exercise of 'economics first-ism' in domestic politics and its expression in foreign policy, chequebook diplomacy, in external policies. The 1991 Persian Gulf War heralded a sea change for the debate on foreign policy and Japan's role in the world. In the aftermath of Japan's capsized attempt in this war to play a role in international political affairs merely by employing chequebook diplomacy, the debate revealed the fact that awareness had spread among Japanese that the heyday of aloofness was over.

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[113] Takashi Inoguchi, 'Japanese Politics in the Eye of History', p. 13, http://avatoli. ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~inoguchi/bunsho/1998/98eyehistory.pdf (downloaded 26 January 2001).

FIVE PRIME MINISTERS

IN ACTION

Japan and Its 'International Contribution'

The non-appreciated gesture during the 1991 Persian Gulf War of Japan's once celebrated chequebook diplomacy forced its leadership to realize that Japan's foreign policy had to be transformed in order to avoid similar setbacks.[1] A first cautious step to mend the damage caused by Japan's 'inactivity' during the Persian Gulf War was seen, when Japan dispatched minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the cessation of hostilities to help clear international waterways. Furthermore, after long drawn-out discussions, the Diet passed the International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992, which authorized the government to send Self-Defense Forces personnel to Cambodia on a post-conflict mission. It was the first time since the Second World War that SDF personnel were dispatched overseas. The restrictions on what they could do were stringent but the break with previous policies was clear. These actions can be seen as a first step in handling US displeasure at Japan's lack of action, which prompted the nagging fear of the US withdrawal from Asia to return to the worried Japanese. Historically as well as in the recent past, the US government has considered withdrawing from Asia.[2] The end of the Cold War lessened the

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[1] Soeya, 'Japan's Enhanced Security Role and the Implications for Trilateral Cooperation', p. 70.

[2] Chong-Sik Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1985), pp. 98ff; Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US–Korea–Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 152ff. In 1970, President Nixon announced that

need in the US global military strategy for Japan as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' as Nakasone Yasuhiro (prime minister 1982–87) famously characterized Japan during a visit to Washington in 1983.[3] The need to contain the Soviet Union no longer existed as an inherent rationale and the organizing principle for a US national doctrine for overseas engagement.[4] In 1990, with a diminished Soviet threat and fiscal restraints on the defence budget, Washington stated clearly its intention to reduce its military forces in East Asia over the next decade, and withdrew from the Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in the Philippines in 1991–92.

The 1990s became a period of intense discussion on the nature and extent of Japan's 'international contribution', *kokusai kōken*. This expression has one of its roots in Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi's insight, after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, that it was not acceptable for Japan to abstain from contributing to international security in a situation when US decline made the world unstable both economically and

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US force deployment in Asia would decrease, which raised the question whether the Japanese could continue to rely on Washington for its defence against external threats. Feelings of insecurity and uncertainty were also triggered by the US pull out of Vietnam in 1975, the planned (but cancelled) withdrawal of US ground troops from South Korea in 1977, the invasion of Afghanistan by Warsaw Pact countries in 1979, and the expansion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the 1980s. Japanese worries over the possibility of a reduced US presence in Asia were demonstrated by two premiers at the end of the 1970s, Fukuda Takeo (prime minister 1976–78) and Ōhira Masayoshi (prime minister 1978–80), who expressed their concern when Jimmy Carter planned virtually full withdrawal or large-scale reduction of US troops in South Korea. Eventually, Carter's idea was not realized, which was reassuring to Japan's political leaders.

[3] Takahama Tatō, *Nakasone gaiseiron: Sōri wa nani o mezashite iru no ka?* [On Nakasone's external policy: What is the prime minister aiming at?] (Tokyo: PHP kenkyūsho, 1984), pp. 81f. Prime Minister Nakasone's characterization of Japan became widely commented upon and met the wrath of Japanese pacifists. It is notable that Japan had been described earlier in terms of being 'a stationary aircraft carrier' by US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance; see Timothy P. Maga, *Hands Across the Sea? U.S.–Japan Relations, 1961–1981* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1997), p. 110.

[4] Paul Giarra, 'U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines: Toward a New Accommodation of Mutual Responsibility', Stanford University, Asia/Pacific Research Center, *Discussion Paper* (June 1997), p. 3, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10129/Giarra.pdf (downloaded 10 March 2005).

politically.[5] Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's vigorous agitation in the 1980s for Japan to be a *kokusai kokka*, literally an 'international state', was an expression of the same understanding of what behoved Japan. According to Nakasone, Japan should move from being a 'peace nation', *heiwa kokka*, to being an ordinary nation by which he meant that the country should beef up its defence forces and reduce its dependence on the United States for national security.[6] The eloquent Nakasone had a magnificent ability to coin elegant slogans, and his successor Takeshita Noboru (prime minister 1987–89) made a concerted effort to link himself to Nakasone. As newly elected premier, Takeshita dared to try to associate with the rhetorically magnificent Nakasone by presenting catchy slogans for the policies of his government – one of which was *sekai ni kōken suru Nippon*, or 'Japan contributing to the world'.[7] It was a forerunner of ideas that were to dominate the Japanese political debate of the 1990s. The upsurge of *kokusai kōken* as a national lodestar was an indication that the debacle of Japan's foreign policy during the Persian Gulf War had made the Japanese aware of the problems caused by aloofness and the realization that Japan's chequebook diplomacy fell short of international expectations and engendered negative responses. Some years after this setback for Japan, a new idea was launched that was seen by some as a powerful tool to repair Japan's international image that had been tainted by its inactivity – human security.

The Pioneer: Murayama Tomiichi

In the Japanese context, Murayama Tomiichi (prime minister 1994–96) stands out as the pioneer for introducing human security. As the first Socialist to head a Japanese government after Katayama Tetsu in 1946–

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[5] Tomoda Seki, *Nyūmon-gendai Nihon gaikō: Nitchū kokkō seijōka igo* [Introduction to the foreign policy of contemporary Japan: Since the normalization of Japanese–Chinese relations] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1988), pp. 85f.

[6] Hayashi Shigeo, '*Kokusai kōken' no hata no shita, Nihon wa doko e no ka: Ampo-bōei seisaku o tettei bunseki suru* [Where is Japan going under the banner of 'international contribution'? A thorough analysis of the security treaty-defence policy] (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 1993), pp. 163ff.

[7] Takeshita Noboru, policy speech in the Diet, 27 November 1987, in MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 32 (1988), p. 297.

47, Murayama's elevation to the political top spot was unexpected, not least because his political experience at a national level was limited. He had been appointed chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ, formerly the Japan Socialist Party, JSP) only nine months before.[8] His parliamentary position was weak. It would be a mistake, however, to see Murayama as a lame duck right from the beginning, because he was responsible for a decision that changed Japan's political landscape. With its political platform of unarmed neutrality, far-reaching pacifism and opposition to the Japan–US Security Treaty as well as the SDF and US bases in Japan, the JSP had represented resolute opposition to the LDP and its policies ever since the parties were founded in 1955.[9] In his policy speech in the Diet on 2 July 1994, Murayama reversed his party's stance. Reciting the positions of previous LDP governments, not the standpoints traditionally associated with his party, he shifted its course without consulting the other party leaders. In an interview he defended his action and said that matters that had been dire to his party hitherto had to be thrown away; the reality after the end of the Cold War and popular will made it necessary for politicians both to show resolve and pursue flexible policies, he told a baffled party congregation.[10]

It is unlikely that Murayama realized fully the consequences for his party of his decision. It resulted in an exodus of party members and in the next general election, the party lost its position as the leading opposition party, a position it had held since its foundation in 1955.[11] But the party's decline had begun even before his volte-face and was linked to the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

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[8] J. A. A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy*. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 85.

[9] Nonaka Naoto, 'Characteristics of the Decision-making Structure of Coalitions', in Ōtake Hideo, ed., *Power Shuffles and Policy Processes: Coalition Government in Japan in the 1990s* (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), pp. 112, 120.

[10] Okano Kaoru, 'Murayama Tomiichi kō: Shakaitō shushōron no ochi to shiketsu' [Thoughts on Murayama Tomiichi: Errors and hemostasis of the discussion on the JSP premier], in Okano Kaoru and Fujimoto Kazumi, eds, *Murayama seiken to demokurashii no kiki: Rinshō seijigakuteki bunseki* [The Murayma government and the crisis of democracy: A clinical politological analysis] (Tokyo: Tōshindō, 2000), p. 13.

[11] Ishikawa Masumi, *Sengo seijishi: shimpan* [Post-war political history, new ed.] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2004), p. 187.

Murayama's lame-duck image hides the fact that not only did he take the crucial decision to discard his party's dearest ideas, but he was also responsible for other deeds that make him a historical figure. Soon after his ascension to the political top spot, he secured a place in Japan's historical annals, when SDF troops were dispatched to assist Rwandan refugees in Zaire. Later, Ogata Sadako who served as UN High Commissioner for Refugees at the time, indicated how sharp the break with Japan's previous diplomacy was: 'I was extremely satisfied when I succeeded in convincing the prime minister that Japan should contribute to international humanitarian crises not only by money and goods but also with people – especially with trained and well-equipped soldiers.'[12] Another significant act was when Murayama invested a great deal of personal effort in persuading the Diet so that on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, he could issue a solemn declaration expressing remorse for Japan's behaviour during the war.[13] Given Murayama's limited experience of national policy-making with international implications, it was also a remarkable deed when his government took responsibility for transforming the US–Japan security framework from a joint mechanism to counter the threat of the Soviet Union to an instrument for regional stabilization.[14]

Murayama's Efforts to Promote Human Security

To claim that Murayama is the pioneer of human security in the Japanese context is based on his endorsement of the new security concept in a speech in the United Nations in October 1995. The first step in that direction was taken by him at the UN Summit for Social Development in

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[12] Sadako Ogata, *The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2005), p. 188.

[13] Stockwin, *Governing Japan*, p. 197. The way the resolution was accepted is unusual. Only 251 members of the Lower House of the total of 502 attended the session at which it was adopted. See Shin'ichi Kitaoka and Matake Fujiya, 'Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001', in Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, Akihiko Tanaka, eds, *The Age of Uncertainty: The U.S.–China–Japan Triangle from Tianmen (1989) to 9/11 (2001)*. Harvard East Asian Monographs Online (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asian Center, 2004), p. 107, http://www.fas.Harvard.edu/~asiactr/publications/pdfs/Vogel_Age_of_Uncertainty.pdf (downloaded 22 June 2005).

[14] Kitaoka and Fujiya, 'Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001', p. 102.

Copenhagen in March 1995, when human security figured in its deliberations. This was to be expected since the UNDP had crafted its 1994 report as an agenda for the Summit.[15] Furthermore, the importance of human security was recognized in the report issued by the high-powered Commission on Global Governance a few weeks before the Summit. The Commission had been appointed in 1992 to work out proposals for UN reform at the initiative of former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who saw the historic opportunity that the end of the Cold War and the East–West conflict constituted.[16] The Commission proposed six principles of security, intended to function as norms for the formulation of the countries' security policies. Retaining the state as the primary security referent, the Commission argued that 'the concept of global security must be broadened from its traditional focus on the security of states, so that it includes also the security of people and the planet'.[17] The fundamental principle was that '[a]ll people, no less than all states, have a right to a secure existence, and all states have an obligation to protect those rights.'[18] The Commission stressed the need for neighbourhood values.[19] This must have sounded familiar to Murayama with his roots in local politics. Less than a decade before, Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru had launched a veritable look-alike of the Commission's idea of neighbourhood values, with his slogan *machizukuri*, *murazukuri*, *chiikizukuri,* or 'neighbourhood building, community building, city building'.[20]

The new security idea was referred to during the Social Summit at which leaders of 118 countries discussed how to eradicate poverty and promote full employment and integration.[21] During preparations for the Summit, it was proposed that human security should be made a key concept of the Summit but this proposal was rejected. The G-7 countries

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[15] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, p. 1.

[16] Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 'History of the SEF', http://www.sef-bonn. org/en/about/history/index.php?f=inhalt (downloaded 11 March 2006).

[17] The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 80.

[18] Ibid., p. 84.

[19] Ibid., pp. 48–54.

[20] Takeshita Noboru, policy speech in the Diet, 27 November 1987, in MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 32 (1988), p. 297.

[21] Nishigaki Akira and Shimomura Yasutami, *The Economics of Development Assistance: Japan's ODA in a Symbiotic World* (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1998), p. 77.

objected to the concept, since the clash between national sovereignty and global action that the concept appeared to entail, threatened to undermine their territorial integrity and the principle of non-interference.[22]

In his speech at the Summit, Murayama supported a human-centred social development which he declared was a priority both for Japan and himself: 'As head of the Japanese Government', he said, 'I seek the creation of a "human-centered society", a vision of Japan in which each individual citizen is treated equally, endowed with opportunity to fully develop his or her potential, and enabled to utilize fully his or her capacity through employment and participation in society. I consider that such political beliefs of mine are in line with the central goal of this Summit.'[23]

The circumscribed reference to human security that Murayama presented at the Copenhagen Summit was replaced by an unequivocal support at the Special Commemorative Meeting of the General Assembly on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations on 22 October 1995, when the Japanese prime minister endorsed human security as a new strategy for the world organization. Murayama reiterated his view in his speech at the Copenhagen Summit that social development should be human-centred and said that the UN should play an important role for world peace and prosperity. A requirement for this was that:

concern is not limited to the nation-state level, but efforts focus on the happiness of every 'global citizen' [*chikyū shimin*]. The role to be played by women and NGOs continues to grow. Not only national security of the state as heretofore but a new 'human security' thinking has emerged as a major issue for the United Nations. This 'human security' thinking, which is based on respect for the human rights of each and every global citizen and defending us from poverty, disease, ignorance, oppression and violence, is consonant with my own political principles […].[24]

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[22] DFAIT, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*.

[23] 'Statement by H. E. Mr. Tomiichi Murayama, Prime Minister of Japan, at the World Summit for Social Development, 11 March 1995', World Summit for Social Development, Statements by governments, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/statements/govts.htm (downloaded 10 October 2004).

[24] MOFA, Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama at the Special Commemorative Meeting of the General Assembly on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the U. N., New York, 22 October 1995, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/archive3/sp.html (downloaded 12 March 2002).

The security referent in Murayama's speech is the individual human being whose well-being and human rights were endangered by threats like poverty, disease, ignorance, oppression and violence. A battery of measures were suggested by him to implement the idea of human security – promotion of democracy and economic reform, economic cooperation, humanitarian assistance, preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping operations, arms control and disarmament with regard to both nuclear weapons and conventional weapons such as anti-personnel landmines and small arms.

Murayama's endorsement of human security was in line with Japan's UN policy. In his policy speech in the Diet three weeks before, the prime minister had expressed his conviction that the United Nations is the central forum for resolving issues that the international community faces, and he pushed for reforms that would strengthen the world organization.[25] That he brought up NGOs in his UN speech can be seen in this light. To stress their important role can be seen as natural for the leader of a party for which grass-roots organizations are important. It may also be taken as support for UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's idea that an integrated approach to human security had to rely on an international division of labour involving not only states but also UN agencies, NGOs and civil society groups.[26]

Murayama's speech in the UN made him one of the first heads of government to endorse human security. Representing a country often said to be unwilling to take a stand on controversial international issues,[27] it was a bold step since it was a new and controversial concept. The prime minister made human security more palatable to sceptics at home by presenting the pursuit of human security not as a strategy for Japan but for the United Nations. Thus, his view foreshadowed what would be expressed by Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of the UN from 1997, that

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[25] MOFA, 'Policy Speech by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama to the 134th Session of the Diet', 29 September 1995, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/archive_2/diet.html (downloaded 12 March 2002).

[26] Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, §16.

[27] Jean-Pierre Lehmann, 'Japanese Attitudes towards Foreign Policy', in Richard L. Grant, ed., *The Process of Japanese Foreign Policy: Focus on Asia* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 124.

human security was the cardinal mission of the UN.[28] To further soften criticism Murayama portrayed human security as a concept that complemented, not replaced, the traditional national security concept.

That Murayama became a pioneer for human security in a Japanese context makes sense based as it was – as he claimed – on the fact that the concept was in line with his political principles. The approach to security represented by human security was consonant with the pacifist ideas embodied in the Japanese constitution and the idealism professed by many Japanese left-leaning intellectuals, politicians and laymen. Backing the new security idea fitted his interest in overcoming the scepticism he met within his own party. As the leader of the SDPJ, he represented a party that had been squarely behind pacifism and unarmed neutrality for decades. The volte-face of his party's policies, that he was responsible for, disappointed sympathizers who had supported the party because it fought attempts by conservatives to revise or modify the pacifist constitution and aggravated their feelings of being let down when the SDPJ entered a coalition government with the conservative LDP and changed its basic political ideas.[29]

In Murayama's speech in the United Nations, 'human security' was translated as *ningen no anzen hoshō*. This translation has become the standard way of transposing the English language concept into Japanese.[30] It is

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[28] *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*. Report of the Secretary-General, 16 April 1998, http://www.un.or/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/(downloaded 13 July 2006).

[29] Shinkawa Toshimitsu, 'Failed Reform and Policy Changes of the SDPJ', in Ōtake, ed., *Power Shuffles and Policy Processes*, p. 171.

[30] In his useful survey of Japan's efforts to push for human security in the United Nations, Satō Yukio claims that Obuchi used *ningen no anzen hoshō* consistently in his speeches with one exception. When Obuchi brought up human security in a speech in Singapore, he used the concept *ningen no anzen*, 'human safety', juxtaposed with the Japanized concept *hyūman sekyuritii*. See Satō Yukio, 'Nihon no kokuren gaikō to ningen no anzen hoshō: Kokuren mireniamu samitto e no kiseki' [Japan's UN diplomacy and human security: Track record up to the UN Millennium Summit], *Kokusai mondai* 530 (2004), p. 4. Now, in Obuchi's policy speech in the Diet in January 1999, he used *ningen no anzen hoshō* juxtaposed with *hyūman sekyuritii* and *hyūman sekyuritii* in a speech at Kŏryŏ University, Seoul, in March 1999. See MOFA, 'Policy Speech by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to the 145th Session of the Diet', 19 January 1999, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/1/119-2.html (downloaded 16 September 2005); and Obuchi Keizō, 'Shinseiki no Nikkan kankei – arata na rekishi no sōzō' [Japan–Korean relations in a new

yet another case of a Western concept that has entered the Japanese language in a way that the Japanese term does not correspond too well with the meaning of the original concept.[31] As is the case with many other Western concepts, human security is not easy to translate into Japanese. Vagueness inherent in the concept of human security was reflected in the way it was translated into Japanese. The standard way of rendering this concept into Japanese settled as *ningen no anzen hoshō*. One aspect of this way of translating is that the composite Japanese concept implies a reference to a guarantee of the safety/security of the state or nation against external aggression.[32] *Ningen no anzen* stands roughly for 'safety of people', while *anzen hoshō* has been used for many years to mean national military security; it is sometimes used for 'security' and has clear military connotations. Thus, *ningen no anzen hoshō* equals something like 'to ensure the national security of people', which is fuzzy and mixes security referents. This fuzziness reflects the vagueness that characterizes the concept launched by the UNDP and added to the vagueness when the term was rendered into Japanese. According to Fukushima Akiko, 'When new qualifiers are attached to the term "security," such as food, environment and human, it causes confusion as to how the concept should be understood.'[33]

Human Security as Environmental Security: Hashimoto Ryūtarō

Murayama was replaced as prime minister by Hashimoto Ryūtarō who was Murayama's opposite in many ways. While Murayama had obvious problems pursuing policies in accordance with the platform of his party due to the fact that he was a leftist-leaning premier in a coalition govern-

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century – the creation of a new history], 20 March 1999, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/11/eos_0320.html (downloaded 5 November 2005).

[31] Kaori Kuroda, 'Exploring a New Civil Society', *NIRA Review* 7:1 (Winter 2000), p. 40.

[32] Dan, 'A Brief Review of Human Security', p. 328.

[33] Akiko Fukushima, 'Human Security and Japanese Foreign Policy', in *International Conference on Human Security in East Asia, 16–17 June 2003, Seoul, Republic of Korea: Proceedings*. Seoul: UNESCO, Korean National Commission for UNESCO, Ilmin International Relations Institute of Korea University, 2004), p. 162.

ment formed by the SDPJ with the conservative LDP, Hashimoto had a solid power base as chairman of the largest party and leader of its largest faction. A general view when he was elected was that economically troubled Japan needed a skilful political fixer and tough international negotiator, and Hashimoto was precisely such a politician.

Also Hashimoto is on record as supporting human security. His endorsement came more or less in passing and cannot be said to have been of much importance to him or his government. Like Murayama, Hashimoto declared his support in a speech in the United Nations. On 23 June 1997, he stated in the Special Session of the General Assembly for the Overall Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of Agenda 21:

> Immediately before coming here, I renewed my determination, together with the other leaders at the Summit of the Eight held in Denver, to preserve the global environment. I want to stress two points: 'our responsibility for future generations' and 'global human security' [*jinrui no anzen hoshō*]. Based on these two points, it is first necessary that each of us develop a strong consciousness and shoulder our responsibilities. We must change our lifestyles. Moreover, it is necessary to develop innovative environmental technologies and to promote their transfer then to developing countries in order to be able to foster sustainable development.[34]

Similar to his predecessor, Hashimoto did not endorse human security as a concept related to security in the traditional sense of national security. In his speech, human security was more or less equal to environmental security, one of the seven security categories identified in the 1994 UNDP report, which makes it a far cry from the comprehensive concept figuring in Murayama's speech. Hashimoto's approach resembled that of the Commission on Global Governance with its focus on global security. His focus was *jinrui no anzen hoshō*, 'global human security' (lit. 'security of mankind') as the worthy cause, with mankind, *jinrui*, the security referent, not the individual human being as in Murayama's speech. Unlike Murayama, he did not mention responsibilities of the individual, women or NGOs. Thus, Hashimoto's approach to human security both resembled and diverged from that of his predecessor. It was similar in that his focus on the environmental aspects of security represented a non-traditional

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[34] MOFA, 'Statement by Prime Minister of Japan Ryutaro Hashimoto at the Special Session of the General Assembly for the Overall Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of Agenda 21', 23 June 1997, United Nations, New York, http:// www.mofa.go.jp/announce/archive_3/agenda21.html (downloaded 12 March 2002).

approach to security but since this was the only aspect he dealt with, the scope of his concept was more limited than in Murayama's speech.

Hashimoto's stance was consonant with his personal political agenda as revealed in his 'vision' of making Japan 'an advanced country protecting the environment'.[35] After his retirement he declared in a speech that a question that he had been involved in as a politician for many years was 'how Japan will be able to exercise her leadership as a member of the international community.'[36] A showpiece for his will to push for this was the Environmental Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. As chair of the LDP's League on the Basic Problems of the Environment [*Kankyō kihon mondai kondankai*], he was a key mover behind the assertive position taken by Japan at the Summit. The Japanese delegation stressed Japan's intention to play a leading role on the issue of the environment and economic development.[37] But Hashimoto's stance as revealed in his UN speech reflected the occasion, too. To express support for human security at a UN session dealing exclusively with environmental policies seems quite reasonable, since environmental security was a key aspect of human security as outlined by the UNDP.

A Politician with a Mission: Obuchi Keizō

The key figure in Japan for the pursuit of human security is no doubt Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō, who replaced Hashimoto as prime minister. Obuchi was a veteran politician. After he won a seat in the Lower House for the first time in 1963, he had been re-elected to the Diet twelve

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[35] Hashimoto, *Vision of Japan*, part 3.

[36] Ryutaro Hashimoto, Talk at the Second Robert S. McNamara Seminar 'Agriculture, Growth and Human Security: The Role of Agriculture and Agricultural Research in Generating Growth and Post Disaster Reconstruction', Tokyo, 2 July 2003 (transcript), p. 11, http://wwww.cgiar.org/pdf/mcnamaratranscript.pdf (downloaded 8 December 2005).

[37] Jonathan Taylor, 'Japan's global environmentalism: Rhetoric and reality', *Political Geography* 18 (1999), p. 539; Masaharu Kohno, 'In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the 1990s: With Cambodia and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as Case Studies', Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Foreign Policy Studies, *CNAPS Working Paper* (Fall 1999), http://thebrookingsinstitution.com/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_kohno.htm (downloaded 2 August 2004).

times.[38] He was adept at managing factional affairs, mediating disputes, and building consensus within his party.[39] This counted in the end and he was elected president of the LDP on 24 July and appointed prime minister on 30 July 1998. His election was seen as 'a triumph of the party's long-serving powerbrokers over younger rebels who have called for more dynamic leadership.'[40] Despite the fact that he had occupied senior positions in the governing LDP and held ministerial posts, his image in the media and among commentators was that he was incapable and inept as a politician and his government was expected to be short-lived.[41] It was hard to recall a new premier meeting such contempt.[42]After his election, a political analyst wrote: 'One of the weaknesses of the Obuchi government is the prime minister himself.'[43] An inkling of bitterness could be sensed in his bleak smile, when he asserted that he was not the 'cold pizza' as characterized by some US journalists.[44] Behind his mild manner lurked a resolve that was not easy to spot. Watching Obuchi in news broadcasts, his stoic way of meeting derogatory remarks was impressive to me.

Obuchi and Human Security

Obuchi has related how an around-the-world trip that he made in his youth to broaden his international horizon had been important for his

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[38] MOFA, *Profile of Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo* (March 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/profile/obuchi.html (downloaded 21 January 2007).

[39] Gerald L. Curtis, *The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 212.

[40] 'Keizo Obuchi: Profile', *BBC News Asia-Pacific*, 24 July 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_138000/138609.stm (downloaded 3 February 2006).

[41] Kurimoto Shin'ichirō, *Gendai seiji no himitsu to kōzō* [The secrets and structure of contemporary politics] (Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shimpōsha, 1999), p. 3.

[42] Takemura Ken'ichi, *Sannin no sōri to hitori no shin'yū ni tsuite katarō* [Talking about three prime ministers and one friend] (Tokyo: Taiyō kikaku shuppan, 2001), p. 201.

[43] Kitaoka Shin'ichi, 'Hashimoto naikaku to Obuchi naikaku: Jimintō seiji wa kawaru no ka' [The Hashimoto government and the Obuchi government: Will LDP politics change?], *Chūō kōron*, October 1998; reprinted in Kitaoka Shin'ichi, '*Futsū no kuni' e* [Towards 'a normal country'] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 2000), p. 234.

[44] 'Obuchi rejects "cold pizza" label', *Japan Policy & Politics*, 27 July 1998.

political career.[45] In his keynote speech at the 40th Anniversary Symposium of the JIIA in December 1999, he said: 'Thirty-six years ago, when I was still just a student, I traveled on my own to 38 countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, North America, and Latin America as a backpacker, something that was exceedingly unusual at the time. This solitary journey taught me the importance of the links between people, and of people as individuals.'[46] Later, he claimed that this journey was behind his resolve to pursue human security. Obuchi made it a hallmark of his policies as premier to promote human security. So important is he seen for the adoption and dissemination of the new security idea that Takemi Keizō, his state secretary for foreign affairs, claimed in retrospect that Obuchi was the first to use the term human security in an official Japanese government document.[47] This is not correct, however. As seen above, the pioneer was Murayama Tomiichi, but Takemi's slip-of-the-tongue reflects Obuchi's standing. While Murayama and Hashimoto supported human security verbally, Obuchi revealed a personal commitment and took initiatives that make him seen, both in Japan and abroad, as a leading champion of human security. It also showed the leadership qualities of this soft-spoken politician. Political leadership in Japan is usually not based on explicit advocacy but was very much so in the case of Obuchi's campaign for human security.

Obuchi and the Launch of a Campaign for Human Security

One of the key advocates of human security in Japan, Takemi Keizō, who served as state secretary for foreign affairs under Obuchi, claims that his own interest in human security was awakened, when some officials in

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[45] 'Kanbōchōkan de baransu kankaku migaku: Obuchi Keizō' [Sharpening the sense of balance as chief cabinet secretary: Obuchi Keizō], in Jiji tsūshinsha seijibu, ed., *21 seiki no shushō kōhosei: Neo-riidā jidai no makuake* [The prime ministerial cadets of the 21st century: The beginnings of an era of new leaders] (Tokyo: Jiji tsūshinsha, 1989), p. 41.

[46] Keizo Obuchi, 'In Quest of Human Security', in *In Quest of Human Security: JIIA 40th Anniversary Symposium* (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2001), p. 8.

[47] Takemi Keizō, 'A New Direction for Japan's Aid Program', *Japan Echo* 30:3 (June 2003), p. 24. The same claim is made by Shinoda in 'Anzen hoshō gainen no tagika to "ningen no anzen hoshō"', p. 69, and 'The Concept of Human Security', p. 16.

MOFA become interested in it and efforts were made to launch it as a new comprehensive policy concept for humanitarian assistance.[48] According to Takemi, human security was of no concern to Obuchi before Takemi brought it up but since Obuchi was 'a good listener', he decided on the spot to adopt human security as a key idea for himself and made it the centrepiece of what became known as 'the Obuchi foreign policy'.[49] As noted above, the prime minister testified that his commitment to human security went back to experiences in his youth, and the episode related by Takemi illustrates that when an idea resonates in the policy-maker, he is willing to listen to a scholar-collaborator.[50] Another key actor on human security in the Japanese context, Yamamoto Tadashi, seconds Takemi's acclaimed view that human security was an idea that was supplied to

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[48] Shozawa Hitoshi et al., 'Zadankai: Hyūman sekyuriti kara miru kokusai shien' [Roundtable discussion: International assistance from a human security viewpoint], *Mita hyōron* 2006: 8–9, p. 20.

[49] Takemi Keizō, member of the Diet, former state secretary for foreign affairs, interview by author, 11 March 2004. Participating in a conference on community building in the Asia Pacific, Obuchi commented: 'As Prime Minister, I have been given quite a number of nicknames, but perhaps the most prominent one is "Vacuum Prime Minister." It is often used in an unkind way, suggesting that I have no substance and am empty. A kinder interpretation may be the one used by the Chinese sage Lao Tze. He described a vacuum as an infinite state and felt it suggested a magnanimity and capacity to absorb each and every thing.' In *Community Building in Asia Pacific: Dialogue in Okinawa* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), p. 22. Obuchi's own description fits the observation made by Iokibe Makoto, according to whom Obuchi listened to others while pretending to be innocent (Professor Iokibe Makoto, President National Defense Academy of Japan, interview by author, 18 November 2006). Fukushima Akiko claims that Obuchi learned about the idea of human security from the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, when they first met at the 1996 G-7 meeting in Lyon, France. The source to her claim is Axworthy himself in Fukushima's interview of him in 2003; see Akiko Fukushima, 'Human Security: Comparing Japanese and Canadian Governmental Thinking and Practice', Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS), Centre of International Relations, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, *CCHS Human Security Visiting Fellow Paper* 1 (2004), p. 19. There is no reason to doubt that Axworthy brought up human security in his meeting with Obuchi, but Takemi's version that Obuchi decided to include human security on his political agenda after Takemi brought it up seems more likely to be closer to the truth.

[50] Cf. Johan Eriksson and Bengt Sundelius, 'Molding Minds That Form Policy: How to Make Research Useful', *International Studies Perspective* 6 (February 2005), p. 52.

Obuchi. According to Yamamoto, he and some others, among them Takemi, thought that after his elevation to foreign minister Obuchi was in need of good policy ideas and formed a group to come up with proposals. When human security was presented to the minister by this group, he 'took it as his baby, since the concept was consonant with his ideas.'[51]

For a start, Obuchi's pursuit of human security was very much a personal endeavour. This is seen in a presentation brochure of the Trust Fund for Human Security issued by MOFA after the pursuit of human security had been adopted as official policy. The ministry claims that in the speech in which Obuchi announced that a trust fund for human security was going to be established, he 'expressed his views on human security'.[52] From this formulation one can grasp that when he gave this speech in December 1998, MOFA had not yet jumped onto the human security bandwagon – but would do soon.

The trigger for Obuchi's and, subsequently, the Japanese government's campaign for human security was the international campaign against landmines. In the course of 1991, a number of NGOs and individuals called for a ban on landmines; the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was founded in October 1992 and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize five years later. The Norwegian Nobel Committee lauded this network of organizations which 'express and mediate a broad range of popular commitment in an unprecedented way. With the governments of several small and medium-sized countries taking the issue up [...] this work has grown into a convincing example of an effective policy for peace.'[53]

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[51] Yamamoto Tadashi, President, Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, interview by author, 11 March 2004. According to Iokibe, the group consisted of the *Asahi shimbun* journalist Funabashi Yōichi, the managing director and editor-in-chief of the *Nihon keizai shimbun* Kojima Akira, and two international relations specialists, Professor Iokibe Makoto and Professor Tanaka Akihiko, as well as the president of the Japan Center for International Exchange Yamamoto Tadashi (author's interview of Iokibe Makoto, 18 November 2006).

[52] MOFA, 'The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the "Human-centered" 21st Century' (November 2003), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21/index.html.

[53] The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 'The Nobel Peace Prize 1997', Press release, http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1997/press.html (downloaded 10 November 2005).

In retrospect, Obuchi claimed that his 'underlying thinking' for bringing about a shift in Japan's policy on landmines was human security.[54] When he was appointed foreign minister in Hashimoto Ryūtarō's second cabinet, Obuchi decided to review the Japanese policy on landmines and took personal charge of it. He announced in his maiden parliamentary policy speech as foreign minister that the Japanese government was going to work for an early ratification of the international treaty against landmines.[55] It was a controversial step because it meant abstaining from a widely used military instrument. Overruling objections from MOFA and the Japan Defense Agency, the government announced on 27 November 1997 its decision to sign the anti-landmine treaty. The policy change was generally ascribed to Obuchi personally and he was greeted with enthusiasm in Ottawa, when the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction was signed by 122 countries. The warm feelings contributed to Obuchi's resolve to make a commitment to 'continue to work for early realization of the target of "zero victims" not only in bilateral fora but also through international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)'.[56] The policy reversal was not easy for the Japanese government, he admitted at the ceremony, 'because the signing of this milestone treaty is very closely related to our national defense.'[57]

Obuchi showed his political skills by obtaining approval for this policy shift. It was a feat which gained him public applause.[58] As new foreign minister he noted that 'it is contradictory to contribute a large sum of money for mine clearance in Cambodia and refuse to sign the treaty.'[59] He

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[54] Obuchi, 'In Quest of Human Security', p. 8.

[55] Foreign Minister Obuchi Keizō, policy speech in the Diet, 16 February 1998, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/fam/19980216.SXJ.html.

[56] Obuchi, 'In Quest of Human Security', p. 9.

[57] 'Japan: Statement by Keizo Obuchi, Foreign Minister, 3 December', Ottawa *Landmines Convention: Treaty Signing Conference and Mine Action Forum.* Signing Conference for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production, Transfer and Stockpiling of Anti-personnel Mines and their Destruction, and Mine Action Forum, Ottawa, 2–4 December, 1997, *Disarmament Diplomacy* 21 (December 1997), http://www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/dd/dd21/ 21ott.htm (downloaded 5 September 2005).

[58] Curtis, *The Logic of Japanese Politics*, p. 212.

[59] Motoko Mekata, 'Building Partnerships toward a Common Goal: Experiences of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines', in Ann M. Florini, ed., *The Third*

continued his endeavour for implementing a change. A few days after his appointment as premier in July 1998, he phoned Shimizu Toshihiro of the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines to convey the message that his government would put utmost effort into preparing legislation for ratification.[60] The Diet ratified the treaty on 30 September 1998. Obuchi's personal resolve was easy to spot in that he did not vacillate even when an external event with repercussions for Japan's security situation occurred. On 31 August 1998, a shock-wave went through Japan when North Korea was reported to have fired a Taepodong missile over Japan, reminding the Japanese of the vulnerability of their country. The diplomatic commentator Funabashi Yōichi argued that it was no exaggeration that it was a shock to the Japanese, when they realized that North Korea possessed the capability of delivering a missile to Japan that could carry a biological, chemical or nuclear warhead.[61] Shocking to them was also the relatively tepid US response to North Korea's missile launch, which renewed questions in Japan about the credibility of the US commitment to Japan's defence.[62]

The Take Off of Japan's Campaign for Human Security

An event that boosted Obuchi's resolve to promote human security was the economic crisis that engulfed several East and Southeast Asian countries in 1997 and 1998. Its character was all the more worrying, given that preceding decades had been a period of rapid economic growth and booming national economies, burgeoning exports and income gains for many of the countries that had been undergoing a development that was seen as constituting an Asian 'miracle'. The crisis began when economic problems in Thailand triggered a run on the Thai *baht* in July 1997, which spread to other countries in the region. Virtually overnight, one saw the

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Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, and Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p. 170.

[60] Ibid., pp. 167f.

[61] Yoichi Funabashi, 'Tokyo's Temperance', *The Washington Quarterly* 23:3 (Summer 2000), p. 136.

[62] Gerald L. Curtis, 'Japan at the Crossroads', *Asia Pacific Issues: Analysis from the East-West Center* 41 (September 1999), p. 7.

collapse of currencies and equity markets of countries previously seen as developmental models. Millions of people were forced into unemployment, bankruptcy and material hardship. In Indonesia, the Suharto regime collapsed after thirty-three years in power.

The economic crisis had dramatic repercussions on the economy of many countries and their social conditions. It undermined the fruits of decades of development and caused widespread political instability and inter-state tensions. The sense of insecurity with political, economic, social and cultural dimensions spread.[63] Japan's economic involvement in Southeast Asian countries made its prospects seem gloomy. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimated that Japan's real GNP would fall 1.3 per cent in 1998 and 0.7 per cent in 1999.[64] The gloomy prospects for a number of Asian countries lingered in the background, when Obuchi announced what was to become a veritable campaign for human security pursued by the Japanese government. The first time he brought up human security was in his opening address at the international symposium 'Health Initiative in Asian Economic Crisis: Human-Centered Approach', convened at his initiative and hosted by the United Nations University in Tokyo on 27 April 1998. In this speech, Obuchi stressed the importance of paying attention to social safety nets in international cooperation.[65] This approach would become a key element in Japan's human security policy. Describing the ramifications of the economic crisis, the Japanese foreign minister said: 'When there is a decline in the overall level of health care, which is a prerequisite for the survival of humanity, there naturally follow other, broader social implications, such as (the effects on) education and employment ... thus high-

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[63] Anthony Burke, 'Caught Between National and Human Security: Knowledge and Power in Post-crisis Asia', *Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change* 13:3 (October 2001), pp. 215ff, http: //www.tandf.co.uk/journals/carfax/13239104.html (downloaded 5 March 2005).

[64] Takeshi Terada, 'Constructing an "East Asian" concept and growing regional identity: from EAEC to ASEAN+3', *The Pacific Review* 16:2 (June 2003), p. 268.

[65] MOFA, 'ODA and the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis', in *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1998,* http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1998/3.html (downloaded 14 July 2006).

lighting the need to look at the issue from the point of view of "human security".[66]

Obuchi's speech at the United Nations University is important in that it was a precursor of the campaign for human security that would be initiated. So far, this speech has been, by and large, overlooked. This is not the case for the next speech in which he touched upon the concept. It was in his keynote speech in Singapore on a round-trip to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.[67] Standing in the rostrum in Singapore, a small but vibrant Southeast Asian country and 'an intellectual centre of Asia' as he flatteringly called it, the occasion was suitable for a speech outlining Japanese foreign policy. His speech was entitled 'Outlook for the twenty-first century – Japan and Southeast Asia'. As the title indicates, the perspective was double: temporal – with his focus on the future; and geographic – with his focus on the region.

Obuchi's speech was given at a time when the Asian economic crisis was in full flood. Rapid economic growth had instilled hope of a glorious future, but the economic downturn made people lose hope and see disaster waiting round the corner. This crisis did not bode well for Japan which had struggled for years with low or miniscule, or even negative, growth figures. The country had made attempts to recover from the economic doldrums it had fallen into when 'the bubble economy' burst at the beginning of the decade, but these attempts had not worked so well. In this situation, Obuchi demonstrated resolve. He declared that Japan felt a duty, despite its own difficult economic situation, to do everything it could to help its East Asian friends. Japan was fully cognizant, he said, of how important its own economic recovery was to restoring stability to their economies, and he pointed out that the 'unprecedented' ¥16 trillion (about US$120 billion) Comprehensive Economic Measures, announced shortly before by the Japanese government, included support for Asian economies amounting to US$5.4 billion.

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[66] Obuchi quoted in Mark Austin, 'Protecting Health-Care Systems from Asia's Financial Crises', *The Daily Yomiuri*, 9 May 1998.

[67] Obuchi Keizō, 'Tōnan Ajia shokoku hōmon no sai no Obuchi gaimudaijin seisaku enzetsu, 21 seiki e no tembō – Nihon to higashi Ajia' [Policy speech by Foreign Minister Obuchi on the occasion of his visit to Southeast Asian countries, Outlook for the twenty-first century – Japan and Southeast Asia], in MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 42 (1998), pp. 198–202.

Obuchi began his speech in Singapore with the remark that geography and history linked Japan and the rest of East Asia and that they had developed increasingly interdependent relations. To stress the importance of interdependence in this way was nothing new to Japanese policy-makers. To point to interdependence as characterizing international relations had been part and parcel of Japanese governmental declarations since the end of the 1960s.[68] In Japanese foreign policy liturgy the world is portrayed as one and indivisible; consequently, Japan is uncontrovertibly involved, whether the Japanese like it or not. Behind the heightened awareness among Japan's foreign policy-makers of the need to come up with a response to interdependence was the realization that it caused problems that could not be resolved by individual countries on their own.

Interdependence as a key element of Japan's international environment and an aspect of international relations was especially pertinent as far as Asia was concerned. Obuchi was acutely aware of how dependent Japan was on its Asian countries. Japan cannot act in isolation from the international affairs of the Asian continent. Neither can it escape from the systemic constraints no matter how hard it tries. Japan and its Asian neighbours have similar socio-cultural traditions and share a common religious heritage. That Japan was a part of Asia is codified as one of the 'principles' of Japan's foreign policy issued in 1957. The expression used was that Japan is 'a member of Asia', *Ajia no ichiin*, which is part of Japanese foreign policy liturgy even today. In 1957 the Japanese government declared:

Asian countries are yet to fulfil their economic potential despite possession of huge natural resources. We may state that there is much room for Japan to cooperate with them by dint of our high-level technology and industry. In addition, if we help by introducing capital and technology from outside Asia, and take the initiative in both public and private sectors to encourage systematic, central and flexible economic co-operation that would enable Asia to embark on economic construction, we would see growing economic exchanges in Asia. To realize this scenario is crucial to the conduct of our economic foreign policy. As it is difficult for us to achieve further development without prosperity and peace in Asia, such economic cooperation is of vital importance in terms of our economic foreign policy.[69]

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[68] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, p. 162.
[69] MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 1 (1957), pp. 7f.

But ambivalence is always there. There has been a longing in Japan, since the Meiji era, to join the West, while at the same time geography makes the country irreversibly a part of Asia. The Japanese have felt an affinity with Asia, and yet, Japan has not been seen by its policy-makers as part of Asia for most of its modern history.[70] Reference was often made to Japan's leading intellectual of the Meiji period, Fukuzawa Yukichi, and his thesis from 1885 that Japan should 'leave Asia, join Europe', *datsua nyūō*. The 'father' of Japan's post-war foreign policy, Yoshida Shigeru, was a post-war proponent of Fukuzawa's ideas and had a patronizing view of Asia.[71] The implication of his famous slogan was that Japan's international status depended on the degree of Westernization to be attained by extricating the country from Asia (that is imitating the West) and by sacrificing neighbouring Asian nations for the benefit of Japan.[72] A variant was to declare that Japan belonged to Asia *and* the West.[73] There is a feeling that Japan has a dual identity – a sense of affinity towards Asia as well as the feeling of being a member of the industrialized Western world.

For Obuchi, interdependence was a key element of international relations. At the conference 'An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow' on 2 December 1998, he argued that the Asian economic crisis 'showed clearly the depth of interdependence among the countries in Asia and in the international community'.[74] To interdependence was added globalization which eroded the legitimacy of national borders and the

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[70] Takashi Inoguchi, 'Distant Neighbours? Japan and Asia', *Current History* 595 (November 1995), p. 392.

[71] Wakamiya Yoshibumi, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia, pp. How the Political Right Has Delayed Japan's Coming to Terms With Its History of Aggression in Asia* (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1998), pp. 67ff.

[72] Shinya Murase, 'Japan and International Law', *The Japan Foundation Newsletter* 15:4 (1997), p. 2.

[73] Kokubun Ryōsei, *Ajia jidai no kenshō: Chūgoku no shiten kara* [Investigating the Asian era: From a Chinese viewpoint] (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1996), pp. 4f; Funabashi Yōichi, *Nihon no taigai kōsō: Reisengo no bijon o kaku* [Japan's external initiative: A vision after the end of the Cold War] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993), pp. 110ff.

[74] Keizo Obuchi, 'Opening Remarks', in [Pamela J. Noda, ed.], *The Asian Crisis and Human Security: An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999), p. 17.

ability of national governments to regulate international migration.[75] Rapid globalization of the world economy resulted in strains that focused Japanese attention on the negative aspects of this process. Takemi Keizō was one of the articulate proponents of human security who argued that globalization has a 'dark side' which made collaboration a must:

There is a limit to what individual countries can do in the face of a phenomenon that might be termed a 'wide-ranging diversification of threats' in the international community. We must apprehend this phenomenon as a problem bearing on the very existence of each and every person, and develop more formidable countermeasures for it. To this end, we must first organically mobilize governments, international agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other actors to construct intellectual, political, and economic networks on a global scale.[76]

In his Singapore speech, Obuchi emphasized the need for compassion, *omoiyari,* for those hit hardest by the raging economic crisis. A background to this priority was that assistance for the socially vulnerable was a major concern of the Hashimoto government.[77] Obuchi stressed the importance of improving the employment and health situation. This attention to health issues would stand the test of time and become part of his legacy. This focus might be related to the fact that a key advisor on human security was Takemi Keizō, who had a special interest in human security from a medical viewpoint and wanted to expand medical care to Southeast Asia.[78] There was a link to Hashimoto's approach to human security, when Obuchi took up the environment: 'The forest fires and the haze problem that are raging in this region aggravated by El Niño are another cause of concern, as they have an adverse impact on the health and lives of a vast number of people and the ecological system in the region.'

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[75] Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain, 'Introduction', in Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain, eds, *Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997), p. xi.

[76] Takemi Keizo, 'Approach to the Mounting Concern of Human Security', in *Tokyo 2000: The Annual Meeting of The Trilateral Commission* (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 2000), pp. 43f.

[77] Comment by Takemi Keizō at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', *The Sasagawa Peace Foundation Annual Report FY 2004*, p. 7, http://www.spf.org/e/publication/annual/pdf/ar04_1.pdf (downloaded 17 February 2006).

[78] Iokibe Makoto, interview, 18 November 2006. Visiting Takemi for an interview in his office, I was struck by the prominent place occupied by posters of the Japan Medical Association.

Obuchi's Tokyo Speech, 2 December 1998

Obuchi's speech in Singapore as foreign minister became a step further towards the campaign for human security that he would orchestrate as prime minister.[79] One of the themes of his speech was the need for 'intellectual dialogue on building Asia's tomorrow' and this was made the topic of a conference on human security in Tokyo on 2–3 December 1998 that he initiated. This theme reflected a key message in his 1998 campaign for the post as president of the LDP – and thus prime minister – when his favourite expression was that Japan had 'no tomorrow' unless it changed its economic and political system.[80]

The Tokyo conference became another step towards what was a veritable campaign for human security. The focus of presentations and discussions was the effects of the Asian economic crisis on vulnerable strata of society and suitable responses by the international community. The acute social and economic situation in Southeast Asia was laid bare in a report by two experts, who presented a numbing picture of how the crisis distorted the livelihood of large groups of people:

The Asian economic crisis is affecting the lives of millions in East Asia and aggravating social vulnerabilities. It has had several negative impacts, among them falling incomes, rising poverty and malnutrition, declining public services, reduced access to education, deteriorating health-care status, heightened pressure on women, and increased crime and violence. The effects of the crisis are acute in Indonesia and severe in Thailand, the Republic of Korea, and Malaysia. The Philippines, while somewhat less affected, also shows signs of worsening social conditions. In Indonesia, there has also been a radical breakdown in social order as an increasingly fragile social equilibrium is brought under acute stress by the economic and financial collapse. The economic crisis has affected almost all households and segments of society. However, some segments and groups are particularly vulnerable, namely, migrant workers, the urban poor, the elderly, women, and children.[81]

Against this disturbing presentation, the need for focusing on people's needs is easy to understand and, again, as in Singapore, Obuchi attended in his speech to those most vulnerable to the effects of the crisis. He clari-

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[79] Shinoda, 'Anzen hoshō gainen no tagika to "ningen no anzen hoshō"', p. 70.

[80] Curtis, 'Japan at the Crossroads', p. 3.

[81] Chia Siow Yue and Shamira Bhanu, 'Human Security Dimensions of the Asian Financial Crisis: A Compendium of Research Materials', in [Pamela J. Noda, ed.], *The Asian Crisis and Human Security*, p. 53.

fied his view on human security in a way that would become the lodestar for the efforts of his government:

It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired. While the phrase 'human security' is a relatively new word, I understand that it is the keyword to comprehensively seizing all of the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and to strengthening the efforts to deal with these threats. […] To support Asian countries in the economic crisis, we have pledged and steadily implemented contributions of the largest scale in the world. With human security in mind, we have given, as one of the most important pillars of our support, assistance to the poor, the aged, the disabled, women and children, and other socially vulnerable segments of the population on whom the Asian economic difficulties have the heaviest impact.[82]

Similar to Murayama and Hashimoto, Obuchi used the human security concept in such a way that security in a military sense was not taken into account. As had been the case with Hashimoto, the security referent is the collective, expressed in various ways '[we] humankind', *wareware jinrui*, and 'we', *wareware*, but also as individuals, using *ningen*, or 'human being(s)', as in Murayama's UN speech. In order to counter challenges to human security, the Japanese government was said to direct its assistance to socially vulnerable segments of population like the poor, the aged, the disabled, and women and children. Core values have a wider scope than Hashimoto's. Obuchi pointed to survival, *seizon*, livelihood, *seikatsu*, and dignity, *sonkei*. Threats to human security mentioned in his speech were the exodus of refugees, violations of human rights, infectious diseases like AIDS, terrorism, anti-personnel landmines, and are thus more numerous than threats listed by Murayama and Hashimoto. According to Obuchi, the security situation was aggravated by problems like global warming and transnational crimes such as illicit drugs and trafficking. The strategy to deal with these threats to human security was said to be for the international community to institute coordinated action and strengthening the linkages and cooperation of governments and international organizations with citizen's activities. Obuchi stated that the basic idea of his diplomatic activities was that the twenty-first century should be 'human centred'; his wording was similar to that used by Murayama in his UN speech. Obuchi claimed that he had long harboured this idea and, thus, continued Mura-

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[82] Obuchi, 'Opening Remarks', pp. 18f.

yama's and Hashimoto's way of making personal beliefs the foundation of policies.[83]

In his speech, Obuchi lauded one of the conference participants, the Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan. His role in introducing human security in Thailand resembles that of Obuchi in Japan and Lloyd Axworthy in Canada. Surin is one of ASEAN's most senior and respected politicians and responsible for key initiatives taken by the Thai government in the pursuit of human security. Obuchi praised Surin and the ASEAN-PMC Caucus for Social Safety Nets which he had proposed at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in July 1998.[84]

Obuchi's address at the Tokyo conference became a key input in the campaign for human security initiated by the Japanese government. The central features of this campaign are all found in this speech – the prime minister's personal commitment, the focus on the most vulnerable, and the necessity of collaboration. In one important respect, Obuchi's ideas modified Murayama's approach. Human security was a concern for Japan and not only the United Nations. That Obuchi's approach meant something new is evident from the fact that a roundtable discussion reported in the November 1998 issue of the monthly *Gaikō fōramu* – thus the month before Obuchi gave his speech – treated human security as something that the United Nations should pursue.[85]

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[83] The importance of this approach was stressed by Obuchi in a report to the Diet about his travel to Europe in June 1999, when he described the creation of a 'human-centred' twenty-first century as 'my long-cherished idea' [*kanete kara no watashi no rinen*]. See Obuchi Keizō, Statement in the Upper House, 25 June 1999, http://village.infoweb.ne.jp/~fwhn9262/sub9.htm (downloaded 12 June 2003).

[84] Obuchi, 'Opening Remarks', pp. 17f. Surin represents a country that has long been influenced by the notion that 'security begins at home' and championed human security in both foreign and domestic policies. The Thai government has championed human security as a way of distancing itself from its authoritarian predecessors, enhancing its international legitimacy and attracting development assistance. See Amitav Acharya, 'The Nexus Between Human Security and Traditional Security in Asia', in *International Conference on Human Security in East Asia, 16–17 June 2003, Seoul, Republic of Korea: Proceedings*, p. 84.

[85] Oshidari Kenrō et al, 'Zadankai: 21 seiki no Kokuren wa ningen no anzen hoshō o mezasu' [Roundtable discussion: The UN of the 21st century aims at human security], *Gaikō fōramu* 143 (November 1998), p. 48.

Obuchi's Hanoi Speech, 14 December 1998

Prime Minister Obuchi returned to human security two weeks after the Tokyo speech during his visit to Vietnam on the occasion of the summit of ASEAN+3, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, Japan and South Korea. His talk at Hanoi's Institute for International Relations was entitled 'Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia'. Again, he made it clear that he acted out of a conviction that the twenty-first century should be human-centred, and said that his vision for Asia was that the next century should be 'a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity', which made it necessary to emphasize human security. In order to realize this vision for Asia, three areas were in focus – efforts to revitalize Asia, the need for emphasizing human security, and promotion of intellectual dialog. Human security is a concept, the Japanese prime minister said in a statement that has been quoted repeatedly, 'that takes a comprehensive view of all kind of threats to human survival, livelihood and dignity', and he stressed the need to respond to these threats.[86]

Obuchi took the Asian economic crisis as the starting-point of his discussion on how threats to human security should be dealt with: 'The economic crisis confronting the Asian countries today has been a direct blow to their socially vulnerable – the poor, women and children, and the elderly – threatening their survival and dignity.' At the same time, he said, 'even in times of economic crisis, we should not forget cooperation on medium- and long-term problems such as environmental degradation, narcotics and international organized crime which need to be addressed if we wish to protect human survival, life and dignity.' With such an approach, it was natural for Japan to flex its economic muscles to overcome the problems for human security caused by the economic crisis. Measures had already been announced by the Japanese government. At a meeting in October 1998 of finance ministers and central bankers from the major industrial countries, Finance Minister Miyazawa Kiichi presented a

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[86] Keizo Obuchi, 'Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia', policy speech at the Lecture Program hosted by the Institute for International Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam, 16 December 1998, http://mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.htlm (downloaded 12 March 2002).

US$30 billion plan to assist Asian countries hit by the economic crisis.[87] Obuchi's announcement was welcome news to the economically hard-pressed countries in the region who had called for Japanese intervention.[88] The plan proposed by Miyazawa meant that Japan's chequebook diplomacy was exercised once again, with the Japanese government writing out a hefty cheque.

Three security concepts figure in Obuchi's Hanoi speech – national security, regional security and human security. In my interview of Takemi Keizō, who wrote the speech, he described them as complementing each other; neither of them can replace the others.[89] Takemi is a scholar-turned-politician, well known for his foreign-policy expertise as a professor of international politics, and was appointed state secretary for foreign affairs when Obuchi became premier. Shortly after Obuchi's speech in Singapore which Takemi helped draft, Takemi told a seminar at Keio University, his scholarly *alma mater*, that coming from academia to politics had made him realize that while different security concepts are used by scholars, in politics they are used side by side.[90]

In his Hanoi speech, Obuchi pointed out that threats to human security 'differ by country and region'. In a speech given at the Japan Institute for International Affairs a year later, he returned to this aspect: 'In Africa, for example, the chief threats are poverty, disease, and conflict; in many developed countries, the threats include drugs and organized crime; in Cambodia, they include landmines. In addition, the threats sometimes change the way in which they manifest themselves, as when the Asian countries that had been achieving dazzling economic growth were suddenly plunged into economic crisis.'[91] Given key issues and problems addressed by the Obuchi government in its pursuit of human security, it

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[87] Marc Castellano, 'Two Years On: Evaluating Tokyo's Response to the East Asian Financial Crisis', *JEI Report* 30 (6 August 1999), http://www.jei.org/Reports/ JEIR/99JEIRsummaries/s9930.html (downloaded 14 September 2005).

[88] Marc Castellano, 'Japan's Promise Of More Aid Steals Show At Asean Summit', *JEI Report* 1 (8 January 1999), http://jei.org/Archive/JEIR99/9901w5.html (downloaded 14 September 2005).

[89] Takemi Keizō, interview, 11 March 2004.

[90] Kawabe Ichirō, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō no seijisei: Teishō no haikei to Nihon ni totte no imi' [The political nature of human security: The background to its advocacy and its meaning to Japan], *Ritsumeikan kokusai chiiki kenkyū* 21 (March 2003), p. 85.

[91] Obuchi, 'In Quest of Human Security', p. 8.

was a matter-of-course that Africa would figure in discussions related to human security. In June 1999, a conference was organized by MOFA and the United Nations University which had Africa as one of its main foci.[92] This conference and Obuchi's speech reflected Japan's heightened interest in Africa.[93]

One of the proposals in the 1994 UNDP Report was that a global human security fund should be established with funding based on a proportion of reductions in global military spending, a fee on globally important transactions or polluting emissions, and overseas development aid.[94] Not unexpectedly, this way of securing financing could not be realized. In Hanoi, Obuchi took up the idea of a human security fund to show that he meant business. To give a boost to his efforts to promote human security, he stated that Japan wanted to establish a new fund that would 'provide support in a flexible and timely manner to projects that are to be implemented in this region.' The proposed fund was meant to be a key instrument for the Japanese government in its pursuit of human security. As his statement clearly shows, what he had in mind was a fund with activities in Asia but working under the aegis of the United Nations. This intention could not be realized, however. Since the new fund was to be a UN agency, its activities could not be limited to a certain region. But few in Asian countries could miss Obuchi's message that the Japanese government was concerned over their situation and saw itself as having a responsibility to contribute to a solution of the problems caused by the Asian economic crisis. Referring to an editorial in the *Tōkyō shimbun* dealing with Obuchi's Hanoi speech, the Foreign Press Center commented: 'The sales point of the package [presented by the Japanese government] is not economic support, but rather its focus on the philosophy of human security, or consideration of the socially vulnerable, in order to protect human dignity.'[95]

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[92] MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 43 (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 2000), p. 13.

[93] Awakened Japanese interest in Africa can be noticed with The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) convening in Tokyo in 1993. This conference has been followed by similar ones every five years. See Morikawa Jun, 'Nihon no Afurika gaikō' [Japan's African diplomacy], *Kokusai seiji* 123 (January 2000), p. 155.

[94] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, pp. 8f.

[95] Foreign Press Center, Tokyo, 'Obuchi Doctrine for Asian Revitalization: Prime Minister Obuchi's Policy Speech in Hanoi', 28 December 1998, http://www.fpcj.jp/

The news media reported that Obuchi's performance in Hanoi had been that of a star. It must have been a pleasure for the Japanese prime minister to read that what he had done was actually to launch what the press called 'the Obuchi Doctrine' – US presidents used to launch their own foreign policy doctrine which had been the envy of Japanese premiers of the 1980s and 90s who also wanted to be linked to their own doctrines. What 'the Obuchi doctrine' actually meant was not clear, however. According to Marc Castellano, Obuchi's pledge of financial support of and proposals for increased cooperation constituted the doctrine, while Japan's Foreign Press Center saw his address as a whole as the doctrine.[96]

After Hanoi, Obuchi continued his drive for human security. In his policy speech in the Diet on 19 January 1999, he identified human security as one of the five bridges, *kakehashi,* to Asia in the twenty-first century: 'Preserving life and ensuring secure livelihood, that is ensuring human security, is an important duty which we should bear. I am [committed to] building a bridge to security, guaranteeing global environmental safety and the security of each and every one.'[97] This emphasis on the global environment was again an obvious parallel to Hashimoto Ryūtarō's idea that is found also in Obuchi's Singapore speech. It was an important aspect to Obuchi. In his message to an environmental conference in 1999 he pointed out that 'global problems ignore national borders and sovereignty' which he said necessitated a new perspective focusing on human security rather than on national security.[98]

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e/shiryo/jb/j9837.html (downloaded 23 June 2003). The editorial is said to be published 16 December 1998 but is found in the morning edition of 17 December.

[96] Castellano, 'Japan's Promise Of More Aid Steals Show At Asean Summit', p. 14; Foreign Press Center, Tokyo, 'Obuchi Doctrine for Asian Revitalization'.

[97] MOFA, 'Policy Speech by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to the 145th Session of the Diet'.

[98] 'Summary Report of the Inter-linkages: International Conference on Synergies and Coordination between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 14–16 July 1999', *Sustainable Developments* 27:3 (1999), p. 1, http://www.iisd.ca/sd/ interlink ages/sdvol27no3e.html (downloaded 6 March 2006).

Obuchi's Bilateral Moves

After Obuchi's speeches in December 1998, Japanese foreign policy spokesmen began to emphasize that the prime minister had made human security a key perspective of Japanese foreign policy. The chief Japanese representative to an international conference on developmental issues in New York in September 1999, Takemi Keizō, stated that 'the Obuchi Government is cultivating the concept of "human security" as a new element in its foreign policy'. Referring to Obuchi's speech in Hanoi, he claimed that the prime minister had defined human security as an important priority of Japan's foreign policy.[99] It was also the key message of a speech delivered by MOFA's Takasu Yukio at a conference on human security in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, in May 2000. Taking Obuchi's Hanoi speech as the starting-point for his remarks, he claimed that Japan accorded high priority to human security in its foreign policy.[100] It was a priority that also reflected on relations with individual countries.

The United States – Thwarted Ambitions

With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see that Obuchi's keynote speech in Singapore in May 1998 foreshadowed the campaign for human security that he would initiate as prime minister. Since international collaboration was *sine qua non* for success of the new policy, it is a foregone conclusion that he was considering how to act. To secure allies Obuchi brought up human security in his meetings with foreign dignitaries and instructed MOFA to get going. The situation was not bad since an increasing number of governments were unified in their view that human security was important. Obuchi proclaimed that human security 'is now being taken more and more seriously by the international community.'[101]

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[99] MOFA, 'Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century'. Address by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Keizo Takemi at a Lecture Meeting Hosted by the Asia Society, 1 September 1999, Asia Society, New York, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human–secu/speech9909.html (downloaded 12 March 2002).

[100] MOFA, 'Statement by Director-General Yukio Takasu at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan-Bator, 8 May 2000'.

[101] Obuchi, 'In Quest of Human Security', p. 8

For Japan with its foreign and security policies based on the security treaty with the United States, it was evident which country was in the foreground. In his Singapore speech, Obuchi was careful to emphasize that it was important for regional peace and stability to ensure US presence in the region through the Japan–US security arrangements. His assertion of the regional importance of this security relationship might be seen as a necessary ingredient in a speech meant to be an important foreign policy declaration by Japan's foreign minister. But in his speeches in December 1998 in which human security was an important theme, there was a discernible difference. In these speeches, relations with the United States were either not mentioned – as in his speech on 2 December, or downplayed – as in his speech on 16 December, when he pointed out the need for a partnership built on cooperation and dialogue not only with the United States but also with South Korea, China and Russia. This was a distinct change of tone compared to the stance taken by his predecessor Hashimoto Ryūtarō the year before on a visit to ASEAN countries, when he expressed Japan's readiness to participate in a summit-level forum with ASEAN to discuss Asian security but did not forget to express the customary reverence to Japan's security alliance with the United States.[102] Within recent memory there was also the fact that Obuchi had been instrumental in the revision of Japan's policy on a controversial issue, landmines, despite US opposition.[103]

The hint at a possible downgrading of the importance of the US relationship that Obuchi's statements might imply did not escape Tanaka Akihiko, a leading analyst of Japan's international relations. In the March 1999 issue of the monthly *This Is Yomiuri* he aired scepticism of Obuchi's launch of the new security idea. According to Tanaka, the prime minister created uncertainty regarding his intentions. He argued that Obuchi's speech 'was highly significant in the way it provided a single framework for all the diplomatic endeavours that preceded it. [....] Obuchi's use of the concept of "human security" was quite fresh even in global terms.' But

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[102] Keiko Hirata, 'Cautious Proactivism and Reluctant Reactivism: Analyzing Japan's Foreign Policy Toward Indochina', p. 39; http://hypatia.ss.uci.edu/PS/personnel/hirata/Indochina.pdf; also published in Akitoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato, eds, *Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration* (Basingstoke and New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001).
[103] Okamoto, 'Japan and the United States', pp. 61f.

Tanaka's ambivalence is clear when he both praises Obuchi for launching a new security concept and expresses scepticism about the way it endangered Japan's security cooperation with the United States. According to Tanaka, attempts to launch human security could not replace traditional approaches to security but must be combined with them: 'Many of the details of "human security" remain unclear', he wrote. 'What does it mean specifically, and in what ways does it overlap or depart from traditional notions of national security? Furthermore, it will not do for preoccupation with new concepts of this sort to cause the essential tasks of ordinary military defense to be neglected.'[104]

Japanese and US officials met in Washington on 8 April to prepare Obuchi's upcoming visit. The two sides agreed 'to work cooperatively to address those economic and social issues that have arisen from the economic crisis in Asia, including measures to ensure "human security" and alleviate the plight of the socially vulnerable.'[105] Prior to this meeting, the Japanese government disseminated the information that Japan and the United States were going to launch joint projects to improve the human security situation of developing Asian countries mired in economic problems because of the rampant economic crises. A newspaper commentator reported shortly before the visit that 'the two countries have conducted various cooperative activities in 18 areas, including health, population, the environment, narcotics trafficking, natural disasters, food supply, counter-terrorism and democratization.' The agreement was said to be part of the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda in Global Perspective agreed upon back in 1993 by Prime Minister Miyazawa and President Clinton. Agreement on the joint projects was going to be finalized at the meeting between Obuchi and President Bill Clinton.[106]

Prospects for joint Japan–US projects in the field of human security clearly existed and a breakthrough for Obuchi's newly launched campaign for human security could not be excluded. As pointed out by Emma Rothschild, 'foreign policy speeches of the Clinton administration

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[104] The article is translated as Tanaka Akihiko, 'Obuchi Diplomacy: How to Follow a Successful Start', in Masuzoe, ed., *Years of Trial*, pp. 81f.

[105] MOFA, 'The U.S.–Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective' (April 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/agenda/gpers9904.html (downloaded 1 October 2003).

[106] Hisane Masaki, 'Japan, U.S. Plan Projects for "Human Security" in Asia', *The Japan Times*, 7 April 1999.

contained repeated references in 1993 and 1994 to extended or "human" security, including "a new understanding of the meaning and nature of national security and of the role of individuals and nation-states".'[107] President Clinton had issued the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement the year after the Common Agenda had been agreed upon, which brought up many of the issues that were central to the discourse on human security, like population growth, environmental degradation, mass migration of refugees, and narcotics trafficking.[108] Furthermore, Clinton's Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Under-Secretary of State Timothy Wirth were on record as using human security terminology.[109] Still, a positive outcome for Obuchi's human security agenda was not likely, since the United States defined its security policies in other terms than human security. Suffice it to point out the fact that the gun tradition, guaranteed in the US constitution, is not compatible with one of the key issues on the human security agenda: the prohibition of small weapons. Die-hard proponents of traditional views on security represented by, for instance, officials of the Pentagon and the State Department continued to reject the idea that there was any need to modify traditional policies for national security based on military strength. While the human security concept had been used occasionally by US officials, cases were rare.[110]

Before his meeting with President Clinton, Obuchi gave a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council in which he linked the problem of the economic woes afflicting Asian countries with future cooperation on

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[107] Emma Rothschild, 'What is Security?', *Daedalus: the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 124:3 (Summer 1995), p. 54.

[108] Referred to in Baldwin, 'Security Studies and the End of the Cold War', p. 139.

[109] Rodger A. Payne, 'Human Security and American Foreign Policy', paper prepared for conference on Human Security in the New Millennium, European Union Center, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, 4–5 March 2004, p. 7.

[110] Inada Juichi, 'Kaihatsu-fukkō ni okeru "ningen no anzen hoshō" ron no igi to genkai' [Importance and limitations of the discussion on 'human security' in development and rehabilitation], *Kokusai mondai* 530 (May 2004), p. 32. A Google search for the phrase 'national security' conducted 21 February 2004 by Rodger Payne yielded over 20,000 results from the White House website. By way of contrast, a similar search of the same website for 'human security' yielded no results. A search for 'economic security' produced 20,500 results, 'homeland security' 21,700, 'energy security' 139 results, 'health security' 68, and 'environmental security' 4. See Payne, 'Human Security and American Foreign Policy', p. 9.

human security between Japan and the United States. In his speech, he declared: 'The economic difficulties in Asia have also had a direct impact on the socially vulnerable Asian countries such as poor persons with disabilities, the elderly, and children. Protecting the lives, well-being and dignity of these people, in other words, responding to human security-related issues, is a pressing task over which further cooperation between Japan and the United States is necessary and possible.'[111] Obuchi's speech was a last-minute addition in the extensive preparations to attempt to pave the way for human security to be included on the eve of his meeting with President Clinton on 3 May 1999.

The meeting became business as usual, however. Whatever Obuchi may have hoped for, human security was not included on the agenda. Reports from the meeting focused on US pressures on Tokyo to get its economy in order. Shortly before Obuchi went to the United States, a legislative package for implementing the updated Japan–US defence cooperation guidelines passed the Lower House. This was a 'gift' that Obuchi brought with him to the meeting, but President Clinton did not reciprocate.[112]

The Nordic Countries – Common Talk but No Joint Action

Prime Minister Obuchi continued his offensive for human security. The month after his summit meeting with President Clinton, the second Nordic–Japanese Summit took place on 22 June 1999. The first such summit had taken place two years before, when Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō included a meeting with Nordic leaders while in Europe.[113] That human security should be put on the agenda of the Summit was suggested by State Secretary Lars Danielsson of the Swedish Cabinet Office at a meeting in Tokyo in May 1999 with the Japanese vice-minister for foreign affairs, Yanai Shunji. Danielsson had visited Canada the year before and

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[111] Keizo Obuchi, 'Japan: America's Partner in Asia', speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 29 April 1999, http://www.lawac.org/speech/obuchi.html (downloaded 17 June 2003).

[112] Kenzo Uchida, 'Obuchi confounds the skeptics', *The Japan Times*, 1 May 1999.

[113] Bert Edström, 'Deperipherialization of a Marginal Relationship? Swedish–Japanese Relations in the Post-war Period', paper presented at the 18th Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia, Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 6–10 December 2004, p. 22.

his discussions with Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy made Danielsson conclude that human security was a suitable topic for the upcoming Japan–Nordic Summit.[114] He also proposed that an initiative should be taken at the upcoming Millennium Summit. Danielsson's proposal was made against the background that he was chair of a commission appointed by the G-16 Group of countries assigned the task of working out proposals for UN reform. This commission was a follow up of the report presented by the Commission on Global Governance co-chaired by Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson of Sweden. Yanai was non-committal and stated merely that 'Japan, and Obuchi personally, puts a lot of emphasis on the discussion of "human security".'[115] Yanai's disinterest in pursuing the matter was quite striking to Danielsson, who concluded that Japan was not particularly interested in collaborating with Sweden on human security.[116] Yanai's cautious reaction can be seen as an expression of his reluctance to commit Japan in any way, especially since he met Danielsson at the same time as the meeting of representatives of eleven governments took place in Norway, which resulted in the formation of the Human Security Network.[117] The Human Security Network is a key multilateral effort aimed at

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[114] Ambassador Lars Danielsson, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, interview by author, 18 December 2006.

[115] Edström, 'Deperipherialization', p. 23.

[116] Lars Danielsson, interview, 18 December 2006.

[117] That Danielsson raised the possibility of making human security an item of the agenda of the Nordic–Japanese Summit was an indication of Swedish interest in actions promoting the new security idea. While not extensive, collaboration on human security between Japan and Sweden has been seen. When the Japanese government established the Commission on Human Security, the Swedish government 'took it seriously' because of the fact that Ogata Sadako and Amartya Sen were appointed co-chairs, and Sweden has consistently been positive to Japanese efforts to promote human security (Magnus Lennartsson Nakamitsu, Minister, Embassy of Sweden, Tokyo, interview by author, 10 November 2006). Carl Tham, a former minister and at the time Secretary-General of the Olof Palme International Centre and later Sweden's Ambassador to Germany, was appointed one of the commissioners. Furthermore, one of the five meetings of the Commission took place in Stockholm and was sponsored by the Swedish government (State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hans Dahlgren to François Fouinat, Executive Director of the Commission on Human Security, Letter 14 February 2002, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, HP24C Dnr 45/001). In a conversation in May 2002 with the Swedish Ambassador to the UN, Pierre Schori, the Commission's co-chair Ogata Sadako expressed her 'great interest in strengthening the link with Sweden and developing contacts with various Swedish actors', according to Schori's subsequent report to

promoting human security. It is an association of states that meet and collaborate in identifying potential areas for collective action in the pursuit of human security. The Network is loosely organized with participating countries joined in their belief of the need for coordinating activities on human security. The starting-point of this multilateral effort to promote human security was a meeting of two diplomats, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy of Canada and his Norwegian counterpart Knut Vollebæk.[118] The basic document of the Network is the Lysøen Declaration named after the Norwegian island outside Bergen, where Axworthy and Vollebæk met in December 1997. The two foreign ministers found that they shared the ambition to see if 'the winning formula' which produced the landmark Ottawa Convention could be replicated for other issues.[119]

Stockholm ('Samtal med Ogata inför mötet i Sverige med Commission on Human Security' [Conversation with Ogata before the meeting in Sweden of the Commission on Human Security], 31 May 2002, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, HP24C). The Swedish goverment does not seem to have responded. In 1998, the Swedish foreign ministry presented a Japan strategy, within the framework of the comprehensive 'Swedish Asia Strategy', which was accepted by the parliament in 1999, and when follow-up studies were made in 2002 and 2005, collaboration with Japan on human security was not included. See Regeringskansliet [Swedish Government], *Framtid med Asien – en uppföljning av regeringens Asienstrategy* [Future with Asia – a sequel of the government's Asia strategy], Ds 2002:24 (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet, 2002); and Utrikesdepartementet [Ministry for Foreign Affairs], *En svensk Asienpolitik* [A Swedish Asia policy], Regeringens skrivelse 2005/06:57 (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet, 2005).

[118] Michio Umegaki, 'Human Security: Some Conceptual Issues for Policy Research', Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University, *Policy and Governance Working Paper Series* 2 (November 2003), p. 8.

[119] Michael Small, 'The Human Security Network', in McRae and Hubert, *Human Security and the New Diplomacy*, p. 230. The Lysøen Declaration outlines an ambitious agenda focussing on landmines, small arms, children in armed conflict, international humanitarian and human rights law, the International Criminal Court, exploitation of children, safety of humanitarian personnel, conflict prevention, transnational organized crime, and resources for development. See Human Security Network, 'A Perspective on Human Security: Chairman's Summary', Lysøen Norway, 20 May 1999, http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs. Efforts to attract other countries brought together a group comprising Austria, Canada, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and Norway, later joined by Costa Rica, Greece, and Mali; South Africa has participated as an observer from the beginning. See DFAIT, *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and Interna-

The press release issued after the Japan–Nordic Summit in Reykjavik reveals that the meeting had a strong human security flavour. The premiers agreed that 'to realise a more humane society in the world, it was necessary to seek every possibility of international cooperation to meet any threats against the survival, livelihood and dignity of human beings from the perspective of human security. The prime ministers stressed the importance of giving all human beings the opportunity to develop.'[120] Danielsson's idea of a possible initiative at the Millennium Summit is not mentioned in the press release.

In Obuchi's comments afterwards he rated highly the joint resolution to cooperate, and characterized the Summit as an event that secured international support of his pursuit of human security: 'Japan places priority in its foreign policy on the concept of "human security" […] Norway and the other Nordic countries also emphasize this concept of "human security." At the Prime Ministers' Meeting between Japan and the Nordic countries in June 1999, which focused on the need to guarantee human security, we agreed on "making the 21st century a human-centred century" and resolved to cooperate toward that global [goal?] internationally in future.'[121] In the *Diplomatic Bluebook*, Obuchi's meeting with the Nordic

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[120] Utrikesdepartementet [Ministry for Foreign Affairs], 'Nordiskt-japanskt statsministermöte i Reykjavik, 22 juni 1999' [Nordic–Japanese prime ministerial meeting in Reykjavik 22 June 1999], Appendix: 'For a World of Human Dignity and Peace: Japan–Nordic Partnership for the 21st Century. Press release issued by a meeting of the Prime Minister of Japan and the Prime Ministers of the Nordic Countries, Reykjavík, June 22, 1999', UD-ASO Memorandum 1999-06-23.

[121] Keizo Obuchi, 'A Message from the Prime Minister of Japan', in Gro Harlem Brundtland, *Preparing for the Worst: Can We Give Hope to Victims in Complex Emergencies?*, Fridtjof Nansen Memorial Lecture 1999, UNU Centre, Tokyo, 17 November 1999, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/brundtland.html (downloaded 25 December 2005). Despite the customary intimate and extensive collaboration of the Nordic countries, Sweden and Norway have had different approaches to Japan in this field. Given the fact that Norway is a co-founder of the Human Security Network, it would seem natural for the Japanese government to choose a Norwegian as one of the commissioners of the Commission on Human Security. Not to do so might be interpreted as a somewhat lukewarm Japanese stance towards Norway and/or the Human Security Network. This reserved stance has not been reciprocated by Norway. A Norwegian Japan strategy was adopted in 2001. One of the elements of this strategy was human security alongside with peace efforts, UN reform, development policy cooperation in Africa and Asia, the elderly population boom and

prime ministers was taken as proof that Japan engaged in a 'lively discussion' with the international community on human security.[122]

Canada – Collaboration on Human Security as a Non-Starter

A bilateral meeting that might have been expected to prove important for collaboration on human security was when a Canadian delegation visited Tokyo shortly after the Japan–Nordic Summit. Canada had been one of the first countries to make human security the backbone of its foreign policy and was already mentioned as an international leader in this field.[123] The interpretation of the human security concept of the Canadian government differed from the 1994 UNDP report, however. Canada was openly critical of the bifurcated human security concept of the UNDP and saw it as excessively concerned with threats associated with underdevelopment, to the detriment of human insecurity resulting from violent conflict.[124] The Canadian view was that human security is 'security of the people' with the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions constituting core elements of a human security doctrine.[125]

Given the fact that Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi had already endorsed human security the year after it was launched by the UNDP, and

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human rights, see [Innovasjon Norge], 'The Norwegian Foreign Ministry's Japan Strategy' (2001),www.eksport.no/upload/offices/tokyo/JAPAN_Strat_E.pdf; downloaded 12 November 2005). However, this strategy does not seem to have taken off and is 'sleeping' at the moment according to an official of the Norwegian foreign ministry. Human security has been one of the issues brought up by Norway in the bilateral dialogue with Japan but, nevertheless, 'it is not easy to point to concrete collaboration in bilateral cooperation.' Contacts have taken place but then between delegations to the United Nations, where Japan and Norway have had 'to a large extent identical viewpoints' (Per Bardalen Wiggen, 2nd Secretary, Embassy of Norway, Tokyo, personal message, 11 December 2006).

[122] MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 43 (2000), p. 102.

[123] Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, 'The Axworthy Revolution', in Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, eds, *The Axworthy Legacy: Canada Among Nations 2001* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 67–88.

[124] Walter Dorn, 'Human Security: An Overview', paper prepared for the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, modified on 19 February 2003, http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn24_e. html#e3 (downloaded 10 June 2003).

[125] DFAIT, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*.

Japan's stand on many international issues could easily be seen to fit the agenda of the Human Security Network, it would be reasonable to expect Japan to become one of its members. This was not the case, however. When Canada together with Norway took the initiative to the Human Security Network, Canada approached Japan informally with an offer to join the Network but Japan declined.[126] This meant that Japan was not going to be represented in what became the key international body working for human security. According to Yamamoto Tadashi, Japan did not become a member of the Network for Human Security because Japan and Canada had 'diverging understandings' of the meaning of human security.[127] This did not mean that Japan's human security activities were pursued independently of the Network. When the Commission on Human Security was established, the former foreign minister of Thailand, Surin Pitsuwan, was asked to sit on the Commission. Since Thailand is one of the members of the Human Security Network, this meant that Thailand became a link between the Network and the Commission.

Since both Japan and Canada had declared human security to be a key concern and collaboration with like-minded countries was seen by both countries as a key tenet of their foreign policy, collaboration could be expected to be forthcoming.[128] Declarations of such intentions from the two governments were forthcoming. When Prime Minister Jean Chrétien led a trade delegation to Japan in September 1999 and met his Japanese counterpart Obuchi Keizō, they agreed to strengthen the Japanese–Canadian partnership.[129] An agreement on a joint action plan was reached. A key section of this plan reads: 'Safety and dignity of people are an international concern. Recognizing human security as a key component of their foreign policies, the Governments of Canada and Japan will explore the

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[126] Fukushima, 'Human Security: Comparing Japanese and Canadian Governmental Thinking and Practice', p. 4; see also Andrew Mack, 'The Human Security Report Project, Background Paper', Human Security Centre, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2002, p. 3.

[127] Yamamoto Tadashi, interview, 11 March 2004.

[128] For Canada, see Lloyd Axworthy, 'Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership', *International Journal* 52:2 (Spring 1997), p. 193; for Japan, see Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, passim.

[129] 'Obuchi, Chretien strengthen bilateral ties', *The Japan Times*, 17 September 1999.

coordination of approaches and activities on human security.'[130] Another agreement clarified how the two countries intended to work together to implement the joint strategy. They were going to collaborate in the fields of ODA with a focus on matters high up on any agenda for human security like basic human needs, education, health care, preservation and protection of the environment, women, sector development, good governance, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction, including programmes for landmine removal and victim support.[131]

Despite the agreement reached by Chrétien and Obuchi, collaboration did not take off. Divergent views turned out to be an obstacle. With Japan unwilling to involve itself abroad militarily, its focus regarding human security was on development, in particular the construction of social safety nets for those who were most vulnerable to the effects of the financial crisis. This made the Japanese view of human security close to the comprehensive and inclusive concept used in the UNDP report from 1994, which was broader than the Canadian view with its focus on the human costs of violent conflict.

In my interview of Takemi Keizō, Obuchi's state secretary for foreign affairs, he stressed that Canada's acceptance of humanitarian military intervention created problems, since such a stand was unacceptable to Japan.[132] He pointed out that Japan's stance was codified in the 1954 Self-

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[130] MOFA, 'Canada–Japan Action Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation', http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/canada/p_ship21/annex3.html (downloaded 24 September 2005).

[131] MOFA, 'Canada–Japan Agenda for ODA Cooperation', http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/canada/p_ship21/annex2.html (downloaded 24 September 2005).

[132] Takemi Keizō, interview, 11 March 2004. With a country like Canada which has participated frequently in UN operations, also with military personnel, Japan was on a collision course. When the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established at the initiative of Canada to clarify how and to what extent humanitarian intervention was permissible, Canada considered Japanese representation and approached Ogata Sadako who declined to join. See Fukushima, 'Human Security: Comparing Japanese and Canadian Governmental Thinking and Practice', p. 44. Ogata's rejection contrasts to what had been seen in other internationally composed commissions, where members often 'represented' countries with starkly diverging interests. While the ICISS testified to the Canadian interest in exploring human security as freedom from fear, examining difficult questions surrounding if and when it is right to intervene in a nation-state's domestic security, Ogata's rejection demonstrated unwillingness to even participate in discussions on the matter. Furthermore, when the ICISS published its report, the

Defense Forces Law, which was interpreted by the Japanese government as forbidding overseas deployment of SDF personnel for any purpose.[133] Takemi was at pains to explain that the key aspect of human security was not conflict as the Canadians asserted: 'As I see it', he said, 'the core concerns for ensuring human security lie in higher degrees of "individual capability" and "freedom" in this process of development and advancement. To put it another way, the key is helping people in all countries and regions, regardless of differences in basic conditions in the social, economic, technical, health and hygiene, and other aspects, to elevate their capabilities for carving out a life for themselves on their own responsibility.' He did not bother to paper over Japan's disagreement with Canada: 'Representatives of Japan, myself included, have conferred with Canadian counterparts on this point on several occasions. Although the latter have since begun to mention the importance of eradicating poverty and organized crime, there undeniably remains [a] significant gap in respect of the placement of emphasis.'[134] It is an understatement to say that to be on record with undisguised criticism of another government in this way is unusual for the Japanese government and implied that collaboration would not be easily forthcoming. Whether the difference was large or tiny can be debated but it caused institutionalized Japanese–Canadian collaboration on human security to come to naught despite joint declarations of such intention by the two governments. Between the foci of the two countries, there is a minor difference, writes Juergen Dedring, but 'while minor, has

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Japanese government did not welcome it. See Akiko Fukushima, 'Review of Japan–Canada Cooperation for Peace and Security', in *The 4th Canada–Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation, June 10–12, 2005* (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 2005), p. 17.

[133] Kiyofuku Chuma, 'The Debate over Japan's Participation in Peace-keeping Operations', *Japan Review of International Affairs* 6:3 (Fall 1992), p. 239. When a reinterpretation of this law was made by the Diet after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the restrictions on permissible actions continued to be strict. The dispatch of SDF personnel overseas was authorized but they were hardly allowed to use weapons even in self-defence. This cautious stance clashed head on with the strategy of UN peace-keeping operations since the use of military force is an important instrument in such operations. In fact, in some cases when UN forces abstained from applying military force like in Srebrenica and Rwanda, the organization was severely criticized afterwards.

[134] Takemi, 'Approach to the Mounting Concern of Human Security', p. 44.

resulted in a powerful tension that cuts across the whole human security movement.'[135]

Apart from constitutional provisions, the Japanese government feared that acceptance of humanitarian intervention for human security purposes would invite opposition from countries emphasizing the weight of sovereignty.[136] Some Asian governments rejected humanitarian intervention, arguing that they were a scheme to intervene in their domestic affairs.[137] MOFA's Takasu Yukio claimed that human security defined as freedom from fear had been used as a justification of humanitarian intervention in the wake of massive human rights violations within a country. This was a practice he objected to since '[t]he use of force for humanitarian intervention is an extremely controversial issue and requires careful examination, not only on moral and political but also on legal grounds.'[138] When Canada convened a meeting at a ministerial level of Human Security Network member states in September 1999, during the session of the UN General Assembly, Japan was also invited but Foreign Minister Kōmura Masahiko did not participate in the meeting. He refrained from going to the get-together on the advice of his Ambassador to the United Nations, Satō Yukio, who felt that participation could give the impression that Japan supported Canada's stand on the issue of humanitarian intervention.[139]

The rejection of humanitarian intervention by the Japanese government did not exclude expressions in favour of it. In the post-Cold-War era, authoritarian governments perpetrating atrocities were no longer immune

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[135] Juergen Dedring, 'Human Security and the UN Security Council', in Hideaki Shinoda and Ho-Won Jeong, eds, *Conflict and Human Security: A Search for New Approaches of Peace-building*, IPSHU English Research Report Series No. 19 (Hiroshima: Hiroshima University, Institute for Peace Science, 2004), pp. 48f.

[136] Ueda Hideaki, 'Ima naze "ningen no anzen hoshō" na no ka' [Why human security now?], *Gaikō fōramu* 138 (February 2000), p. 71.

[137] Shin-wha Lee, *Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in East Asia* (Seoul: Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 2004), p. 34.

[138] MOFA, 'Statement by Yukio Takasu, Director General of Multilateral Cooperation Department at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World', 19 June 2000, Bangkok, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html (downloaded 1 July 2006).

[139] Satō, 'Nihon no kokuren gaikō to ningen no anzen hoshō', p. 11.

from criticism, just because they claimed they were bulwarks in the defence of 'the Free World'.[140] In the aftermath of the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis, which hit Indonesia hard, the situation of ordinary Indonesians was alarming. In an interview in September 1999, Prime Minister Obuchi took the unusual step of indicating that Japan might support humanitarian intervention in Indonesia if the situation worsened: 'I think the UN should once again play the role of settling the situation, and Japan intends to provide all possible support to that end. The responsibility for public safety in Indonesia lies with Indonesia itself. But if the Indonesian measures do not result in an improvement in public safety, then I think Japan will have to take the position of supporting an international military force.'[141] Thus, while Obuchi did indicate that Japan might support humanitarian intervention, he refrained from offering Japanese participation in such an action.

Obuchi and the Okinawa Summit

An opportunity for Obuchi to push for his new priority of human security was the summit of industrialized countries that was going to take place in Japan in June 2000. When summits had taken place in Japan on earlier occasions, Tokyo had been the venue, but Obuchi decided to make Okinawa the site of the 2000 summit. Since the venue, Nago, ranked at the bottom of all candidate sites even on the government's own list, it was an astonishing decision.[142] In his policy speech in the Diet in January 2000, he gave the reason: 'The Summit, to be held in this milestone year 2000, serves as an excellent opportunity to pledge to the world to build a "century of peace", and I am intent on conveying a hopeful, powerful message to the world. The Kyūshū-Okinawa region has close links with many Asian countries, and I expect that discussions will be entered into

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[140] Peter Van Ness, 'Globalisation and Security in East Asia', Australian National University, Department of International Relations, *Working Paper* 2000/2 (March 2000), pp. 5f.
[141] Tom Plate, 'The Japanese Prime Minister Defies His Critics, Hiding Bold Ideas Behind a Bland Style', *Los Angeles Times*, 15 September 1999.
[142] Gavan McCormack and Julia Yonetani, 'The Okinawan Summit Seen from Below', *JPRI Working Paper* 71 (September 2000), http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp71.html (downloaded 27 December 2006).

with due consideration to the Asian perspective.'[143] Obuchi's decision was instructive since Okinawa was a security hub and seen as a symbol of close relations with other Asian countries. The prime minister wanted to boost Japan's role as a bridge between Asian and Western countries which, as already noted, was a point he made in his policy speech in the Diet in January 1999. His decision served to underline what Japanese governments had enunciated many times – its wish to be a bridge between East and West and a spokesman for Asia.[144]

The Okinawa Summit offered an opportunity for Obuchi to promote the human security idea in a global context.[145] There was room for such a manoeuvre, since it is regarded as entirely *comme il faut* for the host of the summit 'to propose as innovative an agenda as the others can accept.'[146] Already a year prior to the G-8 summit, the Obuchi government announced that it wanted to make 'peace and security' and 'human security' the key topics of the agenda. The peace and security agenda was to include issues such as conflict prevention and the non-proliferation and reduction of weapons of mass destruction. In the area of human security, Japan planned to focus on environmental problems, international organized crime, refugees and anti-personnel landmines and promote seminars and symposiums of non-governmental organizations and experts.[147] The prospect for succeeding in making human security a top item on the agenda was good, since Obuchi could take advantage of the momentum created at another summit convened shortly before. The communiqué after

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[143] MOFA, 'Policy speech by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to the 147th session of the Diet', 28 January 2000, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/pm/obuchi/speech 0001.html (downloaded 9 January 2006).

[144] See, e.g., Edström, *Japan's Quest for a Role in the World*, chap. 7.

[145] John Kirton, 'Creating Peace and Human Security: The G8 and Okinawa Summit Contribution', paper presented at a lecture at Soka University, Japan, 26 May 2000, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton200002 (downloaded 30 October 2005); John Kirton, 'Prospects for the Year 2000 Okinawa G7/G8 Summit' (June 20, 2000), http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2000okinawa/prospects.html (downloaded 5 September 2005).

[146] Nicholas Payne, 'Promoting Conflict Prevention and Human Security What Can the G8 Do? Concentrating the Mind: Decision-Making in the G7/G8 System', http://www.g7. utoronto.ca/conferences/2001/rome/bayne-conflict.pdf (downloaded 14 September 2005).

[147] 'Peace, human security to top G-8 summit agenda', *Japan Policy & Politics*, 30 August 1999.

the Cologne meeting of foreign ministers 8–10 June 1999 mentioned human security as a central concern of G-8 countries.[148] Everything went smoothly and in a statement half a year before the Summit, Obuchi reported his determination 'to convey a hopeful, powerful message from the Kyūshū-Okinawa Summit to the effect that each and every individual will be able to enjoy greater prosperity, attain greater peace of mind and live in a world of greater stability in the 21st century.'[149] But he was not to see this hope come true. On 1 April 2000 he suffered a stroke and died six weeks later without regaining consciousness.

Obuchi's Legacy

When Obuchi left the political stage, he had put the campaign for human security on track. The harsh criticism that he met during his campaign for the post of prime minister and initially in office had ceased. As for most Japanese prime ministers, his time in the prime minister's office was brief by Western standards – in his case cut short by his untimely death – but his popularity figures took off while in office. Eventually, the support began to decrease but not dramatically so.[150] The low expectations held initially by the public caused his subsequent perform-ance to seem all the more successful.[151] The Japanese found that their economy fared comparatively well compared to when Obuchi's immediate predecessors were in power, as a result of the expansionist fiscal policy adopted to stimulate the economy; Obuchi referred to himself as 'the

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[148] G8 Information Centre, 'Conclusions of the meeting of the G8 Foreign Minis-ters, Gürzenich, Cologne, 10 June 1999', http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/foreign/fm 9906010.htm (downloaded 3 September 2005).

[149] Kurusu, 'Kokka no henchō no anzen hoshō kara no dakkyaku', p. 31; MOFA, 'Statement by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi Discussion Group on the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit', 28 February 2000, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/ 2000/2/228-2.html (downloaded 26 December 2005).

[150] Takenaka Harukata, *Shushō shihai: Nihon seiji no hembō* [The prime minister's control: Change of Japanese politics] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 2006), p. 119.

[151] Masuzoe Yōichi, 'The Obuchi Administration', in Masuzoe, ed., *Years of Trial*, p. 43.

biggest borrower in the world'.[152] Important for his improved image were his summit meetings with the leaders of important neighbours. President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea visited Japan in 1998. Discussions with him were handled by Obuchi in a way that seemed to put relations with South Korea on a normal basis. It was a considerable feat considering the tortuous past of the bilateral relations of the two countries. Furthermore, Obuchi did not vacillate but stood firm when China's President Jiang Zemin repeatedly stressed Chinese displeasure at Japan's past misdeed, during his state visit to Japan the same year. This met with respect among Japanese.

But part of the shift of Obuchi's image was related to human security. In one of his speeches, he remarked that 'as prime minister, I have taken every opportunity to persuade the international community of the importance of the perspective of human security and have done my best to make it a pillar of Japan's diplomacy'.[153] His eagerness to push for his new foreign policy priority was evident, and his resolve to make human security a key aspect of Japanese foreign policy met with respect.

Obuchi was a pragmatist and left a lasting legacy of human security with its emphasis 'far more on practical humanitarian work and assistance, such as assistance with land-mine removal, than with dazzling conceptual advances.'[154] Obuchi was not impressed by the hullabaloo around the lack of unified views of the 'real' meaning of human security, how to define it, and its alleged lack of value for day-to-day policy-making. For him, practicalities counted more than theoretical niceties. Concrete problems had to be met with concrete actions, and human security was a useful compass when policies and programmes were devised.

It is clear from Obuchi's speeches that human security revolves very much around one of the core values that figures in his discussions, namely, dignity. On this point, Obuchi's leanings reflected what the 1994 UNDP report stressed: 'Human security is not a concern with weapons – it

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[152] Toshihiro Ihori, *International Cooperation Behind National Borders: Country Case Study of Japan* (New York: Office of Development Studies, United Nations Development Programme, 2005), p. 9.

[153] Obuchi, 'In Quest of Human Security', p. 8.

[154] Hans van Ginkel, 'Promoting human security still key goal, says Rector', *UNU Update* 28 (November–December 2003), http://update.unu.edu/archive/issue28_1. htm (downloaded 26 December 2005).

is a concern with human life and dignity.'[155] In Japan's leading law journal, the judge Taya Chikako captures in a nutshell much of what was a concern to Obuchi, when she starts off a discussion on the issue of human rights and human security by stating: 'Human security is the condition of satisfying the dignity and the minimum needs of people.'[156] Amartya Sen has summarized Obuchi's thinking on human security as reflecting 'the belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired.'[157]

Obuchi's legacy is related to the way Japan's foreign policy decision-making system works but is also linked to the political will and personal resolve that he demonstrated. His modest personal style went well with the cautious stance that post-war Japan has customarily taken in international affairs. This stance is linked to Japan's pacifist constitution but also to the historical legacy of pre-war and wartime atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese military, and the recognition of the hostile reactions that aggressive activities would result in. To Obuchi, human security could assist Japan in gaining a say in world affairs. Japan's pursuit of human security was a new expression of the dream of the Meiji statesmen to bring about Japan attaining the status of one of the powers of the world, but in a shape resembling Fukuda Takeo's dream of Japan as 'a great power of a new type' basing its status not on military might as a traditional power but economic power, moral virtues, and humanitarianism.

Learning about Obuchi's death, Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei expressed his admiration for Obuchi's 'achievements in tackling the issue of anti-personnel mines, the Asian economic crisis, and also in the humanitarian field including human security'.[158] As can be noted, activities commended by Kōno were related to human security. Not all commentators were impressed by his efforts in this respect, however. In his assessment of Obuchi's accomplishments, the political scientist Inoguchi Takashi

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[155] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, p. 24.
[156] Taya Chikako, 'Jinken toshite no ningen no hoshō – participation and responsibility for human security' [Human security as human rights – participation and responsibility for human security], *Jurisuto* 1205 (15 July 2001), p. 96.
[157] Sen, Statement.
[158] Japan Embassy, Islamabad, 'Japanese prime minister and foreign minister express their grief at the decease of former prime minister Keizo Obuchi', Press Release, Islamabad, 15 May 2000, http://www.pk.emb-japan.go.jp/PRESS/PRESS %202000/PR14MAY_PMOBUCHI.HTM (downloaded 12 March 2002).

commended Obuchi's 'policy of consolidating ties with the United States and South Korea while seeking continuous engagement with China without further apology and with Russia without dropping territorial claims' and noted that the prime minister 'worked vigorously not only on economic and diplomatic fronts.'[159] Inoguchi's disregard of Obuchi's human security activities indicates that he was not impressed. Fortunately for Obuchi, the role that he played for establishing human security had received international acknowledgement. During a visit to Japan in 1999 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan lauded his host's effort in the pursuit of human security. By his extraordinary commitment to human security and his establishment of a Human Security Fund, Annan said, Japan would undoubtedly have a lifetime seat if there were such a thing as a 'human security council'.[160]

The Underrated Heir: Mori Yoshirō

Obuchi's successor as prime minister, Mori Yoshirō, inherited human security as a key aspect of Japan's foreign policy from his predecessor. While the two politicians seemed kindred souls on this new priority of Japanese foreign policy, Mori lacked Obuchi's vigour in pushing for human security. This was partly a result of the way Mori was appointed. When the ailing Obuchi became unable to function as premier, a small group of what a respected political commentator called 'political bosses' decided that LDP Secretary-General Mori Yoshirō should succeed Obuchi.[161] Mori's career was impressive in terms of party politics, but the way he was chosen as prime minister cast doubts on his legitimacy and contributed to the uphill battle he had to fight throughout his period as premier.

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[159] Takashi Inoguchi, 'The Future of Liberal Democratic Party Politics: Obuchi's Legacy', *Global Communications Platform* (April 2000), http://www.glocom.org/opinions/essays/200004_ inoguchi_ obuchi /index.html.
[160] Kofi Annan, 'Japan's World Role in the Twenty-first Century', speech at the United Nations University, 11 November 1999. United Nations, *Press Release*, SG/SM/7209, UNU/192, 10 November 1999, http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/1999/19991110.sgsm7209.doc.html (downloaded 3 February 2006).
[161] Kenzo Uchida, 'The right leader for Japan?', *The Japan Times*, 19 May 2000. Mori himself took part in the backstage meetings deciding on Obuchi's successor.

The Okinawa Summit

As prime minister, Mori did not have so much a personal agenda but rather left matters to be decided by his party or to await discussions in the Diet.[162] Soon after he had been elevated to the political top spot an opening for him to demonstrate that he was a statesman of global stature presented itself when the G-8 Summit took place on 21–23 July 2000. A week before the Summit, foreign ministers of the participating countries assembled in Miyazaki. The meeting was a bit lacklustre since US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did not attend, which irked the Japanese. Instead, she sent Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.[163] In a document issued after the Miyazaki meeting, human security was a key concept. Participants reiterated that 'an enduring commitment to peace and the fundamental principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and an open economy will remain indispensable. We reaffirm our commitment to human security through the creation of an environment where the dignity, well-being, safety and human rights of all people are ensured.'[164]

When the Okinawa Summit was over the impression was quite different. The human security concept had not loomed large in deliberations and did not figure in the joint communiqué that wrapped up the meeting. Commitments in the communiqués issued after the meeting suggest that cooperative achievements in areas central to the idea of human security like crime and drugs, development and health had been focused on.[165] Information Technology was on the top of the agenda.[166] To prepare for

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[162] Shin'ichi Kitaoka, 'The Koizumi Administration: Its Evaluation and Prospects' (May 2001), Glocom Platform, http://www.glocom.org/opinions/essays/ 200105_ kitaoka_ koizumi/index.html (downloaded 17 May 2006).

[163] Barbara Wanner, 'G-8 Foreign Ministers Tackle Conflict Prevention', *JEI Report* 28 (21 July 2000), http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR00/0028w4.html (downloaded 15 September 2005).

[164] MOFA, 'Conclusions of the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Miyazaki, 13 July 2000', http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/documents/conclusion. html (downloaded 1 October 2003).

[165] G8 Information Center, 'G8 Communiqué Okinawa 2000', Okinawa, 23 July 2000, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/00okinawa/finalcom.htm (downloaded 5 September 2005).

[166] John Kirton, Eleonore Kokotsis and Gina Stephens with Diana Jurevic, 'The G8 and Conflict Prevention: Commitment, Compliance and Systemic Contribution',

the deliberations at the Summit, Mori went on a flying visit to all G-8 countries. This made the analyst John Kirton foresee a deranging of Obuchi's ideas for the meeting: 'Mori, the mediator among equals, also has the classic Japanese skill of listening particularly closely to the Americans, with the result that his pre-Summit tour yielded a shift in emphasis that placed information technology, in keeping with American thinking, clearly in first place as the dominant Summit theme.'[167] That two countries taking part in the G-8 Summit, Japan and Canada, were leading advocates of human security did not carry much weight. Obuchi's original intention to make human security a key issue on the Summit agenda was not helped by the fact that 'the passivity of Japan's diplomacy was quite visible' at the preparatory meeting of the foreign ministers in Miyazaki, according to a high-circulation Japanese daily.[168] Rather than from a human security point of view, international issues were discussed from a different angle. In his subsequent report to the Diet, Prime Minister Mori stated that the G-8 Summit had dealt with issues 'from the perspective of peace of mind'.[169]

In fairness to Mori, it should be noted that Obuchi was partly responsible for the shift of focus. His advisors told him that IT was a driving force in the recovery then underway in Asian economies and since this theme appeared consistent with Obuchi's initial idea to focus on human security, they thought there was no obvious need to single out human security for special attention.[170]

The Millennium Summit

More muscle was demonstrated by Prime Minister Mori at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. The assessment made by MOFA

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paper presented for the conference on Promoting Conflict Prevention and Human Security: What Can the G8 Do?, Rome, 16 July 2001, p. 3, http://www.g8.utoronto. ca/conferences/2001/rome/conflictPrevention.pdf (downloaded 26 December 2005).

[167] Kirton, 'Prospects for the Year 2000 Okinawa G7/G8 Summit'.

[168] 'Chikyū kibo no shiten ga hitsuyō da' [Global viewpoint is necessary], *Mainichi shimbun*, 14 July 2000 (editorial).

[169] MOFA, 'Policy Speech By Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori To The 149th Session Of The Diet', 28 July 2000, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/mori/speech 0007.html (downloaded 20 June 2003).

[170] Kirton, 'Prospects for the Year 2000 Okinawa G7/G8 Summit'.

beforehand was that the Summit was 'the most appropriate forum for continuing to position human security as one of the linchpins of Japan's foreign policy.'[171] Human security was one of the two issues brought up by Mori in his speech; the other was the need to strengthen the United Nations. This was a clear signal to the international community that human security was a priority of the Japanese government. 'With "human security" a pillar of its foreign policy', the Japanese premier said, 'Japan will spare no effort to make the twenty-first century a human-centred century.'[172] Mori characterized human security as a 'pillar', *hashira*, of Japan's foreign policy, which was an indication of its centrality since *hashira* is used in Japan's foreign policy liturgy to stress the importance of an element or idea. Continuing the approach of Murayama and Obuchi, the security referent in Mori's speech was 'each and every human being', *ningen hitori hitori*, while the core values were specified as 'survival', *seizon*, and 'dignity', *sonkei*. One of the core values referred to by Obuchi, 'livelihood', *seikatsu*, was lacking. The list of threats to these core values amounted to conflicts, human rights violations, poverty, infectious diseases, crime and environmental destruction. Two measures to counter these threats were brought up by Mori. One was to increase Japan's contributions to the Trust Fund for Human Security to approximately ¥10 billion (*ca* US$100 million). The other represented an innovation. Mori announced that an international commission on human security should be established within the United Nations. He argued that the UN had to be strengthened for the maintenance of peace and security of the international community and claimed that the latter 'may well be a prerequisite for ensuring human security'.[173] In parallel with Obuchi's original intention to make the Trust Fund for Human Security focus on Asia, the Mori government had in mind a commission focusing on Asia.[174] This idea came to naught, however, as had been the case with the Trust Fund. When

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[171] Comment by Takemi Keizō at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 5.

[172] MOFA, 'Statement by H.E. Mr. Yoshiro Mori, Prime Minister of Japan at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations', 7 September 2000, http://www.un.org/millennium/webcast/statements/japan.htm (downloaded 12 March 2002).

[173] Ibid.

[174] Comment by Ogata Sadako at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 9.

the Commission on Human Security was established half a year later, it was specified that its activities would have a global focus.

Mori and Africa

In the eyes of Mori, a key area for worries about human security was Africa. That Africa is vital for any pursuit of human security had been stressed also by Obuchi. Two of Mori's activities that caught the eye were that he invited African leaders to the Okinawa Summit. Another indication of the increased focus on Africa seen with Mori was a roundtrip that he made to three African countries (the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of Kenya, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria). He outlined his ideas on human security in the African context in a keynote speech in South Africa:

All the problems confronting Africa – poverty, conflicts, refugees, infectious diseases, water resource, environmental destruction, etc. – are problems that threaten human existence itself. Indeed, Japan's peace diplomacy of the 21st century places human security at its core. In that sense, it would not be an exaggeration to say that our success or failure in establishing human security in Africa will test the merits of Japan's foreign policy.[175]

Africa made a deep impression on Mori and he made it one of the key concerns of the foreign policy of his government. His policy speech in the Diet on 31 January 2001 after his return included a passage on the human security situation of Africa. The prime minister's policy speech was notable for his expression of a sincere will to shoulder responsibilities and exert leadership. This was an obvious response to the public who wanted a strong prime minister capable of leadership and clear messages.[176] The prime minister expressed his awareness of his own responsibility in this

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[175] MOFA, 'Speech by Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori "Africa and Japan in the New Century", at Gallagher Estate, Midrand, Republic of South Africa', 9 January 2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/pmv0101/pmspeech.html (downloaded 4 September 2005).

[176] Kitaoka Shin'ichi, 'Koizumi shinseiken no kadai' [The agenda of the new Koizumi government], *Yomiuri shimbun*, 22–23 May 2001. This two-part article is reprinted in Kitaoka Shin'ichi, *Nihon no jiritsu: Taibei kyōchō to Ajia gaikō* [Japan's autonomy: Cooperation with the United States and Asian diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 2004), p. 113.

regard, linking the urge for leadership on the part of his country to the quest for human security: '[...] we must establish "a human security" that will release all people from such threats and forge a twenty-first century that will shine brightly for the people of the world. Furthermore, I [feel] a renewed determination that Japan will exercise responsibility and leadership toward this end.'[177] It was yet another case where a Japanese premier revealed his country's global leadership ambitions in areas of low politics – as could be expected given the allegiance to the Yoshida Doctrine of Japan's mainstream political heavyweights.

Mori's Legacy

Soon after his trip to Africa, Mori had to leave office. A row of gaffes and activities that proved offensive to the Japanese public demonstrated that his stature did not fit the role of prime minister. The writing on the wall had been seen right from the start and by the time he had to throw in the towel, his disapproval rate in opinion polls had reached historical heights, exceeding 80 per cent.[178] His questioned legitimacy and plummeting public support spilled over into his ability to be a spokesman for any policies, including that of human security. This was in stark contrast to Obuchi who not only clarified why human security was important to him, to Japan and to the world but also worked ceaselessly for human security, which gave him the reputation of being a politician who genuinely cared. For Mori, the situation was just the opposite. At least as presented by MOFA, his human security related activities were modest (see Table 2).

This presentation of Mori's activities by MOFA is quite unfair, however. For instance, forgotten is the fact that he dealt with human security in one of his policy speeches in the Diet in a way that clarified the direction of Japan's future policies. The mention was belated in the sense that he had not dealt with it in his three previous policy speeches but, in the end, he spoke up. The establishment of the Commission on Human Secu

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[177] MOFA, 'Policy Speech By Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to the 151st Session of the Diet', 31 January 2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/1/ 0131-2.html (downloaded 17 June 2003).

[178] 'Approval rating for Mori declines to 7%', *The Japan Times*, 27 February 2001.

**Table 2 Prime Minister Mori's Human Security Activities
According to MOFA**

April 2000	Mori mentioned 'human security' in the keynote speech at the Second Japan–South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting.
July 2000	In the conclusions of the G-8 foreign ministers' meeting of the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit, 'human security' was mentioned.
Sept. 2000	Mori announced at the UN Millennium Summit the expansion of The Trust Fund for Human Security and establishment of an international commission on human security.
Jan 2001	Mori mentioned 'human security' in his African policy speech.

Source: Compiled from MOFA, 'Chronology of Activities Related to Human Security by the Japanese Government', http: www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/chronology.html (downloaded 18 June 2003).

rity must be credited to his government. Mori's accomplishment of increasing awareness in Japan of the plight of Africa in a human security context will also last.[179] His activism contributed in enabling Japan to take a leading role in the international efforts for the reconstruction of Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban regime.

Despite the condemnation that met Mori for political ineptness and allegedly usurping power, it would be a mistake to disregard him in the field of human security. His activities to promote human security were, while not outstanding, at least worth respect. Not being a charismatic politician but a political *apparatchik*, he was used to traditional pork-barrel politics, and skilful at it, otherwise he would not have become the political heavyweight that he was, and still is. He was effective in the traditional style of political work, using budgetary means and allocations, which resulted in an increase in budget allocations for human security purposes. As prime minister he was the pre-eminent spokesman of Japan and the top foreign policy decision-maker. Mori may have lacked personal charisma but by handing over to MOFA bureaucrats the management of human security policies, Japanese activities were kept on the same track as

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[179] For a discussion, see Katō Jumpei, 'Sengo Nihon no shunō gaikō: Dokuritsu kaifukugo, Mori shushō taijin made' [Summit diplomacy of post-war Japan: From the regaining of independence to Prime Minister Mori's retirement], *Gaimushō chōsa geppō* 2002:1, p. 97.

laid down by Obuchi. When it came to policies put into practice, continuity reigned.

That Mori saw himself as standing for continuity with his predecessors is revealed in his address at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2001, when he stressed that his conception of human security was based 'on my personal historical view that the twentieth century represented one hundred years of "glory and regrets".'[180] Mori's declarations on human security resembled Hashimoto's approach, when he linked human security and environmental policies by stating that the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases was to be implemented in 2002 based on human security.[181] Even more striking is a statement that Mori made in a speech at the Second Japan–South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting on 22 April 2000, when he declared that it had become 'increasingly important to tackle problems coming across the "Ocean", which threaten survival, livelihood and dignity of people, in other words, "Human Security" issues.'[182] It follows that Yoshida Shigeru's approach to the Japanese identity – Japan as a maritime country – was relevant also to considerations of human security in the eyes of the prime minister.

It is obvious that Mori wanted to project an image of a politician busy promoting human security. His personal homepage on the internet demonstrates how he wants to be seen as a politician; no longer prime minister, he is a politician who stands by the policies of his cabinet and human security as a pillar of its foreign policy.[183] At a human security conference in March 2004, he took personal credit for the Okinawa Infectious

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[180] MOFA, 'Shaping Japan, Shaping a Global Future': A Special Message from Yoshiro Mori, 27 January 2001, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/souri/mori/2001/0127davos_e.html (downloaded June 17, 2003).

[181] For Hashimoto, see MOFA, 'Initiatives for Sustainable Development Toward the 21st Century. The Kyoto Initiative: Assistance to Developing Countries for Combating Global Warming', 1–11 December 1997, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/kyoto_init/kyoto_full. html (downloaded 12 March 2002); for Mori, see MOFA, 'Policy Speech By Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to the 151st Session of the Diet'.

[182] MOFA, Keynote Speech by Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori at PALM 2000 (Second Japan–South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting), 22 April 2000, http://www. mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/spf/palm2000/palm-summit/seika/keynote_mori. html (downloaded 18 June 2003).

[183] Mori Yoshirō homepage, http://www.moriyoshiro.com/03_policy_idea/03_02_diplomacy.html (accessed 3 September 2005).

Diseases Initiative taken at the Okinawa Summit and the launch of the Commission on Human Security.[184] It demonstrates his eagerness to be seen as a politician who understands the need to stand for personal leadership. But it also reflects his good will. Iokibe Makoto argues that Mori's fate was to be disliked by journalists, despite the fact that he is a politician motivated by a strong will to contribute to international harmony.[185]

Mori's feat is recognized in the official history of the LDP: 'Setting an example with regard to "human security", he broadened Japan's international stance, which resulted in improving its credibility in the world.'[186] This seems a more apt characterization of Mori than the lacklustre summary of his activities presented by MOFA.

Scaling Down Human Security Rhetoric: Koizumi Jun'ichirō

At the end of Mori's reign, the unpopular premier was joined in the doldrums by his party with plummeting public support. In order to avoid the risk that the LDP might be wiped out, the LDP powerbrokers mobilized the S.O.P. used when their party is in trouble – to put a new man in the prime minister's office. What differed from earlier instances was that Mori's successor was not picked by the LDP leadership. The election of Koizumi Jun'ichirō was unusual in that it was based entirely on popular support. Riding on a wave of popular discontent with the LDP, Koizumi was successful in his third attempt to reach the political top spot. He had already been a very popular candidate in 1998, when he entered the race to replace Hashimoto Ryūtarō as prime minister, but Obuchi Keizō emerged victorious. In 2001, it was Koizumi's turn. He was heralded as a bold reformer with his political platform which focused on sweeping structural reform and the removal of barriers to economic recovery. Backed by popular support for his reformist agenda, he won a resounding victory in

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[184] Yoshiro Mori, 'Opening Remarks', in *The Human Security Challenges of HIV/AIDS and Other Communicable Diseases: Exploring Effective Regional and Global Responses, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2004* (New York: Asia Society, 2004), p. 18.

[185] Iokibe Makoto, interview, 18 November 2006.

[186] Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, *A History of the Liberal Democratic Party*, 'Chapter 19: Period of President Mori's Leadership', http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/history (downloaded 26 December 2005).

the LDP presidential election and became Japan's 87th premier on 24 April 2001. His assertive leadership style and charismatic personality triggered a 'Koizumi boom', and immediately after his election, an opinion poll showed that he had the unprecedented support rate of 86.3 per cent.[187]

The strategy of LDP elders to blame unpopularity of the party on the premier and dump him worked well. The downslide in popular support for the LDP ceased and its popularity figures got a boost, when the populist and media-savvy Koizumi's personal appeal reflected on his party's standing. Even though levels of support for the party trailed behind the popular premier, the LDP saw an immediate rise in its popular support to 36.2 per cent, an increase of 11.8 percentage points compared to a poll two weeks earlier.[188]

It seems generally accepted that Koizumi's interest in foreign policy and defence was shallow before he became premier.[189] In as much as he had indicated that he would attend to foreign policy, issues had a rather nationalistic flavour. Writing at the end of 2003, the concluding year of the period scrutinized in the present study, a commentator noted that the prime minister had not shown much interest in foreign policy since taking office.[190] There were exceptions, however.

'11 September'

On 11 September 2001, a few months after Koizumi had been appointed prime minister, terrorists hijacked commercial airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These attacks had a dramatic impact worldwide, not least on Japan. The attacks

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[187] 'New Koizumi Cabinet wins record 86.3% public support', *The Japan Times*, 29 April 2001.

[188] Ibid.

[189] Ōtake Hideo, *Koizumi Jun'ichirō popyurizumu no kenkyū: Sono senryaku to shuhō* [Research into the populism of Koizumi Jun'ichirō: Strategy and methods] (Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shimpōsha, 2006), p. 157. See also Yakushiji Katsuyuki, *Gaimushō: Gaikōryoku kyōka e no michi* [The foreign ministry: The way to strengthen diplomatic capabilities] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003), p. 114.

[190] Katsuyuki Yakushiji, 'Election, North Korea, and Iraq', Glocom Platform, Debate: Commentary (8 December 2003), http://www.glocom.org/debates/ 20031208_yakushiji_elec/index.html (downloaded 1 April 2006).

reminded the Japanese of the terrorist operations in the Middle East carried out by the Japanese Red Army. Fresh in their memory was also the Aum Shinrikyō sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in 1995, which killed 12 people and hospitalized more than 5,000. It was not only the fact that the attacks revived memories of terrorist attacks involving Japan, the attacks on 11 September were also an assault on Japan's security underwriter, the United States. This made the attacks highly relevant in the context of Japanese security. The affect on public opinion was clear. In an *Asahi shimbun* poll two weeks after the attacks, 81 per cent of the respondents said that they were worried that Japan might come under similar attacks.[191]

   Given Japan's modern history with its experiences of terrorism, it was not entirely unexpected that the attacks would make Prime Minister Koizumi take action. His swift and resolute actions were striking. In an obvious exercise of the teachings of the Yoshida Doctrine, the security relationship between Japan and the United States was re-confirmed. Within an hour after the attacks, he established a liaison office at the Situation Center of the Cabinet, which was later upgraded to the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters, and called a cabinet-level meeting of the National Security Council for the first time since 1998.[192] The same evening, he sent a message to US President George W. Bush expressing his shock over the attacks.[193] At a press conference the following day, Koizumi communicated Japan's strong support of the United States. Japan was resolved 'to spare no effort in providing necessary assistance and cooperation', he said. 'We must stand firmly together with the concerned nations of the world to ensure that such acts are never repeated.'[194]

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[191] Haruhiro Fukui, 'Security Threat and Institutional Response: The Case of Japan', paper presented at Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague 9–11 September 2004, p. 9, http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/papers (downloaded 21 January 2007).

[192] Tomohito Shinoda, 'Koizumi's Top-Down Leadership in the Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Impact of Political Institutional Changes', *SAIS Review* 23:1 (Winter–Spring 2003), p. 28.

[193] 'Koizumi sends message to Bush over terrorist attacks', *The Japan Times*, 12 September 2001.

[194] Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 'Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Press Conference, 12 September 2001', http://www. kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0912kaiken_e.html (downloaded October 30, 2005).

Actions involved the Diet. After a mere sixty-two hours of deliberations, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was passed on 29 October 2001 authorizing SDF to supply non-combat logistical support and supply fuel and other materials to the United States and its coalition partners. The sensitiveness of the new legislation in the eyes of the Japanese public was shown by the care taken by the government to legitimize the law in the name of the UN Charter and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, not the US–Japan security framework.[195] The anti-terrorism legislation was followed by amendments of the PKO Law, the Japan Coast Guard Law, the Self-Defense Forces Law and the emergency legislation on war contingencies. On 10 November, ships from Japan's Maritime SDF sailed for the Indian Ocean to join the US Navy and other allied forces. Their dispatch was based on the new legislation and commenced the first combat theatre operation abroad of the Japanese navy since 1945.[196] Japan's resolve continued. The Diet adopted the Iraq Special Measures Law in July 2003, orders were issued in December 2003 to Air, Maritime and Ground SDF units to leave for Iraq, and they were dispatched the following month.[197]

Behind the actions taken by the Koizumi government was clearly the 'lesson' learnt during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Fearing that the 'Gulf War syndrome' would re-emerge, Japanese policy-makers were anxious that Japan was seen as being active.[198] The US government put pressure on Japan. When US led actions in Afghanistan were approaching, Japan was bluntly advised by US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to make sure the Japanese flag was visible in Afghanistan.[199] Reactions to

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[195] Soeya, 'Japan's Enhanced Security Role and the Implications for Trilateral Cooperation', p. 72.

[196] Edward J. I. Southgate, 'From Japan to Afghanistan: The U.S.–Japan Joint Security Relationship, the War on Terror, and the Ingnominious End of the Pacifist State?', *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 151 (2003), p. 1599.

[197] Gavan McCormack, 'Koizumi's Japan in Bush's World: After 9/11', *Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online*, PFO 04-46A, 8 November 2004, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0446A_McCormack.pdf (downloaded 25 June 2005).

[198] Christopher Hughes, 'Japan's Security and the War on Terrorism: Incrementalism Confirmed or Radical Leap?', paper presented at the United States–Asia Relations Today: A New 'New World Order'? Colloquium, CERI, 2–4 December 2002, p. 6, http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/jan03/artch.pdf (downloaded 10 June 2005).

[199] McCormack, 'Koizumi's Japan in Bush's World'.

Japan's dispatch of warships overseas demonstrated the shift in mood in Japan and its neighbours. Considering the adverse reactions that signs of Japanese assertiveness had encountered before, the restrained reactions from Japanese pacifists and lack of negative reactions from neighbouring countries indicated the degree to which the terrorist attacks had changed the international political climate.[200]

Koizumi and Human Security

On human security, it was soon evident that Koizumi did not pay much attention to what had been a pet issue of his immediate predecessors despite being a member of the political faction headed by the human security crusader Mori Yoshirō. At the start, Koizumi followed the track laid down by Obuchi and Mori. His first action on human security was to send a message to the Commission on Human Security which held its first meeting on 9 June 2001. A part of his message read: 'Japan regards "human security" as an important viewpoint and perspective of foreign policy. The 21st century should be a human centred century, and [Japan] has undertaken various initiatives, first and foremost the establishment of the Trust Fund for Human Security. We are determined to continue to promote these efforts.'[201]

As seen in Koizumi's message, policy continuity is stressed. That individuals are the security referent is clear from the phrase that the goal is 'to make it possible for each and everyone of us [*wareware hitori hitori*] to live happily in peace and prosperity', underlined by the phrase that it is necessary to 'defend each individual [*kakukōjin*] from threats to human survival and dignity'. Core values are 'survival' and 'dignity'. Thus, 'livelihood' referred to by Obuchi as a core value is lacking, which is

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[200] Amitav Acharya, 'Rethinking International Order after September 11: Some Preliminary Reflections', Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Canada–Asia Pacific Research Network (CAPRN), *CAPRN Discussion Group Paper* (2001), p. 10, http://www.asiapacificresearch.ca/caprn/discussion/bios.cfm (downloaded 22 March 2006).

[201] 'Ningen no anzen hoshō iinkai daiikkai kaigō ni muketa Koizumi Jun'ichirō Nihonkoku naikaku sōridaijin no messēji' [Message from Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō on the occasion of the first meeting of the Commission on Human Security], 9 June 2001, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/meetings/first/j-koizumi.html (downloaded 30 October 2005).

significant, given that the political platform on which Koizumi had been elected and which was economic in nature. This was a reiteration of the stance taken by Mori at the Millennium Summit. On taking leadership, Koizumi described himself in the customary circumscribed way by pointing out that Japan had taken the initiative to establish the Trust Fund for Human Security. Similar to Mori, he put efforts into promoting human security in a global context and hoped 'that the Commission with the rich experience of the commissioners will further develop the concept of human security through serious consideration and discussion so that it will be broadened to a concept accepted and supported in the whole world and that a concrete and practical action programme will be proposed to address the extensive and serious threats to human security.' At the end of his message, Koizumi promised that Japan would extend positive support, *sekkyokuteki shien*, for the activities of the Commission, but he did not make any commitment indicating that his government would take action in the pursuit of human security.

The impact of '11 September' on Japan's pursuit of human security was plain to see. Three months after the terrorist attacks, the Commission on Human Security held its second meeting in Tokyo. The heated atmosphere after the terrorist attacks was reflected in the name of the conference, 'Human Security and Terrorism – Diversifying Threats under Globalization'. The conference made it abundantly clear that the repercussions of '11 September' were such that a turning point in Japan's pursuit of human security had occurred. This was easy to spot in Prime Minister Koizumi's address. The tone was different from his message in June, which had served to stress continuity with the policy of the Obuchi and Mori governments. While Koizumi reiterated that Japan would continue to promote human security, focus had shifted. Now, the Japanese prime minister emphasized that fighting terrorism was uppermost in Japan's foreign policy agenda:

Terrorism is an activity that should never be tolerated, regardless of motives, since it threatens the survival, livelihood and dignity of innocent citizens with heinous violence and killings. At the same time, it is necessary to take a closer look at the danger that conflicts, poverty and other factors create hotbeds for terrorism. To eradicate terrorism, it is necessary to tackle not only terrorism itself but also other diverse threats to individuals. This means that we have to build and sustain a soci-

ety where individual human beings can realize their potential. This is what 'human security' thinking aims at, and which Japan attaches importance to.[202]

In Koizumi's speech, the security referent was the individual human being expressed in various ways [*kojin, kakukojin, ningen kojin*], and the core values that Obuchi referred to were survival, *seizon*, livelihood, *seikatsu*, and dignity, *sonkei*. The scope of perceived threats to human security was narrowed down to terrorism, said to be caused by conflicts and poverty. Koizumi recognized that there were other threats to the individual human being, *kojin ni taisuru sono ta no samazama na kyōi*, but he refrained from specifying their nature. While Obuchi and Mori had been committed and presented concrete measures to further human security, Koizumi found it enough to reiterate his promise in his message to the first meeting of the Commission on Human Security. The Commission had, he said, 'the important mission to deepen the "human security" concept and translate it into concrete actions. […] The Japanese government will continue to render maximum [*saidaigen no*] support for such activities.' Since the prime minister did not indicate that the Japanese government would take action itself but only promised that his government would support the activities of the Commission, he continued to scale down the engagement of the Japanese government that was implicit in his message to its first meeting. Koizumi's use of *saidaigen no* is revealing. This wording could be taken as implying wholehearted support but instead it was a pretty clear indication that the prime minister saw limitations to what Japan could or should do.

It took almost two years after his appointment before Koizumi referred to human security in a policy speech in the Diet, on 31 January 2003. Work to revise Japan's ODA Charter from 1992 had been initiated shortly before, and human security was dealt with in the context of ODA. The prime minister stated that 'ODA will be implemented strategically in human security areas to improve its efficiency and transparency as well as with a priority on stability and growth in Asia, post-conflict consolidation

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[202] '"Ningen no anzen hoshō kokusai shimpojiumu" ni okeru Koizumi sōridaijin aisatsu' [Address by Prime Minister Koizumi at 'The International Symposium on Human Security'], 15 December 2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/hs/terro_koizumi.html (downloaded 12 March 2002).

of peace and the environment.'[203] His speech made it clear that human security was now seen more as a matter of ODA policy than of general foreign policy in the way Obuchi and Mori had presented it.

Considering the fact that the prime ministerial policy speech is prescribed in the constitution and carefully crafted, the fact that human security was not dealt with in Koizumi's reports to the Diet for two years showed that human security was no longer the priority it had been to his predecessors. This impression is strengthened by the fact that when human security was brought up in his policy speech in January 2003, it was at the end; space and placement allotted to foreign policy and foreign policy issues indicate the emphasis given to them in the total policy mix. Koizumi dealt with human security also in his policy speech a year later when, basically, he reiterated what he said in January 2003, with just two modifications. The security referent was specified as the individual human being, *ningen hitori hitori*, and the geographical scope was no longer restricted to Asia but said to be developing countries.[204] By that time, the revised ODA Charter had been adopted by the Diet and the task to promote human security had been made the key of Japanese ODA policy.

As noted above, the general view is that Koizumi had not expressed any particular interest in foreign policy before he became prime minister. However, his fate became the same as that of other national leaders who professed no particular interest in foreign policy before reaching the political pinnacle – once elevated into office, foreign policy became a key matter. Issues like the 11 September terrorist attacks and the war in Iraq made it impossible for Koizumi not to be involved in foreign policy. When he retired in October 2006, a collection of his messages to the Japanese people in his mail magazine was published. In this collection, his messages are organized into nine chapters of which no less than four deal

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[203] MOFA, 'General Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 156th Session of the Diet', 31 January 2003, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/speech030131.html (downloaded 18 June 2003).

[204] Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 'General Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 159th Session of the Diet', 19 January 2004, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/speech030131.html (downloaded 2 Juny 2006).

with foreign policy.[205] This shows that the claim that Koizumi was not interested in or concerned about foreign policy misses the point, at least in the sense that as prime minister he had to involve himself in these matters. Nevertheless, human security did not belong to matters that had priority for Koizumi. The reason seems to be that he took decisions based on his own political ideas and judgement of the political situation.[206] According to a survey of Koizumi's foreign policy compiled by *Yomiuri shimbun* journalists, his diplomacy boils down to three bilateral relationships in need of acute attention at the highest level of decision-making – North Korea, China and the United States.[207] Human security that fitted the consensus-minded Obuchi and the harmony-focused Mori did not become a priority for Koizumi for the simple reason that no human security related issues seem to have been considered by him in need of attention at the prime ministerial level.

Basic Continuity

As one may deduce from the above, a basic continuity can be seen in the way the successive premiers dealt with human security. With their comprehensive and inclusive approach to human security, the approaches to human security of Murayama, Obuchi, Mori and Koizumi resemble each other. The results reached in the preceding analysis do not corroborate Fukushima Akiko's claim that the human security concept was inherited by Obuchi's successors in such a way that they 'adapted it to fit their respective policy agendas'.[208] Mori and Koizumi did not have their own foreign policy agenda. On human security, Mori's approach was faithful to the stance taken by his predecessor, both personally and on a national level, and he became a devoted advocate of human security. While Obuchi

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[205] Jijigahōsha 'Cabinetto' henshūbu, ed., *Koizumi Jun'ichirō desu: 'Raionhāto' de yomu, Koizumi seiken no 5 nenkan* [This is Koizumi Jun'ichirō: Five years of the Koizumi government as read in the 'Lionheart'] (Tokyo: Jijigahōsha, 2006).

[206] Ōtake, *Koizumi Jun'ichirō popyurizumu no kenkyū*, p. 158.

[207] Yomiuri shimbun seijibu, *Gaikō o kenka ni shita otoko: Koizumi gaikō 2000 nichi no shinjitsu* [The man who turned foreign policy into a fight: The truth about the 2000 days of the Koizumi foreign policy] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2006).

[208] Fukushima, 'Human Security: Comparing Japanese and Canadian Governmental Thinking and Practice', p. 16.

and Mori saw human security as a priority for Japan as well as for themselves, it does not seem to have resonated in the same way with Koizumi. When he took over as prime minister, he had been elected on an agenda of reforms and political changes and he left human security largely in the hands of his foreign ministers. Fukushima concludes that the decrease in attention paid to human security was because it had established its position in foreign policy and, furthermore, was recognized overseas, which lessened the need for the prime minister to emphasize it.[209] It seems to me that the facts indicate otherwise. First, '11 September' galvanized Koizumi's resolve to render wholehearted support to the US government in its fight against terrorism. With the perceived acute need to demonstrate support for the United States, there was no room for emphasizing human security. The situation resembled that which faced Canada where a downgrading of the priority of human security can be noted, which was linked to its relationship with the United States.[210] Secondly, the less prominent place of human security seen with Koizumi indicated that general foreign policy was not a priority for him. After all, his task was first and foremost to implement the economic reform package that he had promised voters. Thirdly, human security was no longer considered a policy area that the prime minister had primary responsibility for. The Commission on Human Security had been established and had the task of developing concrete policy proposals. Pending the result of its work, the relative inactivity of the prime minister can be seen as natural. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Koizumi adopted an active role in human security after the Commission had presented its final report. When he met Prime Minister Leszek Miller of Poland on 19 August 2003, they 'affirmed the importance of promoting human security by protecting and empowering each individual to build a community and nation where people can live with

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[209] Fukushima, 'Human Security and Japanese Foreign Policy', pp. 141ff.

[210] Basing himself on a conversation with Foreign Minister John Manley, Professor Paul Evans of the University of British Columbia claims that when John Manley took over as Canada's Foreign Minister after Lloyd Axworthy, he did not embrace human security with the same zeal as his predecessor. The problems he had with human security were that it was Axworthy's legacy and the Americans did not like the idea due to its vagueness. Quoted in Fukushima, 'Human Security: Comparing Japanese and Canadian Governmental Thinking and Practice', p. 37.

dignity.'[211] Koizumi also began to bring up human security on and off in his speeches. Fourthly, from a personal point of view, downgrading an issue intimately linked to Mori would in a sense be quite reasonable, since Mori's elevation to the post of prime minister and his performance in office made him unusually unpopular among voters, and there was a risk of his unpopularity spilling over if his priorities were taken up by his successor. Although not an unusual phenomenon in Japanese political history, there was, however, no need for Koizumi, with his astounding popularity, to distance himself from his unpopular predecessor.

Human Security and the Prime Minister vs the Foreign Minister

The downgrading of human security that can be discerned after Koizumi became prime minister would be misleading if it is taken to mean that human security was neglected by his government. That this was not the case is evident in verbal policy. While all ministers in the Japanese government are involved in activities that are relevant to, or part of, foreign policy, two ministers in particular play key roles – the prime minister and the foreign minister. In scrutinizing to what extent human security appeared in important speeches presented by these officials in the successive governments from Murayama to Koizumi, a shift in how the Japanese government has handled human security can be detected.[212]

That Murayama and Hashimoto dealt with human security in speeches in the United Nations is important but equally significant is that they brought up the new security concept only once. Kōno Yōhei, foreign minister in the Murayama government, and his successor in the Hashimoto cabinet, Ikeda Yukihiko, did not mention the concept. The first foreign minister to deal with human security was Obuchi Keizō, who replaced Ikeda as foreign minister when Hashimoto formed his second cabinet. As already mentioned, Obuchi immediately attended to one of the key issues

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[211] Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 'Joint Statement towards Strategic Partnership between Japan and the Republic of Poland', 19 August 2003, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/08/19seimei_e.html (downloaded 13 February 2007).

[212] Speeches taken into account are those delivered by the prime and foreign ministers and listed by MOFA on its homepage. This means that other speeches given by these officials, not classified as 'important', may have included human security considerations.

on the human security agenda, landmines. As new foreign minister and later when he became prime minister, he made human security a key consideration of Japanese foreign policy. The concept figured prominently in four speeches he gave in 1998 and in the policy speeches in the Diet given by him and Foreign Minister Kōmura Masahiko in January 1999. Furthermore, human security was dealt with in Kōmura's speech to the UN in September 1999. When Mori replaced Obuchi as prime minister, the same tandem treatment can be seen; both the prime minister and his foreign minister declared that human security was a key element of Japan's foreign policy. Nevertheless, one cannot discern any personal commitment or engagement of Obuchi's and Mori's foreign ministers. The same non-committal stance was shown by Prime Minister Koizumi.

The contrast is noticeable in Koizumi's foreign ministers, Tanaka Makiko and Kawaguchi Yoriko. During her short stint as foreign minister, Tanaka brought up human security on a number of occasions. She revealed a personal involvement that equalled Obuchi's and Mori's with her declaration at the meeting of the International Symposium on Human Security on 15 December 2001 that human security was a concept that she always bore in mind after she became foreign minister.[213] After a visit to a refugee camp in Pakistan when she was visibly moved by the plight of the children, she brought up her visit to the refugee camp in her address to the Second World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children on 17 December 2001. The work against child prostitution and child labour was 'an important pillar of human security for our country', she said in her speech.[214] Addressing the international conference on Afghanistan on 21 January 2002 organized by the Japanese government, her remark had the same personal touch: 'Ever since I took office as Foreign Minister, the importance of conflict prevention has always been on my mind. The success of conflict prevention depends on whether people can respect diversity. If people can respect different cultures, values or opinions, they can live together in peace. Such a perspective will

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[213] MOFA, 'Remark by Ms. Makiko Tanaka', The International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo, 15 December 2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo 0112_ fm.html (downloaded 23 June 2003).

[214] MOFA, 'Statement by Ms. Makiko Tanaka, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the Second World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children', 17 December 2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/child/congress 01-f.html (downloaded 23 June 2003).

contribute to the promotion of human security, as well as to conflict prevention.'[215]

Tanaka's successor as foreign minister, Kawaguchi Yoriko, came from the post of environmental minister and had behind her a distinguished career as a top bureaucrat. Almost immediately after her appointment, she had to deliver a policy speech in the Diet. With little time at her disposal to prepare the speech, little could be expected; what she delivered was a statement to the fact that she was well aware of her new responsibilities and clarified how earnest a reformer she was. In her speech she did not mention human security and left out NGOs, which was a way for her to indicate that she was not amused by the turbulence created around NGOs, which had brought down her predecessor.[216]

In a speech to the Japan Press Club one and a half months later, Kawaguchi had an opportunity to review foreign policy. She reported that she was considering 'the challenges faced by our nation's foreign policy, as well as how to address them.' Like Koizumi, she focused on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which she said threatened the peace and stability of the international community. Human security was one of the 'important points' in her speech and referred to no less than three times by her. The first instance was when she pointed out that Japan had stressed human security in recent years and that it was important for the peace and stability of the entire international community to tackle the threats to the survival, dignity and livelihood of individual human beings. In her presentation of issues related to human security, it was not Japan as much as the international community that was in focus; that is, one saw a return to Prime Minister Murayama's approach in his United Nations speech that primary responsibility for working for human security lay within the UN. NGOs were taken into account by Kawaguchi. They had been singled out by Obuchi and Mori as key actors for implementing Japan's human security policies and were brought in when Kawaguchi told of her wish to visit Africa to 'engage in a frank exchange

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[215] MOFA, 'Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs Makiko Tanaka at the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan', 21 January 2002, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/fm0121.html (downloaded 23 June 2003).

[216] MOFA, 'Policy Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi to the 154th Session of the Diet', 4 February 2002, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/kawaguchi/speech0204.html (downloaded June 19, 2003).

of opinions not only with government officials from each country, but also with Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) and NGO representatives who are working in the field in Africa'. To bring up Africa which, Kawaguchi said, was 'a region above all others throughout the world where the perspective of human security is necessary', was an obvious link to Mori.[217]

Before Kawaguchi was appointed foreign minister, she was a high-profile environmental minister, and it was natural that environmental issues figured in her speeches. Therefore, there was continuity not only with policy declarations made by Mori and Koizumi but also by Hashimoto. Kawaguchi argued for the importance of sustainable development for the environment: 'The environment is also extremely important from the perspective of human security. [...] If we allow threats to each and every person posed by environmental destruction to go unresolved, then "development" will be unsustainable. At the same time, in order to advance environmental measures, it is important that the lives of the people be improved through "development".'

While the prime minister ceased to be seen on the human security barricades with Koizumi, he was not altogether inactive. As noted above, when the Diet session opened on 31 January 2003, he touched upon human security in his policy speech. But it was his foreign ministers who continued to raise the human security banner.

Concluding Remarks

The experienced politician Ōhira Masayoshi remarked once that when the man at the helm changes, foreign policy technique and execution change.[218] This can be seen to have occurred as far as human security was concerned, in that the shift of premiers resulted in a change in how human security was dealt with. There was still a basic continuity. Prime Minister Murayama stands out as the pioneer in the sense that he was the first

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[217] MOFA, 'Nihon kisha kurabu ni okeru Kawaguchi gaimudaijin seisaku enzetsu' [Policy speech by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi at the Japan National Press Club], 18 March 2002, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/kawaguchi/speech0318.html (downloaded 19 June 2003).
[218] Tanaka Rokusuke, *Ōhira Masayoshi no hito to seiji* [Ōhira Masayoshi: The man and his politics] (Tokyo: Asahi sonorama, 1981), p. 9.

premier to endorse the new security concept but also in that his view of how Japan should promote policies became a precedent for his successors. To Hashimoto human security seems to have been more or less equal to environmental security. Obuchi expanded the concept and stressed the importance of its two-tiered nature as described by the UNDP. When human security was made a key perspective of Japanese politics after Obuchi's interventions in 1998, the agenda was broad and reflected several of the concerns that were in focus in the international discourse on security.

There is a difference between Obuchi and his two predecessors and two successors. All expressed their support of human security but Obuchi began to take measures to formulate and implement policies promoting human security. Mori continued Obuchi's approach and introduced practical measures in the pursuit of human security. A shift is seen with Koizumi. From having been a key concern to Obuchi and Mori, human security was not a priority for Koizumi. Part of what is usually seen as constituting the human security agenda continued to have priority under Koizumi as well, in that the issue to which top priority was accorded after '11 September' was terrorism. The shift in the Japanese government's handling of human security comes to the fore with the Koizumi cabinet, in that it took the prime minister five policy speeches in the Diet before he dealt with human security, and when he did, he did so only briefly and as a matter of ODA, not as part of general foreign policy as his two predecessors had done. It seems reasonable to think that this change was caused by '11 September' with its far-reaching implications for Japan, since Koizumi's activities with regard to human security before this event did not deviate from Obuchi's and Mori's.

ODA AND
JAPAN'S PURSUIT OF
HUMAN SECURITY

Foreign Minister Obuchi Keizō's speech in Singapore in May 1998 gave a clue to what he was going to do as prime minister. Despite Japan's severe economic situation, he said Japan had a duty as the largest economy in Asia to help East Asian friends engulfed in economic problems. Its ability to do so was well known. The serious nature of Japan's economic problems in the 1990s could not hide the fundamental, underlying strengths of its economy, epitomized by its position as the No. 1 provider of ODA not only in Pacific Asia but also in a global context. Japan's economic strength allowed it to make substantial contributions to help Southeast Asian countries overcome the problems they faced as a result of the Asian economic crisis. The concerned Obuchi pointed out that 'our country has contributed both within the framework of international assistance led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and in bilateral economic cooperation exceeding a total of about US$37 billion dollars, which exceeds by far assistance from any extra-regional country.'[1] He indicated that ODA was going to be used to improve the situation. His statement meant a volte-face. Not long before, he had been one of a number of influential LDP politicians who voiced criticism of Japan's ODA policy and advocated large cuts. They argued that ODA was not

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[1] Obuchi, 'Tōnan Ajia shokoku hōmon no sai no Obuchi gaimudaijin seisaku enzetsu'.

working in such a way that it served Japan's national interest, and accused MOFA of providing 'Santa Claus style handouts' to the Third World.[2] Now, as foreign minister, Obuchi backed the policies he had criticized shortly before. His attitude towards ODA illustrates the veracity of the adage 'where you stand depends on where you sit'.

Brief History of Japanese ODA

The fact that Obuchi found it appropriate to use ODA as an instrument to promote his new pet idea, human security, is not surprising. Japan's official credo is that economic growth and development plays a crucial role in people's well-being and in political stability and democracy, which makes aid a means of improving Japan's security environment. A recent document released by the Japanese government states: 'The objectives of Japan's ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity.'[3] An early case illustrating this thinking was seen in 1954 when Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru urged the United States to finance a Marshall Plan for Asia, which he argued 'would mean the difference between chaos and healthy, steady progress toward solid democratic achievement.'[4] In fact, ODA had been used as a foreign policy instrument by the Japanese government ever since disbursement of aid began in the 1950s. The activities of Japanese militaries during the pre-war and war periods resulted in large-scale suffering for people in many countries and as a result Japan's relations with many countries soured after the end of the Second World War. The country had an urgent need to promote rapid industrial recovery and growth, which necessitated access to overseas markets. Good neighbourly relations with other countries were a prerequisite for this as well as for gaining international acceptance for Japan that found itself an international pariah.

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[2] 'New Breed Seeks Quality in Foreign Aid, Not Quantity', *Nikkei Weekly*, 9 June 1997; as quoted in Keiko Hirata, 'New Challenges to Japan's Aid: An Analysis of Aid Policy-Making', *Pacific Affairs* 71:3 (1998), p. 326.
[3] Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Co-operation Bureau, *Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2003), p. 1.
[4] Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p. 479.

Economic aid was used to improve relations with other countries to overcome Japan's international exclusion initially after the end of the Second World War. The first step was Japanese reparations to countries that had been exposed to Japanese aggression. Under Article 14 in the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty, Japan assumed the burden of paying reparations. Eventually, Japan's reparations totalled US$15 billion paid to 11 countries.[5] In the 1950s and 1960s aid was seen as an instrument for re-establishing trade and investment links with Asian countries. This was admitted rather bluntly by Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke in 1959, when he declared in the Diet that Japan engaged in aid as a lubricant for economic interactions in order to promote trade and cultivate overseas markets.[6] This strategy worked well. Reparations contributed significantly to advance Japan's economic interest.[7] But it was also recognized that developing trade markets served national security purposes.[8]

In the 1970s, foreign policy as well as aid was redesigned to secure a steady supply of energy and other resources. While the bulk of Japanese ODA continued to go to Asia, the ODA-for-oil strategy initiated in the wake of the 1973 oil 'shock' broadened the geographical scope of Japanese aid to also cover countries in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. In the 1980s, responding to US pressure, Japan initiated 'strategic aid', *senryaku enjo*, by allocating aid to countries which were vital to the United States but not necessarily to Japan.[9] In the 1990s, Japan remained a global economic actor despite its economic woes after the 'bubble economy' burst at the beginning of the decade, accounting for more than nine per cent of global GDP and more than 60 per cent of East Asia's GDP in 1999, at a time when it had an economy that was five times bigger than

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[5] Yamakage Susumu, 'Ajia Taiheiyō to Nihon' [The Asia Pacific and Japan], in Watanabe Akio, ed., *Sengo Nihon no taigai seisaku* [Post-war Japanese external policy] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1985), pp. 136–42.

[6] Kishi Nobusuke, policy speech in the Diet, 27 January 1959, in Naikaku seido hyakunenshi hensan iinkai, ed., *Rekidai naikaku sōridaijin enzetsushū*, p. 602.

[7] William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr, Jr., 'Japan's Foreign Economic Assistance', *Asian Survey* 25:3 (March 1985), p. 324.

[8] Kase, *Watashi no gendai gaikōshi*, p. 207.

[9] Inada Juichi, 'Nihon gaikō ni okeru enjo mondai no shōsokumen' [Various aspects of the aid problem in Japan's foreign policy], *Kokusai mondai* 326 (May 1987), pp. 2–10.

that of its giant neighbour China.[10] Despite Japan's largely dismal economic performance, ODA continued to be sizeable (see Fig. 1). On a

Fig. 1. **Trends in ODA Disbursement of Major DAC Countries**

(Million dollars)

Source: DAC press release, 2005; DAC Chairman's Report 2004.
Notes: 1. ODA disbursements exclude assistance for Eastern Europe and graduated countries.
2. US disbursements in 1991 and 1992 exclude debt relief intended for military purposes.

Source: MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2006* (Tokyo: Āban-konekushonzu, 2006), p. 197.

par with being the world's second largest economy and the world's largest gross and net lender, Japan was also the world's leading donor of aid, surpassing even the United States.[11] The geographic scope of Japan's ODA became enormous, comprising 150 countries by 1992, no less than 163 in 1998, and 145 in 2002.[12]

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[10] Kenneth B. Pyle and Eric Heginbotham, 'Japan', in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds, *Strategic Asia 2001–02: Power and Purpose* (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), p. 72.

[11] Hiroshi Okuma, 'New Directions in Japan's Official Development Assistance', in Takako Ueta and Éric Remacle, eds, *Japan and Enlarged Europe: Partners in Global Governance* (Bruxelles and New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2005), p. 157.

[12] Source for 1992: Kee Pookong, Yayoi Nakada and Hiro Take, *Japan's Aid Program: Trends, Issues and Prospects* (Canberra: Australian Agency for International Development, 1996), p. 37; for 1998: MOFA, *Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual Rewport 1999*, Statistical Appendix; for 2002: MOFA, *ODA White*

ODA made Japan a major international actor in both cash and kind. From around 1990, the country began to be described as an *enjo taikoku*, or 'aid great power', and the signs of an 'aid superpower' could be discerned.[13] The remarkable fact was that Japan enjoyed its status as the 'Number One' ODA donor despite its ODA accounting for a relatively small part of its Gross National Income and, furthermore, its share was shrinking, from 0.31 in 1991–92 to 0.23 per cent in 2002.[14] Its position as the Number 1 aid provider in a global context was something that Japanese politicians took pride in. In the words of a noted specialist on development policies, Japan's rise to 'great power' status was linked to its ODA policies, with ODA being 'Japan's first genuine step toward accepting the kind of international responsibilities required of greatness.'[15]

Japan's ODA budget originates from tax revenue, which makes ODA spending accountable to taxpayers.[16] Given the increasingly severe financial problems occurring in the 1990s with rising fiscal deficits and debt, the Japanese government felt the pressure to trim budgets. The *ODA White Paper* noted in 2002 that Japan's ODA budget had been falling since the fiscal year 1998 because of the prolonged economic slump, a deteriorating fiscal situation, and increasingly critical public view of ODA.[17] The Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a subordinate agency of the OECD, reported in 2003: 'There is clearly a sign of aid fatigue among the Japanese public. Although in part due to Japan's weak economic situation, the public is also becoming critical regarding the effectiveness of the aid

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paper 2003, Section 1. Japan's ODA Standing at a Crossroad, 1. The Current Status of Japan's ODA.

[13] See, e.g., Ōkuma Hiroshi, 'Nihon no ODA to kokusai seiji' [Japanese ODA and international politics], in Igarashi Takeshi, ed., *Nihon no ODA to kokusai chitsujo* [Japanese ODA and the international order] (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, 1990), p. 48.

[14] Ōkuma Hiroshi, '2003 nen ODA taikō to ningen no anzen hoshō' [The 2003 ODA Charter and human security], *Shakai inobēshon kenkyū* 2:1 (December 2006), p. 34.

[15] Dennis T. Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy* (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 4.

[16] MOFA, *Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century Final Report* (January 1998), http://mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/report21.html.

[17] MOFA, *Japan's ODA White Paper 2002*, 'Part I. Trends in Japan's ODA in a Rapidly Changing World. Chapter 3 Increasing Public Support and Participation: Further Promoting ODA Reform', http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2002/part1_3.html (downloaded 7 November 2005).

program and the commercial sector has become less supportive of aid.'[18] The percentage of Japanese thinking that ODA should be increased dropped from 41.4 per cent in 1991 to 19.0 per cent in 2003, while those favouring a reduction in ODA increased from 8.0 to 25.5 per cent.[19] Other budgetary posts were also cut, but the ODA budget suffered most. Based on an index of 100 in FY 1997, Japan's general accounting budget was 109 in FY 2003, but the budget for defence was 100, for public works 94, and for ODA 73.[20] The development in Japan was similar to what was seen in other countries. A trend among donor countries was growing disillusionment with foreign assistance, as domestic problems gained priority over international politics.[21]

The ODA Charter

Ever since Japan began to disburse aid in the 1950s, the non-political nature of its aid has been stressed. Owing to Japan's historical legacy of aggression against other countries, the country rejected the idea of inter-vening in the domestic affairs of recipient countries.[22] A modification of Japan's cautious stance was seen when Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter (the ODA Charter) was adopted in 1992. The Charter outlined the philosophy, principles and priorities of Japan's ODA policy and introduced explicitly political and social considerations. The long-standing aversion of the Japanese government to poke its nose into the

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[18] OECD, *Development Co-operation Reviews Japan 1999: No. 34*, http://www. oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_33721_16796754_1_1_1_1,00.html (down-loaded 26 December 2005). The downwards trend of support is evident in Naikakufudaijin kambō seifu kōhōshitsu, *Gaikō ni kansuru yoron chōsa* [Public opinion survey on diplomacy] (2003), graph 28, http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey index-gai.html.
[19] Naikakufudaijin kambō seifu kōhōshitsu, *Gaikō ni kansuru yoron chōsa*, October 1991 and October 2004.
[20] Kazuo Sunaga, 'The Reshaping of Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter', Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development, International Development Research Institute (IDRI), *Discussion Paper on Devel-opment Assistance* 3 (November 2004), p. 4.
[21] Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, *Economic Development*, 8th ed. (Boston: Addison Wesley, 2003), p. 660.
[22] Okuma, 'New Directions in Japan's Official Development Assistance', p. 157.

business of other governments was modified by the prescription of the Charter that decisions on ODA should be taken after reviewing recipients' record on military spending, democracy, moves towards market economy and human rights. This policy shift was a direct response to the Tiananmen riots in 1989, when the Chinese government clamped down on protesters. If Japan had continued to adhere to its customary cautious stance and not react to what happened in Beijing, it would have risked isolation from Western countries.[23]

Despite the adoption of the ODA Charter, the Japanese government continued to be careful not to act in a way that risked disrupting relations with recipient countries. To do so would risk damaging one of the greatest assets that Japan had in its arsenal of foreign policy tools. ODA was one of the major ways of projecting political power for a country like Japan, with its lack of ability and intention to resort to military means.[24] Obuchi's 21st Century Commission stressed the importance of ODA as a means of serving Japan's 'enlightened national interest', *hirakareta kokueki.* According to the Commission, Japan was 'a country that should make itself an essential presence in the international community as a civilian power, having rejected the option of relying on military might.'[25] The Commission saw it as a mistake to abandon or belittle ODA, and argued that 'the maintenance and reform of its own program of ODA' was an important task that Japan could accomplish on its own.[26] The chair of the subgroup on 'Japan's Place in the World' of the Commission was Iokibe Makoto, who stressed that Japan can participate in the international

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[23] Takagi Seiichirō, 'Tenanmon jiken to Nihon no jinken gaikō' [The Tiananmen incident and Japan's human rights diplomacy], in Watanabe Akio, ed., *Ajia no jinken: Kokusai seiji no shiten kara* [Asian human rights: From the viewpoint of international politics] (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, 1997), pp. 187ff.

[24] Masayuki Tadokoro, 'Between the West and Asia: Japan's Position on Human Rights Issues', in Michèle Schmiegelow, ed., *Democracy in Asia* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 270.

[25] Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, *The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millenium* (Tokyo: Office for the Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, Cabinet Secretariat, 2000), p. 164.

[26] Ibid., p. 163.

burden, sharing and playing an international role in post-conflict recon-
struction by linking peace building and economic assistance.[27]

Another input into the cumulative efforts to formulate a comprehen-
sive ODA policy was presented in November 2001 by the Task Force on
Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, a group of heavy-weights
headed by Okamoto Yukio, a former MOFA bureaucrat and owner of a
consulting company, who was assigned the task of formulating guidelines
for Japan's external relations. Okamoto's group did not mince its words
but affirmed as a fact that, so far, Japan's foreign policy had lacked strat-
egy. A strategy based on national interest was urgently needed. This
conclusion was also valid for ODA which was classified into: (1) ODA
directly related to national interest; and (2) ODA which Japan should
shoulder as a member of the international community. It was described as
a means of helping the poor but also as a political key to stabilizing
Japan's international environment and to contributing to the political
stability of East Asian countries which contributed to Japan's safety as
well.[28]

Japanese ODA and Human Security

At the end of the 1990s when ODA began to be cut for budgetary
reasons, there was a need for MOFA to present policies that appealed to
the public. It seemed a sensible strategy to seek to establish a fresh
approach to international development assistance by mobilizing the
concept of human security.[29] It would make it easier for the government to
captivate the pacifist-inclined public and secure funding.[30] Not least,
Japan's chequebook diplomacy provided an impetus for using ODA as a

[27] Iokibe Makoto, 'Gaikō senryaku no naka no Nihon ODA' [Japanese ODA in the foreign policy strategy], *Kokusai mondai* 517 (April 2003), p. 4.
[28] Taigai kankei tasuku fōsu, *21 seiki Nihon gaikō no kihon senryaku: Arata na jidai, arata na bijon, arata na gaikō* [Basic strategies of Japan's foreign policy in the 21st century: A new era, a new vision, a new foreign policy], 28 November 2002, esp. Appendix, 'Waga kuni no ODA ni tsuite' [On Japan's ODA], 25 June 2001; http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2002/1128tf.pdf (downloaded 1 No-vember 2005).
[29] Dan, 'A Brief Review of Human Security', p. 326.
[30] Inada, 'Kaihatsu-fukkō ni okeru "ningen no anzen hoshō" ron no igi to genkai', p. 30.

key instrument in implementing policies for human security. It had been used in the 1970s and 80s but its death knell seemed to have sounded as a result of the severe reaction by the United States and its allies to Japan's 'money only' actions during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Another inspiration was comprehensive security. One of its key aspects was the key role given to ODA, with aid disbursements seen as Japanese contributions to international security. The use of ODA for Japan's policy for human security was also in line with the 'yen for development' strategy, with Japan's role in financing and promoting development in the Third World depicted as constituting a major effort to shoulder global responsibilities.[31]

Employing human security incorporated an attractive feature. In the prevailing situation where the austere financial situation made it hard to avoid reductions of the ODA budget, cuts in this key instrument of foreign policy could be compensated by the input of fresh ideas that human security constituted.[32]

The use of the ODA budget for human security purposes was introduced with *Japan's Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance (ODA)* issued by MOFA in August 1999. This report singled out human security as a 'pillar' of Japan's ODA policy.[33] ODA was mobilized in order to deal with a number of issues often found on the human security agenda of its proponents. In the introduction to this report, MOFA reiterated the fundamental position of Japan's ODA policy:

As the world's second largest economy and the largest donor of official development assistance (ODA), Japan shoulders the important responsibility of contributing to sustainable social and economic development in developing countries. This is a role through which Japan can win the confidence and appreciation of the international community. Furthermore, as a nation whose prosperity is closely linked to world peace and stability and that is highly dependent on the importation of resources, energy, food and other basic materials, ODA plays a very significant role

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[31] Shafiqul Islam, ed., *Yen for development: Japanese Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burden-Sharing* (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1990).

[32] Tanaka Akihiko, 'Anzen hoshō no saitei kosuto; taichū wa taishō zengen o' [Minimum cost for security; aid to China should be gradually reduced], *Asahi shimbun*, 27 September 2002.

[33] Professor Ōkuma Hiroshi, Seijō University, Tokyo, interview by author, 21 October 2006.

in ensuring Japan's own stability and prosperity. As such, economic assistance promotes Japan's best interests, including the maintenance of peace.[34]

The need for poverty alleviation in conflict prevention was emphasized in the report and attention was paid to refugees and the provision of emergency humanitarian aid to countries affected by an influx of refugees. According to this report, Japanese ODA should be extended to support of the resettlement and social rehabilitation of refugees and former combatants. It is worth quoting the report at some length:

Economic growth is a necessary measure for the improvement of human welfare, and 'human-centered development' is indispensable to the realization of sustainable development. Taking this perspective into consideration, Japan assists developing countries for their balanced economic growth and social development. Based on this human-centered approach, special attention will be given to the least developed countries (LLDC). Furthermore, due attention will also be focused on 'human security' and the protection of individuals from various threats […].[35]

Two months later, the government's report on ODA for 1999 was released. A special section devoted to human security appeared for the first time in an issue of this annual report. In his preface, Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei explained that this section was introduced 'with a view to the guarantee of "Human Security" – the protection of the life and dignity of every human being from regional conflict, refugee exodus, antipersonnel mines, natural disasters, drug abuse, and various other threats.'[36] To apply the perspective of human security to governmental policies in this way was a surprisingly quick response by government bureaucrats responsible for ODA to the emphasis on human security announced by the prime minister in December 1998.

A scrutiny of what was proposed shows that the ability to act speedily was built on a reclassification of already ongoing projects which were given labels fitting the new policy idea; policies were old wine in new

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[34] MOFA, *Japan's Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance (ODA),* http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/mid-term/1999/approach.html (downloaded 7 September 2005).
[35] Ibid.
[36] Yohei Kono, 'Foreword', in MOFA, *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999*, p. iii.

bottles. Such a repackaging of aid projects had been seen before.[37] The quick response also reflected the fact that Obuchi was foreign minister before he was appointed premier. The administration and disbursement of ODA is an important activity of MOFA. Therefore, adding human security to the list of foreign policy priorities was in line with the view adhered to by MOFA bureaucrats educated and trained in the tradition founded by Yoshida Shigeru with MOFA having the upper hand in matters of foreign policy.

To clarify the new direction of ODA, the report quotes at length a speech by State Secretary Takemi Keizō at an international symposium. The traditional focus on development is noticeable. MOFA claims that the introduction of human security gives 'a fresh drive to [Japan's] development cooperation policies including ODA'. The link between relief efforts and development is elucidated, with Obuchi's concern with the most vulnerable coming to the fore:

Large scale natural disasters and armed conflicts result in a humanitarian crisis which destroys the very foundations for human livelihood and, furthermore, devastate the fruit of years of development. Subsequent efforts in recovery and reconstruction demand tremendous investments of money and time. Considering such a situation as a major threat to human security, Japan has placed priority on providing assistance to the victims of these violent events.[38]

A subsequent section states clearly that the policies devised by the Japanese government to implement human security reflected the two-tiered human security – freedom from fear and freedom from want – outlined in the 1994 UNDP report:

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[37] At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, Japan announced a ¥900 billion to ¥1 trillion target for environmental aid over the next five years but reached this target one year early, having distributed ¥980 billion in environmental aid by FY 1995. These figures were misleading, however, in that environmental aid in part reflected a reclassification of traditional projects to environmental ones. Reported in David Potter, 'Assessing Japan's Environmental Aid Policy', *Pacific Affairs* 67:2 (Summer 1994), p. 206.
[38] MOFA, *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999*, p. 38; referring to Keizo Takemi, 'New Forms of Development toward the 21st Century which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual', keynote address to the International Symposium on Development, The United Nations University, Tokyo, 24 June 1999.

Political and diplomatic initiatives are of paramount importance to prevent and find solutions to conflicts. ODA can contribute to the prevention of conflicts by alleviating poverty, economic disparities, and other background factors that could nourish hostile confrontation. ODA can even be instrumental in the in- and post-conflict phases: it is a major source of short-term emergency relief and medium- and longer-term reconstruction assistance. ODA also plays an important role in disaster prevention, relief, and recovery.[39]

Also the ODA white papers for 2000 and 2001 include a section on human security but discussion of policies was not extensive. The presentation covers projects initiated by the Trust Fund on Human Security and does not deal with projects financed by Japanese ODA. In the 2002 ODA white paper, greater focus on peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction is recommended. Japan is said to be committed to use aid to ensure human security by funding refugee settlements, humanitarian activities and social infrastructure in developing countries, such as education and public health facilities. The report emphasizes that the main criterion for ODA allocation is its use as a tool to promote Japan's national interests and its own security and prosperity.[40]

Mobilization of national interest as an argument for ODA is noteworthy in view of the reluctance of Japanese policy-makers to indicate, or even hint at, that Japan has national interests. This reluctance has its roots in Yoshida Shigeru's conclusion that the outcome of the Second World War gave Japan no other choice than to behave as 'a good loser', which seems to have induced in Japan's political leadership coming after him the understanding that claims that Japan had national interests could be provocative to other countries.[41] To highlight national interest in the way that MOFA did now can be seen as an effort to give heed to the calls by the 21st Century Commission and later the Okamoto Task Force that Japan should pursue its national interest and not shy away from announcing it. The explicit reference to national interest can be interpreted both as an expression of increasing assertiveness on the part of Japanese decision-makers and as a response to concerns of Japanese taxpayers over the use of tax money for ODA in a situation with rising fiscal deficits and debt.

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[39] Ibid., p. 39.
[40] MOFA, 'Summary of the 2002 White Paper on Official Development Assistance (ODA)', http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2002/summary.html (downloaded 7 August 2003).
[41] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, p. 163.

ODA Policy Reform and Human Security

Considerations of human security were introduced into ODA policies, when MOFA began the process of reviewing the ODA Charter a decade after it had been adopted in 1992. To incorporate human security into ODA was 'a sea change', according to one pundit.[42] Such an assessment is exaggerated, however, since ideas vital to the human security approach can also be discerned in the 1992 ODA Charter. One of its four principles reads, for instance: 'Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided.' The Charter also puts priority on 'the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country'.[43] In practice, however, policies did not always take these principles into account or implement them for reasons of political expediency.

The revised version of the ODA Charter was released by the Koizumi government on 29 August 2003. According to this document, ODA policies would put emphasis on Japan's assistance 'to the Asian region, peace-building, human security, public participation in ODA, and aid visibility'. It was in line with an international trend identified by Obuchi's 21st Century Commission, which saw a thrust within the international aid community towards 'soft' aid, including systemic reform and human resource development, in contrast to the provision of physical structures, which was the forte of Japan.[44] It was also made clear that the revision aimed at 'encouraging wide public participation and of deepening the understanding of Japan's ODA policies both within Japan and abroad.'[45] One of the sections of the revised ODA Charter is entitled 'Perspectives of Human Security':

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[42] David Leheny, 'Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: Evaluating Japan's Counterterrorism Assistance Initiatives', Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, *Asia Program Special Report* 128 (February 2005), p. 18.

[43] MOFA, 'Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter', Cabinet Decisions, 30 June 1992, in MOFA, *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999*, pp. 169–71.

[44] Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, *The Frontier Within*, pp. 164f.

[45] Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Co-operation Bureau, *Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter*, p. i.

In order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, disasters, infectious diseases, it is important not only to consider the global, regional and national perspectives, but also to consider the perspective of human security, which focuses on individuals. Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity of local communities through human resource development. To ensure that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages, Japan will extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals.[46]

Having already been in the pipeline before the revision was formally adopted, the ideas embodied in the revised ODA Charter were already employed in the government's budget for 2003, resulting in an increase of funding for projects for human security purposes. The name of one budget item, Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects, was changed to Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects and the budget for this program was increased from ¥10 billion to ¥15 billion. It was the first ever 'human security allocation' made by the government in the budget for dealing with international post-conflict situations.[47] In my interview of Takemi Keizō, he pointed out that the introduction of human security into the revised ODA Charter was the first time human security had been included in a policy document and that these guidelines would be valid as the basis of Japanese ODA policy for at least a decade.[48]

The Trust Fund for Human Security

When Obuchi introduced the issue of human security in his Hanoi speech in December 1998, he also presented an innovation meant to contribute to the implementation of the new priority. Apart from the direct economic support for Asian countries hit by the economic crisis, he announced that Japan had decided to provide funds for the establishment of a 'human security fund' under the aegis of the United Nations. This was an idea that Obuchi had already broached in his Singapore speech. What he had in mind at that time was a fund that would promote the strategy of ASEAN countries for developing human resources and alleviating poverty, as well as identifying regional projects, plus he proposed the

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[46] Ibid., p. 3.
[47] Jonathan Watts, 'The rise of pragmatism', *The Guardian*, 11 March 2003.
[48] Takemi Keizō, interview, 11 March 2004.

establishment of a 'Solidarity Fund' with ASEAN [*ASEAN to no 'rentai kikin'*]. To explicitly refer to solidarity, *rentai*, with the ASEAN countries was a link to what Japanese consider the noblest of ideas as to what the basis of Japan's relationship with Southeast Asian countries should be, especially the ASEAN states, and which had found its most revered expression in the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. This doctrine became the basis of Japan's relations with ASEAN countries. It should not be forgotten that it was the nationalistic Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, with his roots in Japan's pre-war imperialistic past, who elevated *rentai* to a central position in Japan's post-war relations with Asia. When he presented the three 'grand principles' of Japan's foreign policy in 1957, which continue to be referred to as the basis of Japan's foreign policy even today, one of these 'principles' was that Japan is 'a member of Asia', *Ajia no ichiin*. Kishi stressed the need for invigorating 'Asian diplomacy', *Ajia gaikō*, which was an offshoot of 'Asian solidarity', *Ajia rentai*, a concept with heavy overtones of pre-war Asianism. Kishi was not only the former leader of Fukuda's political faction but also Fukuda's political mentor. Fukuda developed Kishi's *rentai* idea by launching *kyōchō to rentai*, or 'collaboration and solidarity', as his political banner, not only in foreign policy but also in domestic politics. Important, but largely unnoticed, is that *rentai* is a key element of the celebrated Pacific Community concept – in Japanese *Kan Taiheiyō rentai kōzō* or the Pacific Rim Solidarity Concept – Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi's vision for the Pacific region. For some reason, the translation into English omits the *rentai* component. Also later prime ministers like Suzuki Zenkō (prime minister 1980–82), Nakasone Yasuhiro (prime minister 1982–87) and Kaifu Toshiki (prime minister 1989–91) supported the idea that *rentai* was a central concept in Japanese foreign policy.[49] But then, of course, the focus of solidarity was different, comprising 'the advanced Western industrial countries' or the United States.[50]

In his Hanoi speech, Obuchi announced that the Japanese government had decided to donate ¥500 million (US$4.2 million) for the establishment of a human security fund. The purpose was to enable international organizations to provide support 'in a flexible and timely manner to projects that

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[49] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, pp. 172f.
[50] See, e.g., Nagano Nobutoshi, *Nihon gaikō no subete* [All about Japan's foreign policy], new ed. (Tokyo: Gyōsei mondai kenkyūsho, 1991), chap. 3.

are to be implemented in this region'. When the fund was established in March 1999 by the UN Secretariat and the Japanese government with funding from the Japanese government, it was named The Trust Fund for Human Security (TFHS) and was intended to be a tool for launching ODA projects for human security.[51] According to Japanese foreign policy liturgy, the TFHS is 'the main avenue by which the Japanese government translates human security-related ideas into practice'.[52] Akiyama Nobumasa went further and claimed that it is the 'materialization' of Japan's efforts.[53] Despite this status, the TFHS was 'a very small fund' [*kiwamete chiisai fando*] in the initial stage, according to Obuchi's state secretary Takemi Keizō.[54] This seems to be an apt assessment. Considering the prime minister's declared ambition, the initial allocation of ¥500 million must be said to have been rather lacklustre compared to the package of measures totalling US$30 billion channelled into bilateral support for the crisis-affected countries. Funding of the prospective trust fund was also dwarfed in comparison with the size of Japan's ODA budget.[55] The modest sum should be seen as seed money meant to be followed by further financial contributions from the Japanese government and, hopefully, others. After the initial allocation amounting to ¥0.5 billion (March 1999), the next grant from the Japanese government followed in March 2000 amounting to ¥6.6 billion, then ¥2.5 billion in July 2000, ¥1.5 billion in March 2001 and ¥7.7 billion in August 2001, totalling US$170.13 billion at the current value.[56] After grants amounting to ¥3 billion were added in

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[51] Comment by Takemi Keizō at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 5.

[52] Fukushima, 'Human Security and Japanese Foreign Policy', p. 148.

[53] Nobumasa Akiyama, 'Human Security at the Crossroad: Human Security in the Japanese Foreign Policy Context', in Shinoda and Jeong, eds, *Conflict and Human Security*, p. 262.

[54] Shozawa Hitoshi et al., 'Zadankai: Hyūman sekyuriti kara miru kokusai shien', p. 20.

[55] Sanae Suzuki, 'East Asian Cooperation through Conference Diplomacy: Institutional Aspects of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Framework', Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, APEC Study Center, *Working Paper* 03/04, No. 7 (March 2004), p. 14.

[56] Compiled from MOFA, 'Chronology of Activities Related to Human Security by the Japanese Government', http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/chronology.html (downloaded 31 July 2003).

FY 2003 and FY 2004, Japan's total contribution to the TFHS amounted to some ¥29 billion by the end of 2004.[57]

The number of projects and the amount of money allocated to individual projects initiated by the TFHS show that the financial support given by the Japanese government to projects managed by the fund was relatively small in each case. The importance of individual projects should not be underestimated, however. In a local context, some of the projects were substantial. Initially, the TFHS prepared funding of an information, education and communication campaign on HIV/AIDS prevention in China to be launched by the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS and UNESCO.[58] The *Diplomatic Bluebook* for 2000 reports that the TFHS had sponsored the Human Dignity Initiative Project carried out to eradicate poverty in Southeast Asia; the Medical Training Project in Tajikistan designed to improve public health care by providing intensive training for doctors, nurses and midwives; financing the Tokyo International Conference on population in the Semipalatinsk region, Kazakhstan, affected by nuclear test radiation; and the Emergency School Rehabilitation in Decane, Kosovo, rebuilding two destroyed elementary schools.[59]

A survey by MOFA of the activities of the TFHS covering the period until the end of June 2003 shows that projects were concentrated on Asia. This survey shows that by geographical area, 21 projects had been executed in Asia (US$17.13 million) of which fifteen were in East Asia, eleven in Africa (US$9.82 million), two in Latin America (US$1.21 million), three in the Caribbean (US$0.92 million), six in Oceania (US$1.59 million), ten in Kosovo (US$48.80 million) and eight in other regions (US$4.66 million). The projects supported were run by a variety of organizations within the UN system: UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA/WHO, FAO, UNIFEM, WFP, UNESCO, OCHA, UNITAR, UNDP/UNOPS, UNHCR/UNOCHA, UNHCR, WHO, PAHO, UNDCP, UN-HABITAT, ESCAP, UNMIK//UNOPS and UNMIK/DPI.[60] With such a large number

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[57] MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 48 (Tokyo: Taiyō bijutsu, 2005), p. 186.

[58] Koïchiro Matsuura, 'Inaugural Speech', in UNESCO, ed., *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?* , p. 11.

[59] MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000*, pp. 105f, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/index.html.

[60] MOFA, 'The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the "Human-centered" 21st Century' (March 2005), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21/t_fund21.pdf.

of collaborating partners, no joint projects were on a particularly large scale. According to this survey, up to June 2003 a total of US$84.12 million for 61 projects in nine areas had been provided (see Table 3).

Table 3   TFHS Project Support, 1999–June 2003

Area	*No of projects*	*Total (million US$)*
health and medical care	19	9.26
poverty	13	10.8
environment	3	0.43
conflict	2	3.77
refugee	7	6.5
drugs	1	0.2
disaster	3	2.41
Kosovo	10	48.8
others	3	1.95

Source: Compiled from MOFA, 'The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the "Human-centered" 21st Century', http: www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/ t_fund21/fund.html (downloaded 1 August 2003).

Table 3 reveals an interesting trait in the activities of the TFHS. Despite its name and the intention behind it – to further human security – it is hard to find any particular human security profile of the project portfolio. The reason was that initially the TFHS had no conceptual framework available. This was the conclusion reached in an evaluation report by the Japan Center for International Exchange released in 2004. According to the evaluators, the TFHS had become just one among many international bodies. The reason for this is said to be that 'while the categories of activities to be supported by the fund were stipulated, the term "human security" was not clearly defined in the fund's guidelines.'[61] This is also admitted in the 'brief history' of the TFHS found on its homepage, where it is stated that the majority of funding had been directed towards

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[61] Japan Center for International Exchange, *Human Security in the United Nations*. Commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2004, mimeo., p. 2.

developmental concerns including key thematic areas such as health, education, agriculture and small scale infrastructure development.[62]

That human security was not clearly defined in the guidelines might have been due to the lack of interest on the part of Prime Minister Obuchi in indulging in definition hair-splitting. He was a pragmatist and guided by a willingness to take practical action to alleviate human distress and misery. Rather than announcing lofty principles, his will to do good found its expression in a long list of projects to be supported. According to the statutes of the TFHS, its objectives were 'to translate the concept of human security into concrete activities implemented by UN agencies through supporting projects that address diverse threats including poverty, environmental degradation, conflicts, landmines, refugee problems, illicit drugs and infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, thus to secure people's lives, livelihoods and dignity in the real world.'[63] Application procedure followed closely the Japanese *yōseishugi* procedure by which funding is granted based on recipient countries assessing their development needs on their own and making requests through ODA to the Japanese govern-ment.[64] ODA projects are supposed to meet the needs of recipients and Japanese authorities claimed this process of dialogue was best adapted to the development needs of individual countries.[65]

The TFHS as a Japanese Project

A noteworthy fact is that the TFHS was, and is, seen not so much as a UN body but a Japanese institution to a large extent, a point which a high-

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[62] United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, http://ochaonline.un.org/ webpage.asp? MenuID =8289&Page=1503 (accessed 14 January 2006).

[63] MOFA, 'The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the "Human-centered" 21st Century' (November 2003).

[64] The rationale for the *yōseishugi* procedure for granting aid is that it tones down the extent of Japanese involvement in the receiving country's internal affairs. See Inada Juichi, 'Changes in the Norms of "De-politicisation" and "Non-interference" in Japan's Postwar ODA Policy', *Social Science Japan* 26 (May 2003), p. 19.

[65] Margee M. Ensign, *Doing Good or Doing Well? Japan's Foreign Aid Program* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 37; Nobuhide Sawamura, 'Japan's Philosophy of Self-Help Efforts in International Development Coopera-tion: Does It Work in Africa?', *Journal of International Cooperation in Education* 7:1 (2004), p. 34.

ranking Japanese spokesman did not hesitate to admit in 2005.[66] Cases abound where the Japanese government has announced TFHS grants as if they were Japanese. In the speech by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko on the occasion of the fifth and final meeting of the Commission on Human Security in February 2003, both the Japan-centric approach and Japan's urge to exert leadership in the work of the TFHS came to the fore, when Japan's foreign minister declared: 'Through its establishment of the Trust Fund for Human Security in the United Nations in March 1999, Japan has continued to offer concrete assistance, giving an orientation to the activities of international organizations that is based on the concept of human security.'[67]

The Japanese slant can be seen in the application procedure. While an application could be sent to the UN Secretariat, MOFA made it explicit that the preferred procedure was that UN organizations 'submit to the Government of Japan (through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, its embassies abroad, or permanent missions to the organizations concerned) for its consideration, a proposal outlining the activity it wishes to carry out (the proposal should include preliminary cost estimates).' If the Japanese government found that the proposed activity was appropriate use of the TFHS, it would encourage the organization to formally present a request to the United Nations Secretariat for support from the Fund.[68] This procedure has also been kept in the latest revision of the Statutes (December 2005), where it is specified that the TFHS will fund projects that are approved by the UN Secretariat *and* the Japanese government.[69]

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[66] Ambassador Takasu Yukio, in OCHA, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 'Minutes of the ABHS Fourth Meeting', 19 October 2005, http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=2068 (downloaded 18 January 2007).

[67] Kawaguchi gaimudaijin aisatsu, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō shimpojiumu: Kokusai shakai ga samazama na kyōi ni chokumen suru jidai ni okeru sono yakuwari' [Address by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi at the International Symposium on Human Security: 'Human Security: Its role in an era of various threats to international community'], 25 February 2003, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/15/ekw_0225.html (downloaded 19 June 2003).

[68] MOFA, 'The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the "Human-centered" 21st Century' (November 2003), p. 13.

[69] United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *Guidelines for the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security*, 3rd revision, December 2005, http://ochaonline.un.org/DocView.asp? DocID=2703.

In reality, the prescribed application procedure means that the Japanese government did not relinquish control over the use of the financial resources allocated to the TFHS. Since there was no shared strategy between the UN and Japan, projects have been treated on a 'first come first served' basis by the government, taking into account the human security situation of each country and Japan's overall foreign policy considerations.[70] The revision of the statutes of the TFHS made in 2005 eased but did not eliminate the awkward procedure whereby applications for grants from a UN organization are first scanned by the government of an individual country. The 2003 version said: 'Any organization (including its field offices) within the United Nations system that seeks support from the Fund may submit to the Government of Japan (through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, its embassies abroad, or permanent missions to the organizations concerned) for its consideration, a proposal outlining the activity it wishes to carry out (the proposal should include preliminary cost estimates).' The 2005 version states: 'Any organization(s) within the United States that seek support from the UNTFHS should submit a concept note to the HSU for initial assessment.' So far, few governments have shown an interest in jumping on the Japanese bandwagon. And it is not to be expected that interest will grow. When its application guidelines were revised in 2005, no change was made to the fact that the Japanese government has to give its consent to grants.[71] In fact, the Japanese government retains two control stations. If an application is approved in the initial assessment made by HSU, MOFA makes a preliminary review and can say no. If an application goes further and a full-size application is submitted, MOFA is consulted and sends in its 'comments for consideration'.[72]

The will to openly influence others, revealed by the Japanese government, has resulted in the situation where no other major country has found it worthwhile to step in and complement Japanese funding. With the Japanese government closely overseeing TFHS activities and projects, there is

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[70] Corinna Konrad, 'The Japanese Approach: Tracks of Human Security Implementation', *Human Security Perspectives* 1:3 (2006), p. 34.

[71] OCHA, The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, Guidelines for the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 3rd Revision (December 2005), p. 3;http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?ParentID=12197&MenuID=12205& Page= 1969 (downloaded 18 January 2007).

[72] MOFA, *Trust Fund for Human Security*, presentation brochure (2006), p. 11.

not much reason for other governments to see themselves as having any stake in its activities. A broader-based financial funding of the TFHS would improve its standing and the interest in its work of countries other than Japan. That Japan is the sole provider of funds was brought up in a discussion that Ogata Sadako had with the Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations, Pierre Schori, in May 2002 in which Ogata mentioned the TFHS. According to Schori's report to Stockholm, Ogata indicated 'that it would be fine if commitment could be broadened internationally.'[73] The Swedish government does not seem to have heeded Ogata's hint, which she is likely to have been informed about when the Commission on Human Security met in Stockholm the following month.

Ogata continued to worry about Japan carrying the financial burden. In its final report the Commission proposed a broadening of the donor base of the TFHS.[74] When Ogata introduced the report to the Human Security Network, whose members represented countries that could be expected to contribute to the TFHS, she found it expedient to point out that 'the donor base of the Trust Fund should be broadened to include other countries [than Japan].'[75] No such intervention from other countries has been seen. Maybe it was the limited possibility for a broadening of financial sources that made the MOFA representative, at a meeting in September 2003 of the Advisory Board on Human Security, state that 'while welcoming the possibility of broadening the funding base of the Trust Fund, [Japan] does not intend to actively promote such an endeavour at this particular juncture.'[76] Or, is it simply that Japan, when it comes to the crunch, is not that interested in abstaining from one of the few areas where it plays first fiddle?

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[73] Schori, 'Samtal med Ogata inför mötet i Sverige med Commission on Human Security'.

[74] Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People* (New York: United Nations, 2003), p. 142.

[75] Sadako Ogata, 'Human Security Now', remarks at the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Graz, Austria, 8 May 2003, http://www.human security-chs.org/newsandevents/graz.html (downloaded 5 December 2005).

[76] Statement by Ambassador Haraguchi Koichi, Minutes of the Meeting, Advisory Board on Human Security, 16–17 September 2003, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/abhs/Boardmeetings/1-minutes.html (downloaded 22 January 2007).

A Comparison of TFHS and Japanese ODA Project Funding

Compared to Japanese aid, the funding of projects by the TFHS has been modest. It makes it hard to say that its activities mean that the Japanese policy for human security has been 'translated into reality', which was the declared purpose when Obuchi took the initiative for the fund. Projects run by the TFHS and projects funded by the regular Japanese ODA budget have overlapped. To what extent have priorities expressed by Japanese authorities been reflected in the TFHS projects? Two aspects of project funding are striking. First, projects in Kosovo constituted the lion's share for the period up to June 2003 (see Table 3). These projects are hard to distinguish from emergency relief projects. Furthermore, TFHS projects ostensibly aimed at promoting human security are hard to distinguish from development assistance projects funded by the ODA budget.[77] This can be seen, for instance, in the section 'Priority Issues and Sectors' of Japan's regular ODA presented in the annual report on ODA for 1999. Issues and sectors that had priority were: (1) support for poverty alleviation programmes and social development (basic education, health and medical care, women in development); (2) support for economic and social infrastructure; (3) human resources development and intellectual support (incl. support for democratization); (4) responding to global issues (environmental conservation, population and aids, food, energy, drug abuse); (5) support for overcoming the Asian currency and economic crisis and promotion of economic structural reform; (6) conflicts, natural disaster and development; and (7) responding to issues of debt relief.[78] This list shows that the area of projects within the ordinary ODA programme were similar to projects managed by the TFHS and said to be targeted at human security. Since human security is not explicitly referred to in the presentation of projects financed by the ODA budget, this fact is unclear, however. That human security projects are hard to differentiate from projects financed by the regular ODA budget can be taken as an indication 'that

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[77] Bert Edström, 'Human Security and Japan's Foreign Policy in a Civil Society Context', paper presented at the 6th Symposium of Nordic Association for Japanese and Korean Studies, Göteborg, Sweden, 20–22 August 2004, p. 26.
[78] MOFA, *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999*, pp. 14f.

there is not yet a clearly defined idea within the government about what human security is and how to pursue it.'[79]

Secondly, the TFHS has not engaged in projects directed at countering violations of human rights. As seen in Table 3, projects are not targeted at human rights. It has been argued that human security was appropriated by the Japanese government 'as a means of sidestepping controversial issues such as human rights, rather than addressing them in an inclusive manner.'[80] A Japanese human rights activist noted that '[w]hile human rights issues, such as refugees, migration, HIV/AIDS, are indeed mentioned in various policy speeches by government officials, the term "human rights" itself is not used to describe them.'[81] This is in line with the fact that the concept did not appear in Japanese official reports on ODA until 1990.[82]

But Japan has certainly been joined by other countries. As noted by a human security researcher: 'Even though human rights is expressly stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, of which most nations around the world today are members, it is a different story when it comes to the actual issues of individual nations.'[83] The problem for Japan was that some of its neighbours were among the worst perpetrators of crimes against human rights.[84] To the extent that Japan tried to exert leadership on human rights, its approach has been described as 'non-confrontational and emphasize the effects of a policy rather than the universality of the principle of human rights, improvement rather than punishment, quiet backstage diplomatic efforts rather than open criticism.'[85] The Japanese

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[79] Mieko Fujioka, 'Japan's human rights policy at domestic and international levels: Disconnecting human rights from human security?', *Japan Forum* 15:2 (2003), p. 302.

[80] Julie Gilson and Phillida Purvis, 'Japan's pursuit of human security: humanitarian agenda or political pragmatism?', *Japan Forum* 15:2 (2003), p. 205.

[81] Fujioka, 'Japan's human rights policy at domestic and international levels', p. 301.

[82] Inada Juichi, 'Nihon no enjo gaikō' [Japan's aid diplomacy], in Kusano and Umemoto, eds, *Gendai Nihon gaikō no bunseki*, p. 154.

[83] Dan, 'Human Security and Regionalism in Northeast Asia', p. 3.

[84] See, e.g., Yozo Yokota and Chiyuki Aoi, 'Japan's Foreign Policy towards Human Rights: Uncertain Changes', in David P. Forsythe, ed., *Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy* (Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press, 2000), pp. 125ff.

[85] Tadokoro, 'Between the West and Asia: Japan's Position on Human Rights Issues', p. 272.

supported the idea of democracy and human rights, but they disapproved of the domineering manner in which the Americans tried to impose them on Asian countries.[86]

The problem for the Japanese government was that, so far, the TFHS had become a failure for Japanese intentions in two important respects. First, while Japan allocated considerable funds to the TFHS, the actual utilization of funds left room for improvement. The record of the TFHS was not particularly impressive, at least not for the period scrutinized here. According to statistics quoted by Fukushima Akiko, in February 2003 'the Trust Fund had provided approximately 94.33 million dollars to 74 projects. Thus, projects that have been approved by the Trust Fund account for a little over 50% of the fund available.'[87] Fukushima speculates that this discouraging experience was due to unawareness among potential recipients of the existence of the TFHS and to the cumbersome application procedure. Second, she finds that the projects financed by Japan have 'not been visible enough to gain international attention'.[88] Since the intention of the Japanese government was to make the TFHS a key vehicle for its ambitions to further human security, Fukushima's assessment of its performance must be a disappointment.

Concluding Remarks

Only one year after Prime Minister Obuchi elevated human security to Japan's political agenda, it was referred to as an element of the government's policies in its annual report on ODA. Basically, however, important ideas that human security are based on and represent were already included in the ODA Charter that had been adopted in 1992 as a response to the Tiananmen riots in 1989. To implement the new idea, the Japanese government took the initiative to the TFHS established within the United Nations and included human security among values to be taken into account in Japanese ODA programmes. A repackaging and re-label-

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[86] Susumu Yamakage, 'Japan's National Security and Asia–Pacific's Regional Institutions in the Post-Cold War Era', in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds, *Network Power: Japan and Asia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 300.
[87] Fukushima, 'Human Security and Japanese Foreign Policy', p. 148.
[88] Ibid., p. 152.

ling of ongoing projects enabled swift action by MOFA. The Japanese government allocated funds to the TFHS so that it had become the largest of its kind in the United Nations. In a sense, Japan's funding constituted a case of Japan's chequebook diplomacy *par excellence*. A problem for the Japanese government is that funds allocated to the TFHS had been under-utilized and no other governments have joined Japan as financial sponsor of the TFHS.

HUMAN SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT–NGO COLLABORATION

Collaboration in the Domestic Context

In his speech at the Social Summit in Copenhagen in March 1995, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi stressed the importance of public participation and the efforts of civil society in the human-centred social development that he saw as a priority for Japan. When he spoke at the United Nations in October, he outlined the role of women and NGOs in the fight for happiness of each and everyone of whom he called 'global citizens', *chikyū shimin*. The increased standing and prestige of NGOs was also apparent, when even such a staunch fighter for the prime minister's prerogatives as Nakasone Yasuhiro, who during his years as premier worked ceaselessly for a presidentialization of the prime minister's office, turned into a supporter of NGOs. In his case, the triggering events were the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998. Nakasone commented: 'We are at the point where the Japanese government and NGOs all over the world should cooperate in the same way as for the treaty to ban landmines so as to promptly bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect, achieve ratification of the 2nd Strategic Arms Treaty (START II), and get the nuclear states to make a no-first-use commitment, particularly toward the nonnuclear states.'[1]

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[1] *Asahi shimbun*, 30 May 1998.

Obuchi saw NGOs as having an important role to play in the pursuit of human security. He had been instrumental in making Japan join the international campaign against landmines. The resounding success of this campaign was attributable to the efforts of NGOs and individuals working for a ban on antipersonnel landmines. At the ceremony when the Ottawa anti-landmine treaty was signed in December 1997, the Japanese prime minister praised NGOs for encouraging and supplementing intergovernmental negotiations, and he lauded them again in his JIIA speech in 1999.[2]

The success of the movement against landmines was a pertinent reminder of the growing role of NGOs in international affairs. David Davenport has pointed out that 'on many international matters, states – whether great or small – are not even providing the key leadership. Instead, thousands of nongovernmental organizations have come on stage in recent years, driving their own issues to the top of the diplomatic agenda.'[3] To engage NGOs in relief operations and other efforts to further peace and progress has become commonplace. In most Western countries, high-profile organizations like the Red Cross, Save the Children, and Mèdecins Sans Frontiéres are respected collaborators with governments in the field and NGOs participate in national and international decision-making. Obuchi's own 21st Century Commission noted the international trend of increasing involvement of NGOs in the management of aid.[4]

In Japan the situation was different, albeit the key role that NGOs could play was increasingly recognized by policy-makers. The difference was already apparent in the definition of NGO. The English term NGO is used in Japan but defined in a way that differs from international usage, where it tends to stand for a non-profit, voluntary civilian group organized on local, national or international level.[5] In Japan, the term NGO refers primarily to nonprofit private or non-governmental organizations engaged in development-related activities in developing countries. According to a

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[2] Obuchi, 'In Quest of Human Security', p. 9.

[3] David Davenport, 'The New Diplomacy', *Policy Review Online* 116 (December 2002–January 2003), http://www.policyreview.org/dec02/davenport.html (downloaded 7 October 2004).

[4] Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, *The Frontier Within*, pp. 169f.

[5] Rajib Shaw, 'Role of Non-Government Organizations in Earthquake Disaster Management: An Asian Perspective', *Regional Development Dialogue* 24:1 (Spring 2003), p. 4.

widely used definition, the term NGO is used in Japan for 'a group active in international relations', or, more specifically, 'a civic group active in international development cooperation'. NGOs differ from NPOs, non-profit organizations, which are domestically active civic groups, especially voluntary groups not incorporated as public-interest corporations.[6] In a report, the Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century pointed out that the term NGO has been rendered as 'private aid organizations', 'non-governmental aid organizations', or as the literal Japanese equivalent of a non-governmental organization. The Council itself made NGO stand for 'citizen-led organizations involved in the arena of international assistance'.[7]

One reason for the uphill struggle that Japanese NGOs faced in their search for official recognition and support was the centralized state with a strong central government that took shape after the 1868 Meiji Restoration. Popular-level participation in the business of the state was alien to the thinking of the Meiji statesmen albeit traces of such ideas were apparent when local autonomy was introduced in 1888. In his standard work on the Japanese bureaucracy, Tsuji Kiyoaki quotes the official justification for the establishment of the city, town and village system: 'The present reform of the system of localities is conducted in order to distribute the administrative work of the government to the localities, to alleviate the burden of the government by making people participate.'[8] Furthermore, Japan lacked the long tradition of volunteerism found in many Western countries.[9] An up-surge in NGO activities was seen at the end of the 1970s, when many Japanese engaged in helping refugees from Indochina. The presence of NGOs became increasingly noticeable in the 1980s, when Japanese perceived waves of *kokusaika*, the Japanese version of internationalization, to be sweeping over Japan, and heightened their interest in

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[6] Wada Jun, 'Civil Society in Japan through Print and Statistical Data', in Yamamoto Tadashi, ed., *Deciding the Public Good: Governance and Civil Society in Japan* (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999), pp. 173, 181.

[7] MOFA, *Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century Final Report.*

[8] Tsuji Kiyoaki, *Nihon kanryōsei no kenkyū* [Research on the Japanese bureaucratic system] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1969), p. 133.

[9] Susan J. Pharr, 'Japanese Aid in the New World Order', in Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock, eds, *Japan: A New Kind of Superpower* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 177.

the world.[10] The standing and prestige of NGOs skyrocketed as a result of their rescue activities during the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Initially, local officials were unaware of the magnitude of the earthquake and the lack of information caused the government to fail to comprehend the severity of the situation.[11] The lack of rapid crisis assessment at all levels of government delayed the mobilization of critical resources. Instead of the glaringly absent military personnel, 1.3 million volunteers and many NGOs came to the rescue. The reputation NGOs gained by their activities in the aftermath of the earthquake increased the interest and willingness of the Japanese government to support their work. This development in the 1990s paralleled what happened in the 1970s, when popular movements and activist groups were found on the barricades in the fight against pollution. Their work contributed to making the Japanese government introduce tough environmental laws co-opting the environmental movement by responding to its demands.[12]

It is clear that Obuchi had high-flying plans for involving NGOs in the work for human security that he envisaged. One source of inspiration can be found in Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo's initiative back in the 1970s of allocating funds to the ASEAN Cultural Fund in order to foster exchange at the grassroots level between Japan and Southeast Asia.[13] There were precedents to collaboration. The Japanese government had provided financial assistance to NGOs engaged in Third World community development since 1989. Two sources for financial assistance to NGOs were the NGO Assistance Fund provided by the Non-Governmental Organizations Assistance Division and grass-roots grant aid provided by the Grant Aid Division, both within the Economic Co-operation Bureau of MOFA. Regular meetings with NGOs were initiated by MOFA in 1994, and the

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[10] Frank Schwartz, 'Introduction: Recognizing Civil Society in Japan', in Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr, eds, *The State of Civil Society in Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 9.

[11] Kathleen J. Tierney and James D. Goltz, 'Emergency Response: Lessons Learned from the Kobe Earthquake', *University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center, Preliminary Paper* 260 (1997), p. 4, http://www.udel.edu/DRC/prepapers.html (downloaded 26 December 2005).

[12] Frank Upham, *Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 28–67.

[13] Sengo Nihon kokusai bunka kōryū kenkyūkai, *Sengo Nihon no kokusai bunka kōryū* [International cultural exchange of post-war Japan] (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 2005), p. 58.

government's financial assistance had been discussed in meetings between the ministry and NGOs since 1996.[14] Collaboration had grown broader over the years, and the NPO Law (The Law to Promote Specified Non-profit Activities) was enacted in December 1998 in order to promote the activities of non-profit organizations, but the new law did not eradicate the impediments to NGO participation in aid activities. Collaboration between the government and NGOs, as anticipated by Obuchi, would not come about by itself, however.

Factors Hindering Government–NGO Collaboration

Obuchi's wish to involve NGOs in the work for human security encountered a number of obstacles. First, while the number of organizations in non-profit sectors amounted to a massive 350,000,[15] the prime minister did not have this multitude of organizations in mind. The number of NGOs listed by the Japanese NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), an umbrella organization of citizen-led NGOs involved in ODA, amounted to a mere 391 in 2001.[16] Given the size of Japan's economy and the global outreach of its economic and cultural relations, this figure is not impressive.

Secondly, Japanese NGOs are not only few but also small, flexible organizations in terms of budget and personnel. According to the DAC, they are 'underfunded, understaffed, underskilled and relatively young'.[17] Compared to Japan's ODA their small size is striking. According to data collected by the Center for the Promotion of NGO Activities for 1998, the paid staff of the 368 NGOs listed in its directory averaged two to three, and they had three to five regular unpaid volunteers and annual incomes of about ¥10 to 30 million.[18] Figures have improved only marginally since

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[14] Hirata, 'New Challenges to Japan's Aid', p. 319.

[15] Kaori Kuroda, 'Japan-based non-governmental organizations in pursuit of human security', *Japan Forum* 15:2 (2003), p. 229.

[16] Kokusai kyōryoku NGO sentā [JANIC], *Kokusai kyōryoku NGO dairekutorii 2002* [Directory of Japanese NGOs Concerned with International Cooperation] (Tokyo: Kokusai kyōryoku NGO sentā [JANIC], 2002), p. 1.

[17] OECD/DAC, 'Summary and Conclusions', *Development Co-operation Reviews: Japan* 34 (1999).

[18] NGO katsudō suishin sentā, *NGO data book: Sūji de miru Nihon no NGO* [NGO data book: Japanese NGOs in figures] (Tokyo: NGO katsudō suishin sentā, 1998).

then. The room for involving NGO representatives in activities overseas is exceedingly limited due to their minuscule overseas staff.[19] According to JANIC, smallness in itself has direct effects on collaboration. Government grants have to be handled prudently and emphasis is placed by the government on accountability. Since small NGOs have problems in meeting this requirement, the government tends to give grants only to big NGOs, excluding small and middle-sized NGOs.[20]

Thirdly, many Japanese NGOs are reluctant to collaborate with the government, since they want to avoid strings being attached to government grants, fearing that they might lose their identity as voluntary associations.[21] This cautious attitude has been predominant among NGOs in spite of the stipulation in the 1992 ODA Charter that measures for the implementation of ODA would comprise *inter alia* 'cooperation with and appropriate support to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), while respecting their independence.'[22]

Fourthly, many Japanese NGOs have been critical of Japan's aid policy and have argued for an improvement of the quality of aid. They saw the government bureaucracy as representing the Establishment, and ignorant of the needs of the socially disadvantaged in developing countries.[23] Japanese aid was criticized as consisting of large infrastructure-based projects that had adverse effects on the poor and the environment of the recipient societies, and being excessively oriented towards industrial projects benefiting Japanese industry.[24]

Fifthly, a 'traditionally adversarial relationship' between governments and NGOs has often been noted in many countries.[25] This was also the

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[19] The 21st Century Public Policy Institute, *Japanese NGO and Government ODA: Achieving a Breakthrough* (Tokyo: The 21st Century Public Policy Institute, 2000), p. 7.

[20] Miyashita Megumi, Human Resource Development Program Officer, JANIC, interview by author, 6 November 2006.

[21] The 21st Century Public Policy Institute, *Japanese NGO and Government ODA*, p. 10.

[22] MOFA, 'Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter'.

[23] Keiko Hirata, 'Civil Society and Japan's Dysfunctional Democracy', *Journal of Developing Societies* 20:1–2 (2004), p. 7.

[24] Drifte, *Japan's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century*, p. 119.

[25] Richard Langhorne and William Wallace, 'Diplomacy towards the Twenty-first Century', in Brian Hocking, ed., *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 19.

case for Japan. It is fairly common for Japanese bureaucrats to view NGOs as 'illegitimate, antigovernment, and a cause of social instability'.[26]

Factors Conducive to Government–NGO Collaboration

Obstacles to collaboration were mitigated by factors conducive to collaboration. First, NGOs could compensate for the shortage of personnel in the administration of aid.[27] The Japanese predilection for small government resulted in a situation where the foreign ministry staff hardly grew when Japan's global economic activities expanded in the 1970s and 80s.[28] When the ODA budget swelled, staff employed to administer the increasing funds did not correspondingly go up in number. In 1995, the two agencies primarily responsible for managing Japan's aid programme, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), had personnel of around 1,400. Adding staff from other ministries and agencies involved in the administration of aid, total staff numbered around 1,900. This figure was far lower than, for example, the US and German foreign aid agencies with around 4,000 staff.[29] In 2002, Japan had one of the more thinly staffed systems among DAC member states with a total staff level of some 2,097 development professionals to manage its worldwide portfolio of US$9 billion.[30]

Secondly, increased activities abroad by Japanese NGOs could ameliorate the controversy of Japanese overseas activities. Increased NGO involvement in ODA activities could counter the negative impression that Japan had as excelling in 'faceless' aid with ODA activities carried out mainly by the government and contracted to large consulting firms.[31]

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[26] Hirata, 'Civil Society and Japan's Dysfunctional Democracy', p. 7.

[27] Hirata, 'New Challenges to Japan's Aid', p. 318.

[28] Kent E. Calder, 'The Institutions of Japanese Foreign Policy', in Grant, ed., *The Process of Japanese Foreign Policy*, p. 3.

[29] Tomoko Fujisaki, Forrest Briscoe, James Maxwell, Misa Kishi, Tatsujiro Suzuki, 'Japan as Top Donor: The Challenge of Implementing Software Aid Policy', *Pacific Affairs* 69:4 (Winter 1996–1997), pp. 532f.

[30] OECD/DAC, 'Japan: DAC Peer Review, Main Findings and Recommendations', December 2003, http://dakis.fasid.or.jp/report/pdf/handout29-4.pdf (downloaded 11 July 2006).

[31] Akiko Nanami, 'The Role of NGOs in Japan's Aid Policy: Government-NGO Relations', paper presented at 3rd Biennial Conference of the International Devel-

Thirdly, mobilization of NGOs could be expected to improve management of aid, since NGO activists and representatives are often experienced in skills that the small staff of aid agencies lack. This could offset the negative effects of chronic understaffing of aid agencies to which could be added negative effects of frequent rotations, language barriers and limited field experience, which caused problems for decision-making and aid management.[32]

Fourthly, NGOs could be used in activities in politically insecure and unstable areas, where agents working on behalf of the Japanese government could not work; thus resulting in an improvement of efficient use of funds.[33]

Fifthly, NGOs could be a source of inspiration. Many NGOs have come up with fresh ideas and demonstrated an ability to act, thereby revitalizing ODA programmes.[34] Based on the results of its project 'Exploring Japan's Proactive Peace and Security Strategies', the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) concluded that 'state-centered development policies and military-centered security policies are in dire need to be redefined from the viewpoint of ordinary people. This also implies that civil society should play a more significant role as an actor by initiating urgently needed policy changes.'[35] Such civil society initiatives could be provided by NGOs.

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opment Studies, Network of Aotearoa, New Zealand, Massey University, 5–7 December 2002, http://www.devnet.org.nz/conf2002/papers/Nanami_Akiko.pdf (downloaded 11 November 2003). This effect was recognized by Takemi Keizō after Japanese youth had volunteered in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. See Takemi Keizo, 'Evolution of the Human Security Concept', in *Health and Human Security: Moving from Concept to Action*, Fourth Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow, Kisarazu, Japan, March 2002 (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2002), p. 49.

[32] Sunaga, 'The Reshaping of Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter', p. 28.

[33] Kojima Akira, 'NGO, sekaiteki renkei jidai ni' [NGOs in the age of international partnership], *Nihon keizai shimbun*, 14 August 1994; quoted in Atsushi Yamakoshi, 'The Changing Face of NGOs in Japan' (Tokyo: Global Development Research Center, 2000), http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/jpngo-face.html (downloaded 28 December 2004).

[34] MOFA, *Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century Final Report*.

[35] NIRA, 'Human Security: Examining the Role of Civil Society' (2001), http://www.nira.go.jp/newse/research/a147.html (downloaded 1 October 2003).

Sixthly, NGO participation could be expected to nurture public support of Japan's ODA and rally support behind the effort made by the government to promote human security. An idea that was to become recurrent was expressed by the Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century: 'ODA programs are funded by Japan's taxpayers, and as such, are backed by the understanding and cooperation of the Japanese public. For this reason, it is essential that efforts in disclosure and other steps be taken to improve the transparency of ODA. Japan must aim for more open forms of ODA and enlist the help of NGOs to heighten the level of public participation in its ODA programs.'[36] But the Council's ideas were not limited to describing NGOs as trumpets for the government and partici-pants in a PR machinery for ODA policy targeting the general public. The Council also proposed that the government should explore the idea of contracting out projects to, among others, NGOs.[37]

Government–NGO Collaboration on Human Security

Although Japan's ODA expanded, participation by Japanese NGOs and individuals in aid activities sponsored by the Japanese government grew only modestly.[38] A step to rectify this was the government's Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance in which collaboration between the government and NGOs was depicted as increasingly important for the implementation of Japan's ODA policy. According to this policy document, there was a growing need for the government to collaborate with NGOs in several respects: to develop a dialogue and exchange views and ideas with NGOs active in developing countries; to increase and enrich ODA support for NGO aid activities; to increase contracting-out of projects and the utilization of NGO personnel and know-how; to strengthen the base of Japanese NGOs involved in the implementation of aid activities; and to promote participation of persons

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[36] MOFA, *Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century Final Report*.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Masahiro Kawai and Shinji Takagi, 'Japan's Official Development Assistance: Recent Issues and Future Directions', Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, *Asia Program Working Paper* 97 (July 2001), p. 12.

with experience in the implementation of ODA projects.[39] The ideas put forward in this document can be seen as a response to the opinion aired by the DAC that NGOs needed to be liberated from the double bind of limited government support and insufficient private contributions to be able to assume an effective partnership role in the Japanese ODA programme.[40]

The views found in the Medium-Term Policy were in line with Prime Minister Obuchi's ideas. In his JIIA speech in December 1999, he revealed his belief that 'the role of NGOs and other components of civil society have become important. […] Governmental efforts alone will not guarantee human security in Asia and the world in the coming twenty-first century.'[41] In another speech, he discussed how the problems affecting human security 'directly affect the lives of human beings, and since it is this area where activities of citizens through nongovernmental organizations and others are most effective, it is important for governments and international organizations to strengthen linkages and cooperation with citizen's activities.'[42]

The need to improve relations with NGOs became acute with the Okinawa Summit. The Japanese government feared that NGO dissent could overshadow the Summit. A 'NGO Center' managed by MOFA with the cooperation of a liaison group was established to prevent this. According to an announcement by MOFA, the NGO Center would provide a venue for exchanges of views between NGOs and the government.[43] Prime Minister Mori said beforehand that it was 'not good to repeat confusion' so he wanted to chat with NGO representatives at the NGO Center.[44] Thus, even the premier showed up at the Center. According to JANIC, the NGO Center gave them an opportunity to talk with the government but, with its limited function, was not particularly useful for

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[39] MOFA, *Japan's Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance (ODA)*.

[40] OECD/DAC, 'Summary and Conclusions'.

[41] Obuchi, 'In Quest of Human Security', pp. 10f.

[42] Obuchi, 'Opening Remarks', p. 19.

[43] MOFA, 'Press Conference 30 June 2000', http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2000/6/630.html (downloaded 14 December 2006).

[44] 'Mori planning talks with NGOs during Okinawa summit', *Japan Policy & Politics*, 24 July 2000.

NGOs. What was particularly negative was that they were not allowed to contact the media or politicians.[45]

The idea that a network should be created surfaced in the preparations for the Okinawa Summit. It was based on the view that government–NGO collaboration was beneficial for both parties. At the conference of foreign ministers in Miyazaki preceding the Okinawa Summit, the Japanese government presented its so-called 'Action from Japan'.[46] The plan outlined how the government wanted to strengthen its collaboration with NGOs by recognizing the role that NGOs could play in conflict prevention. One measure proposed was to establish the Japan Platform, a governmentally supported network organization consisting of a NGO Unit, MOFA and the Japan Business Federation, Nippon Keidanren. The NGO Unit was to function as the implementation body. When a humanitarian disaster occurred, an investigation team was to be dispatched to examine the need for emergency assistance. The cost was to be covered by grants in the ODA budget, to which MOFA allocated funds, along with private donations. Funds were to be pooled and made available for emergencies when the Japan Platform dispatched an investigation team. To use this fund, the NGO Unit must receive approval from MOFA. The role of business was not only to make financial contributions, but also to assist NGOs in procuring materials and equipment necessary for humanitarian relief.[47] The organization of this network at the outset is seen in Fig. 2.

There is a striking shift in how collaboration between the government and NGOs in the Japan Platform has been described in government documents over the years. When it is mentioned in a government document for the first time, in the 'Action from Japan' (July 2000), it is stated clearly that the government intended to support a 'Japan Platform' but had not taken the initiative.[48] When the first decision to allocate funds to the Japan

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[45] Miyashita Megumi, interview, 6 November 2006.

[46] MOFA, 'The Significance of the "G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention", Action from Japan on "Conflict and Development", Japanese Development Cooperation for Conflict Prevention, Okinawa Summit', July 2000, http://www.g8 kyushu-okinawa.go.jp/e/theme/action.html.

[47] Akiyama Nobumasa, 'Avoiding a Marriage of Convenience: Some Thoughts on a New Japanese State–NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Relief in Conflict', *Peace Studies Bulletin* 20 (2001), http://wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp/psaj/index_e.html (downloaded 3 August 2006).

[48] MOFA, 'The Significance of the "G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention"'.

Fig. 2. Organization of the Japan Platform

Source: MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 44 (2001), p. 111.

Platform was taken a year later, MOFA announced that it was made in order to 'assist the Japan Platform and strengthen the basis of its activities'.[49] That others, rather than the government, were key actors was also apparent in the description given in the *Diplomatic Bluebook 2001* in which it was stated that 'in August 2000, NGOs, the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), and the foreign ministry announced that they had jointly established "Japan Platform". This provides a common

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[49] MOFA, 'Contribution to the Japan Platform', 31 July 2001, http://globalwarming. mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/7/index.html (downloaded 9 August 2006).

platform for closer coordination and cooperation among NGOs, the government, the private companies, foundations, the media, and other concerned parties to promote emergency humanitarian assistance activities. The foreign ministry will actively participate in and cooperate with this plan [...].'[50] In contrast, in 2005, the Japan Platform was described by MOFA as an organization established 'with the aim of providing prompt and effective emergency humanitarian assistance activities for disasters and conflicts, among others, in coordination and cooperation with Japanese NGOs, economic circles and the government.'[51] This gave the impression that it was an organization established by the government and which NGOs collaborated with.

The Japan Platform was an attempt by the Japanese government to further good relations with NGOs, but MOFA did this in a way that made it unclear whether this objective was attained. Not all NGOs were welcome on board. Members of the NGO Unit were carefully chosen by MOFA to include only NGOs favourable to the ministry. Embedding NGOs in the NGO Unit and subordinating it to both MOFA and Keidanren, turned NGOs into subcontractors.[52] According to Miyashita Megumi of JANIC, the Japan Platform played an important role in humanitarian relief but NGOs involved in activities had to obey those who supplied the money, the government and Keidanren. NGOs could apply for grants but JANIC had not done so because of the negative aspects of accepting grants.[53] On the other hand, Hino Aiko of the Association for Aid and Relief, Japan (AAR) states that when projects were financed by governmental grants, AAR 'of course' followed the rules. AAR is a member of the Japan Platform, and Hino described application procedures as 'cumbersome but OK, since they are logical and for accountability.' When a project was planned by the AAR, it was presented to the government and if it agreed to finance the project, it was pursued accordingly; if the government did not accept the proposal, funds from other sources were sought. To stay independent, only ten per cent of the total funds were

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[50] MOFA, *Gaikō seisho 44* (2001), p. 110.
[51] MOFA, 'Funding for the Japan Platform (JPF)', 11 March 2005, http:/www. mofa.go.jp/policy/disaster/indonesia/jpf0503.html (downloaded 9 August 2006).
[52] Ōkuma Hiroshi, interview, 21 October 2006.
[53] Miyashita Megumi, interview, 6 November 2006.

provided by the government. If AAR had to choose between independence and governmental grants, it would always choose independence.[54]

To illustrate how the Japanese government collaborated with Japanese NGOs, two pertinent areas, that were seen as central for Japan's international activities, will be analysed, namely, Kosovo and landmines.

Kosovo

In a meeting with representatives of three Japanese NGOs on 20 April 1999, Prime Minister Obuchi said that he wanted to listen to their opinions and reflect them in his policies.[55] The focus of this meeting was Kosovo, one of the pressing problems of world politics. The Japanese government was asked by these NGOs to provide funds for NGO activities in Kosovo and to make efforts to raise the awareness of the Japanese public of the plight of Kosovo refugees. The response of the government was prompt. In *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999* released shortly afterwards, MOFA argued that the Kosovo conflict 'reaffirmed the value of the NGO role in the arena of emergency humanitarian assistance. The Japanese government decided to provide for greater flexibility in the management of its NGO subsidy framework and grant assistance for grassroots projects scheme in order to provide financial aid swiftly for activities led by Japanese NGOs in Kosovo Province and its neighboring countries.'[56] In a speech on 24 June 1999, State Secretary Takemi Keizō expanded on the role that NGOs played in Kosovo:

A large number of NGOs, some of them representing Japan's younger generation, are currently taking action on a number of fronts. This includes assistance for the refugees from Kosovo as well as other humanitarian and development-related causes, all in an effort to pass along the task of providing assistance down to the individuals who truly need it, and propelled by the initiative of individuals. The sort of finely detailed activities required from the standpoint of human security would be impossible without the involvement of such NGOs. I am convinced that it will

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[54] Hino Aiko, Public Relations Official, Association for Aid and Relief, Japan (AAR), interview by author, 7 November 2006.
[55] 'Obuchi wants to cooperate with NGOs in Kosovo crisis', *Japan Policy & Politics*, 26 April 1999.
[56] MOFA, *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999*, p. 39.

be utterly essential to make full use of the knowledge and powers of NGOs in order to pave the way for tomorrow's world.[57]

So, to what degree did the optimistic prospects that Takemi foresaw for NGOs and their role in Kosovo come to fruition? In a section on 'Japanese NGOs' Activities to Assist Kosovar Returnees' in the annual report on ODA for 1999, it was reported that 'several Japanese NGOs secured areas for operation and began analyzing the need for specific types of aid.' The NGOs mentioned include Peace Winds Japan, Japan Emergency NGOs (JEN), the Japanese Red Cross Society, and the Medical Relief Unit, Japan (MeRU).[58] The activities in Kosovo of these NGOs were rather modest. The largest of these was the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS). Between April 1999 and June 2000, JRCS sent altogether 31 personnel to Macedonia, Albania and Yugoslavia.[59] The number is not impressive and it seems JRCS put in money instead of dispatching personnel.

How about the other NGOs mentioned in the ODA report? According to JANIC's *Directory of Japanese NGOs 2002*, Peace Winds Japan had a staff of 53 and was engaged in five projects overseas, one of which related to humanitarian aid in 'Kosovo and other conflict areas'.[60] On its homepage, Peace Winds Japan reports: 'In 1999, PWJ provided shelter assistance to returnees by transporting and constructing 300 prefabricated houses that were used after the Kobe earthquake in Japan. PWJ closed its Kosovo office in 2000.'[61] For Japan Emergency NGOs (JEN), later to be renamed JEN, the JANIC directory informs the reader that the NGO had a staff of 20, of which 11 worked in its overseas offices.[62] According to the UNHCR homepage, the Medical Relief Unit, Japan (MeRU), had a membership of 40 and staff dispatched overseas amounted to 15. During July 1999–January 2000, it engaged in restoring a clinic and provided

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[57] Takemi, 'New Forms of Development toward the 21st Century'.

[58] MOFA, *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999*, p. 20.

[59] Personal message from Ms Matsumoto Sayaka, Japanese Red Cross Society, International Relief Division, International Relations Department, 25 July 2006.

[60] Kokusai kyōryoku NGO sentā [JANIC], *Kokusai kyōryoku NGO dairekutorii 2002*, p. 193.

[61] Peace Winds Japan (PWJ), homepage, http://www.peace-winds.org (accessed 20 July 2006).

[62] Kokusai kyōryoku NGO sentā [JANIC], *Kokusai kyōryoku NGO dairekutorii 2002*, p. 94.

medical assistance to repatriating refugees in Peja and Decan Municipali-ties.[63] In total, the three NGOs mentioned in the Japanese government report had limited staff and, consequently, limited ability to be involved in the field overseas.

The conclusion that Japanese NGOs were not heavily involved in activities sponsored by the Japanese government does not change, when another aspect of government–NGO collaboration is taken into account – collaboration with non-Japanese international organizations also involving Japanese NGOs. In *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999*, MOFA reported that efforts by the Japanese government had been complemented by 'financial support to the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) for the assignment of Japanese international volunteers to local UNHCR offices and the introduction of an enhanced support measure for emergency humanitarian assistance projects of Japanese NGOs.'[64] The *Diplomatic Bluebook* for 2000 mentions the Emergency School Rehabilitation in Decane, Kosovo, to rebuild two destroyed elementary schools carried out by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in collaboration with a Japanese NGO.[65] Similar to the situation of NGOs acting in the field and sometimes collaborating with the government, the number of personnel dispatched was low. This was high-lighted in an address to the Trilateral Commission by Takemi Keizō in April 2000:

In the case of Kosovo, for instance, the Japanese government sent six personnel to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and from forty to fifty Japanese nationals became involved in NGO activities there. Besides such contribution on the human level, Japan put together a blanket package of financial aid worth some $280 million dollars when the assistance for neighboring countries and its assessed contributions for UN peace-keeping is included (this total also includes roughly $51.8 million from the aforementioned Human Security Fund). While one of the backbones of Japanese policy is support for NGO activities, this aid was directed to the whole spectrum of relevant fields, from construction of housing and schools to assistance for the repatriation of soldiers and further to programs to relieve psychological trauma.[66]

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[63] UNHCR eCentre, Network Directory, PARinAC List, http://www.the-ecen-tre.net/directory/parinac/6-1-12.cfm (accessed 20 July 2006).
[64] MOFA, *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999*, p. 40.
[65] MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000*, p. 106.
[66] Takemi, 'Approach to the Mounting Concern of Human Security', p. 46.

Since the ODA-financed aid programme for relief operations in Kosovo was one of Japan's largest aid programmes of its kind, the modest participation of Japanese NGOs in operations financed by the Japanese government described by Takemi makes it clear that the role played by Japanese NGOs was not very substantial. What happened in Kosovo in later years did not change the scale of NGO involvement. When statements made by MOFA after 2000 on the Kosovo situation, in all nine (17 May, 5 and 18 November 2001, 5 March and 29 October 2002, 15 October 2003, 19 March 2004, 26 October 2005, 24 January 2006) are scrutinized, matters relating to Japanese personnel amount to 11 international peace-keeping operation staff members (including five liaison officers) dispatched to Kosovo to monitor the elections (18 November 2001) and the one election expert dispatched to the OSCE (29 October 2002).[67] In these official announcements of Japanese activities in Kosovo, NGO participation does not emerge. So in as far as it did actually exist, it was not something that MOFA deemed worth reporting.

Landmines

Landmines were another official area where NGOs played a crucial role, for which Obuchi commended them at the signing ceremony of the Ottawa Treaty. On this occasion, he took the initiative by announcing the Zero Victim Program, a plan to provide ¥10 billion over a five-year period for landmine removal and support of mine victim projects. In February 2003, Japan had completed the destruction of its stock of mines, except for 15,000 mines retained for training and research purposes.[68] While the pursuit of human security had not been adopted as official policy when the Zero Victims Program was initiated, it was later claimed in an official declaration that one of the three principles guiding the position of Japan on the issue of landmines was 'human security', or promoting the survival, well-being, and dignity of all people; the two others were 'ownership', or promoting the efforts of mine-affected countries themselves and 'partnership', or promoting coordination of the activities of agencies of the

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[67] MOFA, 'Statements by the Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs', http://www. mofa.go.jp/region/europe/yugo/kosovo/psstate.html (downloaded 13 July 2006).
[68] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, http://www.icbl.org/lm.

United Nations, regional organizations, national governments and NGOs.[69]

Japanese government support was directed towards mine clearance activities and aid for mine victims. In *Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999*, it is reported that the bulk of grants constituted aid through international institutions like the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, the Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA). Financial support of Japanese NGOs involved in the work against landmines was not large; it was reported for 1998 that of the US$8.65 million disbursed by the government to landmine-related assistance projects in 1998, 94 per cent went to multinational organizations and six per cent to NGOs.[70] In 1999, the *Landmine Monitor Report* states that NGOs had been active in raising public awareness and this continued to be the main activity of NGOs throughout the programme period. Japanese NGOs, among them a coalition of nearly 50 NGOs named the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, were engaged in activities and fundraising in order to raise public awareness through public events, lectures, seminars, petitions, sports events, and publications.[71] The work against landmines was reflected in organizational changes. In April 2002, MOFA established a Conventional Weapons Division, in charge of Small Arms and Landmines.[72]

Japan's prolific work made it able to carve a niche for itself in the work against landmines. It engaged in international collaboration on landmines and served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance from May 1999 to September 2001, and of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance from September 2002 to December 2004, and hosted 'The Tokyo Seminar on Landmines' on 4–5 March 2004. The seminar brought together representatives of donors, mine-affected countries, international organizations engaged in mine action and NGOs to review mine action activities and explore more effec-

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[69] Ryuichiro Yamazaki, Alternate Representative of Japan to the United Nations, Speech to the UN General Assembly on 18 November 1999. Press release by the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, 18 November 1999, quoted in *Landmine Monitor Report 2000.*
[70] *Landmine Monitor Report 1999.*
[71] *Landmine Monitor Report 2004.*
[72] *Landmine Monitor Report 2002.*

tive ways to benefit mine-affected communities. At the end of the report carried by the *Landmine Monitor Report*, a significant point was raised where it stated that 'the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines regretted that NGOs had limited opportunities to contribute to the discussion.'[73] It is obvious that the government's stance towards the NGOs involved was met by scepticism by those NGOs.

Assessment of Government–NGO Collaboration
on Human Security

Regardless of the declared good will of Obuchi and top officials towards involving NGOs in human security related activities, in practice the outcome was not very impressive, even for what Takemi Keizō had indicated was a showpiece for collaboration between the Japanese government and NGOs – Kosovo. This outcome was part of a general pattern. Even while NGOs received verbal support officially, their participation in Japan's overseas aid activities was not substantive. The percentage of Japanese ODA extended through NGO channels was small by international standards. According to a document issued by MOFA's Economic Co-operation Bureau in April 2002, only 0.51 per cent of Japan's ODA budget was channelled into NGOs, which was small compared to most other Western countries; for instance, in 1997, the share was 37 per cent for the United States, 16 per cent for Germany and nine per cent for the United Kingdom.[74] For Japan, the share was not only minuscule but also diminishing; in 1993, for instance, when 1.2 per cent of total ODA funding to NGOs had been disbursed, the share was two and a half times larger than the figure for 2002.[75] As little as five per cent of the total income of Japanese NGOs was provided by contract funds from the Japanese government and UN agencies.[76]

Given the meagre resources allocated to NGOs by the Japanese government, there was not much NGO activity that could be reported by

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[73] *Landmine Monitor Report 2004.*

[74] Kawai and Takagi, 'Japan's Official Development Assistance', p. 12.

[75] Kuroda, 'Japan-based non-governmental organizations in pursuit of human security', p. 235.

[76] JANIC, NGO-DATA, http://www.janic.org/en/data.html (downloaded 11 August 2003).

MOFA after Obuchi made human security a priority. At least as reported in the issues of the *Diplomatic Bluebook* until 2002, concrete measures taken by the Japanese government to prop up human security activities involving NGOs were modest. In the issue for 2001 of the *Diplomatic Bluebook*, for instance, it is reported:

At the G8 Kyushu–Okinawa Summit, Japan positioned the issue of infectious diseases control as a central issue and announced the Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative (IDI) as its forthcoming international contribution with a target of allocating a total of US$3 billion over the next five years. These efforts by Japan in combating infectious disease led to a trend toward strengthening global-level efforts that resulted in the convention of the UN General Assembly Special Session on AIDS. Japan sent a large delegation to the session, headed by former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori who chaired the Kyushu–Okinawa Summit, and comprising eminent Japanese figures and representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Japanese delegation participated actively in the discussion. In his speech Head of Delegation Mori delineated [*setsumei*] Japan's performance in combating infectious diseases based on the pillar of the Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative. He announced that Japan would donate a substantial sum [*sōtō-gaku*] to the new global fund, in addition he expressed Japan's determination to continue to play a leading role [*shūdōteki na yakuwari*] in this area.[77]

As the quote makes clear, Japanese NGOs taking part in these activities were hardly mentioned in the speech given by the leader of the delegation on this occasion, Mori Yoshirō, who seems to have made placing himself in the limelight his first priority. He probably saw it as an example of the 'strong leadership' that he found essential for politicians to demonstrate in troubled times, and which he had eloquently expressed as prime minister. Shoving NGOs into the background in the way he did could but confirm in the eyes of NGOs that they were seen as subcontractors by the Japanese government. This stance is not unusual among conservative politicians, bureaucrats and big business leaders who tend to see private nonprofit participants as playing, at best, a role complementary to the government.[78]

Mori's stance is perhaps not surprising. He followed in the footsteps of his predecessor Obuchi Keizō, who saw NGOs as tools for the trade, as

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[77] MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 45 (2002), p. 82.
[78] Yasuo Takao, 'Transnational Coalitions in Northeast Asia: Search for a New Pathway of Japanese Local Government', *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies* 2 (2003), p. 86.

illustrated by his speech at the JIIA conference in December 1999, when he spoke of his intention to work through international organizations and NGOs. To make it clear in this way that the prime minister saw NGOs as an instrument for governmental policies and not as partners on an equal footing did not augur well for collaboration between the government and NGOs. Fairly blunt statements of this kind made NGOs aware that the government's economic support might be a nice idea but was used by the government in order to take advantage of them.[79] To agree on collaboration on these terms was seen by these organizations as 'tantamount to submitting to government authority and to their own spiritual downfall', as noted by Iokibe Makoto.[80]

Even more annoying for NGOs must have been when Obuchi referred to NGOs as anti-governmental organizations, during a roundtable discussion with Jody Williams, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for her work in organizing the anti-landmine campaign.[81] The establishment of the Japan Platform did not do much to change this NGO image. According to JANIC, the government did not listen to NGOs, despite many official statements expressing a willingness to collaborate with them. MOFA is sectionalized and the Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division which NGOs have to work with – they cannot approach other divisions – is small, and its voice does not carry much weight in policymaking. Neither can the Division make decisions, which is entrusted to the Economic Co-operation Bureau.[82] This confirms the observation made by two analysts who have noted that in spite of what Obuchi would like to think, Japanese government officials have 'not embraced fully a role for non-governmental organizations in its pursuit of a human security agenda.'[83] They describe how MOFA 'makes all the right noises about partnership' but is not in reality interested in seeing its control over ODA relaxed.[84] To give NGOs an increased role was contrary to the running of foreign policy that MOFA bureaucrats preferred.

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[79] Miyashita Megumi, interview, 6 November 2006.

[80] Iokibe Makoto, 'Japan's Civil Society: A Historical Overview', in Yamamoto, ed., *Deciding the Public Good*, p. 94.

[81] 'Nagano hatsu jirai naki chūkyū e' [From Nagano: Towards an earth without landmines], *Asahi shimbun*, 7 February 1998.

[82] Miyashita Megumi, interview, 6 November 2006.

[83] Gilson and Purvis, 'Japan's pursuit of human security', p. 205.

[84] Ibid., pp. 203f.

Disagreements hovering beneath the surface involving bureaucrats and NGO representatives have come into broad daylight. A well-known incident was when MOFA wanted representatives of two NGOs, the Japan Platform and Peace Winds Japan, barred from participating in 'The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan' organized by the Japanese government on 21–22 January 2002. According to press reports, these NGOs had expressed their distrust of the government and its bureaucrats, which was an opinion that was offensive to the LDP bigwig Suzuki Muneo.[85] Based on what was later revealed as Suzuki's S.O.P., he believed he had the right to throw out the NGO representatives and, what more, his 'right' to do so was accepted by MOFA. The turbulence caused by Suzuki's intervention reinforced scepticism felt by many NGOs towards involving themselves in government-sponsored programmes. This scepticism was reciprocated by MOFA bureaucrats. Scepticism towards NGOs was not confined to MOFA bureaucrats. When one of the NGO representatives, whose attendance at the international conference on Afghanistan had angered Suzuki, later appeared in a Diet committee, he was attacked by politicians who queried why NGOs thought they were entitled to tax money for their activities.[86]

A behind-the-scenes move by Takemi Keizō might be seen to counterbalance the disinterest of MOFA bureaucrats regarding Obuchi's idea of giving a boost to government-NGO collaboration.[87] As noted above, the Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Projects was renamed as Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security Projects and its budget was increased by 50 per cent in the government's budget for 2003. The background has been revealed by Takemi. When the Commission on Human Security was established, Takemi and President Yamamoto Tadashi of the

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[85] Japan Platform, *Annual Report 2001*, http://www.japanplatform.org/report/2001/0101.html; Keiji Hirano, 'Tokyo Aid Confab Should Have Been More Transparent', *Kyodo News*, 22 January 2001, http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/access/2002/0122tokyo.htm; Suvendrini Kakuchi, 'Aid Scandal Could Give NGOs More Clout', *Asia Times Online*, 7 March 2002, http://www.atimes.com/japan-econ/DC07Dh02.html (downloaded 28 December 2005).

[86] Marie Söderberg, 'The Japanese Citizens Increasing Participation in "Civil Society": Implications for Foreign Aid', *EIJS Working Paper* 159 (October 2002), p. 8.

[87] Takemi's criticism of ministerial decision-making and bureaucracy linked to ODA is well-known. See Fukushima, 'Human Security: Comparing Japanese and Canadian Governmental Thinking and Practice', p. 24.

Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) 'began talking about how, since the Trust Fund for Human Security was strictly a multilateral framework administered through the United Nations, we should create a separate mechanism through which Japan could implement policies based on the concept of human security. At the time, the Japanese grant assistance tool, targeting communities that were closest to this way of thinking, was Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Projects. The government changed the name of this programme to Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects, reconfigured its concept, and expanded its revenue base of about ¥3 billion to ¥15 billion in one go.'[88] By this measure, Takemi and Yamamoto saw to it that the Japanese government could continue its policy of collaborating with NGOs as well as bilaterally with recipient countries parallel with supporting multilateral efforts, without having to abandon its influence over the allocation of funds.

Incidents, like the one at the Afghanistan conference, may explain why Kawaguchi Yoriko proceeded cautiously, when she took over as foreign minister after Tanaka Makiko, who was sacked by Prime Minister Koizumi after the incident at the Afghanistan conference. As newly appointed foreign minister, the former top bureaucrat seems to have nurtured the scepticism of NGOs, said to be ingrained in foreign ministry bureaucrats of the standard mould. In a speech in March 2002 at the Japan National Press Club shortly after she had been appointed foreign minister, she spoke of her wish to visit Africa to 'engage in a frank exchange of opinions not only with government officials from each country, but also with Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) and NGO representatives who are working in the field in Africa'.[89] To refer to 'frank' [*sotchoku na*] exchange of opinions with NGOs was a clear indication of a distance between her and the rest of the party that seemed to hold the traditional scepticism harboured by MOFA officials towards NGOs.

Kawaguchi's scepticism did not bode well for collaboration between the government and NGOs. When the Commission on Human Security met in Tokyo in February 2003 to finalize work on its final report, she declared that Japan's aim was to utilize grant assistance for grassroots

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[88] Comment by Takemi Keizō at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 7.

[89] MOFA, 'Nihon kisha kurabu ni okeru Kawaguchi gaimudaijin seisaku enzetsu', 18 March 2002.

projects and the TFHS to implement its human security policies, and that MOFA was going to strengthen its activities.[90] She did not bring up Japanese NGOs in her address. Leaving them out was a clear indication that they were not at the forefront of MOFA's forthcoming activities. Was it the 'arch bureaucrat' of the standard mould harbouring ill feelings towards NGOs in action? Maybe, maybe not. But the difference from the days of Obuchi and Takemi was huge.

Concluding Remarks

Obuchi's human security vision was imbued with a willingness to collaborate but not much came out of his vision as far as NGOs were concerned. While Japanese NGOs were engaged in implementing policies for human security, the scale of their activities was small, with few officials and limited budgets, and governmental funding of their activities was miniscule. Of course, the prime minister, the state secretary for foreign affairs and other high-ranking officials spoke up for human security but despite the fact that the basic tenets of policies for human security were in line with ideas that form the basis of Japan's foreign policy and ODA policy, the start was slow and prozelytization cumbersome, since the ideas were new and did not always fit the thinking of the MOFA bureaucrats. One reason for the setback for Obuchi's ambition to nurture collaboration in the domestic context seems to be that collaborative efforts ran counter to the interests of MOFA bureaucrats, who were used to running the show and accustomed to being responsible for foreign policy formulation and implementation. Despite the good will demonstrated by Obuchi, Mori and other high-ranking officials, popular participation in the formulation and implementation of policies for human security did not take off.

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[90] Kawaguchi gaimudaijin aisatsu, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō shimpojiumu: Kokusai shakai ga samazama na kyōi ni chokumen suru jidai ni okeru sono yakuwari', 25 February 2003.

ACTING ON BEHALF OF JAPAN: THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY

After Prime Minister Obuchi placed human security on Japan's political agenda and took charge of promoting the new security idea, it was soon presented by government officials as a key perspective of Japan's foreign policy. On the international stage, the drive for human security had generated a variety of responses, some of them enthusiastic, some sceptical or even hostile. The situation was similar in Japan, where human security saw adherents and advocates as well as faultfinders and outright enemies. A remedy for overcoming resistance to the idea of human security was collaboration. In his speeches dealing with human security, Obuchi stressed the necessity of international collaboration. This was in accordance with Japan's clearly stated foreign policy doctrine. To speak up for collaboration with like-minded countries has been one of its key elements since the early 1960s. When Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato became the first leading foreign policy-maker to embrace this idea, like-minded countries were those that were members of 'the free bloc'.[1] Later, like-mindedness recognised different partners but the basic idea that some countries count for more continued to be valid.[2]

An innovation in the Japanese foreign policy context was presented by Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō in his speech at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000, when he launched the idea of an international

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[1] Ikeda Hayato, policy speech in the Diet, 10 August 1962, in Naikaku seido hyakunenshi hensan iinkai, ed., *Rekidai naikaku sōridaijin enzetsushū*, p. 663.
[2] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, p. 171.

commission on human security. Mori's proposal was a practical step towards refining and firmly establishing the new security idea.[3] The plan for the commission materialized when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan met the former UNHCR Ogata Sadako in Tokyo on 24 January 2001. In their meeting, Annan expressed his support for the establishment of the Commission on Human Security (CHS) and said that he expected it to contribute to global efforts to further human security. Annan and Ogata agreed that the CHS was to be formally launched at an inaugural meeting in New York in the first half of 2001. According to Annan, the issues to be addressed by the CHS were closely related to the main concerns of the United Nations, and he promised the close cooperation of the world organization. In its subsequent information to the press, MOFA claimed that Obuchi's and Mori's promotion of human security was broadly supported by Asia–Pacific, African, Latin American, European and North American countries.[4]

The commission was to be an independent body with the unusual feature – at least for Japanese diplomacy – of having two chairs.[5] The choice of Amartya Sen as chair of the new commission showed that the Japanese government meant business and was intent on making it high-powered and influential. Sen was a winner of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, generally called the Nobel Prize for Economics. Sen had given a voice to the world's poor, and embodied the idea that societies must pay attention to social goals, always inclining towards their most vulnerable citizens.[6] The Asian economic crisis made governments pay more attention to social expenditures in

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[3] MOFA, 'Statement by H.E. Mr. Yoshiro Mori, Prime Minister of Japan at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations', 7 September 2000.

[4] MOFA, 'Press Release: Plan for Establishment of the Commission on Human Security', 24 January 2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0101.html (downloaded 25 February 2002).

[5] The arrangement with two chairpersons had been used by earlier international commissions such as the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (1983–88): chairs Sadruddin Aga Khan and Hassan bin Talal; and the Commission on Global Governance (1992–95): chairs Ingvar Carlsson and Sridath Ramphal. Ogata Sadako was a member of both commissions.

[6] Jeffrey Sachs, 'Amartya Sen Wins the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics', www.hup.harvard.edu/journalists/sen_nobel.html (downloaded 29 July 2003).

order to avoid risking further and future instability.[7] With the Japanese focus on the importance of the social safety net as an element of human security, Sen was an ideal choice as chair of the CHS.

But so was the second chair. It was no surprise when Ogata Sadako was picked as co-chair of the CHS. She was the most respected international official that Japan could muster and the most famous Japanese woman of her era in the eyes of many Japanese. She was so distinguished that she is almost the only Japanese of the post-war era mentioned by the leading scholar on East Asian thought Wm. Theodore de Bary in his treatise on 'Asian ideals of leadership'; a choice made by him in recognition of Ogata's 'brilliant individual performance in the U.N.'.[8] In fact, as was later testified by Takemi Keizō: 'When the commission was set up, there was debate in MOFA and elsewhere in the government as to who would be best suited to link it with actual policies. There was universal agreement that Sadako Ogata was the only person who could do this.'[9] So important was her role that, when Yamamoto Tadashi was sent to her but failed to make her accept the job, Prime Minister Mori himself intervened and persuaded her.[10]

Ogata's credentials were impeccable. She had earned respect through hard work as an international official serving in the United Nations, but her story was also one of family traditions and good fortune.[11] She was born into the ruling elite of Japan, into a family that had long been involved in the government of Japan: her great-grandfather Inukai Tsuyoshi was prime minister in the 1930s, her grandfather Yoshizawa Kenkichi a foreign minister, her father Nakamura Toyokazu a diplomat, and her uncle Iguchi Sadao Ambassador to the United States.[12] Her family back-

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[7] Amitav Acharya, 'The Nexus Between Human Security and Traditional Security in Asia', in *Proceedings. International Conference on Human Security in East Asia, 16–17 June 2003, Seoul, Republic of Korea*, p. 84.

[8] Wm. Theodore de Bary, *Nobility and Continuity: Asian Ideals of Leadership and the Common Good* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 201.

[9] Comment by Takemi Keizō at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 6.

[10] Iokibe Makoto, interview, 18 November 2006.

[11] 'Jottings: Ogata Sadako', *The East* 37:5 (January–February 2002), p. 4.

[12] Kuroda Tatsuhiko, *Ogata Sadako to iu ikikata* [Life of Ogata Sadako] (Tokyo: Besutoserāzu, 2002), p. 16.

Table 4   Members of the CHS

Co-Chairs

Mrs Sadako Ogata	Former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Prof. Amartya Sen	Master, Trinity College, Cambridge University

Commissioners (alphabetical order)

Prof. Bronisław Geremek	President of the European Law Committee of Polish Sejm
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi	Under-Secretary-General for Special Assignments in support of the Secretary-General's Preventive and Peace-Making Efforts
Dr Lincoln C. Chen	Executive Vice President for Strategy, The Rockefeller Foundation
Dr Frene Frenny Noshir Ginwala	Speaker of the National Assembly, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa
Ms Sonia Picado S.	Chair of the Board of Directors of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights
Dr Surin Pitsuwan	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand
Dr Donna E. Shalala	Former Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States
Mr Peter Sutherland	Chairman and Managing Director, Goldman Sachs International
Prof. Albert Tevoedjre	Former Deputy Director General of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and Former Minister of Planning in Benin
Mr Carl Tham	Secretary-General, Olof Palme International Center, former Minister of Higher Education and Research

Source: MOFA, 'Members of the Commission on Human Security as of April 19, 2001', http: www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/commission/member.html (downloaded 28 February 2006).

ground was one factor to her, as a woman, having made a distinguished career; but another crucial factor was her father's encouragement for her to study abroad, which was unusual for a Japanese woman in her youth. In 1976, she was appointed minister of the Japanese mission to the United Nations, later becoming extraordinary envoy. Between 1982 and 1985, she was minister in Japan's representation to the UN Commission on Human Rights, in 1990 became the Independent Expert of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar and in 1991 was appointed UNHCR, serving altogether three terms.[13] She was the eighth commissioner, the first woman, the first Japanese and the first academic. It was a difficult post to which she brought a patient, hard-working and devoted spirit. Ogata's work at UNHCR earned her respect, not least among the Japanese public and government circles. Appointing Ogata as co-chair of the new commission would ensure that the result of the its work would be palatable to the Japanese government.

The list of commissioners was announced on 19 April 2001 (Table 4). The choice justified the claim made by MOFA that the commissioners had an international reputation, and Japanese officials liked to label them, if not 'world leaders', at least 'world opinion leaders'.[14]

Tasks

The CHS was entrusted with the task of developing the human security concept and presenting proposals for action to be taken by the international community. When the Mori government came up with the idea to establish the commission, its intention resembled Obuchi's when he presented the idea of a trust fund for human security, in that the geographical scope was limited to Asia. But in the case of the TFHS, once its work began, its scope was not limited in this way. The prospective chair, Ogata Sadako, was reluctant to take on the job. She thought that the proposed focus of its work, public health, was outside her field of expertise: 'Of course disease, poverty, and unemployment are among the threats to

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[13] 'Ogata Sadako' [Ogata Sadako], in Kyōto sangyō daigaku, ed., *Gendai jinmei jiten* [Modern Who's Who?] (1999), http://www.kyoto-su.ac.jp/information/famous/ogatas.html (downloaded 1 June 2003); 'Jottings: Ogata Sadako'.

[14] See, e.g., Takemi, 'A New Direction for Japan's Aid Program', p. 24

human security, but I had long been concerned with the plight of the ordinary people who were the casualties of conflict. So I made it clear that I was willing to be involved if the commission were expanded to include such issues.'[15] Her idea was accepted and when the establishment of the CHS was announced, its work was specified as, first, to promote public understanding, engagement and support of human security; secondly, to develop the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation; and thirdly, to propose a concrete action programme to address critical and pervasive threats to human security. The work was to be action-oriented and to reach practical results, to direct research and outreach activities, and disseminate the results of its work.

In a presentation booklet issued by MOFA, the official Japanese view was that the CHS was 'mandated to develop the concept of human security and make recommendations that will serve as guidelines for concrete action to be taken by the international community.'[16] There was some vacillation on the part of the ministry, however. In the 2002 edition of the *Diplomatic Bluebook*, the goals of the CHS are defined somewhat more modestly, amounting to deepening the thinking on human security as well as presenting proposals for practical actions to be taken by the international community.[17] The latter more modest aspiration is reflected in the final report of the CHS in which the aims are said to have included 'developing the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation' and 'proposing a concrete programme of action to address critical and pervasive threats to human security.'[18]

Organization and Activities

Ogata's organizational affiliation as former UNHCR turned out to be a blessing. The office of the UNHCR agreed to function as the institutional base of the CHS, maintain its secretariat and provide day-to-day adminis-

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[15] Comment by Ogata Sadako at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 8.
[16] MOFA, 'The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the "Human-centered" 21st Century' (November 2003), p. 5.
[17] MOFA, *Gaikō seishi* 45 (2002), p. 86.
[18] Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, p. 153.

trative support. The number of staff was small. Apart from the executive director, François Fouinat, who had worked for Ogata as the director of UNHCR's Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, the staff included two programme directors, a research writer responsible for the final report, an associate editor, an administrative assistant and a liaison official dispatched from MOFA. The secretariat of the CHS collaborated closely with the Human Development Report Office of the United Nations in the formulation of its final report. Another organization supporting the CHS was the Rockefeller Foundation whose Executive Vice-President Lincoln Chen was a member of the CHS.

The CHS followed in the footstep of the Commission on Global Governance, which Ogata had been a member of, by establishing two offices. In the press release after Annan's meeting with Ogata in January 2001, it was clearly stated that the office in Tokyo was going to function as the central secretariat.[19] This revealed the close connection with the Japanese government. The close link was further underlined by the fact that a liaison officer, the MOFA official Tase Kazuo, was stationed at the New York office. He had been assistant director of MOFA's Second Africa Division, Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau,[20] and his appointment indicated that the ministry reckoned that Africa was going to be a central concern of the CHS. This was not unexpected given Prime Minister Mori's declared personal interest in Africa. The close links between MOFA and the CHS were also demonstrated by the budget which Japan provided.[21]

The first meeting of the CHS took place in New York on 8–10 June 2001. In a message to the meeting, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his support and said that he considered the establishment of the CHS 'an important complement to the existing Trust Fund for Human Security established at the UN by the Government of Japan.' But Annan's support was somewhat scaled down compared to the statement he made in January in Tokyo. No longer was he making any commitment on the part

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[19] MOFA, 'Press Release: Plan for Establishment of the Commission on Human Security'.
[20] See 'Asia–Africa Forum III Participants, TICAD, 13 July 2000', http://www.undp.org/ticad/AAF/aafpart.htm (downloaded 30 July 2003).
[21] UNHCR, 'Global Appeal (Addendum) 2002', http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/fdrs/ga2002/ga2002toc.htm (downloaded 29 July 2003).

of the world organization but only giving assurances that 'the UN has a deep and direct interest in your work and…will closely follow it.'[22]

The CHS held four more meetings: in Tokyo (December 2001), Stockholm (June 2002), Bangkok (December 2002) and Tokyo (February 2003). It engaged in outreach activities with the aim of listening to people in dire straits. With its object of promoting work for the establishment of human security as a key undertaking of the international community, conference diplomacy was important. Seminars and conferences were organized to scrutinize the human security situation and explore theoretical questions posed by the human security concept. Meetings and conferences were arranged in developing countries, apart from two taking place at Harvard University (Table 5).

Table 5   Outreach Meetings Organized by the CHS

Workshop on Measurement of Human Security, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, 30 November 2001
Workshop on Relationship Between Human Rights and Human Security, San José, Costa Rica, 1 December 2001
Workshop on Education, Equity and Security, Kolkata, India, 2–4 January 2002
Workshop on Human Security, Human Rights, and Human Development, Harvard Kennedy School, 6 February 2002
Workshop on Rethinking Peace, Coexistence and Human Security in the Great Lakes Region, Kigali, Rwanda, 16–19 April 2002
Roundtable on Transition in Central Asia and Human Security, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, 22–24 April 2002
Symposium on Economic Insecurity in Africa, Cotonou, Benin, 24–25 May 2002
Public hearing at the Global Civic Society Forum, Johannesburg, 27 August 2002
Meeting on African Civil Society, Pretoria, 15–16 October 2002

Source: Commission on Human Security, homepage, http: www.humansecurity-chs.org (downloaded 10 June 2003); Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People* (New York: United Nations, 2003), p. 145.

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[22] Message from the UN Secretary-General, Mr. K. Annan, to the first meeting of the Commission on Human Security, Greentree Estate, 8–10 June 2001, http:// www. humansecurity-chs.org/activities/meetings/first/annan.html (downloaded 1 August 2003).

Two programmes were conducted by the CHS, one on development and one on conflict. These programs reflected the approach of the UNDP in its 1994 report and Secretary-General Annan's call at the Millennium Summit for the pursuit of the twin goals of freedom from want and freedom from fear. From the start the CHS wanted to use the Internet to disseminate information. The electronic Bulletin Board System offered an opportunity for interactive discussion and for organizing a public forum.

In August 2002, the avid reader of the homepage of the CHS learned: 'Why human security now? How will human security affect conventional ideas such as state security and human rights? What is human security in conflict situations? What can human security do in development context? Let's join the latest and most advanced international discussions here!'[23] The CHS posted a message to this effect on its homepage at the beginning of its work: 'Since human security is a comprehensive idea covering [a] wide range of issues from conflict, and development to financial crisis and social safety net, Internet links concerning human security will also encompass diverse areas. The secretariat endeavours to expand this link day by day, and it would be appreciated if you could suggest useful sites for us.'[24] No great success for this attempt at exchanging ideas with the general public was discernible, however, since few visitors seem to have participated in the ongoing discussion.

Apart from seminars and conferences, the CHS issued a steady stream of statements, articles and editorials. Not all of the commissioners were involved in the work to inform and influence public opinion, despite the commissioners having been appointed because of their credentials as 'world opinion leaders'. From the presentation of activities found on its homepage, Ogata, Sen, Ginwala, Sutherland and Chen were reported to be active among the commissioners, with Ogata responsible for the bulk of activities.[25]

There was an intimate link between the CHS and MOFA that was evident in presentations made by Japanese governmental agencies in which activities of the CHS and the ministry were not separated. The

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[23] Commission on Human Security, 'On the web' (updated 23 August 2002), http://www.humansecurity-chs.org (accessed 2 October 2002).
[24] Commission on Human Security, homepage, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org (accessed 10 June 2003).
[25] Ibid.

'Chronology of Activities related to Human Security by the Japanese Government' on the homepage of MOFA did not cover only activities by the ministry but also the activities of the CHS and the TFHS.[26] In one presentation the ministry wrote that the TFHS 'has organised international symposia on human security to promote public understanding and awareness of this issue. In December 2001, MOFA organised an international symposium in Tokyo on the theme "Human Security and Terrorism" with the participation of members of the Commission and experts from both Japan and overseas.'[27] The symposium took place the day before the meeting of the CHS, and activities presented on its homepage were indistinguishable from activities organized by MOFA.

Final Report

The key activity of the CHS was to develop the concept of human security as an operational tool and to propose an action programme. The Commission wound up the work in its final report, *Human Security Now,* during the final meeting in Tokyo on 23–25 February 2003. The report was handed over to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 1 May 2003. At first, it was published in English and Japanese, and an outline was made available in French and Spanish.[28] Thus, the gist of the report was not made available in two of the languages used at the UN, namely Chinese and Russian. This could be taken as an indication of where the CHS reckoned interest in its report might lie. Later, the report was also published in Spanish, French and Russian. Interestingly, the Russian edition was published by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[29]

The report was an ambitious attempt to describe and analyze human security and indicate the direction of future work. A striking feature is that

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[26] MOFA, 'Chronology of activities related to Human Security by the Japanese Government', http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/chronology.html (downloaded 7 October 2005).

[27] MOFA, 'The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the "Human-centered" 21st Century' (November 2003), p. 7.

[28] Commission on Human Security, 'Final Report of the Commission on Human Security', http://www.humansecurity-chs.org (downloaded 4 November 2005).

[29] Commission on Human Security, homepage, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org (accessed 22 February 2007).

the authors of the report did not make any attempt to eliminate the vagueness characterizing the discourse on human security. The authors emerge as worthy guardians of the legacy of the UNDP report of 1994 that had been written by authors keen on keeping human security all-encompassing and comprehensive in order to further collaboration. At the beginning of its report, the CHS stresses that 'any concept of human security must be dynamic', because '[w]hat people consider to be "vital" – what they consider to be "of the essence of life" and "crucially important" – varies across individuals and societies.'[30]

Human security as described in the report encompasses several kinds of freedom – 'freedom from want and freedom from fear, as well as freedom to take action on one's own behalf', and the report underlines that the topics selected are 'suggestive rather than exhaustive'.[31] To quote the delineation that CHS makes, human security is 'to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.'[32] The report further emphasizes that human security reinforces human dignity and aims 'at developing the capabilities of individuals and communities' to act for themselves.[33] In this way, the report adds empowerment to the protection aspect, stressing the abilities of individuals to protect themselves from threats and conflicts and to respond to problems. In the report, human security takes into account a bewildering array of aspects like the equity principle, reproductive health, gender equity, the rights approach, civil society participation, sustainable development, poverty eradication, foreign direct investment, education and health for all, private sector partnership, good governance, empowerment and HIV-AIDS prevention, plus the Millennium goals. Yet, this was not good enough reckoned the CHS and pointed out that the targets of human

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[30] Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, p. 4.
[31] Ibid., pp 10, 12.
[32] Ibid., p. 4.
[33] Ibid., p. 9.

security 'must go well beyond the Millennium Development Goals to respond to the full range of critical and pervasive threats'.[34]

The reason for vagueness was given by a member of the CHS: 'Although the Commission developed a definition, it refrained from preparing a list of issues that comprise human security, arguing that it was important to keep the concept dynamic, and to have the flexibility to adapt the framework to the needs of different societies.'[35] Ogata Sadako concurred when she presented the CHS report to a meeting of the Human Security Network: 'The concept of security means different things to different people', she said. 'In fact, there is no broad consensus on the meaning of security.'[36] With such an approach, it is easy to agree with the report authors: 'Whereas state security is focused, human security is broad.'[37]

Vagueness also characterized the view of humanitarian intervention found in the report, which did not take a clear stand concerning humanitarian intervention, the bone of contention that key Japanese decision-makers indicated was the obstacle to Japanese–Canadian collaboration on human security. On the one hand, the report talked about 'linking the political, military and humanitarian dimension of protecting people in conflict', which seemed to imply that humanitarian intervention in form of military actions was acceptable. On the other, the view that humanitarian intervention might be nothing but a mask for the use of force is also found in the report, which questions the legitimacy of such actions.[38]

Finalizing the Work of the CHS

On the occasion of the meeting of the CHS in Tokyo on 23–25 February 2003, its report was finalized and the results were presented to Prime Minister Koizumi.[39] Two months after the report had been presented to

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[34] Ibid., p. 131.

[35] Frere Ginwala quoted in 'Report on the International Consultation and Workshop on Regional Dynamics of Human Security, held at The Wits Club, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 & 27 MBay 2005', http://ochaonline.un.org/GetBin.asp?DocID=3614 (downloaded 25 July 2006).

[36] Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, p. 142.

[37] Ibid., p. 6.

[38] Ibid., pp. 33, 27.

[39] MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 47 (2004), p. 188.

Prime Minister Koizumi, Ogata and Sen met Secretary-General Kofi Annan and handed over the report.[40] Even if Ogata had ample reasons to keep Koizumi well informed, since he represented the country that in every sense of the word was behind the CHS, not to present the findings to the United Nations first might be seen as a fairly blunt reminder that the UN was playing second fiddle, as far as Ogata was concerned. It must be seen as a blunder if there was a need and necessity of international collaboration, the idea that had been a lodestar to Obuchi. This lack of diplomatic finesse revealed that the basis of Japan's talk of the UN playing a central role in the pursuit of human security was quite flawed. Japan was unlucky in that Ogata's lack of diplomatic *Fingerspitzengefühl* was reciprocated – the United Nations did not endorse the report.[41]

Maybe the lack of courtesy towards the United Nations demonstrated by Ogata was behind the reception, brief to the point of rudeness, that the report received from the chair of the Human Security Network, when Ogata presented the report to the Network a week after the report had been handed over to Kofi Annan. In his summary of this meeting, the chair of the Network reported: '*The Network* noted with interest the report by the Human Security CHS entitled "Human Security Now", presented by Ms Sadako Ogata in her capacity as Co-Chair of the Commission at the public opening session of the Meeting.'[42] The perfunctory treatment confirmed the impression created on the occasion when the report was presented to Secretary-General Annan. The presentation of what was intended to be a landmark report continuing the path-breaking reports of the Brandt, Palme, Brundtland and Global Governance commissions did not create much fanfare or generate much reporting.[43]

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[40] Ogata and Sen presented the report to UN Secretary-General Annan on 1 May 2003.

[41] Minami, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō to Nihon gaikō', p. 51.

[42] Human Security Network, 'Chair's summary: Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Graz, 8–10 May 2003', http://www.humansecurity network.org/docs/10may2003-e.php (downloaded 25 September 2005).

[43] The CHS was a bit unlucky, however. David Bosold and Sascha Werthes have pointed out that the report was 'marginalized by the ongoing war on terror and the unwillingness of key international actors to work through multilateral processes within international organizations.' See David Bosold and Sacha Werthes, 'Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese Experiences', *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft/International Politics and Society* 2005:1, p. 97.

The CHS was disbanded on 31 May 2003 but the commissioners decided that the results of the work of the CHS should continue to be disseminated.[44] This was done by establishing the Advisory Board on Human Security, which was given the task of carrying on the recommendations of the CHS. A follow-up was seen in September 2004 when the Human Security Unit (HSU) was established in the United Nations Secretariat at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The overall objective of the HSU was to place human security in the mainstream of UN activities.[45]

The Japanese Government and the CHS

On 19 December 2002 CHS Co-Chair Ogata Sadako met Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko in Tokyo, and argued that the Japanese government should be active in promoting human security. Responding to this attempt at lobbying, Kawaguchi was evasive and merely said that the Japanese government hoped to take positive action.[46] In her policy speech in the Diet on 31 January 2003, Kawaguchi refrained from making any statement that would indicate that human security was part of Japanese foreign policy but reiterated what she had told Ogata, namely that the Japanese government would take positive action. She was more forthcoming when she addressed the CHS at its fifth meeting in Tokyo in February 2003. On this occasion, she made a point of being personally involved: 'Since last year, I have stressed in newspapers, magazines and other media that human security should be an important field [*jūten bun'ya*] of Japan's foreign policy, first and foremost ODA.' She also made a commitment on behalf of the Japanese government and declared that 'after receiving this report, the Japanese government intends to develop measures to further promote Japan's human security foreign policy [*ningen no anzen hoshō gaikō*]. We will do so at different fora, such as the

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[44] Commission on Human Security, homepage, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org (accessed 10 June 2003).
[45] Ibid. (accessed 14 August 2006).
[46] 'Ogata calls for Japan's efforts to promote human security', *Japan Policy & Politics*, 23 December 2002.

United Nations and other multilateral fora, and advance it in bilateral relations with other countries as well.'[47]

As seen here, Kawaguchi's backing of human security was strong, and she even claimed that Japan pursued a 'human security foreign policy'. She touched upon the two-tiered strategy that the Japanese government was using in its pursuit of human security. On the one hand, ODA was mobilized as aid was an effective instrument for promoting human security, and, on the other, the Japanese government planned to support international organizations and engage in bilateral cooperation with individual countries. In this respect, it had come full circle, reconfirming what Prime Minister Obuchi said in his Hanoi speech. Kawaguchi did not take NGOs into account, nor did she indicate that individuals had a responsibility to act. This was a clear indication that, in practice, the interest in promoting human security by mobilizing actors outside the government had been devalued in the domestic context compared to the Obuchi and Mori governments.

To what extent Kawaguchi's assurances would be followed up by action remained to be seen. The financial situation of the Japanese government was so precarious that a debate raged over whether ODA should be cut or not. It may have been her awareness of this debate which coloured Ogata's comments when the work of the CHS neared its close. In an *Asahi shimbun* interview shortly before the final meeting of the CHS in February 2003, Ogata was asked if she thought the report soon to be issued would serve as a guideline for Japan and the international community, and she answered: 'If so, Japan must do something. After all, it was Japan that created the Commission and has backed it. […] It is up to Japan to promote this idea. I am hoping that perhaps Japan is finally onto something that will put it at the vanguard of the international community.'[48]

Ogata was not only a leading representative of Japan's foreign policy elite but also belonged to the upper echelon of Japanese society. Her answer reflected the dream that has plagued and haunted Japan's political leadership ever since the early Meiji period – Japan as *ittōkoku*, 'a first-

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[47] Kawaguchi gaimudaijin aisatsu, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō shimpojiumu: Kokusai shakai ga samazama na kyōi ni chokumen suru jidai ni okeru sono yakuwari', 25 February 2003.
[48] 'Ogata Sadakosan ni kiku: "Kokka" koe anzen hoshō e' [Interview of Mrs Sadako Ogata: Towards security beyond 'the state'], *Asahi shimbun*, 20 February 2003.

class country'. The disappointment sensed in her statement can also be a reflection of the fact that the report that she was about to present was 'suggestive rather than comprehensive', serving as 'a catalyst for further thinking and practical applications.'[49] The CHS had 'had to restrain its exercise for reasons of time and expertise', she said later but hoped 'that the thrust of our message will stimulate interest and gain support to be followed with further exploration.'[50]

In a comment included in her speech in the United Nations General Assembly in September 2003, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi stated clearly that 'Japan will continue to work for the realization of the recommendations made in the Report by the Commission on Human Security together with the United Nations, other countries and NGOs, through diplomatic measures, first and foremost ODA.'[51] Once again, it was ODA that was in the foreground when measures to be applied were specified; once again, Japan's UN centrism was at play, with the UN mentioned as partner in this endeavour before other countries and NGOs. But it might have been partly a matter of courtesy: after all, Kawaguchi's speech was delivered in the UN, the formal employer of the CHS.

With the presentation of the final report of the CHS, the end of the first stage of establishing human security on the international security agenda can be seen as having been reached, but the seasoned Ogata stressed in her response to a journalist that the work of the CHS was 'no more than a beginning'.[52] The groundwork was done; the rest was work that should commence. The hint of disappointment revealed by her answer to the journalist's question is an indication that she sensed that Japan might perhaps not live up to the leadership ambitions that she ascribed to Japan, and which had been an intrinsic element of Obuchi's and Mori's thinking.

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[49] Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels, 'Human Security: Protecting and Empowering People', *Global Governance* 9 (2003), p. 273.

[50] Sadako Ogata, 'Empowering People for Human Security', Payne Lecture, Stanford University, 28 May 2003, p. 8, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/newsand events/payne.html (downloaded 24 August 2005).

[51] MOFA, 'Statement By H.E. Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister For Foreign Affairs of Japan at the Fifty-Eighth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations', 23 September 2003, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/ fmv03 09/unstate.html (downloaded 31 October 2005)

[52] Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, p. iv.

Concluding Remarks

The CHS states in its report that '[w]hile many governments recognize the importance of human security, special mention must go to the Japanese.'[53] Nevertheless, if one scrutinizes the report, Japan or the Japanese government are hardly mentioned at all. When gratitude is expressed in the foreword of the report to 'the active engagement and commitment to human security of successive prime ministers of Japan: Keizo Obuchi, Yoshiro Mori and Junichiro Koizumi',[54] this verges on being platitudinous. Apart from the obvious mention that the CHS was created at the initiative of the Japanese government, received financial support from it, and held meetings in Tokyo, Japan figures more or less only when the TFHS and a grant for bilateral grants for human security purposes are mentioned as examples of resources targeted at human security.[55]

For the Japanese government, the establishment of the CHS had been a way to gain recognition for its efforts to promote human security and exert leadership on an issue that was high on the international political agenda. Given this ambition, the modest place given to Japanese efforts in the report must have been a disappointment to the Japanese government. But what could it do? There was no reason to give up altogether, however. In its official reaction to the report, MOFA kept a stiff upper lip and stated that 'Japan is striving to ensure that "human security" should be established as an idea that complements the conventional concept of security and that the efforts based on the final report of the Commission are put into practice.'[56]

The lack of distinction between activities of MOFA and of the CHS that can be discerned, helps explain why the impact of the CHS was not comparable to that of previous international commissions. It was symptomatic of Japanese boldness that the CHS reported to the Japanese prime minister two months before its report was handed over to its employer, the United Nations. Inadvertently, it testified to Japan's eagerness to play first fiddle on human security.

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[53] Ibid., p. 155.
[54] Ibid., p. v.
[55] Ibid., p. 142.
[56] MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2004,* p. 184.

HUMAN SECURITY AND JAPAN'S LEADERSHIP AMBITIONS

Leadership and Foreign Policy

On his first visit to Japan in May 1997, as newly elected secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan gave a luncheon speech and went far in his praise of the host country. Japan, he said, 'has long understood the centrality of development in building enduring peace and human security. In fact, it has been in the vanguard of such efforts. [...] I urge Japan to continue playing a leadership role in this area as the natural complement to its activities in humanitarian assistance and United Nations peace-keeping.'[1] With the humiliating setback for Japanese diplomacy during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and frustrated ambitions to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Annan's words must have been encouraging to his Japanese audience. Carefully crafted or not, the customary flattering from a polite guest or not, his encouragement of Japanese leadership on human security must have sounded like sweet music. At the same time, his praise was puzzling. The Japanese government had not committed itself or taken any particular initiative to further the cause of human security apart from Murayama's personal endorsement and Hashimoto's statement in its favour. It was not uncommon to come across assessments – both in journalism and scholarly

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[1] Kofi A. Annan, Speech at a luncheon hosted by the United Nations Association of Japan in Tokyo, 13 May 1997, *UN Press Release* SG/SM/6236, 13 May 1997, pp. 5f.

writing – that Japan had not assumed any leadership role at all in international affairs. But, then, what did 'leadership' actually mean?

There are a number of competing theoretical approaches to leadership. Starting from the observation that the categories used by researchers like Young, Underdal and Malnes are overlapping, Gupta and Grubb have created a typology of leadership based on a synthesis of their results. *Structural leadership* is defined as 'the exercise of power derived from political strength in the global order and the weight of an actor with respect to the problem at hand'; it is based on Underdal's 'coercive' mode of leadership, where power can be used in the international system to force others to adopt certain policies, which is similar to Malnes's use of what he designates 'sticks and carrots', in order to encapsulate how threats or incentives from powerful states can be used as tools of influence; *instrumental leadership* is 'the exercise of skill in negotiations and the closely related question of instrumental design of the regime to accommodate the needs of different parties'; it is based on a similar idea as represented by Malnes's concept of 'problem-solving', which refers to the skill of negotiators to look for openings in the negotiations and draw on common interests; and *directional leadership* which 'concerns strategies to alter the perception and direction of human development to accommodate the constraints of sustainability'; it is associated with setting good examples or showing the way on how to deal with an issue, when a state 'leads by example', where internal policies influence the perception of other states of what is practical and feasible.[2]

As will be clear from the exposition to follow, Japan has not excelled in structural or instrumental leadership but tried to accomplish directional leadership. Japan's political leaders were long known for avoiding expressing openly anything connected with leadership ambitions in international security affairs in the post-war period. It was not due to the lack of ambition. An idea that has plagued, even haunted, Japanese political leaders since the Meiji period is that Japan's rightful place was to be an international leader. In the midst of its economic successes the yearning for status and prestige grew but the war-induced psychological and mental scars of broad strata of the people and the pacifist constitution

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[2] Michael Grubb and Joyeeta Gupta, 'Leadership', in Joyeeta Gupta and Michael Grubb, eds, *Climate Change and European Leadership: A sustainable role for Europe* (Dordecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 18–23.

set strict limitations on assertiveness. Any quest for international leadership had to be exerted under the restrictions placed on the country by the security treaty with the United States. Japan's search for 'autonomy' or even leadership had to be balanced by compliance with US leadership.[3] Japanese ambitions to become an *ittōkoku* country clashed with its subordinate status vis-à-vis the United States, inherent in the security treaty framework. The Yoshida Doctrine taught that Japan should stay away from having ambitions in areas of high politics.

The legacy of the past, with its lingering memories of Japan's treatment of its neighbours before and during the Second World War, made the Japanese government cautious. At a conference in 1995, Takemi Keizō made a pertinent remark when he pointed out that the tenure as independent nation-states of numerous Asian nations was short, which made their political leaders object to outsiders' intervention in what they thought were the internal affairs of their own countries.[4] This stance of preaching independence and sovereignty was boosted by the tremendous economic successes of countries in Asia Pacific, but optimism was dashed by the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis.

The paradox is that Japan's new-found assertiveness which emerged in the 1990s began at the nadir of its post-war foreign policy, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which was a blow to Japan's foreign policy as practiced in the 1970s and 80s when its chequebook diplomacy brought triumphs. While the Japanese government practised chequebook diplomacy, once again in the belief that money talks – a belief that seemed increasingly validated during the 1980s – the sobering fact later emerged that money was not enough: 'Whatever opportunity the Japanese leadership might have had in the Persian Gulf case to seize the moment, to assert Japan's stated global interests in a fashion related to the situation – to demonstrate its heavy stake in Middle East stability and the depth of the commitment to the U.S. alliance – was lost at the outset', assessed Michael Blaker in an early analysis of the outcome of Japanese actions taken during the Persian

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[3] Yoshihide Soeya, 'Japan in Asia: Beyond the Balancing Act', in Hanns W. Maull, ed., *Bowing to the Winds of Change? New Aspects in Japanese Economic, Foreign and Security Policies*. Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik E.V., Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik 88 (October 1994), p. 52.
[4] Keizo Takemi, 'Japan's Perspective on Human and Security', in Tatsuro Matsumae and Lincoln C. Chen, eds, *Common Security in Asia: New Concepts of Human Security* (Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 1995), p. 84.

Gulf War.[5] This crushing moment for Japanese self-esteem became the starting-point for a more assertive foreign policy with clearly discernible international leadership ambitions.

Prolegomena to Japan's Leadership on Human Security

Japan's cautious but increasingly assertive steps towards international leadership seen in the 1990s were initiated in low politics. By opting for leadership in environmental policies, Japan's advance was enacted within the confines of the Yoshida Doctrine. The environment had not been of any concern to Japanese industrialists and politicians during the period when Japan excelled in double-digit economic growth rates. Eventually, environmental problems caused by unrestricted industrial expansion created increasing awareness that the industrial policy for rapid economic growth was not sustainable in the long run. In 1972, the year of the first Earth Summit which was held in Stockholm, the reform-minded vice-chairman of the Japan Socialist Party Eda Saburō lamented that Sweden was greatly respected internationally due to its forward-looking activities in the environmental and seismological fields, while the economic great power Japan was not held in esteem because it behaved like the economic animal it was described as.[6] In the 1970s and 80s, strict environmental laws were adopted which made many see Japan as a model for other countries. At the beginning of the 1990s, the quest for Japanese international leadership on the environment was an ambition announced by a number of political hopefuls. The fact that Japan should be a leader was made part and parcel of their political platforms, which proved its value in the domestic political power game. Internationally, Japanese politicians could push for such a leadership, because it did not refer to the basic power structure of the international system and, consequently, was compatible with the Yoshida Doctrine in that it did not go against the US prerogative of supremacy in matters of international security.

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[5] Michael Blaker, 'Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance', in Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, p. 19.
[6] Eda Saburō, *Watashi no Nihon kaizō kōsō* [My plan for a reform of Japan] (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1972), p. 114.

To opt for the role of environmental leader in global politics was a way for Japan's political leaders to begin to try to appease the badly injured national feelings after the ordeal that its foreign policy had passed through during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Japan's ambitions to play the role of international leader on environmental policies surfaced at the 1992 'UN Conference on Environment and Development', generally called the Rio Earth Summit.[7] A leading Japanese environmentalist remarked in an interview that Japan's success at transforming itself from one of the world's worst industrial polluters to one of the cleanest advanced economies could make it a role model for developing nations. Director-General Nakamura Shōsaburō of the Japanese Environment Agency promised that Japan would do its utmost in solving global environment problems.[8] Japan encountered a problem during the conference, however. Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi could not deliver his speech at the conference, since he was kept at home by a heated parliamentary debate on sending troops abroad on international peace-keeping missions. The Japanese delegation tried to save the situation by circulating a taped version of Miyazawa's speech but the way it was delivered weakened its impact.[9] In an assessment *post festum*, Karasawa Kei wrote that 'Japan exercised only limited and unobtrusive leadership at the conference, giving due deference to the other delegations.'[10]

It was soon clear that Prime Minister Miyazawa's ambitions went further than revealed during the Rio Earth Summit. In his parliamentary policy speech in January 1993, he made a bold claim when he disclosed a willingness on the part of Japan to be an international leader also in the political realm. In the carefully prepared statement that the prime ministerial policy speech in the Diet is, Miyazawa declared: 'It is no exaggeration that the outlook for the world going into the 21st century will

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[7] Taylor, 'Japan's global environmentalism', p. 538.

[8] 'Japan's Shortage of Proposals Sinks Its Hopes of Environmental Leadership', *The Straits Times*, 5 June 1992, http://www.recyclingpoint.com.sg/Articles/1992 june5Japan'sshortageofproposals.htm (downloaded 15 October 2005).

[9] Shima Nobuhiko, *Shūnō gaikō: Senshinkoku samitto no rimenshi* [Summit diplomacy: The hidden historical background to the summits of the advanced countries] (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2000), p. 174.

[10] Karasawa Kei, 'Japan and the World Environment', in Warren S. Hunsberger, ed., *Japan's Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect* (Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 79.

largely depend on whether or not Japan and the United States, together accounting for about 40 per cent of world GNP, are able to provide coordinated leadership under a shared vision.'[11] This was the first case in Japan's post-war history that a prime minister stood on the rostrum of the Diet and proclaimed that Japan aimed to be an international leader in an area of high politics.

Despite Miyazawa's boldness, it was easy to see from whom he had learnt his tricks of the trade. Miyazawa was one of Yoshida Shigeru's most gifted disciples and known as an interpreter of his mentor's ideas. Like Yoshida, Miyazawa knew Japan's place. On many occasions during his almost half a century-long career as leading politician and thirteen-times minister, he had used his eloquence to explain why it did not behove Japan to strive to become Number One. Thus, while the prime minister showed off a desire on the part of Japan to be an international political leader, he did not mince his words when he said that Japan's aspiration amounted to 'coordinated leadership' together with the United States.

Miyazawa's aspiration echoed a claim that had begun to be heard in Japan during the 1980s. Since power is relative, the prolonged economic problems of the United States after the oil crisis of 1973 were interpreted as a rise in Japanese power.[12] Japan's economic successes made its path of ascendancy seem unstoppable, and led a leading US strategist to caution: 'The United States will have to be willing to deal with the fact that at some tables, Japan will be in the principal chair.'[13] In 1987, the political scientist Inoguchi Kuniko drew a conclusion that thrilled the Japanese. Up to then, Japanese foreign policy formation had been guided by the Yoshida Doctrine. In the post-occupation period, Japan had faithfully lived up to its obligations and been careful not to act as a competitor or a challenger to the United States. Now, this leading scholar was no longer convinced by the idea that the United States was the leader of the world.

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[11] Miyazawa Kiichi, policy speech in the Diet, 22 January 1993, in MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 37 (1993), p. 142.

[12] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 157.

[13] John Endicott, *Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 18. For an illuminating discussion, see John H. Makin and Donald C. Hellman, eds, *Sharing World Leadership? A New Era for America & Japan* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989).

She predicted a future world order of consortia in which the key adversaries would forge coalitions and no single actor would be allowed to dominate the others.[14] Her idea of a future Pax Consortis was an expression of the hubris that consumed Japanese in leading positions, when Japan's economic surge seemed unstoppable. Analysts looked into their crystal balls and predicted the dawn of a Pax Nipponica replacing US hegemony.[15]

A prolific contributor to the debate on Japan as an international power was the *Asahi shimbun* journalist Funabashi Yōichi. He argued that Japan should define itself as 'a global civilian power', which implied a more active but still pacifist foreign policy. This idea was a bit awkward for mainstream thinking in Japan; the political creature outlined by Funabashi became somewhat grotesque in shape in Japanese, *gubōraru-shibirian-pawā*, and had to be translated into language understandable to ordinary Japanese, *chikyū minsei taikoku*.[16] He based this idea on the fact that Japan was bound by constitutional provisions not to use force or threat of force in solving conflicts with other countries. Funabashi did not detect the decline of US leadership that other researchers like Inoguchi Kuniko seemed to take for granted. He worked on the idea of a US–Japanese bigemony with Japan augmenting and complementing US leadership, supporting its global posture and commitment.[17]

Countries in the Asia Pacific were in the forefront of Funabashi's endeavour to outline the implications of his idea that Japan should be a global civilian power. In his widely acclaimed *Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC* (1995), Funabashi presented a study of a potential

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[14] Inoguchi Kuniko, *Posuto haken shisutemu to Nihon no sentaku* [The post-hegemonic system and Japan's options] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1987), pp. 102–12.

[15] See, e.g., Ezra Vogel, 'Pax Nipponica', *Foreign Affairs* 64:4 (Spring 1986), pp. 753–67.

[16] Funabashi, *Nihon no taigai kōsō*, pp. 164.

[17] Funabashi Yōichi, 'Reisengo no sekai to Nihon' [The world and Japan after the Cold War], in Funabashi Yōichi, ed., *Nihon senryaku sengen: Shibirian taikoku o mezashite* [A Japanese strategic manifesto: Towards a civilian great power] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1991), pp. 52–57. See also his 'Introduction: Japan's International Agenda for the 1990s', in Yoichi Funabashi, ed., *Japan's International Agenda* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1994), p. 16. The idea of bigemony had some proponents among US leaders, see, e.g., U. Alexis Johnson, *The United States and Japan: Cooperative leadership for peace and global prosperity* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990).

regional community among countries in the Asia Pacific. In his analysis, Japan's leadership emerged as an important factor promoting community building. It resembled the idea of Tarui Tōkichi in the nineteenth century who preached solidarity with Asia and advocated a union of East Asian nations under Japanese leadership as an anti-thesis to the idea of 'leave Asia, join Europe' [*datsua nyūō*] proposed by Japan's leading intellectual and scholar of modern Japan, Fukuzawa Yukichi.[18] In more distant history there was Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke's aborted attempt in 1957 to persuade the US government to support his idea of a Southeast Asia Development Fund, which he claimed would enable the United States and Japan to jointly 'liberate Asia from poverty'. The idea behind this scheme was Kishi's drive to establish 'Japanese leadership in Southeast Asia'.[19]

Japanese leadership in the Asia Pacific was a matter-of-course for Funabashi. This was partly because this sharp-eyed analyst discerned difficulties for the Japanese 'to perceive and execute a more effective foreign policy because of their inability to assimilate the concept of equality in international relations.'[20] The idea of Japan as the top-dog in the region clashed with something he and others were only too well aware of. Given the history of the recent past, nationalism and other factors, countries in the region did not have any particular appetite for adopting Japan as a leader but – as I wrote in a paper presenting Funabashi's ideas – 'his yearning for Japan to be a bit better, or a bit more valuable than other countries does not leave him. He does not seem to have been struck by the idea that Japan could deal with other countries on an equal footing.'[21]

Leadership ascribed to Japan by Funabashi was to be enacted in the Asia Pacific; he did not have joint global leadership in mind. This was fully in agreement with the Fukuda Doctrine. In 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo formulated a diplomatic line towards Southeast Asia, later

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[18] Hirano Ken'ichirō, 'Nihon no Ajia gaikō' [Japan's Asian diplomacy], in *Ajia no naka no Nihon* [Japan in the midst of Asia], Tōkyō daigaku kōkai kōza 20 (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1975), p. 208.

[19] Kishi Nobusuke, *Kishi Nobusuke kaikoroku: Hoshu gōdō to ampo kaitei* [Kishi Nobusuke's reminiscences: Conservative merger and security treaty revision] (Tokyo: Kōsaidō shuppan, 1983), p. 320.

[20] Funabashi, 'Introduction: Japan's International Agenda for the 1990s', p. 8.

[21] Bert Edström, 'Yoichi Funabashi and Asia Pacific Fusion', in Bert Edström, ed., *Interdependence in Asia Pacific*. Swedish Institute of International Affairs Conference Papers 28 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2001), pp. 65f.

known as the Fukuda Doctrine. It committed Japan (1) to reject the role of a military power; (2) to build the relationship of mutual confidence based on 'heart-to-heart' understanding; and (3) to be an equal partner of ASEAN. Simply put, the prime minister could be said to have made an attack on the perception common among Japanese that neighbouring countries were not equal partners.[22] Fukuda's declared policy constituted a radical break with the resource diplomacy, *shigen gaikō*, which was launched in 1972 by MITI, forming the backbone of Japanese foreign policy, by Fukuda's predecessor Tanaka Kakuei in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis.

Funabashi was optimistic: 'Through an active APEC policy, Japan can for the first time assume regional leadership without raising the ire and suspicion of either its Asian neighbors or its American friends.'[23] He argued that Japan's effort to promote joint actions with the United States would help the United States to keep up its power position in the Asia Pacific. This would benefit countries in the region. Through engagement in Asia, Japan 'should encourage the United States to help build a new Asia Pacific community fortified by strong security commitments.'[24] This idea represented the same kind of thinking that constituted the underpinnings of Japan's strategic aid, *senryaku enjo*, instituted in the early 1980s, when economic aid was disbursed to countries which were vital to the United States but not necessarily particularly important to Japan – a tangible form of Japan participating in 'burden sharing' with the United States. As a seasoned analyst, Funabashi was well aware that 'Japan has been inclined to view its Asia policy as an integral facet of its policy toward the United States', and he could not rid himself of the fact that Japan's Asia policy was 'subsumed by its US Asia policy'.[25] At the same time he was careful to specify that Japan's ambitions of exerting leadership was a joint

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[22] The most significant point of the Fukuda Doctrine was Japan's aspiration to serve as a political mediator between ASEAN and Indochina in order to bring about peaceful coexistence. As noted by Soeya Yoshihide, this goal was achieved on ASEAN's own initiative with the coming into being of the ASEAN-10 in 1999. See Yoshihide Soeya, 'Japan in East Asia: Changes in the 1990s and New Regional Strategy', Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), *RIETI Discussion Paper* 04-E-013 (February 2004), p. 16.

[23] Funabashi, *Asia Pacific Fusion*, p. xii.

[24] Ibid., p. 239.

[25] Ibid., pp. 205, 227.

endeavour with the United States. He wanted to loosen its grip on Japan's policies, and described what could be described as a new Asianism with Japan 'inherently driven by psychic yearnings for it to disassociate itself from the United States.'[26]

The Asian Economic Crisis

Less than two years after the publication of Funabashi's *Asia Pacific Fusion*, a chance for the Japanese government to act in the way he proposed was presented by the Asian economic crisis. The reason was the simple fact that Japan was 'an economic Gulliver in a region of Lilliputs' – to use T. J. Pempel's catchy characterization[27] – and was seen by its neighbours as having both a duty and the responsibility to come to their rescue. In Indonesia, for instance, a change of mood was seen with the onset of the crisis. The Suharto regime had been lukewarm when Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō made a visit in January 1997 and proposed regular Japan–ASEAN summits and separate but parallel bilateral dialogues on regional security matters.[28] Indonesia's rejection of Hashimoto's proposal was a setback for Japan but his visit to Jakarta clarified, as pointed out by Inoguchi Takashi, that the Fukuda Doctrine had become 'a reality of sorts, with both Asean and Japan speaking the language of friendship and candour'.[29]

When the Asian economic crisis was ravaging countries, Japan was asked to intervene to rescue hard-hit countries. This suited Japan. No longer did it have to be the bully knocking on the door of others not knowing if it would be opened or not. The Japanese government acted quickly and resolutely. In September 1997, only two months after the outbreak of the crisis, it proposed the establishment of an Asian Monetary

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[26] Ibid., p. 225.

[27] T. J. Pempel, 'Transpacific Torii: Japan and the Emerging Asian Regionalism', in Katzenstein and Shiraishi, eds, *Network Power*, p. 69.

[28] Andrew MacIntyre, 'Japan, Indonesia, and Policy Leadership in the Pacific: Economic Crisis and Foreign Policy Opportunities', in Takashi Inoguchi, ed., *Japan's Asia Policy: Revival and Response* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 10.

[29] Takashi Inoguchi, 'Japan Wants New Asian Pals', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 February 1997, p. 28.

Fund (AMF), an Asian counterpart of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to tackle the region's financial problems. The AMF did not materialize, however, due to US refusal to support the proposal. The official line of the US Treasury was that the AMF would create an unnecessary incentive for Asian countries to postpone adjustment and would add little to the pre-existing system that centred on the IMF.[30] Behind the adverse US reaction lurked the perception – at least according to the chief Japanese negotiator, Sakakibara Eisuke – that not only was Japan posing a challenge to US hegemony in Asia by coming up with its AMF proposal, it was also hurting US pride.[31] The chief economist of the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz wrote later that 'the United States evidenced little understanding of the special features of the Asian economies, and, at least initially, remarkably little sympathy for their problems.'[32] It is no wonder that the US image was damaged by the wide-spread perception that it was disinterested in any commitment to rescuing countries affected by the economic crisis.[33] Prime Minister Helen Clark of New Zealand remarked that there were 'terribly bitter feelings in Asia from the US response'.[34]

Japan chose not to complain when US opposition aborted the AMF proposal.[35] This was in accordance with the Yoshida Doctrine but a disappointment to those in the region who expected Japan to play a leading role in fighting the crisis. An Indonesian foreign policy commentator made his displeasure plain: 'There is a feeling of a real lacuna in Japan's leadership in this crisis, which after all is an economic one and is happening in East Asia and therefore should be of great concern to Japan. This suggests that Japan really has to prepare herself and to get her act together now in order

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[30] Phillip Y. Lipscy, 'Japan's Asian Monetary Fund Proposal', *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs* 3:1 (Spring 2003), p. 96.

[31] Sakakibara Eisuke, *Nihon to sekai ga furueta hi: Saibā shihonshugi no seiritsu* [The day that rocked Japan and the world: The establishment of cyber capitalism] (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha, 2000), pp. 185f.

[32] Joseph E. Stiglitz, *The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World's Most Prosperous Decade* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), p. 228.

[33] Terada, 'Constructing an "East Asian" concept and growing regional identity', pp. 265ff.

[34] As quoted in Nihon keizai shimbunsha, ed., *Ajia: Aratanaru rentai* [Asia: The new solidarity] (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbunsha, 2000), p. 82.

[35] Takashi Inoguchi, 'Globalization and Japan's Foreign Policy', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, 13:3 (Fall 1999), p. 164.

to play a leadership role for the future development of the region.'[36] Learning that Japan did not fight for its proposal, Malaysia's prolific Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad retorted that Japan seemed to have lost the will to be a leader of the region.[37] He was noted for his outspoken views on Japan becoming a regional leader. In his plan to form the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), proposed in 1990, he excluded the United States and depicted Japan as a leader of the region but it was difficult for Japan to accept Mahathir's idea, given the teachings of the Yoshida Doctrine. Mahathir's criticism of Japan for being too modest in announcing leadership ambitions is well-known. Already by 1994, he had told visiting Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi that he wanted Japan 'to play every possible role [*subete no yakuwari*] for the sake of Asia's peace and prosperity.'[38] To Mahathir, Japan was 'the only Asian country with the ability to help fellow Asian countries'.[39] In a conversation with one of Japan's well-known business gurus, he went so far as to claim that Japan's 'natural place' was to be a 'world leader'.[40]

The Japanese government was annoyed but not dispirited by US resistance to its AMF proposal. In October 1998, the Obuchi government was back with a new idea of how Japan could help alleviate the problems caused by the Asian economic crisis, when Finance Minister Miyazawa Kiichi presented the idea of a US$30 billion programme to assist Southeast Asian countries. It was a rejoinder to the criticism that Japanese contributions were 'too little, too late' and an indication of its feelings of disgust over President Bill Clinton's slap in the face during a visit to China in June 1998, when he applauded China for its constructive role and

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[36] Jusuf Wanandi, interview by Andrew MacIntyre, September 1998, quoted in Andrew MacIntyre, 'Can Japan Ever Take Leadership? The View from Indonesia', *Asian Perspective* 24:4 (April 2000), p. 307.

[37] *Nikkei Weekly*, 22 December 1997; as quoted in Hook et al., *Japan's International Relations*, p. 204.

[38] *Asahi shimbun*, 28 August 1994.

[39] *Australian Financial Review*, 24 October 1994; as quoted in Terada, 'Constructing an "East Asian" concept and growing regional identity', p. 257.

[40] Ōmae Ken'ichi, *Ajiajin to Nihonjin: Mahatiiru Marēshia shushō to no taiwa* [Asians and Japanese: Conversations with Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir] (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 1994); as quoted in Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America's Future in Asia* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1996), p. 100.

criticized Japan for its lack of economic reform.[41] It irked the Japanese that Clinton failed to reaffirm the stabilizing importance of the Japan–US security treaty relationship in his talks with President Jiang Zemin of China.[42]

The initiatives taken by the Japanese government were in response to the calls from Asian countries that Japan should take on a more substantive regional leadership role.[43] Leaders of countries hit by the Asian economic crisis reacted positively to Japan's efforts. During a meeting with Japanese and South Korean lawmakers, including Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō and South Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil at the end of November 1998, the South Koreans brought up the Japanese idea of the AMF and 'stressed the importance of Japan's leading role' along with cooperation by other Asian nations in realizing the proposed AMF.[44] It was further reported that Prime Minister Kim backed the idea that 'Japan should be the leader of Asia'.[45] If correctly reported, Kim's statement must have been encouraging to the Japanese government, since he was the premier of a country that Japan had long had tortuous relations with. During a visit to South Korea in March 1999 Obuchi responded to the South Korean premier's call for Japanese leadership by proposing that South Korea and Japan should play such a leadership role jointly.[46]

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[41] Soeya Yoshihide, 'Higashi Ajia anzen hoshō shisutemu no naka no Nihon' [Japan in the East Asian national security system], in Soeya Yoshihide and Tadokoro Masayuki, eds, *Nihon no higashi Ajia kōsō* [Japan's East Asia plan] (Tokyo: Keiō gijuku daigaku shuppan kyōkai, 2004), p. 201.

[42] Yoichi Funabashi, 'Japan's Moment of Truth', *Survival* 42:4 (Winter 2000/01), p. 76.

[43] Saori N. Katada, 'Japan and Asian Monetary Regionalization: Cultivating a New Regional Leadership after the Asian Financial Crisis', paper presented at the Annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, 24–27 March 2002, http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/katada.html (downloaded 21 February 2004); MacIntyre, 'Can Japan Ever Take Leadership? The View from Indonesia', p. 309; Castellano, 'Two Years On: Evaluating Tokyo's Response to the East Asian Financial Crisis'.

[44] 'Japanese, S. Korean lawmakers agree on Asian fund', *Asian Economic News*, 7 December 1998.

[45] FBIS, *Seoul Chungang Ilbo*, 20 November 1998; as quoted in Katada, 'Japan and Asian Monetary Regionalization', fn. 49.

[46] Obuchi, 'Shinseiki no Nikkan kankei'.

Human Security, International Leadership and Japan

Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil's reported call for Japan to assume leadership was certainly appealing to the Japanese. Participating in a conference on human security in Tokyo in June 1999, Lincoln C. Chen told conference participants that 'Japan wants to be a creator to security policies that are very much in the making.'[47] Shortly afterwards, the 1999 edition of the *Diplomatic Bluebook* was released and confirmed the pertinence of Chen's observation. It was the first annual report on foreign policy issued by the Obuchi government and it staked out the direction of its diplomacy. Symptomatically, it carried the subtitle 'Developing a Diplomacy Backed by Leadership for the New Century'. Foreign Minister Kōmura Masahiko wrote in his introduction: 'Since assuming the post of foreign minister, I have endeavoured to develop "a diplomacy backed by leadership" [*gaikō aru riidashippu*]. It is important for Japan to take appropriate initiatives to guide countries in various situations on the international stage.'[48]

In an assessment of the impact of the Persian Gulf War on Japan, the diplomat Ōkawara Yoshio concluded in its wake that 'Japan is an economic power and may become a political power in the future, but it cannot be a military power or a leader in the sense of creating universally accepted values.'[49] But another equally distinguished diplomat, Owada Hisashi, saw it differently. He predicted that Japan would become a power in world politics, if it pursued a course that stood for universal values that others found valid.[50] A similar view was presented by the ODA expert Hirono Ryōkichi: 'Japan must recognize that a financial contribution, however large it may be, cannot by itself win political recognition from the international community, but that an intellectual contribution can.'[51]

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[47] Chen, 'Health and Human Security'.

[48] MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 42, part 2 (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1999), np.

[49] Yoshio Okawara, 'Japan's Global Responsibilities', in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, eds, *Japan's Emerging Global Role* (Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 65

[50] Owada Hisashi, 'Diplomacy of Japan in the Post-Gulf Crisis World', in MOFA, *Japan's Post Gulf International Initiatives* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991), p. 14.

[51] Ryokichi Hirono, 'Japan's Leadership Role in the Multilateral Development Institutions', in Islam, ed., *Yen for Development*, p. 178.

When Japan had surpassed the United States as the largest provider of ODA, Hirono asked rhetorically who would provide leadership with respect to ODA and gave his own answer that 'the top donor has the responsibility to provide intellectual leadership.'[52] According to Tanaka Akihiko, Obuchi had done exactly that by his Hanoi speech – combining the 'hard power' of an economic nature (Japan lacking military clout) with 'word power'.[53]

A window of opportunity was opened by the Asian economic crisis. In the eyes of Obuchi and his collaborators, Japan's post-war experience proved that the country was eminently suited to pursue human security in a bid for leadership. They realized that Japan could become a leader in the sense of creating universally accepted values, if it adopted and preached the virtues of human security alongside its recognized role as the world's largest aid donor, which role it had kept up throughout the 1990s despite its economic problems. With its focus not on military but social and economic dimensions of security, the pursuit of human security could compensate for Japan's constitutionally induced inability to participate in the management of international security by military means: 'As you have pointed out', Prime Minister Obuchi told a journalist in September 1999, 'we are abiding by the Japanese constitution, and thus we are forbidden to contribute to world peace by any military presence. We are trying hard to contribute to world peace by pursuing human security – that is, to achieve security for human beings.'[54] He and his collaborators felt that human security represented an area where Japan could make a contribution to the international community worthy of a power wanting to qualify as a global civilian power.[55] A top official of MOFA, Takasu Yukio, declared: 'I believe that Japan's experience since the end of the Second World War in

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[52] Hirano Ryōkichi quoted in Peter Van Ness, 'Understanding Japan's ODA as International Sanctions: The Case of Sino–Japanese Relations', in Tatsuro Matsumae and Lincoln C. Chen, eds, *In Pursuit of Common Values in Asia: Japan's ODA Charter Re-evaluated* (Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 1997), p. 204.

[53] Tanaka Akihito, *Wādo-poritikusu: Gurōbarizēshon no naka no Nihon gaikō* [Word politics: Japanese foreign policy in the midst of globalization] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 2000), p. 147.

[54] Plate, 'The Japanese Prime Minister Defies His Critics'.

[55] The idea that a country pursuing human security could be recognized as a power was not unique to Japan. As mentioned above, Norway has pursued a conscious effort to use human security to gain 'humanitarian large power status'. See Suhrke, 'Human Security and the Interests of States', p. 267.

promoting prosperity and the well-being of its people through economic and social development makes it particularly well-prepared to advocate such a broad concept of human security.'[56] This ambition was especially relevant in an East Asian context. According to Yamamoto Tadashi: 'Indeed, the East Asian regional community provides many opportunities for Japan to make essential contributions in the areas that are characterized by human security concerns. It was an area where Japan could make the most positive and critical contributions. It could be said that building an East Asian regional community would not be possible without Japan playing a leading role. That is East Asian regional community was where Japan could prove to be a "human security power."'[57] As noted above, when Obuchi launched the idea of a human security fund, he intended it at first to be active in East Asia.

The Japanese prime minister took advantage of the window of opportunity that opened up with the Asian economic crisis by taking the initiative in the area of the internationally controversial yet acclaimed concept of human security. Combining the pride of Japan's foreign policy of the 1970s and 80s, chequebook diplomacy, with the pursuit of human security, Obuchi hoped to erase Japan's reputation as excelling in 'faceless aid' and a word-less main donor just gushing out money.[58] Human security was a concept that fitted what the senior diplomat Owada Hisashi argued in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War was a must for Japan, namely to propagate 'values that can be presented to the world as ideals, guiding policies, and principles which everyone can understand and fully support'.[59]

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[56] MOFA, 'Statement by Director-General Yukio Takasu at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan-Bator, 8 May 2000'.

[57] Yamamoto Tadashi, 'Human Security – From Concept to Action: A Challenge for Japan", in *International Conference on Human Security in East Asia, 16–17 June 2003, Seoul, Republic of Korea: Proceedings*. Seoul: UNESCO, Korean National Commission for UNESCO, Ilmin International Relations Institute of Korea University, 2004, p. 14.

[58] Hirai Terumi, 'Nihon gaikō seisaku to ningen no anzen hoshō: Banguradeshu no jirei kara' [Japan's foreign policy and human security: The case of Bangladesh], in Katsumata Makoto, ed., *Gurōbaruka to ningen no anzen hoshō: Kōdō suru shimin shakai* [Globalization and human security: Activating civil society] (Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2004), p. 344.

[59] Owada, 'Diplomacy of Japan in the Post-Gulf Crisis World', p. 15.

The establishment of the TFHS demonstrated the ambition that Obuchi expressed in his JIIA speech in December 1999: 'Japan will', he said on this occasion, 'continue to take the initiative to see that the perspective of human security is reflected in concrete measures.'[60] The appearance of human security on the international security agenda gave an opening for a more assertive behaviour on the international arena. 'It is evident', wrote the political scientist Shinoda Hideaki, 'that the Japanese government took advantage of the possibilities of human security by linking it to the international position of Japan.'[61]

Obuchi's successor, Mori Yoshirō, continued along Obuchi's path with his proposal to establish the CHS. When he presented his idea, he did not envisage a body taking part in carrying out Japanese projects but as devising policies that were to be implemented by the international community. The ardent supporter of human security Takemi Keizō stressed the link from the Rome Club and the Palme and Brundtland commissions to the CHS and argued that the CHS report enabled Japan to give 'a great intellectual contribution to international society' [*kokusai shakai ni taisuru ōkina chiteki kōken*].[62]

After the CHS had been established, MOFA took pains to stress that the commission was not a Japanese institution but working on behalf of the international community. The efforts to present the CHS as an international body surfaced in a passage in the press release issued by the ministry when it was established: 'The Commission on Human Security has been conceived by several leaders around the world in order to seize this opportunity of enhanced awareness about human security, and as stated in the UN Millennium Declaration, to promote broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in the era of globalization.'[63]

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[60] Obuchi, 'In Quest of Human Security', p. 9.
[61] Shinoda, 'The Concept of Human Security', p. 18.
[62] Tase Kazuo and Takemi Keizō, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō to Nihon no yakuwari' [Human security and Japan's role], in Tōkai daigaku heiwa senryaku kokusai kenkyūsho, ed., *21 seiki no ningen no anzen hoshō* [Human security of the 21st century] (Tokyo: Tōkai daigaku shuppankai, 2005), p. 129.
[63] MOFA, 'Press Release: Plan for Establishment of the Commission on Human Security'.

In a conscious move by the Japanese government to exercise leadership through participation and cooperation in multilateral institutions,[64] both the CHS and the TFHS were established within the UN. Presenting human security as a fundamental philosophy for the setting of international rule made Japan's ambition to be seen as a norm-creator more credible, since the United Nations is an arena where global rules are set.[65] Obuchi's former state secretary for foreign affairs Takemi Keizō confirmed in a roundtable discussion with Ogata Sadako and Yamamoto Tadashi some years later that the 'proposal to establish the Commission on Human Security in cooperation with the United Nations [was] to enable Japan to take the initiative in more precisely defining the still vague policy concept of human security.'[66] The UN is the most important international arena for multilateral activities, and, in one respect, taking the initiative in collaboration with it could also be seen as an expression of Japan's UN centrism, one of the 'pillars' of its declared foreign policy doctrine, long dormant but revived in the wake of the ending of the Cold War.[67] To promote a security concept that had won credence in the UN system was also a way for Japan to tacitly push for its candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Although the origin of the human security idea and the security thinking it represents does not originate in Japan, Japanese officials liked to depict it as 'Made in Japan'.[68] Pushing for this novel concept might help Japan present itself as a norm entrepreneur, filling the bottle that was so empty – Japanese ideas of how the world could and should be run. In this, human security was a remedy for what Kōsaka Masataka saw as the fatal flaw in Japan's foreign policy – there was in Japan no sense of its mission or its role in the world because of its position as 'junior partner' to

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[64] Cf. Ronald M. Behringer, 'Middle Power Leadership on Human Security', paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 30 May–1 June 2003, p. 2, http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/paper-2003/behringer.pdf (downloaded 13 January 2005); Drifte, *Japan's foreign policy for the 21st century*, p. 134.

[65] Ishikawa Kaoru, 'Gurobaru-ruru o tsukuru Kokuren' [The UN lays down global rules], *Gaikō fōramu* 185 (December 2003), pp. 32–38.

[66] Comment by Takemi Keizō at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 6.

[67] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, p. 148.

[68] Shinoda, 'Anzen hoshō gainen no tagika to "ningen no anzen hoshō"', p. 72.

the United States that resulted in passivity.[69] Kōsaka's insight had been asserted back in the 1970s but it was a thesis that lingered. Japan was accused of using its enormous purse to gain influence in international affairs but of shying away from having opinions in areas of high politics. When *kokusai kōken*, 'international contribution', became a key concept of Japan's political discourse and the lodestar for political bigwigs and political hopefuls, it represented an approach which clashed with the *taigan no kasai* mentality reflecting the *sakoku* psychology and the fact that Japan had only been a member of the international community for little more than one century.[70]

Measures taken by the Japanese government were presented as successful. Only a year after human security was made a priority for Japan by Obuchi, high-ranking officials claimed that Japan was exhibiting leadership in international fora like the United Nations and the G-8.[71] This viewpoint was reiterated in the 2000 *Diplomatic Bluebook* in which MOFA declares that 'Japan is actively [*sekkyokuteki*] implementing practical [*gutaiteki na*] policies and has come to lead the discussion on human security in international arenas.' The next year, MOFA reported that 'Japan has come to lead the debate in international arenas by implementing concrete policies and by actively making intellectual and financial contributions.' In the issue for 2002, MOFA claimed that Japan was leading discussions not only in international arenas but was 'demonstrating international leadership [*kokusaiteki na riidashippu*] in the promotion of human security by implementing concrete policies and making active intellectual and financial contributions.'[72]

Concluding Remarks

During a visit to Japan in 2001, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed how he was 'heartened to see the commitment by Japan to

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[69] Masataka Kosaka, *Options for Japan's Foreign Policy*. Adelphi Papers 97 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 19.

[70] Masuda Hiroshi and Tsuchiyama Jitsuo, eds, *Nichibei kankei kīwādo* [Japanese– US relations in keywords] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2001), p. 220.

[71] See, e.g., Ueda, 'Ima naze "ningen no anzen hoshō" na no ka', p. 72.

[72] MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 43 (2000), p. 104; MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 44 (2001), p. 6; MOFA, *Gaikō seisho* 45 (2002), p. 86.

continue playing its leadership role.'[73] This time he had more reason to laud Japan for its leadership than in 1997, as his visit coincided with the high point of Japan's pursuit of human security. Its efforts were not merely altruistic and a way of showing off as an international good guy. The pursuit of human security opened an avenue for Japan to advance towards its more than century-old ambition of becoming an international leader. The establishment of the CHS and the TFHS were steps taken by the Japanese government towards a leadership role on an issue that had gained in prominence on the international political scene. Placing both the TFHS and the CHS under the aegis of the United Nations signalled that the Japanese government wanted its pursuit of human security to be seen in a global and multilateral context. By building on and supporting the UNDP efforts to establish human security as a key aspect of international security, Japan's human security policy could be seen as an attempt to influence the rules guiding the international community and as a conscious effort to demonstrate that the country had what was said to be necessary for playing a leadership role internationally, namely ideas of its own as to how international relations should be conducted. In one way, this policy was the very opposite to its chequebook diplomacy practised in the 1970s and 80s and which was overturned in the 1991 Persian Gulf War but, at the same time, meant a continuation of Japan's reliance on economic instruments, with the significant modification that this economist-style habit was combined with a wish to act as, and be seen as, a norm entrepreneur.

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[73] *United Nations Daily Highlights*, 24 January 2001, http://www.hri.org/news/world/undh/2001/01-01-24.undh.html (downloaded 28 July 2003).

HUMAN SECURITY AND THE OBUCHI FOREIGN POLICY

Obuchi's Personal Leadership on Human Security

The introduction of human security, with people as the security referent and protection of people's lives and dignity the core values, led, as Akiyama Nobumasa wrote once, to 'a transformation of the logic of linking people and national interests [which] posed states to re-think and re-organize their own "security" policy.'[1] In this assessment an apparent oversight is inherent, however. Akiyama disregarded that it is not states that think or act; it is people who do. Anthropomorphizing the state in this way turns decision-making into a black box. Yet the state is not a unitary actor; it involves various actors pursuing their own interests. In the Japanese case, what Hosoya Chihiro called 'the tripod system' is most commonly referred to. Principal actors identified and described metaphorically as a tripartite power elite comprising bureaucrats, parliamentarians from the usually incumbent LDP and big business form a closely interlinked network, with the prime minister and the government the ultimate decision-makers.[2] But such a tripod is far too simplistic. In any text on Japan's foreign policy, authors will explain how the increasingly

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[1] Akiyama, 'Human Security at the Crossroad', p. 253.

[2] Hosoya Chihiro, 'Taigai seisaku kettei katei ni okeru Nichibei no tokushitsu' [The characteristic of Japanese and US external policy decision-making processes], in Hosoya Chihiro and Watanuki Jōji, eds, *Taigai seisaku kettei katei no Nichibei hikaku* [A comparision of Japanese and US external policy decision-making processes] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1977), pp. 1–20.

pluralistic nature of policy-making has caused a number of other actors to take part in foreign policy decision-making.[3] A standard text on Japan's external relations by Satō Hideo can be used as an illustration. Actors listed by Satō comprise political leaders and Diet members as individuals, the government, the Diet and political parties as institutions, ministries and agencies and their officials in the bureaucracy, interest groups including business groups and NGOs, mass media and citizens.[4] Actors relevant to a certain issue or influencing decision-making on a certain issue or in a specific issue area might vary. Regarding human security as an element of Japanese foreign policy, a number of actors have been active but in a study focusing on governmental policies, only a dedicated few actually counted. While Murayama Tomiichi must be seen as the pioneer when it comes to human security in the Japanese political context, it was Obuchi Keizō who made human security a central concern of Japan's foreign policy. In retrospect, human security turned out to be the 'pillar' of 'the Obuchi foreign policy'.[5]

The degree to which human security was news when it was adopted by Obuchi as a key idea can be gauged by a report presented the same year by the political scientist Inoguchi Takashi. He reported a survey of the views of Japan's foreign policy held by the country's bureaucratic, political and business elites. Findings are based on interviews with members of these elites conducted in 1997 and 1998. For our study, the most noteworthy result of the survey is that human security does not figure at all. While 'new' non-traditional threats surface, such as terrorism, weapons proliferation and drugs, they are not in the limelight. Other issues included on what is generally seen as the human security agenda, such as landmines and small guns, are mentioned – but only in passing.[6]

Based on Inoguchi's survey, it seems fair to conclude that human security was not part of the world-view of Japanese elites at the time of his empirical research for his subsequent article, shortly before Obuchi

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[3] Kamo Takehiko, *Sekai seiji o dō miru ka* [How to look at world politics] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993), p. 170.

[4] Satō Hideo, *Taigai seisaku* [External policy] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1989), chap. 2.

[5] Ueda, 'Ima naze "ningen no anzen hoshō" na no ka', p. 69.

[6] Takashi Inoguchi, 'Japan's Foreign Policy under US Unipolarity: Coping with Uncertainty and Swallowing Some Bitterness', *Asian Journal of Political Science* 6:2 (December 1998), pp. 9, 13.

declared human security to be a key perspective of Japanese foreign policy. This fact indicated that the place Obuchi secured for human security on the political agenda was the result of his personal intervention. One of his associates, JCIE President Yamamoto Tadashi, testified to the crucial role of the prime minister: 'One reason human security was incorporated into the Japanese government's policy system had to do with Obuchi's own character. The concept of human security was already spreading, but if someone else had been prime minister, things might not have progressed.'[7] Does this mean that he exercised personal leadership?

The extent to which the Japanese prime minister exerts leadership is a perennial question that has intrigued researchers. *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science* defines leadership as 'the power of one or a few individuals to induce a group to adopt a particular line of policy'.[8] This definition implies that a leader has the ability to influence others to do or act or think in a way different to how they had acted before. To what degree did Obuchi exhibit such a faculty? Garett Mattingly has pointed out that diplomacy is a functional representation of the political system in which it operates.[9] This observation is valid also for Japan. Obuchi had to act within the confines of Japan's foreign policy decision-making system founded in the early post-war period vesting formal decision-making power on foreign policy in the prime minister, the government, the Diet and the foreign ministry. Empirical studies have shown that it is often hard to pinpoint who is actually wielding power over a policy decision, although the primacy in decision-making that the prime minister has regarding major foreign-policy issues is clear.[10] Not all premiers have exercised this right, however. Traditionally, it was the role and not the personality that was decisive for leadership, but in some cases personal

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[7] Comment by Yamamoto Tadashi at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 6.

[8] 'Leadership', in Vernon Bogdanor, ed., *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 321.

[9] Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London: Penguin, 1973); as quoted in Brian Hocking, 'Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Foundations, Forms, Functions and Frustrations', in Jovan Kurbalija and Valentin Katrandjiev, eds, *Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities* (Malta and Geneva: Diplo, 2006), p. 14.

[10] Kusano Atsushi, 'Taigai seisaku kettei no kikō to katei' [The structure and process of external policy decision-making], in Aruga et al., eds, *Nihon no gaikō*, pp. 82ff.

leadership by prime ministers has been decisive. Back in 1972, the Japan specialist Donald C. Hellman noted: 'Whether by design or not, each Prime Minister has assumed personal responsibility for, and identity with, one principal policy achievement during his administration, and inevitably major foreign-policy decisions have fallen into this category.'[11] Hellman lists Hatoyama Ichirō, Kishi Nobusuke and Satō Eisaku (and presumably also Yoshida Shigeru although he is not mentioned) as responsible for this kind of decisions. A similar conclusion was reached twenty years later by Frank McNeil, the long-time observer of Japanese politics: 'The conventional wisdom among Euro-American observers and among many Japanese as well, has been that prime ministers lack leadership. That judgment demonstrates the insistence on defining leadership in Western terms—as a charismatic or, as in the case of Truman, a take-charge personality type. In those terms only Yoshida, Kishi and Yasuhiro Nakasone fit the bill.'[12]

Obuchi was the very opposite to politicians commended by Hellman and McNeil. The overall role that he played in the context of human security seems to be encapsulated by a concept employed by John Campbell in his study on Japanese old age policy in which he argues that 'the presence or absence of an effective sponsor – one with sufficient skills, resources, and drive to take charge of the process – is the single most important "variable" in determining whether and when a policy change will occur, and sometimes its content as well.'[13] Despite Obuchi's mild manner and consensus-oriented political style, he became a leader of international stature by functioning as a 'policy sponsor' of human security. In Japan, the process by which a premier is selected has favoured politicians who have experience of manipulating a factionalised party and building a coalition of intra-party supporters. Obuchi was such a political leader. He was thoroughly versed in the intricacies of Japan's faction-ridden political system based on consensus, where the prime minister's role is very much that of a middleman bringing about unity among competing factions and

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[11] Donald C. Hellman, *Japan and East Asia: The New International Order* (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 56.

[12] Frank McNeil, *Japanese Politics: Decay or Reform? The Consequences of Political Stagnation and the Prospects for Major Change* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), p. 37.

[13] John Creighton Campbell, *How Policies Change: The Japanese Government and the Aging Society* (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 47.

interests.[14] He reached the top spot, not by being a politician representing 'strong' leadership à la Yoshida Shigeru or Nakasone Yasuhiro, but by being one of the best and brightest among those who knew how to manoeuvre the prevailing system, valuing harmony, conformity, and conflict avoidance.

Once Obuchi was prime minister, a novel trait could be discerned. His choice of ministers indicated that he decided on appointments for the key posts very much on his own and did not follow the customary way of allocating ministers to LDP factions according to their strength. Furthermore, he also used his discretion when he appointed vice-ministers, by not always picking the politician proposed by the faction.[15] There were also instances when he took decisions single-handedly. One case in point was his decision to bring about a change in Japan's policy on landmines which demonstrated his leadership capability;[16] another is his decision to make Okinawa the venue of the G-8 Summit in 2000. In both these cases, Obuchi emerges as, what the Hermanns have called, 'the ultimate decision-maker'.[17]

It does not seem unreasonable to add human security to this rather short list. Through Obuchi's speeches in 1998, human security was made an element of Japan's political agenda. It was a development consonant with a trend in international affairs with presidents and prime ministers increasingly taking charge of foreign policy.[18] But he also followed in the footsteps of his predecessors who were known to take charge of handling foreign policy matters personally and to make important decisions. Eventually, he gained the image of being a premier exhibiting personal leader-

[14] Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), p. 70.

[15] Takenaka, *Shushō shihai*, p. 110.

[16] Ishikawa, *Sengo seijishi: shimpan*, p. 199.

[17] Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, 'Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry', *International Studies Quarterly* 33:4 (December 1989), pp. 361–88.

[18] Jan Melissen, 'Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age', Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy* 86 (May 2003), p. 1; Inoguchi Kuniko, *Sensō to heiwa* [War and peace] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1989), pp. 248f.

ship.[19] In Iokibe Makoto's assessment, Obuchi pretended that he did not exert any leadership while he, in fact, exerted strong leadership.[20]

The 21st Century Commission

One of Obuchi's key moves in furtherance of his new pet idea, human security, was to have it included in the deliberations of a commission that he set up, and assigned the task to formulate the desirable future direction of Japan and come up with proposals for long-term policies. The prime minister asked a number of respected and influential academics, journalists and businessmen to participate in the work of The Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century [*'21 seiki Nihon no kōsō' zadankai*], generally known as the 21st Century Commission. Its report was completed in January 2000 and constituted an authoritative assessment of Japan's long-term development. It reflected a combination of 'back to basics' philosophy and a forward-looking stance represented by this line-up of eminences. It had a precedent in the reports worked out by working groups set up by Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi at the end of the 1970s, presenting proposals for Japan's future.

One of the Commission's subgroups dealt with 'Japan's place in the world'. A number of its members had shortly before been members of a private group which had handed over a report on foreign policy to Foreign Minister Kōmura Masahiko.[21] In their report, *Challenge 2001–Japan's Foreign Policy toward the 21st Century*, a 'vision' of Japan's foreign policy was presented. The overarching goal of foreign policy of the next century was said to be for Japan to become and act as a 'global player' by acquiring a greater voice in international arenas. Three foreign policy

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[19] Masuzoe, 'The Obuchi Administration', p. 43.

[20] Iokibe Makoto, interview, 18 November 2006.

[21] MOFA, 'Challenge 2001 – Japan's Foreign Policy toward the 21st Century', 4 January 1999, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/challenge21.html (downloaded 25 February 2002). Members of the group were Professor Inoguchi Takashi (University of Tokyo), Professor Hakamada Shigeki (Aoyama Gakuin University), Professor Yamauchi Masayuki (University of Tokyo), Professor Kitaoka Shin'ichi (University of Tokyo), Professor Yamakage Susumu (University of Tokyo), Professor Kokubun Ryōsei (Keio University), and Professor Tanaka Akihiko (University of Tokyo).

challenges are identified: (1) to enhance the total strength of foreign policy; (2) to enhance national power that supports foreign policy; and (3) to reinforce diplomatic frameworks. Human security was taken into account in the report. It figured under what is said to be the second challenge facing Japan: 'Enhancing national power that supports foreign policy'. What is needed is to evince 'inventiveness' of which human security is one part. According to this report,

Japan must cultivate its ability to design systems and rules that could serve as global standards. In the area of development, Japan advocates [for] a comprehensive approach for the solution of conflicts and poverty [...]. Japan is also trying to embody the concept of 'human security' to the effect that human existence and dignity must be secured from various threats including environmental issues and poverty by strengthened and comprehensive measures.[22]

Like the Ōhira panel which presented its famous report on comprehensive security in 1980, Prime Minister Obuchi's consultation group scrutinized foreign policy. The subgroup pondering Japan's place in the world predicted that in the twenty-first century 'the use of military might to secure national development and settle disputes will increasingly lose legitimacy', and called on Japan to 'strive to win acceptance for its role as a global civilian power within the international community.'[23] The Commission reiterated that the Japan–US alliance is the core element of Japan's preparedness against direct threats but recommended that Japan 'in principle' should participate in joint operations in an international security framework. While the alliance with the United States will remain one of the pillars of Japan's security according to the report, the Commission argued that the alliance should be conceived of as one of four pillars comprising a multi-layered security framework. The other pillars were: (1) efforts through diplomacy, multilateral structures, and international institutions to build trust and reduce tensions; (2) economic security; and (3) human security designed to ensure the protection of the global environment, the eradication of poverty and hunger, and the protection of human dignity. This comprehensive machinery for managing external relations

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[22] MOFA, 'Challenge 2001 – Japan's Foreign Policy toward the 21st Century'.

[23] Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, *The Frontier Within*, p. 43.

was designed to counter threats to security domestically, bilaterally and regionally, as well as in a global context.

The 21st Century Commission presented proposals intended to pave the way for the introduction of human security in the comprehensive way that Prime Minister Obuchi had envisaged. Its report rejected the idea that Japan should content itself with 'a course of unilateral pacifism' and argued that security in the twenty-first century would need to be a comprehensive concept, encompasssing economic, social, environmental issues, human rights, and other elements.[24] The tasks ahead were manifold. It was indicated that human security would occupy an important place on the agenda: 'In the period ahead, even greater energy should be devoted to global issues relating to human security, such as the environment, antipersonnel mines, drugs, earthquakes, refugees, population, food, medical care, and AIDS, and these areas should become established as a sphere of international activity by Japan.'[25]

The Commission itself, and certainly Prime Minister Obuchi himself, had high hopes. Obuchi's personal involvement was shown not least by the fact that he took part in eleven of the forty meetings of the Commission.[26] But expectations of Obuchi and the Commission came to naught. The attempt by this prime ministerial *ad hoc* think-tank to lay a new foundation for Japanese politics, including foreign policy, aborted, when Obuchi suffered a stroke. A member of the Commission could only tell me that the report had been quietly buried after the prime minister's untimely death.[27] But he predicted that its time would come.[28]

Nevertheless, when the 21st Century Commission presented its report, the work of implementing the idea of human security as a key perspective of Japan's foreign policy was well under way in the foreign ministry. In a summary of the report, one of the members of the Commission wrote: 'We hope that the task of contributing to global issues linked to human security

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[24] Ibid., p. 45.

[25] Ibid., p. 160.

[26] Ibid., p. 9.

[27] Personal communication from a member of the Commission to the author, quoted in Bert Edström, 'Japan's foreign policy and human security', *Japan Forum* 15:2 (2003), p. 222.

[28] Commission member Soeya Yoshihide wrote later that he expected the shelf life of the report to be twenty to thirty years. See Soeya Yoshihide, 'The Frontier Within', *Look Japan* 529 (April 2000), p. 23.

will be defined as one of the main thrusts of Japan's actions in the international arena.'[29] Considering the fact that human security had been declared by Obuchi to be a key perspective of Japanese foreign policy, there should surely have been weighty reasons for the Commission to be more assertive. Now, this member reported that the Commission was meekly 'hoping' that human security would be defined as a main thrust for Japanese activities. It was a far cry from the forthright optimism of Prime Minister Obuchi. The reason for this modesty might be that the idea revealed uncertainty as to whether Obuchi's ideas would stand the test of time, not that the idea was unimportant. A prime minister will last only for a limited period and his prolific ideas, if he has any, will not necessarily live much longer than his time in office.

Human Security and Japan's Foreign Policy Making System

In an analysis of the evolving debate on human security published in 2003, the political scientist Hatsuse Ryūsei studied what the Japanese government had done to promote human security. According to him, the human security policy pursued by the Japanese government was more or less a variant of ODA policy.[30] This conclusion belittled what had been done, however. Hatsuse disregarded the fact that Obuchi's decision to introduce human security made it a key perspective of Japan's foreign policy and that his decision made a difference, when it was put into actual practice.

New Institutions

The pursuit of human security initiated by Obuchi had multilateral collaboration as one of its starting-points.[31] This continued a trend seen in

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[29] [Kojima Akira], 'Reinventing Japan: Report of the Commission on Japan's Goals in the Twenty-first Century (Outline)', *Japan Echo* 27:2 (April 2000), p. 20.

[30] Hatsuse Ryūsei, '"Ningen no anzen hoshō" ron no hōkōsei' [Trends in 'the human security' debate], *Kyōto joshi daigaku gendai shakai kenkyū* 2003: 4/5, p. 86.

[31] Ueda Hideaki, 'Nihon no muruti gaikō no saizensen: Ningen no anzen hoshō no shiten yori' [The frontline of Japan's multilateral diplomacy: From the viewpoint of human security], *Kokusai mondai* 470 (May 1999), pp. 2–15.

the 1990s when Japan began to engage in multilateral institutions. As late as 1990, Japan's reaction was lukewarm when Canada and Australia attempted to promote 'a habit of dialogues' in multilateral settings among Asia-Pacific states.[32] Multilateral security institutions in Asia were rejected for fear that they would undermine Japan's security relationship with the United States. With the Cold War over, multilateral engagement came to supplement Japan's previously predominant bilateralism. The move away from bilateralism began when Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarō proposed in 1991 that a new regional multilateral security dialogue should be instituted, building on the existing ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference.[33] It meant that the Japanese government reversed its previous opposition to multilateral dialogue. Behind the Nakayama Initiative was the new-won insight that participation in international organizations opened up an avenue for Japan to promote its interests.[34] Multilateral security cooperation provided transparency and mutual reassurance for the neighbouring countries and increased trust. Involvement in multilateral organizations was therefore seen as an opening for coping with the distrust and fear among Japan's neighbours nurtured by the legacy of the past.[35] A significant step towards introducing multilateralism was presented by the Higuchi Report (1994) with its emphasis on the importance of multilateral security cooperation. In order to remove the sense of insecurity, caused by the opaqueness and uncertainty of the international order in which the dangers are dispersed and difficult to predict, the report argued that the international community had to engage in multilateral cooperation in order to prevent the development of conflicts.[36]

While there were three or four trans-Pacific channels for discussion on political and security issues in 1989, there were over sixty by 1995. Although the number of multilateral institutions increased in the Asia Pacific in the 1990s, there was a lack of multilateral institutions suitable

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[32] Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, 'Between realism and idealism in Japanese security policy: The case of the ASEAN Regional Forum', *The Pacific Review* 10:4 (1997), p. 497.
[33] Ibid., p. 481.
[34] Inoguchi, 'Globalization and Japan's Foreign Policy', p. 164.
[35] Soeya, 'Japan in Asia: Beyond the Balancing Act', p. 64.
[36] Bōei mondai kondankai, *Nihon no anzen hoshō to bōeiryoku no arikata: 21 seiki e mukete no tembō* [The modality of the security and defence capability of Japan: The outlook for the 21st century] (Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsukyoku, 1994), pp. 6f.

for pursuing human security.[37] In order to implement Obuchi's ideas on human security, the Japanese government took the initiative to two international bodies working under the aegis of the United Nations and financed but not run by the Japanese government. The first was the TFHS. The other was the CHS, which built on the successes of the series of previous international commissions assigned the task of coming up with fresh ideas on how to manage international relations or solve international problems. Japan had been represented in such commissions, which had shown that participation in internal commissions gave it opportunities to push for central ideas. This initiative illustrates multilateralism as a case of 'the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states' as it has been defined by Robert Keohane.[38]

An important aspect of the Obuchi influence on the style of foreign policy decision-making was that the establishment of the CHS was very much a private initiative.[39] The way it was established and worked was similar to the approach Obuchi had used when the 21st Century Commission was set up. This kind of *ad hoc* committee had not been uncommon in Japanese politics in recent decades but differed from most previous ones in their composition. A member of the 21st Century Commission told me that it was very different taking part in its deliberations compared to a *shingikai*, since private citizens and not bureaucrats were responsible for its work.[40]

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[37] Amitav Acharya, 'Multilateralism: Is there an Asia–Pacific Way? Multilateralism: Structure Versus Process', *NBR Analysis* 8:2 (May 1997), p. 5. See also Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective', in Katzenstein and Shiraishi, eds, *Network Power*, p. 27. On the lack of institutions in Asia Pacific, see Akiko Fukushima, 'Japan's Emerging View of Security Multilateralism in Asia', in Ralph Cossa and Akiko Fukushima, eds, *Security Multilateralism in Asia: Views from the United States and Japan*, University of California, Multi-Campus Research Unit, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, *IGCC Policy Papers* (June 1999), p. 25.

[38] Robert O. Keohane, 'Multilateralism: an agenda for research', *International Journal* 45:4 (Autumn 1990), p. 731.

[39] Takemi Keizō, interview, 11 March 2004.

[40] Personal communication from a member of the Commission.

Popular Participation

A survey of the literature shows that the conventional interpretation is that foreign policy is an elite process, dominated by the executive in all developed states.[41] Policy-making is seen as an elite affair by nature and necessity. This is the case of Japan's post-war foreign policy as it was once conceived. Its legacy goes back to the Meiji era. The foreign ministry was part of the bureaucracy organized after the 1868 Meiji Restoration when a centralized administrative system was introduced in Japan in its bid to catch up with Western countries. Japan's foreign policy as re-constructed during the occupation years carries the personal insignia of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who began his career as a diplomat during the Meiji era and was a top diplomat before the Second World War. His *modus operandi* was bureaucratic and autocratic and he was led by his belief that foreign policy should be handled by specialists, that is, diplomats and foreign ministry bureaucrats. Obuchi's introduction of human security as a key element of Japan's foreign policy went against foreign policy à la Yoshida. Responsibility for turning the human security idea into practical policies was intended not to rest wholly with govern-mental agencies. With its introduction, Obuchi's intention was clearly to increase the influence of civil society on policy formation and increase the participation of NGOs. According to Yamamoto Tadashi, 'the crucial role of nongovernmental organizations and other civil society actors in devel-oping, advocating, building, and implementing human security [is perhaps] one characteristic that distinguishes human security from tradi-tional security.'[42] Since NGOs are an important expression of civil soci-ety, their involvement meant that foreign policy formulation and imple-mentation went from being an elite process to a process based on popular participation. It could be seen as an expression for what Brian Hocking describes as catalytic diplomacy – the symbiosis between the activities of state and non-state representatives in which new kinds of actors deal with new kinds of issues in new ways, to capture the situation where states are

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[41] William Wallace, *Foreign Policy and the Political Process* (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 40.
[42] Yamamoto, 'Human Security – From Concept to Action', p. 7.

joined by other actors on the international stage, such as local and regional governments, large companies and NGOs.[43]

When Obuchi's decision to introduce human security into foreign policy was implemented, the intention was to make private individuals central actors.[44] This was a new aspect of the role that the non-governmental sector could play, away from the policy-maling 'tripod'. It was an attempt to take into account, or take advantage of, the quest for larger popular participation in national decision-making that followed the upsurge of NGO strength in the wake of the failure of the central authorities to handle problems caused by the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995. This upsurge of popular participation meant a strengthening of the current of idealism in Japanese politics and, thus, influenced the view on which stance Japan should take on international issues and the role that the country should play in the international community.

There were precedents. Over the decades in the post-war period, developments away from MOFA having the upper hand in matters of foreign policy were apparent. While the ministry played a key role in the management of foreign policy, foreign policy activities not handled by it emerged. Outbursts of 'people's diplomacy', *kokumin gaikō*, were evident periodically.[45] Opposition parties were involved in external relations to such an extent that the term 'opposition party diplomacy', *yatō gaikō*, was in sway. These parties had played a complementary role in foreign policy in relations with countries difficult for representatives of the Japanese government to visit.[46] MP associations, LDP factions, individual MPs and political heavyweights were also involved in promoting relations with other countries.[47] Shortly after the CHS presented its report, moves were taken in the Diet to further human security, when Takemi Keizō and other

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[43] Brian Hocking, 'Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond "Newness" and "Decline"', in Jan Melissen, ed., *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 21–42.

[44] Inoguchi, 'Globalization and Japan's Foreign Policy', p. 164.

[45] See, e.g., 'Kokumin no gaikō' kenkyūkai, ed., *Sengo Nihon seiji gaikōshi* [A history of post-war Japanese political foreign policy] (Tokyo: San'ichi shobō, 1967).

[46] Nakano Kunimi, 'Gaikō ni okeru kokkai no yakuwari' [The role of the Diet in foreign policy], in Nakano Kunimi, ed., *Kokkai to gaikō* [The Diet and foreign policy] (Tokyo: Shinsansha, 1997), pp. 26f.

[47] Kohno, *In Search of Proactive Diplomacy*.

parliamentarians formed The Parliamentary League for the Promotion of Preventive Diplomacy and Human Security with a membership of around 170.[48]

Intellectual Dialogue

The idea of intellectual dialogue as the basis of the CHS has been described by Fukushima Akiko as the 'ultimate expression' of Obuchi's human security legacy.[49] Japan's drive for human security initiated by him had intellectual dialogue as one of its hallmarks. He was an ardent proponent of the idea of dialogue which he saw as contributing to identifying commonalities and developing a conceptual foundation uniting participating parties. In his address at a conference in 1998, Obuchi remarked that 'the most important thing is for intellectuals to gather across national borders and share their confidence toward the future based on the common aspirations emerging from their intellectual dialogue.'[50] As reported by Yamamoto Tadashi, Obuchi was convinced 'that government alone can't translate the concept of human security into reality, and that this can be done only with the help of intellectual dialogue and civil society.'[51] Resting on 'the habits of dialogue', participants acknowledge the long-term benefits of undertaking regular consultations.[52] He took advantage of the movement for creating dialogues emerging in the Asia Pacific, with governmental and non-governmental dialogues proliferating. A number of initiatives were taken to create such habits of dialogue 'to overcome security dilemmas and misperceptions and to forge closer political, economic and social ties between states.'[53] In his Singapore speech in May 1988, Obuchi proposed that a conference should be convened focusing on the

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[48] Minami, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō to Nihon gaikō', p. 49.

[49] Fukushima, 'Human Security and Japanese Foreign Policy', p. 146.

[50] Obuchi, 'Opening Remarks', p. 19.

[51] Comment by Yamamoto Tadashi at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 7.

[52] David B. Dewitt and Amitav Acharya, 'Cooperative Security and Development Assistance: The Relationship Between Security and Development With Reference to Eastern Asia', *Eastern Asia Policy Papers* 16 (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1996), pp. 9–10.

[53] David Capie, 'Rival Regions? East Asian Regionalism and Its Challenge to the Asia–Pacific', in Jim Rolfe, ed., *The Asia–Pacific: A Region in Transition* (Honolulu, HI: Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 150.

'Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow'. The purpose was to mobilize the intellectual assets and resourcefulness of each country for peace and prosperity of the Asian region. Subsequently, this conference took place in December 1998 in Tokyo, followed by similar conferences in Singapore 1999, Bangkok 2000, Kisarazu (Japan) in 2002, and Tokyo in 2003.

Think-tanks

The important role assigned by Obuchi to the input of intellectuals into the policy-making process was complemented by the role played by think-tanks. That think-tanks play an important role for supplying policy ideas is a fairly recent phenomenon in Japan.[54] A Japanese think-tank that played a vital role in making human security palatable to Japanese policy-makers was the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), headed by Yamamoto Tadashi, a long-term and influential political entrepreneur.[55] Yamamoto was a central promoter of human security in Japan, both in front of cameras and behind the scenes. The JCIE organizes scores of conferences and seminars and publishes extensively. Its role resembles that of think-tanks in the United States by generating new ideas for government officials.[56] The key role that the JCIE president played was alluded to by Takemi Keizō in a speech at a meeting of the Trilateral Commission in 2000. Takemi revealed that efforts for the construction of intellectual networks were made at the initiative of Yamamoto.[57] When Obuchi established the 21st Century Commission, Yamamoto was both a member of the Commission as well as its executive director.[58] After Obuchi disclosed his idea of institutionalizing intellectual exchange on human security during his speech in Singapore in May 1998, he asked

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[54] Hook et al., *Japan's International Relations*, p. 62; Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, *The Frontier Within*, p. 169.

[55] A brief survey of Yamamoto Tadashi's activities is found in Sengo Nihon kokusai bunka kōryū kenkyūkai, *Sengo Nihon no kokusai bunka kōryū*, pp. 197–203.

[56] Cf. Richard N. Haass, 'Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker's Perspective', *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda: An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State* 7:3 (November 2002), p. 7.

[57] Takemi, 'Approach to the Mounting Concern of Human Security', p. 47.

[58] Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, *The Frontier Within*, p. 11.

Yamamoto to organize a conference focusing on intellectual dialogue, which took place half a year later in Tokyo. At the second such conference in Bangkok in June 2000, an informal group was formed to explore the possibility of creating an independent human security commission. One of the members of this group was Yamamoto. When MOFA could not provide the money needed for establishing the CHS because of what Yamamoto characterized as its 'bureaucratic rigidity', he secured funding from the Rockefeller Foundation.[59] Furthermore, when Ogata Sadako had been identified as the most suitable chairperson of the CHS, Yamamoto was assigned the task 'to try to persuade her to come on board'.[60]

Elevated Personalities

The CHS resembled an *ad hoc* consultative or deliberative *shingikai*, a council assigned the task to handle politically sensitive issues and/or come up with policy proposals. The CHS differed from an ordinary *shingikai* of that type in that it was internationally composed, with members who were private individuals elected in the capacity of being what James Der Derian called 'elevated personalities'.[61] Behind the establishment of the CHS was the idea that the personal prestige and international credibility of the two co-chairs and the commissioners would contribute to the acceptance of the proposals and ideas that the CHS might come up with but also would result in goodwill for Japan. The composition of the CHS had an interesting side-effect that might, or might not, have been intended. In an analysis of Japan's security policy, Michael Green has pointed out that 'The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum create the impression of international activism for Japan, without the risk attendant with international actions.'[62] The same effect can be seen linked to Japan's mobilization of elevated personalities

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[59] Yamamoto Tadashi, interview, 11 March 2004.

[60] Comment by Takemi Keizō at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 6. As already noted, Yamamoto did not succeed so Prime Minister Mori stepped in himself and persuaded Ogata to take on the task (Iokibe Makoto, interview, 18 November 2006).

[61] James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 203

[62] Michael J. Green, 'State of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy', *AccessAsia Review* 2:1 (September 1998), pp. 12f.

in its pursuit of human security. Elevated personalities function as an anti-dote to the problem that Japanese foreign policy experienced of being renowned for its faceless [*kao ga mienai*] stance. Due to its historical past, Japan encounters restrictions, perceived or real, in the way it can act internationally. Eminent persons acting in their personal capacity but seen as representatives of Japan create the impression that it is Japan that is active without the Japanese government having to be actually involved. This effect was noted in a UN context, where the work of high-ranking officials like Ogata Sadako, Akashi Yasushi and Nakajima Hiroshi has even been seen to result in a Japanese 'overpresence' in the world body.[63] A well-known case is Akashi Yasushi who served as the special representative of the UN in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia. He was so important for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), that he 'was' UNTAC.[64] The most representative name in this respect is Ogata Sadako. Appointing her as the co-chair of the CHS was a clever way of using elevated personalities. She is Japan's leading spokesperson for the United Nations, alongside Akashi, with a long and distinguished career behind her as a high-ranking official in the world organization. Despite Japan being virtually closed to refugees, Ogata's activities gave Japan credentials as a refugee-friendly country.[65] Her popularity contributed in making human security a buzz-word in Japan and neutralizing the scepticism and even resistance that existed in, for instance, the foreign ministry.[66]

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[63] Oshidari Kenrō et al, 'Zadankai: 21 seiki no Kokuren wa ningen no anzen hoshō o mezasu', p. 45.

[64] Hugo Dobson, *Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: Pressures and Responses* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 97.

[65] According to the *World Refugee Survey 2004*, there were some 900 refugees and asylum seekers in Japan at the end of 2003. During 2003, Japan granted 10 persons asylum and 16 persons long-term residence permits based on humanitarian considerations. Some 190 claims were pending before the government at the end of the year. See U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, *World Refugee Survey 2004*, http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=123 (downloaded 30 January 2006).

[66] Minami, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō to Nihon gaikō', p. 44.

Conference Diplomacy

Japan has exhibited a predilection for conference diplomacy, defined as the 'part of the management of relations between governments and of relations between governments and international organizations that takes place in international conferences.'[67] Conference diplomacy has grown in importance among countries in the Asia Pacific and created an arena for dialogue with Japan emerging as one of its prime movers. Over the years, a long list of initiatives have profiled Japan as a driving force for cooperation on development assistance, the environment, nuclear disarmament, arms control, etc.[68] Obuchi was an ardent supporter of the conference and dialogue approach to international collaboration and it became a vital component of his diplomacy. In his Singapore speech in 1998, he pointed out the importance of promoting intellectual interaction 'to mobilize diverse intellectual assets and resourcefulness of the region to respond to the challenges threatening peace and prosperity of the region. Fusion of creative ideas, facilitated by region-wide cooperation, should produce new policy initiatives for the new century.'[69] The centrality of this idea is shown by the fact that the conference on human security organized in Tokyo in December 1998 was convened under the theme 'intellectual dialogue on building Asia's tomorrow'. Promoting and hosting international conferences on human security signalled the intention of the Japanese government to carve itself a niche in international affairs in a human security context. The Tokyo conference became the first in a series of conferences convening under the banner of 'intellectual dialogue', which served to institutionalize the exchange of ideas targeting human security. Extensive use of conference diplomacy became one of Obuchi's legacies and was also an integral part of the work of the CHS.

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[67] Johan Kaufmann, *Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 7.
[68] Kohno, *In Search of Proactive Diplomacy*.
[69] Obuchi, 'Tōnan Ajia shokoku hōmon no sai no Obuchi gaimudaijin seisaku enzetsu'.

Concluding Remarks

In many ways, human security was Obuchi's baby and it became a key element of 'the Obuchi foreign policy'. The introduction of this concept into the political agenda was one of the cases where Obuchi engaged in personal leadership. A consensus man and a master at managing a factionalised party and building coalitions, his preferred option was not to stand on the barricades, but in the case of human security he did just that. The acclaim he met with when he decided to take personal charge of changing Japan's policy on landmines might have been one reason for his resolve to make human security a key consideration when Japan's long-term foreign policy was formulated. Pushing for human security, he used existing structures and institutions but also created new ones. A number of instruments were used in the pursuit of human security. Seen in isolation from each other, many of them were not new to the Japanese foreign policy system – but the mix was.

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

Keeping the Old while Adding the New

In an essay published in 1998, Japan's leading scholar on his country's diplomatic history, Ikei Masaru, discussed the challenges faced by Japan in the post-Cold War era. He concluded: 'What is required of Japan facing the twenty-first century is not to be "a giant without a face" expanding only its economy, but to be a country developing a foreign policy with a clear idea and philosophy.'[1] In hindsight, his remark pinpointed a development in the wings. Not long after Ikei's essay was published, Japan was seen to make a decisive effort to launch such 'a clear idea', when human security was presented by Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō as a lodestar for Japan's foreign policy. It was an idea that resonated with the Japanese for whom – well versed in the thinking of the Meiji statesmen as they are – it was but a short step to embrace the idea of human security which advocates that security is dependent on many factors. It was not particularly surprising to the Japanese that security could not rely solely on military might. One of the premises for national security, as the Japanese see it, is the century-and-a-half old insight of the crucial role played by economic factors. The idea of human security was also easy to accept for broad strata of Japanese society heavily imbued as they are by pacifism.[2] Nor was it a big jump from the concept of human security, as outlined in the 1994 UNDP report, to the idea of comprehensive security as presented by

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[1] Ikei Masaru, 'Rekishi ni miru Nihon gaikō' [Japan's foreign policy in the light of history], in Soeya Yoshihide and Akagi Kanji, eds, *Reisengo no kokusai seiji: Jissen, seisaku, riron* [International politics after the Cold War: Practices, policies, theories] (Tokyo: Keiō gijuku daigaku shuppankai, 1998), p. 179.
[2] Inada, 'Kaihatsu-fukkō ni okeru "ningen no anzen hoshō" ron no igi to genkai', p. 31.

the Inoki group.[3] Both concepts take into account economic and social aspects of security in addition to military ones and rely on the idea that security is about protecting people from various types of threats. The similarities of the two concepts are so striking that a Japanese think-tank claimed that 'human security is a form of comprehensive security related to people's daily lives.'[4] The Japanese could not help noting the similarity of the idea of human security and the evocation in the preamble of the revered Japanese constitution that 'all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want'.[5] Since Japan's post-war constitution outlaws the use of violence for solving international conflict, the new security concept captivated some of Japan's foreign policy-makers.

Obuchi Keizō's Feat

The key person for securing a place on Japan's political agenda for human security is Obuchi Keizō, who became prime minister when his party's popularity was at a nadir and his own reputation not much better. His abysmal reputation improved during his time in power. One reason for his improved standing in public opinion was that he received the credit when the Japanese noticed that their economy fared relatively well compared to the years after 'the bubble' burst, because of the sizeable economic packages that the Obuchi government put in place to get Japan out of the doldrums. But part of the story behind his image change for the better was that he turned out to be a premier who was efficient in representing Japanese interests internationally. Most notable were his encounters with Kim Dae-jung and Jiang Zemin; the first a showpiece of good will, the latter testifying to the Japanese that Obuchi did not accept Japan being bullied. The Japanese also looked favourably on the fact that he emerged as a premier with ideas on how Japan could make an interna-

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[3] Ogata Sadako, *Watashi no shigoto* [My work] (Tokyo: Sōshisha, 2002), p. 18.
[4] NIRA, 'Human Security: Examining the Role of Civil Society', *NIRA Policy Research* 14:5 (2001), http://www.nira.go.jp/newse/research/a147.html (downloaded 1 October 2003).
[5] Dan Yusuke, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō to hokutōajia no chiikishugi: Kokka shuken no ato ni kuru moderu' [Human security and regionalism in Northeast Asia: A model after sovereignty], *Human security* 8 (2003/2004), p. 362.

tional contribution that had the potential to improve its international standing.

Obuchi's launch of human security as a key concern for Japan can be seen as taking advantage of the window of opportunity created by the Asian economic crisis. The crisis sweeping the region in 1997–98 made a larger role for Japan more palatable to its neighbours, since it was using economic clout to raise its position, not military means like ordinary powers. Human security was made a central aspect of Japanese aid policy and, since ODA is a key instrument in Japan's foreign policy, human security became an outlet for the Japanese government's efforts to carve a niche for Japan in international affairs and improve understanding for its ambition to gain international recognition.

It was not only the economic crisis ravaging Asia that was the impetus for Obuchi to take action. The fundamentals of his worldview had been shaped by an extensive around-the-world journey in his youth. Obuchi showed that he was equal to the occasion and had leadership qualities. In a way his feat brought to mind former Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro's comment on the task of political leaders: 'Changing history is the job of political leaders. […] Leaders need, more than anything else, a strong determination to change history, as well as the power of imagination and action. […] A grand plan is needed – to move mountains instead of small hills.'[6] Hosokawa was to be short-lived as prime minister but he was instrumental in changing Japan's electoral system in a way that at first seemed minor but later was to cause an overhaul of Japanese politics and made him a historical figure.[7] Obuchi's introduction of human security had the same potential.

The Ups and Downs of Human Security

The analysis presented in preceding chapters shows that Japan's pursuit of human security had its ups and downs during the period studied. Vacillation is evident in the annual reports on foreign policy released by

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[6] Morihiro Hosokawa, 'Dispel the end-of-era mood', *The Japan Times*, 20 May 2002.

[7] Bert Edström, 'Japan i brytningstid' [Transition period for Japan], *Internationella studier* 1994:2, pp. 59–70.

the Japanese government. All issues after 1998 of the *Diplomatic Blue-book* include a section on human security. In the 1999 issue released shortly after Obuchi had launched human security as a key endeavour for Japanese foreign policy, it is presented in the latter part of the report as part of developmental policies. In the 2000 issue, human security was dealt with as part of Efforts toward the Realization of a Better Global Society, which is included in the second chapter entitled Sectoral Analysis of the International Situation and Japan's Foreign Policy. In the 2001 issue, presentation of human security efforts was moved to the General Overview in the beginning of the report, in the section dealing with the United Nations, especially UN reform, which had long been a matter of concern to Japan. In the 2002 issue, human security was dealt with in the General Overview as part of the section on Main Efforts by the International Community. In the 2003 issue, the description of human security covers almost all issues dealt with in a sub-section of Efforts in Global Issues. Two subjects are covered – the CHS and the TFHS.

The change in how human security has been handled also comes to prominence when one scrutinizes how Japanese representatives dealt with it in the most important international arena, the United Nations. Table 6 presents the frequency of statements and speeches in UN committees and venues listed as 'important' on the homepage of the Japanese mission to the UN in which the term 'human security' has been used by Japanese representatives. The attention paid to human security varies, revealing that after an initial spurt, attention diminished. Based on Table 6, it is hard to claim that human security has been a top priority for Japan in the United Nations except for two years, 1999 and 2000. The decrease in interest that can be observed may be explained by two factors. First, the CHS was intended by the Japanese government to be a key vehicle in its pursuit of human security. The CHS was established within the UN and it is not unreasonable to think that when the commission was at work the Japanese government was waiting for its findings and proposals. Secondly, the '11 September' terrorist attacks changed the international political climate.

Prime Minister Koizumi initiated an all-out support of the United States which reduced opportunities for attention to be paid to human security. Shinoda Hideaki noted in a survey article on Japan's human security policy published in 2004: 'Since September 2001, the Japanese government has not simply emphasized its commitments to human security. Japa-

Table 6   **Important Japanese Statements and Speeches in the UN Containing the Term 'Human Security', 1997–June 2003**

Year	Total number of Speeches (A)	Human security mentioned (B)	B/A (%)
1997	12	1	8
1998	9	0	0
1999	38	10	26
2000	22	7	35
2001	39	4	10
2002	30	2	7
2003*	14	1	7

* Until 3 June

Source: Bert Edström, 'Japan's Concept of Human Security: A Move Beyond State Security?', paper presented at the Triennial Conference of the European Association for Japanese Studies, Warsaw, 27–30 August 2003, p. 16.

nese foreign policy makers seem to be preoccupied with how to keep up with the military actions of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq as the US's major ally.'[8] Maybe this was the reason for the fact that when the CHS report was translated into Japanese, it was given the title *Anzen hoshō no konnichiteki kadai*, or 'Today's Issues of National Security', which does not suggest in any way that the report focused on human security.

Human Security and Japan's Foreign Policy

The hop, step, jump by which human security was introduced into Japanese politics were Obuchi's speeches in Singapore in May 1998, and in Tokyo and Hanoi in December the same year. The introduction of this new and fresh idea was intended by him to add an important element to policies conducted by the Japanese government. This ambition is noteworthy since the literature, scholarly as well as popular, abounds with

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[8] Hideaki Shinoda, 'The Concept of Human Security: Historical and Theoretical Implications', in Shinoda and Jeong, eds, *Conflict and Human Security*, p. 20.

descriptions of how Japanese foreign policy has remained unchanged since its formative years in the early post-war years. The well-known expert on Japanese foreign policy Frank Langdon assessed the situation the year before Obuchi's announcement: 'What is striking about Japan's behaviour', Langdon wrote in 1997, 'is the extent to which it remains in close accord with the goals and approaches of the last fifty years despite the kaleidoscopic changes of domestic party politics and economic restructuring as well as changing regional and global conditions to which Japan is subjected in the nineties.'[9]

The introduction of human security is a case of an innovation introduced into foreign policy, which resulted in modification of that policy. The way it was done was in line with the experiences of other countries. It is natural and expedient to emphasize policies that have been found effective. Internationally, the establishment of human security programmes tended to continue pre-existing lines of activity and to be consistent with existing strategies.[10] Given Japan's financial muscle, it is easy to understand that freedom from want was an aspect of human freedom, where the country was seen to be able to contribute effectively. This was, basically, Obuchi's idea when he brought up human security. According to Ogata Sadako: 'Obuchi's idea tended to take "freedom from want" as its starting point, but people like me, who have worked amid conflict, tend to put "freedom from fear" first. Both approaches are necessary, but we still were not able to couple them firmly.'[11] This shift in how human security was viewed is interesting considering the strong emphasis that Japanese spokespersons have put on both branches of human security advocated by the UNDP.

The importance of human security to Obuchi and a number of other Japanese policy-makers was not so much a question of the concept being new but that it represented a useful approach to security. The general view was that human security does not replace the traditional concept of

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[9] Frank Langdon, 'Japan's Regional and Global Coalition Participation: Political and Economic Aspects', The University of British Columbia, Institute of International Relations, *Working Paper* 14 (June 1997), p. 1.

[10] Paula Gutlove and Gordon Thompson, 'Human Security: Expanding the Scope of Public Health', *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 19:1 (January 2003), http://www.irss-usa.org/pages/documents/MCS_HandHS.pdf (downloaded 26 December 2005).

[11] Comment by Ogata Sadako at 'Roundtable: How to Safeguard People's Freedom', p. 9.

national security. To the extent that they were sympathetic to the idea of human security, they saw it as complementing, not replacing the traditional security concept, namely national security. This idea was already evident in Prime Minister Murayama's speech in 1995 in the United Nations. It was a view that was in accordance with what was to emerge as the mainstream international discourse on human security. This thinking fitted mainstream thinking in Japan on security and defence. Well-established Japanese notions of security make it a multilayered concept and not only a question of military strength. Of course security, in terms of the traditional military-based national security, is a key element of the security of states but – as has been increasingly made clear by the development of conflicts – maltreatment of people and gross violations of human rights can easily result in situations that endanger the security of both states and people. Obuchi with his compassion for the vulnerable felt at home with the new security concept.

Human security is a concept that fits Japan's predilection for quiet diplomacy and long-held norm of anti-militarism.[12] The human security policy that took shape gradually, combined revitalized chequebook diplomacy with initiatives to promote multilateral efforts. Takemi Keizō has been at pains to make clear that there is a natural link from human security to foreign policy including ODA which was central for Japan in its attempt to have a say in international affairs. ODA is an instrument not only for improving the plight of the distressed but also for making Japan a respectable actor in international affairs.[13] According to two key administrators of the Japanese policy for human security, the pursuit of human security was seen to make it possible for Japan to make 'a great contribution' intellectually and financially to international society. It constituted a rejuvenation of chequebook diplomacy and enabled the country to take the initiative to participate in rulemaking in a global context.[14] In this way, human security opened up the prospect of Japan improving its international standing.

After some years, from being at the forefront of Japanese foreign policy in the way envisaged by Obuchi, human security was not discussed in Japan as a 'pillar' or a principle of foreign policy, but in terms of ODA

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[12] Hook et al., *Japan's International Relations*, p. 288.

[13] Takemi, 'A New Direction for Japan's Aid Program', p. 24.

[14] Tase and Takemi, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō to Nihon no yakuwari', pp. 147f.

and developmental policies. It was even made 'pillar' of Japan's ODA policies when the 1992 ODA Charter was revised in 2003. This downgrading of human security as a priority should not necessarily be seen as a setback for Japanese proponents of the new security concept, however, since it meant that human security had secured a place in governmental policies. At a seminar organized by the World Bank in 2004, Takemi Keizō assessed what had been achieved:

[F]rom the perspective of a politician, I can say that this human security is so large and lofty a concept that now we have revised the course of our policy based on this new concept. However, we must understand that such policies are now being implemented by government officials. I think it is quite difficult to implement what is written on paper and we sometimes face a dilemma or difficulties in translating concepts into action. Therefore, we would like to see the establishment of the policy making process as we expected as quickly as possible, so that we can see the growth of human security concept to be utilized for policy making.[15]

Takemi should not have had reason to worry too much over Japanese efforts to 'translate concepts into action' as far as human security is concerned. The person in charge of carrying out policies for human security was Ogata Sadako, who had been a key figure for making human security a buzz-word in Japan.[16] On 1 October 2003, she was appointed Director-General of JICA, the agency responsible for putting into practice the ODA policies of the Japanese government. In a situation where the Japanese ODA budget continues to be trimmed, her appointment raised awareness and understanding of Japan's aid efforts.[17] Ogata was the greatest guarantee possible that JICA will also become a key agency for pursuing human security.

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[15] 'World Bank Public Seminar on Human Security & Sustainable Development: Achieving results through social progress, 29 July 2004, Tokyo, Japan (Transcript)', p. 10, http://www.worldbank.or.jp/02event/01seminar/pdf_ss/ss25_tran script_eng.pdf.
[16] Minami, 'Ningen no anzen hoshō to Nihon gaikō', p. 44.
[17] 'JICA Chief Ogata to give Japanese aid "human face"', *Nikkei Weekly*, 6 October 2003.

Vagueness vs Pragmatism

Soon after its launch, human security as a concept began to be criticized for vagueness, and political scientists rushed to identify its inherent weaknesses. In this process, one saw what Fen Osler Hampson and John Hay describe as 'the evident inability of scholars to advance beyond theoretical debates over definitions toward practical policy recommendations [which] understandably frustrates practitioners in the policy community.'[18] Interestingly enough, the discourse in countries playing leading roles in the pursuit of human security was heading in the opposite direction. For Japanese, Norwegian and Canadian policy-makers advocating human security, the scholarly disputes around the human security concept and the inability of scholars to reach consensus on its 'real' meaning was not a problem. As has been argued by Mirko Zambelli, 'no absolute definition [of human security] is needed for flexibility has to be left to the political choices of today and tomorrow [...] a "correct" definition in a social context may very well be "incorrect" in another context.'[19] In their survey of literature on security, Ann Florini and P. J. Simmons noted: 'It is not clear that much is gained by continuing to debate what to include under the rubric of "security." Too much disagreement exists about whose security matters, about how the various new "threats" interact, and about where policy interventions could be most effective. These disagreements will not readily resolve themselves. Addressing them directly might prove a more fruitful avenue than debating how to label the category.'[20] These researchers formulated a view that has pervaded Japanese thinking on the subject. The question of vagueness did not bother Japanese advocates of human security. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and they found the new security concept useful as a policy tool.

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[18] Fen Osler Hampson and John B. Hay, 'Human Security: A Review of the Scholarly Literature', *The Human Security Bulletin* 1:2 (2002), p. 3.

[19] Mirko Zambelli, 'Putting People at the Centre of the International Agenda: The Human Security Approach', *Die Friedens-Warte: Journal of International Peace and Organization* 77:1–2 (2002), http://hei.unige.ch/ped/docs/Human-security.doc (downloaded 27 May 2003).

[20] Ann M. Florini and P. J. Simmons, *The New Security Thinking: A Review of the North American Literature* (Washington, DC: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1998), p. 44.

In her keynote speech at the international get-together that resulted in the Lysøen Declaration, Ogata Sadako pointed out that human security is not an abstract idea; it is a real, tangible need. One should not look at human security purely from the point of view of theory and definition, but rather determine what practical steps and measures enable us to maintain people in, or restore them to, a state of security. In other words, human security should be a conceptual tool that leads to action.[21] 'The Japanese instinct is to take each situation as it comes', writes John Campbell.[22] Obuchi, Takemi and other Japanese policy-makers allowed themselves to disagree with those who discarded the human security concept because of its vagueness. They took a pragmatic and flexible approach to what human security 'actually' means and sought to implement it regardless of criticism levelled against it.[23]

To Obuchi and Takemi, human security was both a vision as well as a practical tool. Far from being vague to the limit of meaninglessness as some critics of the new security concept maintained, it was seen by them as a useful instrument. To Takemi, what the UNDP had presented with its new security concept revealed a call for a change in thinking. Human security is, he argues, 'a mindset'.[24] He pointed out the pragmatism characterizing the activities of the Japanese government: 'In essence, in addressing the individual issues of development and global problems based on the concern of individual capability as a contention raised in learned debate, the government has laid down human security as a definite orientation and purpose in the process of drafting and executing policies rooted in real problems.'[25] There were real problems that had to be tackled by concrete measures, and the alleged endemic vagueness and expansiveness of human security criticized by scholars were seen instead as openings for flexibility and pragmatism when responses to upcoming problems

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[21] Ogata, 'Human Security: A Refugee Perspective'.
[22] John C. Campbell, 'Japan and the United States: Games that Work', in Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, p. 55.
[23] Lam Peng Er, 'Japan's Human Security Role in Southeast Asia', *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 28:1 (April 2006), p. 145.
[24] Takemi Keizō, interview, 11 March 2004. Cf. Kyle Grayson, 'Re-evaluating Public Goods: Human Security in the Global Era', York University, Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, *Robarts Working Papers*, http://www.robarts.yorku.ca/pdf/kylefin.pdf 08/28/01 (downloaded 1 October 2003).
[25] Takemi, 'Approach to the Mounting Concern of Human Security', p. 45.

had to be devised.[26] The high-ranking MOFA official Ueda Hideaki argued that 'rather than engaging in a hundred discussions about what the concept means, it is far better to implement projects in practice.'[27] This pragmatic Japanese approach had prominent supporters. In a speech in Tokyo in 1999, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan backed the pragmatic Japanese approach: 'I know there are some who worry that the word "security" suggests a military mind-set. But as my friend Yukio Satoh, Japan's Ambassador to the United Nations, has said, "defining the term is less important than drawing increased international attention to issues endangering the life and dignity of human beings."'[28]

The fluidity of the human security concept found in the international literature on security resulted in the situation where the human security agenda had no definite shape but reflected the agendas of governments, international organizations and aid organizations using the concept.[29] This made a researcher like Tye Ferrell argue that 'as countries like Japan and Canada attempt to incorporate the concept and implement human security, they define it somewhat arbitrarily, presumably to ensure that it conforms to their foreign policy and development agendas.'[30] Ferrell's claim is fairly meaningless, however. Representatives of the Japanese government 'have to face up to a number of contemporary realities – domestic and external – with the tools available to them.'[31] While human security à la Obuchi was based on the idea prevalent in the international discourse on security, it got a distinctly Japanese look in the Japanese context. Human security is multi-faceted and Obuchi saw that the trick was to pick measures and activities that reflected Japan's comparative advantages.[32] This resulted in a domestication of the concept. Human security exemplifies

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[26] Edström, 'Japan's foreign policy and human security', p. 221.

[27] Ueda, 'Ima naze "ningen no anzen hoshō" na no ka', p. 69.

[28] Annan, 'Japan's World Role in the Twenty-first Century'.

[29] Inada, 'Kaihatsu-fukkō ni okeru "ningen no anzen hoshō" ron no igi to genkai', p. 31.

[30] Tye Ferrell, 'The Conflict Resolution Overlap: Class 12. The Concept of Human Security', *The Fletcher School, Institute for Human Security, Seminar Discussion Paper*, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/humansecurity/pdf/Ferrell.pdf (downloaded 27 May 2003).

[31] Gilson and Purvis, 'Japan's pursuit of human security', p. 200.

[32] Cf. Sabine Alkire, 'A Conceptual Framework for Human Security', Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford, *CRISE Working Paper* 2 (2002), p. 10.

how an international norm was modified and adapted when it was introduced into the Japanese context, in short, Japanized. In the international discourse on ideas of human security, several versions are found which added to the vagueness linked to the UNDP concept. Vagueness suited the Japanese predilection for ambiguity and was seen to make the new security concept a potent idea for uniting governments, people, organizations and individuals around a worthy cause.

The Rocky Road of Collaboration

Rather than viewing human security as a concept that was not particularly useful because of its vagueness, this aspect was deemed a strength by Japanese proponents. The attempts to come up with a clear-cut definition was not too much of a concern. Participating in an international conference on development, the profiled and eloquent spokesman for human security Takemi Keizō pointed out that 'if we join hands and put our backs into the work before us, in the field of development and in other fields as well, and see our efforts pay off in a gradual accumulation of positive accomplishments, this in itself will give real meaning to the words "human security".'[33] This pragmatic stance made it natural for the Japanese government to base its policy on collaboration. Obuchi outlined a strategy envisaging collaboration in domestic, bilateral and multilateral contexts. His idea was to institute coordinated action by the international community as well as to strengthen the links and cooperation of governments and international organizations with citizen's activities. Collaboration in the domestic context focused on collaboration with NGOs and other organizations as well as individuals active in the broadly defined field of human security; collaboration in the bilateral context was to be enacted by collaboration with like-minded countries; while multilateral collaboration on human security was to be furthered by the creation of the TFHS and the CHS.

The road to collaboration was bumpy, however. In the domestic context, collaboration was troubled and lacked the growing symbiosis between the activities of the state and non-state representatives that took place internationally. Human security is a vision of security centring on

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[33] Takemi, 'New Forms of Development toward the 21st Century'.

people, but what has happened in the field does not fit Inoguchi Takashi's assertion that part of Japanese style human security is to make not states but individuals central actors. That might have been Obuchi's intention but it did not turn out that way in practice. It is hard to claim that Japanese human security activities have been shouldered by individuals. Popular involvement in formulation and execution of the human security policy has been limited. The agents carrying out Japanese policies have been officials rather than NGOs, in the way intended by Obuchi. To base formulation and implementation of the human security policy on popular participation went against habits ingrained in the foreign policy decision-making system founded by the autocratic elitist Yoshida Shigeru in the initial post-war years. In fact, MOFA acted in such a way that the inherently human-centred human security ends up as state-centred in policies pursued by Japan.

Given the facts that human security became increasingly prominent on the international security agenda and was introduced into foreign policy by a number of countries, it would be natural to expect quite intensive international collaboration on human security involving Japan. Such broad-based collaboration was not forthcoming, however. Despite the general unanimity of views among governments supporting human security, collaboration was much easier to advocate than to accomplish.

The case of Japan and Canada illustrates the fact that the common road forward was bumpy even when there was a basic unity as to what human security entails and there was a political will among parties to collaborate. Despite the fact that Japan and Canada were prolific proponents of human security and declared that it was a key element of foreign policy, collaboration did not take off. Japan did not become a member of the Human Security Network organized by Canada and a number of other countries, and no Canadian became a member of the CHS, when it was established by the Japanese government and given the task of coming up with proposals for policies to be implemented by the international community. The pursuit of human security by the two countries demonstrates that like-mindedness is not enough if the will to collaborate is offset by a reluctance to adjust different points of view.

A year after the CHS had begun its work, the leading Japanese daily *Asahi shimbun* editorialized its displeasure with the Japanese government's efforts towards collaboration: 'How about Japan participating as an

observer in the forthcoming meeting of the [Human Security] Network in Chile in July? Human security is still an evolving diplomatic idea. For this very reason, Japan should proceed and participate in the multilateral discussion.'[34] Considering the fact that this editorial was published in May 2002, when the work of the CHS was underway and the work of the Human Security Network in full swing, the view aired by this influential newspaper is ironic and pinpoints the failure to lay differences of opinion aside. This became an obstacle to realizing Obuchi's vision that the pursuit of human security should be founded on collaboration.

Despite its declarations of a willingness to collaborate, a going-it-alone stance by the Japanese government can be discerned. According to the Japanese human security specialist Shinoda Hideaki, Japan 'does not only assist international agencies working for human security, but also wants to implement human security measures by itself.' Akiyama Nobu-masa goes even further and argues that the Japanese have 'tried to make best use of it to promote its own foreign policy agenda.'[35] The predilection of the Japanese government to act on its own, contrary to its declared intention of collaborating, seems to fit a discernible pattern of Japanese ODA policies according to two ODA specialists: 'For the most part, when it comes to the use of bilateral resources, Japan still prefers to work alone, fearing that its already low visibility will become even more diminished if its resources are to be pooled with other donors' resources and used for common objectives.'[36]

The urge to get rid of its 'faceless' image caused Japan to be not particularly eager to collaborate, as demonstrated by Vice Minister Yanai Shunji in his meeting with Swedish State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Lars Danielsson. For Japan, Yanai's lack of interest in responding positively to Danielsson's ideas was a missed opportunity which could not later be remedied when Ogata Sadako came with a similar proposal to Sweden, since by then, Sweden had agreed to Norway's idea that the latter should pursue human security.

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[34] 'Ningen ampō: Kajitsu o fuyasu gaikō o' [Human security: For a diplomacy that will increase results], *Asahi shimbun*, 22 May 2002 (editorial).
[35] Shinoda, 'The Concept of Human Security', p. 19.
[36] Kawai and Takagi, 'Japan's Official Development Assistance', p. 13.

Japan's Leadership Ambitions

The reasons for the lack of success of collaboration as envisaged by Obuchi seem to be that some aspects of policies pursued by the Japanese government were not conducive to collaboration. First, what many adherents saw as a strong point of the UNDP approach to human security and which was adopted by Japan – the ambition to get all and sundry on board – resulted in there being no generally accepted view among countries as to how human security should be defined. This turned out to be an obstacle to collaboration. Japanese officials objected in unusually strong wording to, for instance, what they saw as Canada's exaggerated emphasis on the freedom-from-fear leg of human security.

Secondly, the willingness to collaborate, that is so noticeable in Obuchi's statements, clashed with Japan's ambitions to play the first fiddle. Japan's desire for international leadership, long dormant but awakened in the 1980s, became clearly apparent in the 1990s. In its ambition to play a leadership role based on the pursuit of human security, Japan was not alone, however. Other countries saw, and seized, the opportunity to play a leadership role. Most prolific was Canada's effort. The Canadian government made human security the lodestar of its foreign policy, opted for leadership on human security to become, eventually, 'a leading voice on the world stage'.[37] By pursuing a version of human security that differed from Canada, which was recognized as a leading country in this field, an avenue was opened up for the Japanese government to claim that it exerted leadership. Human security became an outlet for launching Japanese leadership ambitions rather than a vehicle for international collaboration.

Japan's drive towards international leadership caused it to exert efforts to heighten concern for human security ideas in the United Nations. Japan's leadership ambitions can be discerned in the work of the TFHS and the CHS, both created by Japan. Placing both under the aegis of the UN was intended to bestow international legitimacy and prestige, which the Japanese government hoped would spill over and increase its goodwill and international status. Japan's policy of promoting human security in the context of the United Nations was appropriate according to Japan's former Ambassador to the United Nations Satō Yukio, who argued that the most

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[37] Alkire, 'A Conceptual Framework for Human Security', p. 19.

important arena was not the UN in New York but developing countries. 'There is no doubt', wrote this leading diplomat, 'that this will lead to Japan's voice [*hatsugenryoku*] in the United Nations increasing.'[38]

Japan's funding of the TFHS made it the largest trust fund within the United Nations and Japan kept control over projects and activities. Despite explicit lobbying by Japan, the TFHS was a little too much of an instrument for the ambitions of the Japanese government to induce other governments to provide additional funding. In the case of the CHS, a strong link to the Japanese government was created, with its secretariat financed by the Japanese government and MOFA supplying a liaison official. The role of the CHS resembled that of a *shingikai* in Japanese policy planning in that it was given a key role for formulating policy proposals, in this case to be implemented by the international community. This attempt at Japanese directional leadership did not become a success.

The efforts by Japan to place human security on the agenda of the UN can be seen to have gained ground, when the concept was mentioned in the 2005 World Summit Outcome and adopted by the UN General Assembly: 'We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly.'[39] Ambassador Takasu Yukio expressed Japan's official view of the resolution, noting that his government 'highly appreciates the inclusion of paragraph 143 in the Outcome Document, and calls on other interested countries to seriously consider ways to follow up this paragraph.'[40]

But the success for Japan was limited. The inclusion of this paragraph was made at the insistence of the Japanese government, since it was

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[38] Satō, 'Nihon no Kokuren gaikō to ningen no anzen hoshō', pp. 8f.

[39] United Nations, General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1), 2005, §143, http://www.eytv4scf.net/a60r1.htm (downloaded 19 January 2007).

[40] Yukio Takasu, 'Towards Forming Friends of Human Security': On the Occasion of 8th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Bangkok, 1 June 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0606.html (downloaded 18 January 2007).

necessary to have something to show the Japanese public.[41] Some countries felt misgivings over its inclusion. Their objections resembled the protests heard previously when humanitarian intervention had been discussed. The difference here was that, then, Japan was on the side of the protesters, now it sided with those who favoured action.

Prospects for the Future

Human security was a concept that came in handy for Japanese political leaders who believed that Japan should not forego ambitions in international affairs in the way prescribed by the Yoshida Doctrine. In its search for prestige and global standing, the necessity for Japan to put the focus outside the myopic preoccupation with the US relationship had been stressed, and human security made this perspective potentially realizable. Considered low politics, human security offered the prospect of Japanese international leadership that did not encroach on US prerogative to be the leader and Japan the follower, as far as international security affairs were concerned – the prescription inherent in the Yoshida Doctrine. It is an area where Japan could act fairly freely and in ways that it found fit, without offending the US government. Pursuing human security enabled Japan to engage in activities devised in Tokyo, not Washington. The conclusion reached by Shinoda Hideaki is straightforward:

Due to the constitutional constraints and historical disadvantages, Japan has difficulty in earning a good reputation in international cooperation concerning 'traditional' security issues such as participation in peacekeeping operations. Human security is apparently expected to enable Japan to compensate for weakness in the 'traditional' security field. The 'incumbent' permanent members of the Security Council established their status in the 'traditional' security field, and Japan might be a leading force in a newly recognized field called human security.[42]

Human security was not only a way for Japan to play the part of a responsible party in the international community but also to pursue the lofty objectives that befitted Japan as an international actor in the eyes of

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[41] Magnus Lennartsson Nakamitsu, interview, 10 November 2006; Ōkuma Hiroshi, interview, 21 October 2006.
[42] Shinoda, 'The Concept of Human Security', p. 19.

Obuchi and his associates. The pursuit of human security enabled Japan, on the one hand, to play the part of a credible ally to the United States in accordance with the Yoshida Doctrine and, on the other, offered Japan a chance to take on a global political role commensurate with its economic strength, while allaying suspicions of the neighbouring countries that Japan might be playing a role that was too active and assertive. Its human security policy was in agreement with what the 21st Century Commission argued for in its report – the necessity for Japan 'to exert itself both to prepare for eventualities and to improve the overall international environment through steps including regional confidence-building measures.'[43] Subsuming the national goal of enhanced international status under the guise of a concern for human security offered Japan a chance to stand tall and advance towards its centuries-old goal of being recognized as a force to be reckoned with.

The promotion and pursuit of human security initiated by Obuchi Keizō served as a means to counter impressions prevalent among some of Japan's neighbours that its substantial economic support was not only proof of generosity but also constituted an attempt by Japan to run the show over the heads of its vulnerable brethren. Japan's human security policy was based on what Hirai Terumi calls 'a hidden asset' of Japan's diplomacy – its lack of involvement in power politics.[44] It is symptomatic that when the Obuchi government initiated what was in reality a campaign for human security, no protests were heard from Japan's neighbours despite the fact that it implied a more assertive international role for Japan, something a number of its neighbours had objected to vehemently in the past. Instead, statements approving Japanese leadership were heard. The pursuit of human security initiated by Obuchi allowed Japan to fulfil its desire to play a larger role beyond economics in Southeast Asia without upsetting its general public and neighbours.[45]

The terrorist attacks in September 2001 made issues associated with human security acute and demonstrated how acutely needed human security is, in the sense that the fight against terrorism and eradication of its

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[43] Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, *The Frontier Within*, p. 157.
[44] Terumi Hirai, 'Afghanistan: Proposals from the Human Security Perspective', NIRA Study Group on Afghanistan (July 2004), http://www.nira.go.jp/newse/paper/niraprop/prop-h.pdf (downloaded 13 July 2006).
[45] Lam, 'Japan's Human Security Role in Southeast Asia', p. 143.

root causes are key issues on the human security agenda.[46] Taking on what many see as the root causes of terrorism, the maltreatment, real or perceived, that individuals have to suffer, Japan's pursuit of human security would seem to be in agreement with strengthening its relationship with the United States. As noted by Kōno Masaharu: 'Japan is often criticized for "always following the United States." But the fact is that Japan shares fundamental values and ideas with the United States, and as such, its foreign policy naturally moves in a direction similar to that of the United States.'[47] The realization of the compatibility of fundamental interests of Japan and the United States, that was the lodestar for Yoshida Shigeru, has been a constant trait of foreign policy pursued by subsequent Japanese governments. Certainly, Obuchi's decision to revise Japan's landmine policy was taken despite US opposition, and his speeches on human security in December 1998 could be taken as an indication of Japan moving away from its myopic and unilateral siding with the United States. But he did not remove the traditional US myopia of Japanese foreign policy. While he worked towards making human security a significant element of Japan's foreign policy, there was no relaxation of the Yoshida Doctrine-induced dictum that the relationship with the United States is the basis of Japan's foreign and security policies.

Policies, activities and viewpoints of successive Japanese governments have been shaped within the constraints posed by the Japan–US Security Treaty. The Yoshida Doctrine prescribes Japanese acceptance of subordination to the United States in international affairs. So common has been the dismissal of Japan as simply blindly emulating US foreign policy that Jean-Pierre Lehmann claimed that the Japanese 'have become accustomed … to having the Americans think for them on international affairs'.[48] That Obuchi signed the Ottawa treaty despite US opposition, and his introduction of human security show that this view is not correct. Obuchi and his collaborators saw in human security an idea that fitted Japanese predilections and the situation in which Japan found itself in the 1990s after its setback in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Marching under the banner of human security enabled the Japanese government to say goodbye to times ironically characterized by the French former UN official Maurice

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[46] Akiyama, 'Human Security at the Crossroad', p. 266.
[47] Kohno, 'In Search of Proactive Diplomacy'.
[48] Lehmann, 'Japanese Attitudes towards Foreign Policy', p. 135.

Bertrand as 'The Japanese do not come up with ideas. Always keeping silent and putting in the budget is their greatest international contribution.'[49]

It is a common and general observation that international norms will have an impact if they resonate 'with established cultural understandings, historical experience, and the dominant views of domestic groups'.[50] The impact of human security should be seen in the light of Japan's two-tiered security traditions. On the one hand, foreign and security policies founded on realism à la Yoshida Shigeru are enacted within the security framework based on the security treaty with the United States but, on the other, an important starting-point for policies has been the pacifism embodied in the post-war constitution and the strong currents of pacifism and anti-militarism embraced by a broad social strata. The impact that the idea of human security has had was not only a result of the fact that it was launched by the political heavy-weight that a prime minister is, but also because it was compatible with the idealistic and pacifist strand of the political culture of post-war Japan and mainstream thinking on national security represented by comprehensive security.

The Canadian representative at a conference on human security in 2000 noted: 'As a policy imperative, human security serves to focus attention and action not just on the security of the state, but on the security of the person. [...] By looking more to the security of people in the conduct of international relations, we redefine the very meaning of security – and transform the conduct of world affairs.'[51] This bold claim matched views held by Japanese policy-makers. In the heyday of Obuchi's drive for human security, Takemi Keizō argued that networks on human security must be used 'as means for establishing nothing less than a new international system that will underpin an order in which "human survival,

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[49] Quoted in Yoshida Yasuhiko, *Kokuren kaikaku: 'Gensō' to 'hiteiron' o koete* [UN Reform: Beyond 'illusions'and 'denials'] (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 2003), p. 157.

[50] Darren Hawkins, 'The Domestic Impact of International Human Right Norms', paper presented at the 42nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 20–24 February 2001, http://www.isanet.org/archive/hawkins.html (downloaded 14 January 2006).

[51] Louis Hamel, 'Keynote Address on the Canadian Initiative to Strengthen Human Security. Towards human security: a people-centred approach to foreign policy', in UNESCO, ed., *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-First Century?*, p. 15.

human well-being, and human freedom" will be assured in the new century.'[52]

Bold and daring statements of this kind was not to Obuchi's taste, however. He was a soft-spoken consensus politician but, nevertheless, succeeded in elevating human security onto the political agenda and making it part and parcel of Japan's foreign policy liturgy. The human security policies initiated by him can be interpreted as an attempt to launch an assault on Japan's image as a 'faceless' economic giant without concerns other than how it fared economically.

Japan's pursuit of human security has become a stunning success if UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is taken as a yardstick of the truth. On a visit to Japan in 2004, he addressed the Diet and stressed that the pursuit of human security made Japan's role important: 'The world will not achieve the Millennium Development Goals without Japan's technological prowess and its focus on "human security". Just ask the people of the dozens of African countries what a difference Japan has made in promoting health, education and environmental protection there.'[53]

In a way, Annan's recognition showed that Obuchi's decision to pursue human security had enabled Japan to advance towards what Fukuda Takeo preached back in the 1970s – that the country should be 'a great power of a new type' – by rallying support for increased cooperation around measures aimed at increasing international security in a way that would benefit Japan's status in the international community of nations.

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[52] Takemi, 'Approach to the Mounting Concern of Human Security', p. 44.

[53] Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, 'The Secretary-General's Address to the Japanese Parliament', 24 February 2004, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=789 (downloaded 3 February 2006).

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Japan and the Challenge of Human Security
The Founding of a New Policy 1995–2003

The 1990s was a decade of upheaval. After the collapse of the bipolar Cold War world order epitomized by the US–Soviet confrontation the possibility of a major war was greatly reduced. The emergence of a new world order meant a challenge for Japan's foreign and security policies, since they were premised on the Cold War cleavage of the world with two ideologically hostile blocs pitted against each other. The contours of a more assertive Japanese foreign policy could gradually be discerned. One element of the change that took place was seen in 1998 when human security was made a key concern of Japan's foreign policy. The key actor behind this policy shift was Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō. Spearheading the promotion of this security idea, he initiated an international campaign that put Japan at the forefront of championing human security.

This is the first comprehensive account of the background to Japan's pursuit of human security, and traces the evolution of its policy on human security during its formative period.

Bert Edström is Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Security and Development Policy.

Institute for Security and Development Policy