Human Security Gateway: Morocco

Violences, Vulnérabilité et Migration : Bloqués aux Portes de l’Europe Un Rapport sur les Migrants Subsahariens en Situation Irrégulière au Maroc

Wed, 13 Mar 2013 11:13:30 -0700

Au cours de ces dix dernières années, l’Union Européenne (UE) a durci ses contrôles aux frontières et externalise de plus en plus sa politique migratoire ; d’un pays de transit pour les migrants qui se déplacent vers l’Europe, le Maroc est devenu entre-temps un pays de transit et de destination par défaut. L’expérience de MSF démontre que plus le séjour des migrants subsahariens se prolonge au Maroc et plus leur vulnérabilité augmente. Cette vulnérabilité préexistante, associée à des facteurs tels que l’âge et le genre, et les traumatismes subis durant le processus migratoire, s’accumule lorsqu’ils se retrouvent bloqués au Maroc et sujets à des politiques et des pratiques d’exclusion, de discrimination et de négligence.

Les données de MSF démontrent que les conditions de vie précaires auxquelles sont contraints la majorité des migrants subsahariens et la violence criminelle et institutionnelle généralisée à laquelle ils sont exposés sont encore à ce jour les principaux facteurs qui déterminent leurs besoins médicaux et psychologiques. A maintes reprises, les équipes de MSF ont signalé et dénoncé cette situation, mais la violence est une réalité quotidienne encore aujourd’hui pour la majorité des migrants subsahariens se trouvant au Maroc. En réalité, comme en témoigne ce rapport, à partir du mois de décembre 2011 une recrudescence importante des abus a été constatée ainsi qu’une forte violence et des comportements à caractère dégradant envers les migrants subsahariens exercés par les forces de sécurité marocaines et espagnoles. Ce rapport souligne également la violence généralisée commise par les bandes criminelles, y compris par les délinquants et les réseaux de traite et de trafic d’êtres humains.

Il donne un aperçu du degré alarmant des violences sexuelles auxquelles sont exposés les migrants durant tout le processus migratoire, et demande de réserver aux personnes affectées une meilleure assistance et une plus solide protection.

Ces niveaux inacceptables de violence ne devraient pas éclipser ce qui a été réalisé quant à la reconnaissance et au respect du droit des migrants subsahariens à la santé au cours de ces dix dernières années. Malgré les grands progrès qui ont été réalisés, les défis sont encore nombreux, notamment en ce qui concerne la santé secondaire non urgente, la prise en charge des personnes ayant des problèmes de santé mentale et la protection et l’aide aux survivants de violences sexuelles.

Un plus grand investissement et la réforme du système de santé doivent également être mis en œuvre. L’impact des progrès déjà obtenus à ce jour et toute future réforme seront néanmoins limités, à moins qu’une action concrète ne soit mise en œuvre pour résoudre le paradoxe des politiques européennes et marocaines qui, d'un coté, ont une approche de la migration se faisant à travers un prisme de sécurité et qui criminalisent, marginalisent et discriminent les migrants subsahariens au Maroc et, de l'autre coté, protègent et défendent leurs droits humains fondamentaux. SOURCE: Medecins Sans Frontieres // Doctors Without Borders

Violence, Vulnerability and Migration: Trapped at the Gates of Europe

Wed, 13 Mar 2013 11:11:29 -0700

Over the last ten years, as the European Union (EU) has tightened its border controls and increasingly externalised its migration policies, Morocco has changed from being just a transit country for migrants en route to Europe to being both a transit and destination country by default. MSF’s experience demonstrates that the longer sub-Saharan migrants stay in Morocco the more vulnerable they become. This preexisting vulnerability, related to factors such as age and gender, as well as traumas experienced during the migration process, accumulates as they are trapped in Morocco and subjected to policies and practices that neglect, exclude and discriminate against them.

MSF’s data demonstrates that the precarious living conditions that the majority of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco are forced to live in and the wide-spread institutional and criminal violence that they are exposed to continue to be the main factors influencing medical and psychological needs. MSF teams have repeatedly highlighted and denounced this situation, yet violence remains a daily reality for the majority of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco. In fact, as this report demonstrates, the period since December 2011 has seen a sharp increase in abuse, degrading treatment and violence against sub-Saharan migrants by Moroccan and Spanish security forces. This report also reveals the widespread violence carried out by criminal gangs, including bandits and human smuggling and human trafficking networks. It provides a glimpse into the shocking levels of sexual violence that migrants are exposed to throughout the migration process and demands better assistance and protection for those affected.

These unacceptable levels of violence should not overshadow the achievements that have been made in recognition and respect for sub-Saharan migrants’ right to health over the last ten years. Progress has been made, however considerable challenges remain, particularly with regard to non-emergency, secondary care, care for people with mental health problems and protection and assistance for survivors of sexual violence. Further investment and reform of the healthcare system is needed, however the impact of the progress made to date and any future reforms will be limited unless concrete action is taken to address the discrepancy between European and Moroccan policies which view migration through a security prism and criminalise, marginalise and discriminate against sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco and those which protect and uphold their fundamental human rights.

This report highlights the medical and psychological consequences of this approach and the cumulative vulnerability of the significant numbers of sub-Saharan migrants who are trapped in Morocco. In doing so it calls, once again, on the Moroccan authorities to respect their international and national commitments to human rights, develop and implement protection mechanisms and ensure that sub- Saharan migrants are treated in a humane and dignified manner, no matter what their legal status. SOURCE: Medecins Sans Frontieres // Doctors Without Borders

Concluding Remarks on MEI's Western Sahara Series

Mon, 21 Jan 2013 13:13:42 -0800

“Compromise” is the word repeated 25 times in this three-voice dialogue with opposing views on what could be the best solution to the Western Sahara dispute. The settlement options that emerged from the three contributors to this series have accepted either autonomy for the Western Sahara territory (subject to a referendum) or a referendum on self-determination that would include independence as well as other possibilities, including autonomy. The choices now on the table concern a self-determination referendum (with independence as well as autonomy as options) or negotiated autonomous status (without independence as an option). The shift, however, is significant because the conflict over Western Sahara is no longer characterized in mutually exclusive terms, i.e. through a defining referendum process on either integration with Morocco or independence (with an Algerian flavor). Autonomy is now part of the equation, though the latter has not changed fundamentally. SOURCE: Middle East Institute

Solving the Western Sahara — What Now Remains

Mon, 21 Jan 2013 13:09:17 -0800

What more can be done to resolve the problem in Western Sahara?

Mr. (Carne) Ross, Undersecretary General Miyet, and I have be trading opinions for six months and it is clear that Mr. Ross has no intention to propose or agree on any kind of political settlement or compromise, regardless of arguments to the contrary. It is time to quit deluding ourselves and allowing the refugees to be used as hostages in an effort to advance the cause of a few thousand Polisario rebels. Rather, we should reach out together for a common middle-ground solution.

There are two absolute realities that we should not fool ourselves about. First, Morocco will never leave its Saharan territories, and the UN Security Council will never force Morocco to do so. This fact is grounded in an agreement between the US and Morocco and supported by the actions of the UN Security Council over the past two decades to not impose solutions on the parties. Even when the UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy James Baker threatened such a move, he was rejected by the Security Council, and consequently resigned. SOURCE: Middle East Institute

Responses to Western Sahara: It’s Time for the People to Choose

Mon, 21 Jan 2013 13:07:35 -0800

Responses to "Western Sahara: It's Time for the People to Choose"

Carne Ross is right when he refers to the unwillingness of the Security Council to impose any mandatory solution over the last 35 years, but wrong if he believes that the international community will change its approach in the foreseeable future. In this context, is it wise or constructive to definitively conclude that “really there is no other option” possible than the only one that has been impossible to achieve during more than three decades? One might conclude that it is wishful thinking or statement of principle rather than search for an outcome to this difficult problem. SOURCE: Middle East Institute

Western Sahara: It’s Time for the People to Choose

Mon, 21 Jan 2013 13:05:32 -0800

The latest diplomatic dance on whether or not former US Ambassador Christopher Ross should be allowed to continue to mediate UN-led talks between the Frente Polisario and Morocco on the future of Western Sahara is symptomatic of a much bigger problem ― the large powers’ unwillingness to advance an end to a dispute that they mistakenly see as peripheral to their strategic interests, and their resultant acquiescence in the brutal and illegal occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco for more than 35 years.

Western Sahara is not part of Morocco, nor has it ever been. When still under Spanish colonial rule in 1963, Western Sahara was listed by the UN as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, putting it on the same path towards independence traveled by almost all other colonial territories in Africa. Spain was expected and indeed obliged to oversee a process of decolonization that it completely failed to deliver upon. Instead, Spain’s withdrawal in 1975 was knowingly orchestrated to leave the territory to a tripartite administration with Mauritania and Morocco that eventually led to the illegal annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco. SOURCE: Middle East Institute

Responses to Autonomy: The Optimal Political Solution?

Mon, 21 Jan 2013 13:04:04 -0800

Responses to "Autonomy: The Optimal Political Solution"

Bernard Miyet rightly points out that it has always been the goal of Morocco to gain the recognition of the international community of what it has maintained was its historically legitimate assertion of sovereignty over the Western Sahara. He is also correct that the UN effort to conduct a referendum on either the full integration of the territory into Morocco or its independence as a new state in the Sahel had utterly failed by late 1998. His analysis of the prospects that any such “winner take all” solution might lead to greater tensions, or worse in this already volatile region, was one of the reasons why the US State Department changed US policy on this question in early 1999, during the second Clinton Administration. This new policy continued during the Bush Administration and is one that Secretary Clinton has stated publicly remains unchanged under the Obama Administration. SOURCE: Middle East Institute

Autonomy: The Optimal Political Solution

Mon, 21 Jan 2013 11:39:00 -0800

Origins and genesis of the conflict:
Since the origin of the crisis, it has been evident that Morocco would never accept any outcome that might contest its sovereignty or result in the independence of the Western Sahara. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) proposed in its first resolution adopted on December 16, 1965 that Spain “takes all necessary measures” to decolonize the territory, while entering into negotiations on “problems relative to governing.”

Following this first step, the UNGA adopted seven resolutions between 1966 and 1973 reiterating the need to hold a referendum on self-determination, in line with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Nevertheless, King Hassan II has consistently advocated that Western Sahara was part of the Kingdom. This became crystal clear when Spain announced its plan to organize such a referendum in early 1975; King Hassan II immediately referred the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and called for the “Green March” the day after the publication of the Court opinion. SOURCE: Middle East Institute

Western Sahara: Deferred Referendum or Lasting Settlement?

Mon, 21 Jan 2013 11:36:34 -0800

Over the last decade, the dispute over the future status of the Western Sahara territory, which has set Morocco and the Algeria-backed pro-independence Polisario front in opposition, has entered a qualitatively new phase. This is due to attempts at finding a negotiated outcome instead of the long-delayed self-determination referendum. The idea of a political solution to break a twice deadlocked (1997 and 2000) UN self-determination referendum for the Western Sahara territory has steadily revived the prospect of autonomous status for the territory within Moroccan jurisdiction. As the viability of the implementation of the UN settlement plan became increasingly questionable, the relevance of a political solution to the dispute was again given renewed saliency. Yet, Morocco’s quick embrace of a negotiated settlement impelled Polisario to resent what it perceived as the hijacking of the old UN settlement plan, which it wanted to be fully implemented. The introduction of two proposals on autonomy and self-determination by the UN Personal Envoy, James Baker, eventually linked the autonomy option with a self-determination referendum, but failed to gain support from Morocco. SOURCE: Middle East Institute

The Maghreb in Transition: Seeking Stability in an Era of Uncertainty

Mon, 14 Jan 2013 13:19:58 -0800

The Maghreb is in motion. Political changes underway across North Africa have created opportunities for more representative and transparent governance. Debates over the nature of authority and the role of the state that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago now shape political discourse. And yet, doubts remain.

Transitions in Libya and Tunisia remain incomplete, and their ultimate impacts on the region are still uncertain. Popular expectations of reform are straining governments’ abilities to adapt. Dilemmas of political identity and institutional structure challenge both new and existing governments. Meanwhile, the region’s persistent economic tasks—to provide jobs, stability, and growth for the millions of citizens who enter the labor market every year—endure. Economic success will be integral to the success of the region’s political transformation and its future.

To better understand the evolving political, economic, and security dynamics in the Maghreb (defined here as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), the CSIS Middle East Program convened a conference in Washington, D.C., on October 12, 2012. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton delivered the keynote address, imparting her optimism as well as her commitment to building on recent gains in freedom and civic participation. The conference gathered a senior group of experts from government, academia, policy research, and the business community to share their insights. While many agreed that there is reason to be cautiously hopeful, there was no denying that the region is at the beginning of a long and uncertain phase of change. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Water Challenges and Cooperative Response in the Middle East and North Africa

Fri, 09 Nov 2012 08:45:50 -0800

On May 29-31, 2012, the Stimson Center convened a workshop on Water Challenges and Cooperative Response in the Middle East and North Africa as a component of the 2012 US-Islamic World Forum held in Doha, Qatar. Participants included scientists, academics, policy analysts, and practitioners from several MENA countries, as well as US and European experts. The interdisciplinary working group identified the principal water resource issues facing decision makers and stakeholders in the region, assessed the MENA states’ existing governance capacities and resources to address these emerging pressures, and recommended priority areas and approaches for advancing international and intersectoral cooperation and for identifying and strengthening intellectual and technical resources, tools, lessons, and best practices that could be shared, applied, or adapted across the region.

This report first provides a brief overview of available water resources in the MENA region. It then discusses the salient socio-economic and environmental stresses and trends that will drive and condition water supply and demand over the coming decades. Next, the report sketches prevailing water management approaches that are being developed or might be brought to bear. With this foundation in place, the report then seeks to illuminate the water governance policy options and obstacles confronting the region by examining three case studies: the Tigris-Euphrates basin, the Nile basin, and a side-by-side consideration of water stewardship in Yemen and Oman. Finally, the report concludes by presenting some recommendations suggesting strategies for the MENA countries to build their water management capabilities and bolster collaborative alternatives to managing scarce water resources at both the domestic and regional levels. SOURCE: The Brookings Institution

Averting a Moroccan Revolution: The Monarchy's Preemptive Spatial Tactics and the Quest for Stability

Mon, 24 Sep 2012 10:33:33 -0700

Morocco is often seen as the exception to the “Arab Spring”. The country’s socio-political profile suggested that it was only a matter of time for the disgruntled masses to take to the streets and bring down another autocracy that has monopolised governance for decades and on whom the country’s ills can be blamed. Contrary to expectations to date, however, Morocco’ regime has survived the regional unrest, and its leadership seems to be as strong as ever. This is often explained with the promises of political reform that King Mohammed VI issued soon after regional uprisings started. This succinct narrative, albeit factual, does not accurately reflect the relationship between the resilient monarchy and the country at large. Other factors – particularly the regime’s approach to the country’s built environment, which encompasses the range of deliberately constructed physical structures: from inhabitable spaces to supporting infrastructure – can help explain the endurance of the inherited political status quo. SOURCE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs)

Building Stability through Economic Growth in the Maghreb

Thu, 06 Sep 2012 11:35:55 -0700

Governments across the Maghreb are struggling to address a wide range of socioeconomic and political grievances that sparked popular uprisings throughout 2011. The problems are rooted in political systems that have been marred by corruption, exclusion, and marginalization of large swaths of the population, including young people. Despite significant change in the last year, the region is still at the beginning of a long phase of transformation.

To better understand the political and economic factors shaping transitions in the Maghreb (defined here as Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia) and opportunities for spurring economic growth, the CSIS Middle East Program convened a half-day conference in Washington, D.C., on June 13. Because states dominate most economies in the region, the conference examined both government strategies to address a range of economic challenges and the role that trade and investment could play in promoting growth. The conference brought together high-level U.S. government officials, diplomats, and leading experts in academia and business. The following report summarizes the views and ideas discussed at the conference. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

An Energy-rich Region of Increasingly Energized Citizens

Tue, 28 Aug 2012 14:12:13 -0700

The Middle East North Africa (MENA) region is experiencing a shift in its political and social landscape as citizens throughout the region are mobilizing for greater dignity and freedom. This political awakening is a response to the decades-long dominance of systems of economic and political exclusion, which have stalled economic progress, created enormous wealth distribution gaps, endemic corruption, high unemployment and soaring inflation. The popular rage relates not least to the way the considerable resource wealth of the region is managed.

For the ONS Summit 2012 to be held 28-31 August, this year on the theme "confronting energy paradoxes", the ONS Foundation approached International IDEA as an organization specializing in democracy and operating in the West Asia and North Africa region to write a study entitled An energy-rich region of increasingly energized citizens - the interplay between democracy, politics and energy in the shadow of political upheaval in the MENA region. SOURCE: International IDEA

Forced Migration Review: North Africa and Displacement 2011-2012

Fri, 15 Jun 2012 14:22:29 -0700

The so-called Arab Spring continues to reverberate locally, regionally and geopolitically. The 20 articles in this issue of FMR reflect on some of the experiences, challenges and lessons of the Arab Spring in North Africa, the implications of which resonate far wider than the region itself. SOURCE: Refugee Studies Centre

Human Security Research [April 2012]

Mon, 30 Apr 2012 15:04:30 -0700

Human Security Research is a monthly compilation of significant new human security-related research published by academics, university research institutes, think-tanks, international agencies, and NGOs.

Articles in this issue:
CAUSES OF WAR: Inequality and Identity: Causes of War?
SPOILERS: Spotting the Spoilers: A Guide to Analyzing Organized Crime in Fragile States
DR CONGO: Insecurity and Local Governance in Congo’s South Kivu
CONFLICT MEDIATION: Global Networks of Mediation: Prospects and Avenues for Finland as a Peacemaker
MEXICO: Drug Violence in Mexico Data and Analysis Through 2011
NORTH CAUCASUS: North Caucasus: Views From Within
PEACEBUILDING: A Peacebuilding Tool for a Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Development: A Pilot Initiative in Nepal
PHILIPPINES: Pagpati'ut: Mediating Violence in Sulu
WESTERN SAHARA: Simmering Discontent in the Western Sahara
TERRORISM: Individual Disengagement From Al Qa'ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups: A Rapid Evidence Assessment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism
SRI LANKA: Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of Minority Rights
MYANMAR: “Untold Miseries”: Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s Kachin State SOURCE: Human Security Report Project

Political Violence in North Africa: The Perils of Incomplete Liberalization

Fri, 16 Mar 2012 10:19:14 -0700

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, a growing number of analysts and policymakers drew a link between the dramatic rise of terrorism in the Middle East and the region’s lack of democracy. The question of whether levels of political rights and freedoms affect the resort to violence continues to be a source of major political debate.

While some scholars insist that democracies are less likely to produce terrorist activity, due to their ability to channel grievance peacefully, others contend that regimes transitioning to democracy are highly vulnerable to destabilization. Periods of liberalization often raise citizens’ expectations for freedom that regimes are unwilling or unable to meet. The resulting dissonance can fuel violent opposition.

This study examines whether liberalizing regimes in the Maghreb are more or less vulnerable to the threat of political violence and terrorism than their more repressive counterparts. Do political reform processes, however limited and incomplete, boost regime legitimacy and undercut support for radical opposition forces?

Over the last decade, the Maghreb has become a major producer and exporter of violent extremists to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Europe. This paper investigates whether political liberalization efforts in Algeria and Morocco, including the incorporation of mainstream Islamist groups, have contributed to a rise or decline in the level of political violence. Tunisia, one of the Arab world’s most authoritarian states, is also examined to determine whether more exclusionary state policies prevent violence or instead facilitate radicalization. The three cases suggest that the greater the gap between expected change and actual change, the greater the likelihood of political unrest and violence.

This paper argues that the potential negative impacts of liberalization processes on stability stem not from the depth of political and economic reforms but rather from their limited and inconsistent nature. This unevenness is, in some sense, inevitable. It is extremely difficult for political institutions in authoritarian contexts to keep pace with popular demands. As a result, most Arab societies find themselves torn between what they are and what many expect them to become. This gap cannot be easily erased. But it can be managed. SOURCE: Brookings Doha Center

Waiting for the Arab Spring in Western Sahara

Thu, 15 Mar 2012 11:36:22 -0700

The fate of the Sahrawi nation of Western Sahara hangs in the balance this week. About 165,000 Sahrawi refugees in Algeria are eagerly watching the current UN-sponsored negotiations taking place outside of New York City on the status of their country. For the past 36 years they have been languishing in camps, waiting for the day they may return home, which is currently under Moroccan control. Thus far, they have had little reason to hope.

The three-day negotiations, taking place from March 11-13, involve Morocco, with backing from the United States; regional nations like Algeria and Mauritania; and representatives from Western Sahara. It is the latest meeting in a 20-year process that has been marked by a continual failure to resolve the disputed status of this little-known and forgotten corner of Africa, wedged between Morocco and Mauritania.

Morocco is a perennial favourite of Western tourists who rightfully admire its spectacular natural vistas and the hospitality of a friendly people. But its dealing with the Sahrawi people is a little-known, dark and festering sore. SOURCE: Brookings Institution

Simmering Discontent in the Western Sahara

Wed, 14 Mar 2012 11:04:23 -0700

The Western Sahara, a former Spanish territory annexed by Morocco despite Algerian objections, is a critical region that could quickly become part of the criminal and terrorist networks threatening North Africa and the Sahel. The undergoverned areas abutting the territory are becoming major hubs for drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, and weapons circulation. And Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is extending its reach in the region. The potential for destabilization is real.

AQIM and its offshoots in the Sahel are already working to expand their partnership with smugglers from massive refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, and to enlist recruits among the disenchanted youth there. If AQIM strengthened its alliance of convenience with the Polisario, the movement that has long fought for Western Sahara’s independence, a formidable terrorist organization could emerge.

Nearby Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara is plagued by widespread socioeconomic protests and ethnic strife. A deep enmity has developed between various groups in the territory, some of which have ethnic and cultural ties to inhabitants of the Tindouf camps. A growing number of Western Saharans find themselves increasingly isolated and frustrated—a precarious development. Just over a year ago, Laayoune, Western Sahara’s biggest city, was the site of violent rioting. Ethnic cleavages and cultural animosity have become dangerously pronounced, threatening to further fuel radicalism, violence, and confrontations.

Resolving the Western Sahara conflict would help untangle the main existing deadlocks in North Africa and the Sahel: impediments toward regional reconciliation and coordination in the fight against violent extremism and organized criminal activity. Based on the author’s multiple trips to the Moroccan Western Sahara and dozens of interviews, this paper examines the security risks of the persistence of the conflict by analyzing the destabilizing forces that heighten local tensions and regional instability. SOURCE: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East: Outcomes and Prospects [Volume III]

Thu, 08 Mar 2012 11:01:37 -0800

On October 20, 2011, Libyan leader Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi was found in Sirte and subsequently killed (under circumstances that remain unclear) after an eight-month battle with rebel forces. Just days later, residents of neighboring Tunisia went to the polls in droves for that country’s first elections since the fall of Bel ‘Ali in January. Under these strikingly different circumstances, the Middle East Institute concludes its series on Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East by examining the progress that has been made throughout the region in order to understand what lies ahead. As the varied fates of the deposed Qadhafi, Mubarak, and Ben ‘Ali governments indicate (not to mention the fates of the embattled governments of al-Asad in Syria and Salih in Yemen), no two countries have had the same trajectory in the Arab Spring, and events across the region will likely unfold in similarly varied ways.

Every country that has seen a movement for change in the past eleven months has contended with different circumstances: different regime strengths, different demographic compositions, different sets of long-standing rivalries, and different attitudes towards change. The articles in this final volume seek to provide insight into some of these differences, by looking forward to prospects for election and reform in Tunisia and Egypt (and what seems to be stability in Morocco), by looking to the past for the inspiration of literature, and by examining the dynamics of protest and non-violence as a tactical choice of protestors.

When we began this series of publications, we recognized the extreme difficulty faced by any scholar in seeing into the future for the implications of dramatic change — what seemed unthinkable only a year ago is now a reality in many places. What we hoped for was not to generate a perfect foresight into events to come, but rather to prompt a nuanced analysis of the different factors at play and the different possible trajectories that might result. While this volume represents the conclusion of this series, it does not represent the end of the conversation. By presenting these viewpoints, we hope we have begun a debate that will continue. SOURCE: Middle East Institute

Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East: Government Action and Response [Volume II]

Thu, 08 Mar 2012 10:51:57 -0800

On August 21, 2011, rebel forces in Libya rolled into the capital Tripoli, seemingly finishing off months of armed combat and foreign intervention and bringing down yet another Arab head of state. At the same time, sporadic but violent repression of protests in Syria continues, while other states remain calm or have seen their protest movements fizzle. We open this second volume of our series, Revolution and Political Transformation¸ at a time of uncertainty and transition for the region.

The events of the “Arab Spring” demonstrate more clearly than anything else the heterogeneous nature of states in the Middle East. Monarchies, republics, and jamahiriyya alike have all faced popular protest to one degree or another, yet some have stood and some have crumbled.

While the first volume of this compilation of essays focuses on 'Agents of Change', those people and movements who pushed these revolutions forward, the essays in this volume seek to answer the question of why they succeed or fail by examining regime responses. Why does nonviolence accomplish in Egypt and Tunisia what required armed insurrection to accomplish in Libya, and why does nonviolence fail in Syria and Bahrain? What role does the US play in the success or failure of popular protest? By examining the “re-action” to the “action” of popular mobilization, we hope to provide a more complete picture for future analysis.

This volume comes little more than half a year since the fall of President Husni Mubarak in Egypt, and the ink has not yet dried on the pages being written about the other countries in the region. We intend these pieces to provide an outlet for commentaries, hypotheses, and analysis, but not to serve as the final word. The third and final volume in this series [Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East: Outcomes and Prospects] to be released this fall will seek to summarize our contributors’ thoughts on the way forward. SOURCE: Middle East Institute

One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications

Mon, 05 Mar 2012 15:28:24 -0800

Since an obscure young fruit vendor named Muhammad Bouazizi set himself on fire in the dusty Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid in December 2010, the flames that ended his life have spread across the entire Middle East, both figuratively and literally. The protests, demonstrations, and upheavals originally inspired by his action have acquired a variety of terms – Arab spring, Arab awakening, Arab uprising – and they have ousted, threatened, or at least frightened almost every ruling regime in the region. The terms used to describe this phenomenon clearly connote a sharp break from the decades of political stagnation and quietism that preceded Bouazizi’s desperate act and imply that some momentous region-wide transformation has been set in motion.

However, as Amos Yadlin reminds us in his introductory overview, only six of 22 League of Arab States members have experienced the full force of the upheaval, and in only two of those (Tunisia and Libya – the latter in the wake of external military intervention) has the regime actually been overthrown. In two others (Egypt and Yemen), the leader has been ousted but major elements of the ancien regime remain in place; in one (Syria) the struggle between regime and opposition continues unabated; and in one (Bahrain), the uprising seems to have been suppressed, at least for the time being. This volume does not delve into the domestic politics and society of those six states. Such issues are ably dealt with by area studies experts. Instead, in keeping with the mandate of the Institute for National Security Studies, we focus here on the regional and international implications of this phenomenon, with special reference to the potential ramifications for Israeli national security.

One year is not a very long time in which to judge the significance of events, especially when they continue to unfold, and historians may rightly criticize efforts of this sort as premature. In validating their criticism, they will almost certainly enjoy repeating the widely cited (though never really authenticated) comment allegedly made by Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai to US President Richard Nixon about the significance of the French Revolution: “Too soon to tell.” Any rush to judgment should certainly be avoided. Unfortunately, there is no consensus among historians on what does constitute sufficient perspective. More to the point, policymakers and the analysts who are supposed to help them in their deliberations do not have the luxury of waiting until some period of time arbitrarily defined as “enough” does elapse. Instead, they need to identify the challenges they face and constantly formulate and reformulate their policies in real time, notwithstanding the unavoidable fact that they will have to do that on the basis of incomplete or even erroneous information and of inevitably imperfect understanding. The purpose of the authors of this volume, all members of the INSS research staff, is to provide brief, concentrated studies of the international and regional dimensions of the Arab spring in the hope of minimizing analytical imperfections in the ongoing public debate over issues that confront Israel with urgent choices. SOURCE: Institute for National Security Studies

Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring

Wed, 29 Feb 2012 13:10:47 -0800

This is a summary of an event held at Chatham House on 1 February 2012.

The event examined the role of transitional justice mechanisms after the Arab Spring, and in particular, the role of international mechanisms of justice and the role of international actors. Discussion focused first upon the transitional justice context within individual countries, before expanding upon a number of themes that emerge from all or a number of those situations. Included in this discussion was the Lebanese experience of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen. SOURCE: Chatham House

Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria’s Pivotal Ambivalence

Wed, 08 Feb 2012 16:34:55 -0800

Despite growing concerns across the Sahel and Maghreb over the increasing potency of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the diffusion of heavily armed mercenaries from Libya, the expanding influence of arms and drugs trafficking, and the widening lethality of Boko Haram, regional security cooperation to address these transnational threats remains fragmented.

Algeria is well-positioned to play a central role in defining this cooperation, but must first reconcile the complex domestic, regional, and international considerations that shape its decision-making. SOURCE: Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Revolution in the Arab World: The Long View

Fri, 13 Jan 2012 14:21:26 -0800

In Revolution in the Arab World: The Long View, CCAS presents recent analysis of the historical context and events making up the Arab Spring. Themes covered in this collection include the prospects Arab states have to institutionalize their achievements, the vulnerability of various Arab authoritarian states to uprisings similar to those in Tunisia and Egypt, and counter strategies authoritarian regimes are using to resist, contain, and co-opt the protests.

In the first article, Dr. Laleh Khalili compares the Arab Spring with other revolutions in the twentieth century, pointing out how difficult it is to ascertain what the effects of revolutions might be. Next, Dr. Jillian Schwedler also takes a historical approach to the study of revolution by looking systematically at protests in Jordan over several decades with a focus on law, urban space, and spectacle. Third, Dr. William Zartman focuses particularly on the events in Tunisia, commenting particularly on different groups vying for leadership. Fourth, Mr. Gamal Eid writes about how youth have used social media to rally support and organize protests in Egypt. SOURCE: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies

The OSCE-Mediterranean Partnership and the Arab Uprisings

Tue, 06 Dec 2011 17:00:11 -0800

This meeting note summarizes discussions at an IPI workshop in Vienna, held on October 25, 2011, about how the uprisings and changes in the Arab world affect the partnership between the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and its Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (MPCs). Based on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE has developed and intensified relations over the last two decades with six MPCs: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, and, Jordan.

Today, the OSCE-Mediterranean partnership is based on a broad political framework. However, there has been a lot of form and little substance. Much of the focus has been on improving dialogue and on the voluntary implementation of OSCE commitments by partners, but there has been little practical cooperation. This meeting asked whether this is changing.

The first panel examined the current state of the OSCE-Mediterranean dialogue. Speakers provided an overview of the dialogue’s positive achievements and also addressed its shortcomings. Also, since the OSCE is one among a crowded field of players offering assistance to Mediterranean countries in transition, the need for close cooperation with partners was stressed. The importance of meaningful dialogue was also stressed, with emphasis on it being a "two-way street."

The second panel focused on the revolutions in the Arab world and examined the resulting geopolitical changes. Speakers discussed the relevance of "society," comparisons to the 1848 revolutions in Europe, and the impact of the uprisings in the "Greater Middle East." The third panel looked at whether the Helsinki process could be used as a model or a source of inspiration for promoting security, democracy, and development in North Africa and the Middle East. The idea of whether the Middle East needs its own Helsinki process was discussed.

The paper concludes that recent changes and events in the Arab world could give new momentum to the OSCE-Mediterranean partnership. It is therefore important that the OSCE makes use of this window of opportunity and seizes the moment. SOURCE: International Peace Institute

Crisis Watch No. 100 [1 December 2011]

Fri, 02 Dec 2011 11:06:59 -0800

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s presidential and parliamentary vote went ahead on 28-30 November, after a campaign marred by violence and amid allegations of rigging and mismanagement. Political rallies were banned in the wake of election-related clashes in Kinshasa on the eve of polls, and sporadic reports of violence emerged, including from Lubumbashi and West Kasai, during voting. In Burundi state troops clashed with the recently formed Forces for the Restoration of Democracy; the government reported 18 rebels killed.

Relations between Sudan and South Sudan deteriorated further this month. On 9 November the Sudanese Armed Forces reportedly launched cross-border airstrikes on Maban County in South Sudan’s Upper Nile State, and a day later bombed Yida refugee camp in Unity state, killing 12. Late-month negotiations between the two sides failed to achieve a settlement on contentious oil and transitional financial arrangements. Both Sudan and South Sudan also grappled with internal instability.

In Syria violence continued, with the regime’s brutal crackdown ongoing, elements of the protest movement increasingly militarised, the conflict internationalised and the Arab League’s attempt to end the bloodshed running aground. Tensions continued to rise in Kosovo. Late month violence in the north between international KFOR troops and ethnic Serbs who are barricading customs gates with Serbia left dozens injured.

NATO airstrikes on two Pakistan military border outposts left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead and U.S.-Pakistani relations in tatters. Islamabad swiftly condemned the attacks, requesting NATO vacate its airbase in Balochistan and shutting down its supply routes. The incident also damaged already strained Pakistani relations with Afghanistan, with the Pakistani government threatening to boycott forthcoming Bonn talks on Afghanistan.

Myanmar saw further positive developments this month. The announcement by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD party that they will contest seats in forthcoming by-elections marked their return to the political process. On 1 November leaders of Nepal’s four main political parties signed a landmark deal to integrate one third of former Maoist rebels into the national army and give others financial rehabilitation packages, removing a major stumbling block to the drafting of a new constitution. Morocco held the first elections under its new constitution, approved by referendum in July, which devolved some power from the monarch. Following the official announcement of last months’ historic election results, Tunisia’s new Constituent Assembly held its first session on 22 November. The main parties quickly agreed to form a new government, with Hamadi Jebali, the leader of the moderate Islamist An-Nahda party which took over 41% of the vote, assuming the post of prime minister. The first stage of parliamentary elections in Egypt took place at the end of November. The polls, the first since President Hosni Mubarak was toppled in February, were mostly peaceful despite deadly protests earlier in the month against the interim military leaders who replaced Mubarak. SOURCE: International Crisis Group

Constitutional Reform in North Africa

Thu, 03 Nov 2011 13:33:31 -0700

This report provides an overview of constitutional reform efforts currently in progress across North Africa. While electoral and other legal reforms are often part and parcel of constitutional reform, this report focuses specifically on the constitutional reform process. While relevant, the concurrent electoral and other legal reforms are outside of the scope of this report, which will highlight how the various players—the electorate, political parties, interim leaders and others—are reacting to and contributing to constitutional reform. This report also details the trends and common threads across North Africa, as well as important changes and key outcomes of the current reform processes.

Across North Africa, political change intensified since the beginning of the year. The Arab Spring, the Jasmine Revolution, the 20 February Movement, the Day of Rage—these are just some of the labels given to the many changes that have been occurring throughout North Africa since December 2010. The self-immolation of Tunisian fruit seller Tariq Mohammed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010 is largely considered the catalyst that triggered rapid change and upheaval across the region. In Tunisia and Egypt, the leaders fled early in 2011. In Libya, as of July 2011, the leader remains in power amid NATO intervention and armed opposition. Meanwhile scholars and practitioners have asked when or if Morocco and Algeria, will face the same challenges of regime change as Egypt, Tunisia or Libya. One of the only commonalities among the states of North Africa is the promise of political reform—whether ushered in by transitional governments or the sitting head of state.

The following pages provide detailed explanations for each country in North Africa. The report concludes with a look at the common themes and concerns across the region. SOURCE: NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre

Morocco: Gender and the Transitional Justice Process

Fri, 28 Oct 2011 12:02:43 -0700

This paper examines the impact of gender-focused transitional justice measures adopted in Morocco. In one of the first transitional justice programs implemented by an Arab country, Morocco’s Equity Reconciliation Council [IER] has included stipulations on including women in transitional justice process and highlighted human rights abuses pertaining specifically to women such as sexual assault, rape, and torture. This paper examines the effectiveness of the IER’s current gender focus and offers recommendations to further ensure female participation in the transitional justice program. SOURCE: International Center for Transitional Justice // Foundation for the Future

Upheaval in the Arab World: Is this the Dawn of a New Era? [Event Transcript]

Tue, 11 Oct 2011 15:15:57 -0700

This is a transcript of a special recording of BBC Radio 4's The World Tonight with Robin Lustig, held on 11 March 2011 at Chatham House. A group of leading experts on the Arab world discussed whether the toppling of leaders in several countries across the region will lead to real democratic change or whether vested interests will reassert themselves in new guises. SOURCE: Chatham House

Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War

Tue, 04 Oct 2011 10:18:55 -0700

We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts [and hence multiple threat points] is identified. The theory predicts conáict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist conflict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model. SOURCE: Columbia University // University of Zurich

The EU, Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in Western Sahara: The Failure of Disengagement

Tue, 20 Sep 2011 17:09:11 -0700

The protracted Western Sahara dispute, which has for over three decades pitted Morocco against the Sahrawi independentistas of the Polisario Front, epitomises the impotence of state-led conflict resolution efforts. The European Union [EU] has voluntarily remained withdrawn from the processes of transformation of this southern neighbourhood conflict, unable to surpass the politics of its inherent inter-governmentalism. This paper examines the alternative role played by local civil society organisations [CSO] in the transformation of the Western Sahara conflict. It analyses the input of a methodologically-informed selection of Moroccan and Sahrawi CSOs with a view to identifying the potential of more effectual EU involvement in the dispute, notably through cooperation with the relevant CSOs. The findings of this study point to the overwhelmingly fuelling role played by local CSOs in this particular conflict, but identify ways in which more peace-building civil actors could be empowered by the EU. These CSOs are often of grass-root origins with little or no links to the establishments on both sides of the conflict. SOURCE: MICROCON

Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel: Al-Qa‘ida’s Franchise or Freelance?

Thu, 11 Aug 2011 10:08:03 -0700

This Policy Brief examines the real and imagined influence of al-Qa‘ida in North Africa and the Sahel. Despite a perception of the transnationalization of terrorist movements in North Africa under al-Qa‘ida’s banner, robust evidence of an effective al-Qa‘ida’s expansion in the Maghreb and the Sahara/Sahel region remains elusive at best. Rather, doubts about al-Qa‘ida’s actual threat and the efficacy of international response in the context of pervasive state failure in the Sahel raise questions regarding the policy objectives of US-led counter-terrorism in the region. SOURCE: The Middle East Institute

The "Resource Curse" in MENA? Political Transitions, Resource Wealth, Economic Shocks, and Conflict Risk

Thu, 28 Jul 2011 10:21:57 -0700

The recent political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa region have exposed growing concerns about conflict risk, political stability, and reform prospects across its societies. Given the prevalence of oil and gas resource endowments in the region, which a voluminous literature suggests can be associated with adverse development consequences, this paper examines the interplay between their associated rents and political economy trajectories. The contribution of the paper is threefold: first, to examine the quantitative evidence of violent conflict in the region since 1960; second, to provide a nuanced review of the regional case study literature on the relationship between resource endowments, political stability, and conflict risk; and third, to assess how prospective political transitions have implications for the World Bank Group's work in the region on public sector management and private sector development. The authors find that resources and regimes have intersected to provide stability and limited violent conflict in the region, but that these development patterns have yielded a set of policy choices and development patterns that are proving increasingly brittle and unsustainable. A major institutional challenge for reforms will be to consolidate a requisite degree of inter-temporal credibility and stability in these regimes, while expanding inclusiveness in state-society relations. SOURCE: The World Bank

Food Security, Human Security and the Black Sea: The Instructive Case Study of 2010‐ 2011 Events

Wed, 27 Jul 2011 11:01:39 -0700

This policy brief focuses on a case study. It is suggested that an environmental disaster during the summer of 2010 in the Black Sea region triggered in winter 2011 a food crisis in the Arab World; in turn, this led to massive riots, revolts, political instability, a NATO operation and, alas, an oil crisis that accentuates an already suffering global economy. Coextensively, it may be suggested that an environmental crisis triggered a political crisis, which escalated in a series of conflicts that are of major concern for traditional security structures in Europe and beyond. In sum, the argument is made that as a result of this experience, the human security agenda must have a direct effect on our traditional security agenda. The question addressed at this point is how these interrelated chains of events affect the security establishment and our notions of a ‘high strategy.’ SOURCE: International Centre for Black Sea Studies

Bracing For Aftershocks: North African Politics and Security

Wed, 15 Jun 2011 12:59:30 -0700

North Africa is bracing itself. Not since Algeria’s brutal civil war a generation ago has the region witnessed so much turmoil and uncertainty. Angry and frustrated masses demanding improved governance and greater socioeconomic opportunities present regimes with new challenges. The need for governments to address these grievances is urgent. Failure to respond will intensify public pressure and heighten the risk of more violence.

This Report is part of the publication 'Global Forecast 2011: International Security in a Time of Uncertainty' SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Foreign Fighter Interdiction: Stability Operations as Countermeasures

Fri, 20 May 2011 12:56:14 -0700

Foreign fighters fuel the world’s conflicts. They make conflicts more costly for host nations and peacekeepers. These extremists come from all over the world and believe they need to fight for their ideological survival. The best way to combat the use of foreign fighters is to stop them as close to the source as possible. This can be difficult, especially if the U.S. is lacking diplomatic, informational, military, and economic relations with the source country. The U.S. government, especially military and political agencies, needs to be aware of the foreign fighter phenomenon and plan for it when developing new contingency and campaign plans as well as further developing bilateral and regional relationships in foreign fighter source and transit countries. This paper will discuss and highlight, from the national security perspective, the potential military actions for interdicting foreign fighters. The foreign fighter problem set, terminology, and life cycle are defined and discussed. Foreign fighters in current conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan/Pakistan, and Somalia are discussed as well. Finally, potential solutions are introduced as well as actions the U.S. military can take to stem the flow of foreign fighters within stability operations framework. SOURCE: United States Army // Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism

Thu, 28 Apr 2011 10:31:30 -0700

Efforts to promote “deradicalization,” or to rehabilitate detainees charged with terrorism-related offenses, have taken multiple forms in a wide range of countries, often as part of broader counterradicalization strategies that seek to prevent the adoption of violent extremist ideologies or behaviors in the first place. Some are more formal rehabilitation programs, with well-defined agendas, institutional structures, and a dedicated full-time staff, while others are a looser combination of social and political initiatives. Programs vary in their objectives, their criteria for participation, and the kinds of benefits and incentives they might offer. The cumulative lessons learned from several states’ experiences in dealing with violent extremist groups are of growing interest to countries now facing similar challenges.

With its global membership, neutral “brand,” and powerful convening capacity, the United Nations has the potential to play a powerful role in setting global norms and shaping international legal frameworks regarding counterterrorism, as well as in providing a platform for the exchange of information and technical assistance for practitioners and governments.

This paper draws lessons learned from case studies of deradicalization initiatives in eight Muslim-majority countries, which corroborate the experiences of countries in other regions that have grappled with violent extremist groups. The paper concludes by making recommendations concerning how the UN could help to facilitate the provision of knowledge and resources to key stakeholders interested in establishing or strengthening their own rehabilitation programs. SOURCE: International Peace Institute

Stability in the Middle East: The Other Side of Security

Wed, 13 Apr 2011 16:54:49 -0700

National security is normally seen in terms of military strength and internal security operations against extremists and insurgents. The upheavals that began in Tunis, and now play out from Pakistan to Morocco,. have highlighted the fact that national security is measured in terms of the politics, economics, and social tensions that shape national stability as well. It is all too clear that the wrong kind of internal security efforts, and national security spending that limits the ability to meet popular needs and expectations can do as much to undermine national security over time as outside and extremist threats.

It is equally clear that calls for democracy are at best only the prelude to dealing with critical underlying problems, pressures, and expectations. It is far from certain that even successful regime change can evolve into functional democracies and governance. Countries with no political parties and experienced leaders, with no history of checks and balances in government, with weak structure of governance led by new political figures with no administrative experience, will often descend into chaos, extremism, or a new round of authoritarianism. Even the best governments, however, are unlikely to change an economy and national infrastructure in less than half a decade, and existing demographic pressures will inevitably go on for at least the next decade. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Transition in Arab States: Time for an “EU-Master Plan”

Thu, 07 Apr 2011 12:36:46 -0700

Since the end of January 2011 Arab countries have been confronted with the biggest upheaval since their establishment. Besides all political aspirations towards democracy, political participation, rule of law or civil rights one should not forget root causes that have led to these revolutions. Population growth, a disproportionally high number of young people, unemployment, less developed industry and agriculture, as well as migration pressure from sub-Saharan countries, are remaining and unresolved challenges.

The EU is facing serious internal and external challenges in tackling the revolutions on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. Internally coherent and cohesive action is needed; while externally the biggest problem could be to (re)gain credibility and trust because of the long period of good relations with the former autocratic regimes and leaders. The decisive point will be to change the strategic approach from containment to inclusive partnership. A new Overall Strategy is required – the time is ripe for an “EU-Master Plan”. SOURCE: Geneva Centre for Security Policy

The Arab Powder Keg

Thu, 24 Mar 2011 10:04:09 -0700

An animated map of recent protests in the Middle East as they spread from country to country, updated with the most recent events. Particular outcomes indicated with descriptions of the progression of events for each nation. SOURCE: Slate Magazine

Algeria: Current Issues

Thu, 10 Mar 2011 12:39:45 -0800

The United States has increasingly viewed the government of Algeria as an important partner in the fight against Al Qaeda-linked groups in North Africa. The Algerian economy is largely based on hydrocarbons, and the country is a significant source of natural gas for the United States and Europe. Algeria receives little development assistance from the United States, but its security forces benefit from U.S. security assistance and participation in bilateral and regional military cooperation programs.

Algeria’s relative stability, always tenuous, has most recently been challenged by a series of riots and popular demonstrations that have occurred since early January 2011. The unrest initially appeared to be motivated by discontent over food prices, but has turned more overtly political since mid-January. The example of neighboring Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” and the ripple effects of ongoing unrest in Egypt may contribute to opposition activism, with further protests anticipated in mid-February. The government has reacted both by attempting to assuage the public through political and economic concessions and by using the security forces to prevent and break up demonstrations. Across the region, other authoritarian governments have adopted a similar approach with varying results. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

The Toppling of Ben Ali: Isolated Development or First Domino?

Mon, 07 Mar 2011 12:56:31 -0800

Following the fall of Tunisia's President and in light of the upheaval in Egypt, the spectre of domino effects has been raised. The lack of prospects for young people, social injustice and political repression - all causes that sparked the protests in Tunisia - are problems in virtually all Arab states. SOURCE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik // German Institute for International and Security Affairs

The Consequences of Terrorism: An Update on al-Qaeda and other Terrorist Threats in the Sahel & Maghreb

Thu, 03 Feb 2011 11:03:25 -0800

The purpose of this updated report is to supplement two earlier special studies published in 2009 and January 2010: “Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, and Options for Effective Engagement in North Africa” (March 2009) was co-sponsored by the Conflict Management Program of the John Hopkins University jointly with the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. The second report, “Maghreb & Sahel Terrorism: Addressing the Rising Threat from al-Qaeda and other Terrorists in North and West/Central Africa”(January 2010), was published by the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

In sum, a coherent and firm US policy vis-à-vis the threats of terrorism in Maghreb and Sahel would increase domestic public understanding and support in the US for sustained engagement with the nations of North and West/Central Africa. The updated documents incorporated in this report, particularly the statistical tables and terrorism chronology covering the period September 11, 2001 – December 31, 2010 make it clear that constructive and sustained engagement is vital, employing both “hard” (security, military, intelligence cooperation) and “soft” elements (economic and social development creating employment opportunities, education that equips students/trainees for jobs, and reduction of religious radicalism). Otherwise, the US, the EU, and our friends in the region will remain hostages to, and targets of, these ideological, theological, and political terrorists for the remainder of the 21st century. SOURCE: International Center for Terrorism Studies // Potomac Institute

The North African Military Balance

Thu, 09 Dec 2010 09:48:48 -0800

The military balance in North Africa, and internal security developments in each country, receive less attention than the Arab-Israeli balance and the balance in the Gulf. They are, however, an important part of the security of world energy exports, and the struggle against terrorism and extremism. Moreover, major acquisitions on the part of Algeria and Morocco starting in 2006, and potential major orders by Libya, could mark the beginning of important military modernization efforts in the region. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies // Burke Chair in Strategy

Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa

Fri, 19 Nov 2010 16:06:08 -0800

Militias, rebels and Islamist militants: human insecurity and state crises in Africa explores how armed non-state groups have emerged as key players in African politics and armed conflicts since the 1990s. The book is a critical, multidisciplinary and comprehensive study of the threats that militias, rebels and Islamist militants pose to human security and the state in Africa. Through case studies utilising multidisciplinary approaches and concepts, analytical frameworks and perspectives cutting across the social sciences and humanities, the book conceptualises armed non-state groups in Africa through their links to the state. After contextualising these groups in history, culture, economics, politics, law and other factors, a systematic effort is made to locate their roots in group identity, social deprivation, resource competition, elite manipulations, the youth problématique, economic decline, poor political leadership and governance crisis. Differentiating militias from insurgents, rebel groups and extremist religious movements, the book illustrates how some of the groups have sustained themselves, undermining both human security and the state capacity to provide it. The responses to their threats by local communities, states, regional mechanisms and initiatives, and the international communities are analysed. The findings provide a conceptual reference for scholars and practical recommendations for policymakers. SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies // L'Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité

Morrocco: "Stop Looking for Your Son": Illegal Detentions under the Counterterrorism Law

Mon, 25 Oct 2010 09:31:01 -0700

The 56-page report, "‘Stop Looking for Your Son': Illegal Detentions Under the Counterterrorism Law in Morocco," documents a pattern of abuse under the country's counterterrorism law, which was adopted 12 days after coordinated suicide bombings in Casablanca on May 16, 2003, took 45 lives. Many of these abuses violate the progressive legislation Morocco adopted to safeguard against torture and illegal detention, as well as international conventions that Morocco has signed, Human Rights Watch said. The report is based in part on interviews conducted with persons detained under the counterterrorism law between 2007 and 2010 and their relatives. It includes a response from the Moroccan government, which Human Rights Watch welcomed. "While Morocco has demonstrated the political will to adopt enlightened human rights legislation, it lacks the political will to enforce it when it comes to terrorism suspects," said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. The pattern starts with the suspects' detention by agents in plainclothes, who show no identification, do not explain the basis for the arrest, and then transport suspects, blindfolded, to a secret place of detention, Human Rights Watch found. There, suspects often remain longer than the 12-day legal maximum in garde à vue, or pre-arraignment, custody, and many of those held under those conditions say that they were tortured or ill-treated in detention. The authorities eventually transfer them to a police station, where officers present them with a statement for signature. Only after they have signed do most of them first see a lawyer and are their families first notified of their whereabouts - sometimes four or five weeks after their arrest. The failure of arresting agents to prove their identity as police is significant because the suspects and their families uniformly contend that those who carried out the arrests are agents of the domestic intelligence agency, the Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire. Under Moroccan law, only the Judiciary Police is legally authorized to arrest and hold persons in garde à vue custody. SOURCE: Human Rights Watch

Islamist Movement in Morocco: Main Actors and Regime Response

Mon, 23 Aug 2010 16:36:42 -0700

The purpose of the present report is to provide easily accessible background information about the main Islamist organizations in Morocco and about recent trends in regime responses to them. Islamist organizations are here defined as organizations and actors distinct from the wider Islamic community or umma by their seeking to create a political order defined in terms of Islam (Mandaville, 2007: 20). Morocco hosts a profusion of Islamist organizations. Among these are a number of radical organizations which do not shy away from using violence to obtain their goals. Such organizations were behind the terrorist attacks in Casablanca of 16 May 2003, were involved in the Madrid bombings in 2004 and have also been behind a number of small-scale events, such as an unsuccessful bombing attempt in Casablanca in 2007. However, the present report focuses predominantly on the two main and non-violent Islamist organizations in Morocco; namely Harakat al-Islâh wa at-Tawhid (Movement for Reform and Unity, MUR) and its related political party, Hizb al Adala wal Tanmia (Party of Justice and Development, PJD); and Al Jama’a al Adl wal Ihsan ( Justice and Spirituality Organisation). The report has been prepared on the basis of existing literature and on insights gathered during a field visit to Morocco in November 2009. Merieme Yafout (doctoral student at the University of Hassan II in Casablanca) has contributed with important research input in Morocco. SOURCE: Danish Institute for International Studies

Western Sahara: The Failure of "Negotiations Without Preconditions"

Thu, 06 May 2010 13:31:51 -0700

The conflict over Western Sahara between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, which represents the people of Western Sahara, has been on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council for close to 19 years, since June 1991, when the council took up the issue and established MINURSO, the U.N. mission in Western Sahara. Throughout this period, the U.N. cannot show any real progress towards resolution of the conflict, other than occasional outbursts of optimism that eventually have come to naught. Peacemaking efforts towards a political solution, undertaken in order to move the parties away from the winner takes all solution envisaged by the referendum on self-determination under the U.N. Settlement Plan, have been at an impasse since June 2004. James A. Baker, III, the first United Nations personal envoy of the secretary-general, charged with such a task, resigned from his position at that time after he served in that role for seven years, stating that he had done all he could to resolve the conflict. He pointed out that only the parties themselves could exercise the political will necessary to reach an agreed-upon solution, as the U.N. would not solve the problem without requiring the parties to do something they would not voluntarily agree to do. The most recent informal talks between the parties organized by Christopher Ross, current personal envoy, on February 10 and 11, 2010 resulted at an impasse as did all previous talks organized by the U.N. since the Security Council adopted Resolution 1754 on April 30 2007, asking the parties to negotiate without preconditions. SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace

Hard Progress and a Long Road Ahead: Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa

Wed, 03 Mar 2010 14:50:20 -0800

As the governments of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) undertake the difficult process of enacting social and political change, the unequal status of women presents a particularly formidable challenge. In Iraq, deliberations over women's legal status have been as contentious as negotiations over how to structure the government. In Jordan, measures to increase penalties for so-called honor crimes faced strong resistance by ultraconservative parliamentarians and ordinary citizens who believe that tradition and religion afford them the right to severely punish and even murder female relatives for behavior they deem immoral. These debates are not just legal and philosophical struggles among elites. They are emotionally charged political battles that touch upon fundamental notions of morality and social order. In order to provide a detailed look at the conditions faced by women in the Middle East and understand the complex environment surrounding efforts to improve their status, Freedom House conducted a comprehensive study of women's rights in the region. The first edition of this project was published in 2005. The present edition offers an updated examination of the issue, with a special focus on changes that have occurred over the last five years. Although the study indicates that a substantial deficit in women's rights persists in every country in the MENA region, the findings also include notable progress, particularly in terms of economic opportunities, educational attainment, and political participation. SOURCE: Freedom House