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<title>Human Security Gateway: Djibouti</title>
<link><![CDATA[http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/browse.php?By=REGION&Selection=15]]></link>
<description>Items related to "Human Security Gateway: Djibouti".</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2013 0:45:07 +0000</pubDate>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2013 0:45:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
<webMaster>robert_hartfiel@sfu.ca (Robert Hartfiel)</webMaster>


   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 26 Sep 2012 08:35:04 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Horn of Africa Drought: One Year On</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=38338</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=38338</guid>
		 <description>In July 2011 the Horn of Africa region was affected by one of the worst droughts in decades with an estimated 12.4 million people reported to be in urgent need of food. Plan International (Plan) mobilised its teams in Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan to respond to the drought in the three countries where it is involved in long-term development work.
&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;
By June 3O, 2012 we had raised US$28, 8 million from our donors to help those affected by the drought and to date US$13,7 million has been spent helping the affected people, in particular children, recover and rebuild their communities. The balance of the funds will continue to support affected families, children and their communities over the coming months as part of our post emergence interventions.
&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;
One year on, our emergency response interventions have reached nearly 1.2 million people, mostly children, in Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Our efforts will continue to touch the lives of many more vulnerable communities in the months ahead.
&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;
In the aftermath of the drought, Plan partnered with local organisations to help the affected communities, especially children, recover from the calamity through a variety of projects. Plan provided food to communities, supplementary feeding in schools and health centres, water as well as health and sanitation training and facilities. 	   SOURCE: Plan International</description>
	 <source>Plan International</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 18 May 2012 10:53:38 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Baseline Study on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in the IGAD Subregion</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=37511</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=37511</guid>
		 <description>Money laundering and terrorist financing are major, interconnected problems for East Africa and the Horn. As the World
Bank’s World Development Report 2011 makes clear, they pose a significant threat not only to security but also to development.
&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;
Both the Financial Action Task Force [FATF] and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
[ESAAMLG] have identified a number of states in the subregion as demonstrating weak implementation of international
standards on anti–money laundering [AML] and countering the financing of terrorism [CFT]. Some states in the subregion
(Ethiopia and Kenya) have even been placed within the FATF International Cooperation Review Group [ICRG] process,
which can ultimately lead to obstacles to engagement with the international financial system. There is consequently a growing
recognition that states in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD] subregion stand to benefit in multiple
ways from a more concerted effort to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. There is also, however, a chronic
limitation of data and knowledge about the problems of money laundering and terrorist financing and about AML/CFT
vulnerabilities, risks, and capacities in the subregion. States of the subregion have their own specific vulnerabilities, challenges,
weaknesses, and strengths, even as they share certain cross-cutting challenges.
&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;
In this Baseline Study, the IGAD Security Sector Program [ISSP] and the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
[CGCC] set out with support from the Royal Government of Denmark to provide a more detailed and nuanced analysis of AML/
CFT challenges and opportunities in the IGAD region, to inform a better allocation of resources to risk and to potential return
on investment. The study is a joint effort developed in response to repeated requests by the ISSP’s and the CGCC’s governmental,
intergovernmental, private sector, and civil society partners in the subregion who sought assistance in obtaining baseline data
about money laundering risks and AML capacity in the region and guidance on the data’s potential use for CFT efforts. 	   SOURCE: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation</description>
	 <source>Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 18 May 2012 10:35:37 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Fighting Terror Through Justice: Implementing the IGAD Framework for Legal Cooperation Against Terrorism</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=37509</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=37509</guid>
		 <description>East Africa and the Horn face a number of transnational security threats, including terrorism, transnational crime, and
piracy. In recent years, particularly following the July 2010 attacks in Kampala, al-Shabaab has been increasingly viewed as
a threat not only to Somalia, but to the greater subregion. Tourism has declined and shipping costs have risen due to the
threat of piracy from Somalia. Lawless pockets where government reach is weak, together with rampant corruption, have
turned the region into a major transit point for black market financial flows and various forms of illicit trafficking.
&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;
Terrorism and transnational crime increasingly threaten security in the subregion of the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development [IGAD]. Because of their transnational nature, no individual IGAD member state will single-handedly be
able to deal effectively with these threats. As the IGAD Security Strategy adopted in December 2010 makes clear, effective
cooperation will be crucial to winning the struggle against terrorism and to ensuring that other forms of transnational crime
do not similarly jeopardize the IGAD subregion’s growth, prosperity, and stability. 	   SOURCE: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation</description>
	 <source>Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 16 Apr 2012 10:06:38 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Response to the Horn of Africa Emergency: A Continuing Crisis Threatens Hard-Won Gains</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=37250</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=37250</guid>
		 <description>Following one of the worst droughts in recent memory,
the Horn of Africa ended 2011 with marked improvements
in a number of conditions underpinning
the regional humanitarian crisis. The chronic and often
acute vulnerability of these affected communities highlights
the need for a sustained humanitarian response
in 2012 which places resilience building and disaster
risk reduction approaches at its center.
&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;
At the height of the crisis in July 2011, more than 13
million people in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti
were impacted by severe drought exacerbated by
conflict and reduced humanitarian access in Somalia
that displaced many people from their homes and into
neighboring countries. In July and August, the UN classified
parts of Southern Somalia as famine zones. UNICEF
declared the crisis a Level 3 emergency – triggering its
Corporate Emergency Activation Procedure – through
January 2012 and, in the case of Somalia, until May 2012.
&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;
A combination of favorable rains in much of the eastern
Horn of Africa in late 2011 and a significantly scaledup
international aid response have improved the dire
conditions of affected communities including displaced
and refugee children. This was especially evident in
the containment and progressive easing of previously
declared famine conditions in six areas of Southern
Somalia. Across the arid and semi-arid areas that characterize
this drought-prone region, improved pasture
and projected increased agricultural production pointed
to a tentative recovery in early 2012.
&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;
The report details the results of UNICEF’s massive humanitarian response in the second half of 2011. 	   SOURCE: United Nations Children's Fund</description>
	 <source>United Nations Children's Fund</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 29 Jul 2011 15:44:05 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Report of the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 1916 (2010) [S/2011/433]</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=35693</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=35693</guid>
		 <description>It would be hard to conceive of two States that offer greater contrasts than
Somalia and Eritrea: the former, a collapsed State for over two decades, with no
functional national institutions; the latter, possessing the most highly centralized,
militarized and authoritarian system of government on the African continent. From a
sanctions monitoring perspective, however, the two countries present very similar
challenges: in both cases, power is concentrated in the hands of individuals rather
than institutions and is exercised through largely informal and often illicit networks
of political and financial control. Leaders in both countries often depend more
heavily on political and economic support from foreign Governments and diaspora
networks than from the populations within their own borders. And both countries —
in very different ways — serve as platforms for foreign armed groups that represent a
grave and increasingly urgent threat to peace and security in the Horn and East
Africa region.
&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;
More than half of Somali territory is controlled by responsible, comparatively
stable authorities that have demonstrated, to varying degrees, their capacity to
provide relative peace and security to their populations. Without exception, the
administrations of Somaliland, Puntland, Gaalmudug, and “Himan iyo Heeb”
evolved independently of centralized State-building initiatives, from painstaking,
organic local political processes. Much of Galguduud region is controlled by anti-Al-
Shabaab clan militias loosely unified under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a
(ASWJ), but lacks a functional authority. Consolidation of and cooperation between
such entities represents the single most effective strategy for countering threats like
extremism and piracy, while expanding peace and security in Somalia. 	   SOURCE: The United Nations Monitoring Group</description>
	 <source>The United Nations Monitoring Group</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 28 Jul 2011 10:21:57 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>The &quot;Resource Curse&quot; in MENA? Political Transitions, Resource Wealth, Economic Shocks, and Conflict Risk</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=35685</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=35685</guid>
		 <description>The recent political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa region have exposed growing concerns about conflict risk, political stability, and reform prospects across its societies. Given the prevalence of oil and gas resource endowments in the region, which a voluminous literature suggests can be associated with adverse development consequences, this paper examines the interplay between their associated rents and political economy trajectories. The contribution of the paper is threefold: first, to examine the quantitative evidence of violent conflict in the region since 1960; second, to provide a nuanced review of the regional case study literature on the relationship between resource endowments, political stability, and conflict risk; and third, to assess how prospective political transitions have implications for the World Bank Group's work in the region on public sector management and private sector development. The authors find that resources and regimes have intersected to provide stability and limited violent conflict in the region, but that these development patterns have yielded a set of policy choices and development patterns that are proving increasingly brittle and unsustainable. A major institutional challenge for reforms will be to consolidate a requisite degree of inter-temporal credibility and stability in these regimes, while expanding inclusiveness in state-society relations. 	   SOURCE: The World Bank</description>
	 <source>The World Bank</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 21 Jul 2011 14:41:36 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Post-Conflict Recovery: Institutions, Aid or Luck?</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=35654</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=35654</guid>
		 <description>This paper identifies the factors linked to cross-country differentials in growth performance in the aftermath of social conflict for 30 sub-Saharan African countries using panel data techniques. Our results show that changes in the terms of trade are the most important correlate of economic performance in post-conflict environments. This variable is typically associated with an increase in the marginal probability of positive economic performance by about 30 percent. Institutional quality emerges as the second most important factor. Foreign aid is shown to have very limited ability to explain differentials in growth performance, and other policy variables such as trade openness are not found to have a statistically significant effect. The results suggest that exogenous factors (&quot;luck&quot;) are an important factor in post-conflict recovery. They also highlight the importance in post-conflict settings of policies to mitigate the macroeconomic impact of terms of trade volatility (including countercyclical macroeconomic policies and innovative financing instruments) and of policies to promote export diversification. 	   SOURCE: International Monetary Fund</description>
	 <source>International Monetary Fund</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 18 May 2011 16:57:04 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>A Gendered Perspective on the Impact of Conflict in the Horn of Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=35258</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=35258</guid>
		 <description>This Policy Note focuses on the gendered consequences of the militarisation of the Horn of Africa. Despite being in different ‘moments’ of conflict, the countries of this region share features of extreme social, economic and political violence, which impact negatively on their citizens. Protracted refugee and refugee-like conditions, extreme disinvestment in social programmes, increasing militarisation and political repression adversely affect women, thereby further entrenching gender disparities. Concerted national and international efforts and resources should support local democratic initiatives to find political solutions to these protracted conflicts and advance the struggle against sexual and gender-based violence and discrimination. 	   SOURCE: Nordic Africa Institute // Nordiska Afrikainstitutet</description>
	 <source>Nordic Africa Institute // Nordiska Afrikainstitutet</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 13 Apr 2011 16:54:49 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Stability in the Middle East: The Other Side of Security</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=35050</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=35050</guid>
		 <description>National security is normally seen in terms of military strength and internal security operations against extremists and insurgents. The upheavals that began in Tunis, and now play out from Pakistan to Morocco,. have highlighted the fact that national security is measured in terms of the politics, economics, and social tensions that shape national stability as well. It is all too clear that the wrong kind of internal security efforts, and national security spending that limits the ability to meet popular needs and expectations can do as much to undermine national security over time as outside and extremist threats.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;
It is equally clear that calls for democracy are at best only the prelude to dealing with critical underlying problems, pressures, and expectations. It is far from certain that even successful regime change can evolve into functional democracies and governance. Countries with no political parties and experienced leaders, with no history of checks and balances in government, with weak structure of governance led by new political figures with no administrative experience, will often descend into chaos, extremism, or a new round of authoritarianism.  Even the best governments, however, are unlikely to change an economy and national infrastructure in less than half a decade, and existing demographic pressures will inevitably go on for at least the next decade. 	   SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies</description>
	 <source>Center for Strategic and International Studies</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 28 Mar 2011 10:10:32 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Transnational Islamist (Jihadist) Movements and Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=34962</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=34962</guid>
		 <description>Somalia has engendered the policy debate on the extent of the spread of transnational Islamist Jihadist groups in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and their consequences for peace and security across the region. These concerns are justified given the emergence since the late 1980s of extremist groups such as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement and the Somali Jihadist Islamist groups of the likes of Al-Ittihad, the Islamic Courts Union and currently Al Shabab. The leaders and fighters of these groups relocated to the HOA after the defeat of the Taliban following the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan. The operations of these transnational Islamist groups within and across the countries of the Horn pose serious challenges to the region and beyond. 	   SOURCE: Nordic Africa Institute // Nordiska Afrikainstitutet</description>
	 <source>Nordic Africa Institute // Nordiska Afrikainstitutet</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 10 Mar 2011 13:02:57 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians [updated 3 February 2011]</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=34893</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=34893</guid>
		 <description>This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also includes American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen. Casualty data of U.S. military forces are compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency's press releases. Also included are statistics on those wounded but not killed.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Because the estimates of Afghan casualties contained in this report are based on varying time periods and have been created using different methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look to them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact. This report will be updated as needed. 	   SOURCE: Congressional Research Service</description>
	 <source>Congressional Research Service</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 27 Jul 2010 10:57:04 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Somali Refugees: Protecting Their Rights in Cities</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=33468</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=33468</guid>
		 <description>Tens of thousands of Somali refugees have sought asylum in cities in neighboring countries but have long been overlooked by humanitarian actors. Many of these refugees have found ways to survive in Nairobi, Djibouti, Aden, and Sana’a and have become self-reliant, but others suffer from police harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, and forced return. Registration and documentation should be the foundation of refugee protection in cities. Partnerships with community-based organizations and ongoing refugee profiling is essential to identify and serve the most vulnerable. Promoting the protection of refugees in cities helps them live with greater independence and dignity. Due to ongoing violence, human rights violations, and conflict in Somalia, today there are some 580,000 Somali refugees in four main asylum countries—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen. 	   SOURCE: Refugees International</description>
	 <source>Refugees International</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 19 Jan 2010 13:33:00 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD’s Contribution to Regional Security in the Horn of Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=31823</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=31823</guid>
		 <description>The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development [IGAD] is the regional organisation of
seven Eastern African countries with a stated ambition to achieve peace, prosperity and
regional integration among its member states. Each of these objectives is challenging, but
none more so than the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict in a region
that has been steeped in warfare for decades. The current conflicts in the Horn of Africa
include civil war in Darfur, protracted state collapse in Somalia, deep hostility and a stalled
peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a fragile peace agreement between North and
South Sudan, a border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti and periodic bouts of unrest in
the Ogaden and Northern Uganda.
This paper assesses the contribution that IGAD has made to regional security in the Horn of
Africa since the mid 1990s. It begins with a brief account of the origins of IGAD in 1986 and
the development of its peace and security mandate in 1996, set in the context of an evolving
African regionalism. It then examines the two major peace processes over which IGAD has
presided, the first for Sudan [1993-2005] and then the Somali process [2002-2004]. The next
section considers the overall effectiveness of IGAD’s contribution to peace and security and
assesses the success of IGAD’s reconciliation efforts in Sudan and Somalia. The paper argues
that the regional security framework of IGAD was conceived during an exceptional [and
brief] interlude of good relations among all its member states. It attributes the subsequent
failure of IGAD to prevent or resolve much of the serious conflict in the Horn to an
entrenched political culture that endorses the use of force and mutual intervention by states in
each other’s conflicts and domestic affairs. It notes that IGAD member states continue to fuel
conflict even when reconciliation talks are in progress and suggests that where positive results
have been achieved these are more the product of regional power politics than of IGAD’s
institutional strength. It concludes that the scope for the IGAD Secretariat to develop an
autonomous conflict-resolution capability will remain limited, but that member states will still
seek to utilise IGAD’s authority to legitimise their own regional policies. 	   SOURCE: Crisis States Research Centre // London School of Economics // Development Studies Institute</description>
	 <source>Crisis States Research Centre // London School of Economics // Development Studies Institute</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 13 Jan 2010 10:41:41 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Conference Report: Combating Terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=31792</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=31792</guid>
		 <description>The following is intended to provide a report of the discussions at the “Examining the ‘Bastions’ of Terror: Governance and Policy in Yemen and the Horn of Africa” conference held November 4-6, 2004 at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and the Sudan—the countries constituting the “Horn of Africa”— together with Yemen, are potential hostages to terrorism. Their largely unsecured territories provide a platform for terrorists, and their internal conflicts and weaknesses create potential breeding grounds for current and future anti-American terrorism.
American efforts to combat terrorism in the region demand cohesive strategies across U.S. foreign policy agencies and across the region. The U.S. must employ multipronged social, economic, political, and military strategies to overcome not only the immediate threats but medium- and longer-term risks. 	   SOURCE: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs // John F. Kennedy School of Government // Harvard University</description>
	 <source>Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs // John F. Kennedy School of Government // Harvard University</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 05 Jan 2010 13:59:51 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>United Nations Security Council Resolution 1907 on Peace and Security in Africa [S/RES/1907]</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=31699</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=31699</guid>
		 <description>The Security Council today imposed arms and travel sanctions on Eritrea for supporting insurgents trying to topple the nascent government in nearby Somalia.

The resolution, supported by 13 of the 15 members of the Council, places an arms embargo on Eritrea, imposes travel bans on the Horn of Africa nation's top political and military officials, and freezes the assets of some of the country's senior political and military officials.

China, one of the five permanent members of the Council, abstained from voting for the resolution, while Libya voted against it.

In the resolution, the Council expressed concern over Eritrea's rejection of the United Nations-facilitated Djibouti Agreement, a 2008 peace accord between Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).

Despite that pact, fighting and humanitarian suffering continue to engulf Somalia, which has been without a central authority for nearly two decades. Eritrea and Djibouti are also engaged in a border dispute.

Today's resolution “demands that all Member States, in particular Eritrea, cease arming, training, and equipping armed groups and their members including al-Shabaab, that aim to destabilize the region or incite violence and civil strife in Djibouti.”

It also calls on all nations to support the Djibouti peace process and support the TFG's reconciliation efforts in Somalia. 	   SOURCE: United Nations Security Council</description>
	 <source>United Nations Security Council</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:15:53 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Development Outreach Vol. 11 No. 2: Fragility and Conflict</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=31326</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=31326</guid>
		 <description>Fragile and conflict-affected states are not new, but the challenges they pose have moved to the top of the development agenda in recent years. Experience has shown that the task of moving a poor, conflict-affected state out of fragility is a complex, difficult and long-term project. In many cases, like in Afghanistan, gains have been hard-won, slow and uncertain. Nonetheless, recent history offers grounds for optimism. Mozambique and El Salvador, once stuck in a downward slide of violent conflict and economic ruin, are now democracies enjoying growth and relative stability. Rwanda, Liberia and Angola have made rapid progress, especially given the conditions they faced when their conflicts ended. But Timor Leste and the Horn of Africa, while very different, remind us that progress can also be marred by setbacks.

Paul Collier, who contributed an article to this issue of Development Outreach, has helped us understand
the forces that keep states fragile, and how that fragility undermines development prospects. External assistance is essential to help solve the problems of what Collier calls the “Bottom Billion” states, many of which are fragile, conflict-affected or both. But this aid must be complemented by local leaders who fill the institutional voids that created the vulnerability in the first place. One of their first tasks is to build capacity in the public service and in key institutions of civil society. Sanjay Pradhan and Alastair McKechnie, respectively World Bank Vice President for the World Bank Institute, and Director of the Bank Group’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected States Unit, outline the challenges on these fronts.

Elsewhere in this issue—which was developed with guidance from Henriette von Kaltenborn-
Stachau and Erik Caldwell Johnson—analysts and world leaders offer lessons. Timor Leste’s Finance
Minister Emilia Pires underlines the importance of long-term commitments by donors. At the same
time, she cautions governments in fragile settings not to take on everything at once. Perhaps the most decisive element in success or failure is the kind of leadership that emerges in fragile situations. Harvard Professor Matt Andrews, defines this as, “individuals connected in networks [who] intentionally mobilize people, ideas,meaning and resources toward achieving a purpose.” 	   SOURCE: The World Bank Group</description>
	 <source>The World Bank Group</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2009 16:17:34 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Djibouti Facing Local Insurgency and Threats from Somali Islamists</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=30875</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=30875</guid>
		 <description>Few nations in the world are as strategically important but as little known as Djibouti, a small desert nation of half a million people in the heart of the Horn of Africa. A lingering insurgency by the ethnic-Afar Front pour la Restauration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy - FRUD) that many believed was over in 2001 has reemerged as one of a number of security problems challenging Djibouti’s continued stability.  
 
FRUD is based in northern Djibouti, the traditional home of the nomadic Afar people. The Afar ethnic group represents roughly a third of the population in Djibouti, where the dominant ethnic Somali group is divided between the majority Issa clan and smaller groups from the Issaq clan and the Gadabursi, a Dir sub-clan. Most of the nomadic Afars live in the Danakil Desert of Ethiopia, giving them their alternate name of “Danakil.” The lack of Afar representation in the central government sparked the Djiboutian Civil War in 1991. France became involved in both mediation efforts and support missions for government troops, but the conflict continued until 2001, when the remaining radical faction signed a peace agreement with the government and joined the president’s governing coalition. Since then, however, it appears that a number of Afar militants have retaken the field, dissatisfied with the implementation of the peace treaty.  Most of the movement made peace with the government in 1994, with a group of hardliners under the late FRUD founder Ahmad Dini Ahmad holding out until 2001 before cutting their own deal with the government. Though certain roles at the highest level of the government have been reserved for Afars, the rest of the administration is still largely dominated by the ethnic-Somali Issa clan. 	   SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Global Terrorism Analysis</description>
	 <source>The Jamestown Foundation // Global Terrorism Analysis</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 10:57:57 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>United Nations Security Council Report on Peace and Security in Africa [S/RES/1862]</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=29593</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=29593</guid>
		 <description>Urging Djibouti and Eritrea to peacefully resolve a border dispute that flared into fighting in June 2008, killing at least 35 people and leaving dozens wounded, the United Nations Security Council demanded today that Eritrea pull its forces from the contested area and cooperate with diplomatic initiatives.

Through a unanimously adopted resolution, the 15-member body welcomed Djibouti’s withdrawal to its positions before the dispute, which centres on an un-demarcated border in an area known as Doumeira, and condemned Eritrea’s refusal to follow suit.

The armed conflict erupted last year after weeks of tensions and military build-up on both sides, and a subsequent UN fact-finding mission, which was welcomed by Djibouti and blocked by Eritrea, reported that the dispute had the potential to destabilize the entire region.

In October 2008, Representatives of Djibouti and Eritrea outlined their positions to a Council meeting that also heard statements from the Council’s 15 members, in which they stressed the need for restraint and backed existing international efforts to mediate a settlement.

In today’s resolution, the Council said it deeply regretted that Eritrea continuously refused to admit the fact-finding mission or any envoy of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who has offered his good offices to help resolve the issue.

The Council encouraged the African Union and the Arab League to strengthen their efforts to engage both parties in diplomacy, and asked Mr. Ban to contact both organizations before reporting back on the matter within six weeks. 	   SOURCE: United Nations Security Council</description>
	 <source>United Nations Security Council</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2009 11:41:47 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Evaluation of 2009-2012 UN Human Rights Council Candidates</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=29258</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=29258</guid>
		 <description>On May 12, 2009, the UN General Assembly will elect 18 new Human Rights Council members. Twenty countries are candidates. However, each is not competing against all of the others, but rather only against the ones from the same UN regional group. In this year’s election, all but two regional groups have submitted the same amount of candidates as available seats. The Asian Group has 5 countries vying for 5 available seats, the Latin American and Caribbean Group (―GRULAC‖) has 3 countries vying for 3 available seats, and the Western European and Others Group (―WEOG‖) has 3 countries vying for 3 available seats. This does not mean that the candidate countries for these groups will automatically be elected; in order to become a Council member, a country must receive the votes of at least 97 of the 192 General Assembly member states (an absolute majority). Competition between the candidates exists only in the African Group, where 6 countries are vying for 5 available seats, and in the Eastern European Group, where 3 countries are vying for 2 available seats. 	   SOURCE: Freedom House // United Nations Watch</description>
	 <source>Freedom House // United Nations Watch</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2008 16:10:54 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=26935</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=26935</guid>
		 <description>“Eastern Africa” denotes the geographical area
comprising the seven member states of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD):
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan,
and Uganda. Tanzania is also included because it
has had long historical and political interactions
with Kenya and Uganda within the rubric of the
East African Cooperation (EAC). The main
challenges to human security in this region have
originated from political and state fragility,
resource scarcities, and environmental degradation.
All these factors have contributed to a regional
context that is characterized by intrastate conflicts,
interstate wars, and political extremism. Raging
civil wars and interstate conflicts have, in turn,
produced forms of statelessness and marginality
that have deepened societal insecurities and
strained human livelihoods. Consequently, in
addition to profound political instability and
economic destitution, human security is arrayed
against escalating communal violence, small arms
proliferation, and massive movements of people
within and beyond the region.
Regional insecurities have also had wider global
resonance, attracting international actors, institutions,
and resources. Since the turn of the new
century, man-made conflicts and natural disasters,
such as droughts and floods, have tasked the
energies of the international community.
International engagement will continue because
new security threats such as terrorism and piracy
have emerged, exploiting extant weaknesses in
states and societies of the region. Resuscitating
structures that reduce the challenges to human
livelihoods in eastern Africa will entail the return to
sturdy territorial order, national cohesion,
economic viability, and the building of regional
institutions for security and prosperity.
Key Challenges
The key challenges for East Africa and the Horn
include the following:
• Weak states and governments that lack authority
and legitimacy, resulting in the weak organization
of security;
• Ecological, environmental, and health vulnerabilities
that have exacerbated the inability of
states and societies to produce food and other
forms of material sustenance;
• The proliferation of lawless and marginal
communities imperiled by the vagaries of the
weather, internecine communal violence, and
state neglect;
• Susceptibility to international terrorist and
criminal networks. 	   SOURCE: International Peace Institute</description>
	 <source>International Peace Institute</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2008 10:53:35 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Guerres dans la Corne de l’Afrique</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25681</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25681</guid>
		 <description>Une carte qui montre:
(1) les conflits armés dans la région de la Corne de l'Afrique dans les années 1980-2006
(2) les zones régionales de forte insécurité alimentaires et de famines
(3) le nombre de déplacés et réfugiés dans la région 	   SOURCE: Le Monde Diplomatique</description>
	 <source>Le Monde Diplomatique</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 24 Jun 2008 10:33:25 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Update Report on Djibouti-Eritrea [23 June 2008 Number 7]</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25070</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25070</guid>
		 <description>The Council will hold an open debate tomorrow, 24 June, on the recent border fighting between Djibouti and Eritrea. The meeting will be convened at the request of Djibouti under the general agenda item “Peace and Security in Africa.” It is intended to provide an opportunity for the parties to present views. But it is unclear whether Eritrea will address the Council. No formal outcome is expected at this stage. 	   SOURCE: Security Council Report</description>
	 <source>Security Council Report</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2008 12:51:54 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Le point sur l’épidémie de sida - Résumés par région - Afrique subsaharienne</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24354</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24354</guid>
		 <description>Ce rapport contient des résumés sur les régions suivants: Afrique australe, Afrique de l’Est, Afrique de l’Ouest et Afrique centrale, et Afrique centrale, et  aussi sur les thèmes suivantes: le double défi de la tuberculose et du VIH, circonsion masculine et préventions du VIH, epidémies latentes parmi les hommes ayant des rapports sexuels avec des hommes, la consommation de drogues injectables: un facteur croissant dans plusiers épidémies de VIH de L'Afrique Subsaharienne, et signes de changements vers des comportements à moindre risque. 	   SOURCE: Nations Unies // Programme Commun Des Nations Unies Sur le VIH/SIDA</description>
	 <source>Nations Unies // Programme Commun Des Nations Unies Sur le VIH/SIDA</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:47:34 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Deceptive Hope for Peace? The Horn of Africa Between Crisis Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=19649</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=19649</guid>
		 <description>In the past three years, the Horn of Africa has been characterised by keen diplomatic activities

and advanced processes of mediation. To end Africa's oldest war, representatives of the

Sudanese government began negotiations in Machakos (Kenya) with the Sudan People's

Liberation Army (SPLA), Sudan's most important rebel movement. Kenya is also hosting

peace talks to set up a new Somali government; participants include the Transitional National

Government (TNG) first set up in Arta (Djibouti) in 2000, numerous warlords who were

excluded from the Arta process, and local politicians and tribal elders of every shade of

opinion. And finally, an international commission in April 2002 made public a decision

regarding the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highly contentious issue; thus a

mechanism to manage conflict through arbitration was applied. It was agreed upon in the

Algiers Peace Agreement of December 2000. But demarcation remains to be done and is

contested by Ethiopia. 	   SOURCE: Journal Of Peace, Conflict And Development</description>
	 <source>Journal Of Peace, Conflict And Development</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:47:19 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Linking Environment and Security: Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking in East and Horn of Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=19259</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=19259</guid>
		 <description>In November 2004, the Heinrich Bxc3xb6ll Foundation invited four environmental security experts from Africa to Washington, D.C., and New York to meet with members of U.S. government, U.S. Congress, the United Nations, and civil society organizations interested in enhancing regional and global security through environmental cooperation. At the Wilson Center on November 16, the visitors presented their experiences with conflict in Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan; discussed the environmental implications; and suggested opportunities for resolution through cooperation. Linking Environment and Security: Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking in East and Horn of Africa collects these presentations, which--like the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change--find that ecological problems can contribute to intra- and interstate conflicts. Therefore, this publication seeks to contribute to this year's United Nations Millennium Review Summit and the Special Session of the UN General Assembly, which will address the reform of the United Nations to promote global security in the 21st Century. 	   SOURCE: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars // Environmental Change and Security Project // Heinrich Bxc3xb6ll Foundation North America</description>
	 <source>Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars // Environmental Change and Security Project // Heinrich Bxc3xb6ll Foundation North America</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:46:50 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004: Djibouti</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=18568</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=18568</guid>
		 <description>Djibouti is a republic with a strong presidency and a weak legislature. In 1999, the country elected its second president since gaining independence in 1977. Ismael Omar Guelleh, the candidate of the ruling People's Rally for Progress (RPP) that has ruled the country since independence, won the election with 74 percent of the vote. The election was considered generally free and fair. In the 2002 legislative elections, the ruling party coalition won all 65 seats, amid opposition claims of massive fraud. The judiciary was not independent of the executive and was subject to corruption and inefficiency.



Security forces include the National Police Force (FNP) and the Gendarmerie Nationale under the Ministry of Interior, the army under the Ministry of Defense, and an elite Republican Guard under the Presidency. An intelligence bureau under the direction of the National Security Advisor reports directly to the President. The FNP is responsible for internal security, border control, and prisons. The Gendarmerie Nationale is responsible for internal security. The army is responsible for external security, but also has some domestic security responsibilities. The Republican Guard is responsible for the protection of the President. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority. Security forces committed serious human rights abuses. 	   SOURCE: U.S. Department of State</description>
	 <source>U.S. Department of State</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:46:22 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Djibouti: A Human Rights Report on Trafficking of Persons, Especially Women and Children</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=17848</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=17848</guid>
		 <description> 	   SOURCE: Protection Project // School of Advanced International Studies // Johns Hopkins University</description>
	 <source>Protection Project // School of Advanced International Studies // Johns Hopkins University</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:46:21 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=17756</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=17756</guid>
		 <description>This article identifies some of the main causes of conflict in Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Somalia, evaluates the peace initiatives underway, and attempts to identify the apparent reasons that prevented their implementation.  For each conflict Yoh offers recommendations on how these peace initiatives might be improved.  	   SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies</description>
	 <source>Institute for Security Studies</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:46:03 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Progress 6: Implementing the Nairobi Declaration to Tackle Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=16981</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=16981</guid>
		 <description>The year 2005 was critical in the

history of the Regional Centre on Small

Arms (RECSA). With the signing

of the agreement establishing RECSA in

June 2005, Member States signatory to

the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi

Protocol renewed their political

commitment to the fight against the

proliferation of illicit small arms in the

Great Lakes Region and the Horn of

Africa. 	   SOURCE: Saferworld</description>
	 <source>Saferworld</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:45:56 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=16704</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=16704</guid>
		 <description>The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986. The ultimate goal of IGAD is to achieve economic integration and sustainable development for the region. In order for IGAD to play its proper role in regional and continental integration and be recognised as a suitable vehicle for promoting development in the region, it must address the following objectives:-





Promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macro-economic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields; 



Harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, services, and people within the region. 



Create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment; 



Initiate and promote programmes and projects to achieve regional food security and sustainable development of natural resources and environment protection, and encourage and assist efforts of Member States to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their consequences; 



Develop a coordinated and complementary infrastructure, in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy in the region; 



Promote peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue; 



Mobilize resources for the implementation of emer#gency, short-term, medium-term and long-term programmes within the framework of regional cooperation; 



Facilitate, promote and strengthen cooperation in research development and application in science and technology. 

 	   SOURCE: </description>
	 <source></source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:45:46 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=16337</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=16337</guid>
		 <description>To oversee the implementation and interpretation of the COMESA agreement, the Treaty established a Court of Justice, modeled on the European Court of Justice. Like the European Court of Justice, the COMESA Court of Justice can be seized of a matter by one of several ways. First, a member State may bring another member State or the Council before the Court for breach of the Treaty or failure to fulfill an obligation thereunder. Providing the Common Market with independent monitoring and enforcement power, the Treaty permits the Secretary General (with the agreement of the Council) also to bring a member State before the Court for failure to fulfill its Treaty obligations. Like the European Court of Justice, the COMESA Courtxc3xads decisions have precedence over any decisions of national courts. 	   SOURCE: Project on International Courts and Tribunals // African International Courts and Tribunals</description>
	 <source>Project on International Courts and Tribunals // African International Courts and Tribunals</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:44:29 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Shadow Networks and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=13965</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=13965</guid>
		 <description>Internal conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are never the result of internal factors only, but rather

a confluence of other factors, most of which bear a relationship to the shadow economic networks of

individuals or institutions connected to the international systems of trade and finance. These networks

foster corruption, elite rivalry and ethnic hatred because they survive on the indiscriminate plundering

of natural resources. But since they function outside domestic and international legal regimes, they

suffer little or no sanctions at all. This paper explores the limitations of international legal regimes in

this regard and suggests some improvements that could enhance their conflict-reduction function in

the region. 	   SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies</description>
	 <source>Institute for Security Studies</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:44:29 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Conflict circuit breakers in the Great Lakes Region of Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=13966</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=13966</guid>
		 <description>Conflict resolution in the African Great Lakes Region has been linked to the protocols and projects

agreed upon at the Second International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The

ICGLR created a continental-wide framework of conflict circuit breakers focused on resolving the

structural and surface situational causes of the 1996 to 2003 armed conflicts that drew in at least six

nations and destabilised the entire region. The implementation of these protocols and projects will

serve as a test for the African Great Lakes Region to move away from conflict and into a cooperation

and development phase; however, the effort to bring peace, stability and development will face

obstacles not only in the security sector, but also in developing infrastructure, civil society, and good

governance. In summary, this article contends that peace in the Great Lakes Region will depend

equally on two factors: internal governance and building civil society institutions, and focused regional

interlocking circuit-breaking institutions. 	   SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies</description>
	 <source>Institute for Security Studies</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:44:01 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Afar: The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=13109</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=13109</guid>
		 <description>This paper contends that conflict in the Afar region is attributable to numerous reasons: nationalism, inter communal (e.g. Afar-Issa) conflict, competition for power between political parties, and on occasion, inter-clan conflict over resources. The conflict is exacerbated by misguided and externally imposed development strategies, the militarisation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia and decline of traditional values and dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper makes the following recommendations to address this conflict: strengthening IGAD's conflict prevention capacity in the sub-region by tackling the hostility between and within some of its members, especially its early warning mechanism; and an inwardlooking approach by the governments of the three states in which the Afar that would produce policies that are inclusive,

non-discriminatory, and participatory.  	   SOURCE: Center for Policy Research and Dialogue // Institute for Security Studies</description>
	 <source>Center for Policy Research and Dialogue // Institute for Security Studies</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:44:00 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Horn of Africa Complex Emergency Situation Report #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=12870</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=12870</guid>
		 <description>Several successive seasons of failed rains, including the critical October to December 2005 deyr season, have resulted in a humanitarian emergency across pastoralist areas of the Horn of Africa in early 2006. USAID's Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) estimates that more than 7 million people currently face crisis conditions, with the largest numbers affected in the region spanning southern Somalia, northern Kenya, and southern and southeastern Ethiopia. Relief efforts have been hampered by insecurity, which is limiting humanitarian access throughout Somalia and parts of Somali and Oromiya regions, Ethiopia. Resource-based conflictxe2x80x94inter-clan, as well as cross borderxe2x80x94has also reportedly risen in Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, as water, food, and forage supplies became depleted during the long dry season. 	   SOURCE: United States Agency For International Development</description>
	 <source>United States Agency For International Development</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:43:39 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Arab League Boycott of Israel</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=11819</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=11819</guid>
		 <description>The Arab League has maintained an official boycott of Israeli companies and

Israeli-made goods since the founding of Israel in 1948. The United States actively

opposes the boycott and works on both bilateral and multilateral fronts to end it. The

U.S. government also enforces laws that prohibit U.S. firms from participating in the

boycott. This report will be updated as events warrant. 	   SOURCE: Congressional Research Service</description>
	 <source>Congressional Research Service</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:43:31 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Report on IGAD Conference on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism </title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=11496</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=11496</guid>
		 <description>The Conference took place at the initiative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with the technical assistance of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and financial support of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Gesellschaft (GTZ). Delegations from the member states of Djibouti , Ethiopia , Kenya , Somalia , Sudan and Uganda attended the three day conference, which took place at the United Nations Conference Centre in Addis Ababa , Ethiopia from 24-27 June 2003. The IGAD Secretariat took the initiative to organize the conference in response to the increasing acts and threats of international terrorism in the IGAD region.

 	   SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies</description>
	 <source>Institute for Security Studies</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:43:11 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>African Union</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=10498</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=10498</guid>
		 <description>Website of the Africa Union.  	   SOURCE: </description>
	 <source></source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:43:06 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean // World Health Organization</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=10129</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=10129</guid>
		 <description>

WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean consists of four technical divisions headed by directors reporting to Deputy Regional Director/Regional Director. They are: Health Protection and  Promotion (DHP), Health Systems and Services Development (DHS), Communicable Disease Control (DCD), General Management (DAF). There are two departments in the office of the Assistant Regional Director and they report directly to the Assistant Regional Director. The two departments are Knowledge Management &amp; Sharing and Policy &amp; Strategy Support. Five priority programmes are supervised by the Regional Directory/Deputy Regional Director while reporting through their respective divisional directors. The  priority programmes are the Tobacco Free Initiative, Roll Back Malaria, Stop TB, Community-based Initiatives, Women in Health and Development. Further, the regional office runs a special programmes on Polio Eradication, which  reports directly to the Regional Director. Another is the UNAIDS Inter-Country Programme. It gives support to the development of an expanded response to HIV/AIDS through the coordinated action of the UN theme groups on HIV/AIDS as well as the process of national strategic planning; collaborates with EMRO in the joint response to HIV/AIDS at the regional and country level; strengthens partnerships with UNAIDS cosponsers through joint regional initiatives in HIV/AIDS priority areas.

 	   SOURCE: </description>
	 <source></source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:43:06 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Horn of Africa Complex Emergency Situation Report #6, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=10195</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=10195</guid>
		 <description>Successive seasons of failed rains, including the critical October to December 2005 season, have contributed to a humanitarian emergency across pastoralist areas of the Horn of Africa. Poverty, weak governance, and in some cases political marginalization of local populations have compounded chronic food insecurity in this area. Effects of the drought are particularly pronounced in Somalia, where limited security and political stability have created conditions for resource-based conflict. According to the U.N. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for the Horn of Africa, the current drought is affecting more than 8 million people, primarily in the region spanning southern Somalia, northern Kenya, and southern and southeastern Ethiopia. Insecurity is hampering relief efforts and limiting humanitarian access throughout Somalia and parts of Somali and Oromiya regions in Ethiopia. Resource-based conflictxe2x80x94inter-clan and cross-borderxe2x80x94has risen in Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, due to the depletion of water, food, and forage supplies during the long dry season. A U.S. government (USG) assessment team is currently in the region to evaluate levels of food insecurity and make recommendations for future programming. 	   SOURCE: United States Agency For International Development</description>
	 <source>United States Agency For International Development</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:43:01 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Assessment for Afars in Djibouti</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=9944</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=9944</guid>
		 <description>About two-thirds of the Republic of Djibouti's inhabitants live in the capital city, but over 50 percent of the total Afar population are migrant nomads or reside in small towns or oases. The condition of Afars in Djibouti is certainly better at present than a decade ago. However, despite some political reforms, Issa presently dominate executive decision-making, the civil service, and the ruling party, which is a situation that has bred resentment and political competition between the Somali Issas and the Afars. Because a certain number of Afar still wishes to reunite with their brethren in the region, there is a level of uncertainty concerning the Afar. Yet, there is no united regional movement fighting for this cause, and support amongst the Afar for militant organizations like FRUD seems to be waning in the early 2000s. 	   SOURCE: Minorities at Risk Project // Center for International Development and Conflict Management // University of Maryland</description>
	 <source>Minorities at Risk Project // Center for International Development and Conflict Management // University of Maryland</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:42:56 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Gouled Hassan Dourad: Al-Ittihad al-Islami Senior Operative</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=9710</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=9710</guid>
		 <description>Profile: Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) operative who also worked for al-Qaeda; Grew up in Germany and Sweden, a refugee from the Somali civil war. An imam in Sweden sponsored his trip for weapons training in Afghanistan in 1996; he returned to Somalia that year. He joined AIAI in 1997 to oppose Ethiopia; He met Abu Talha in early 2003, and on his orders cased Camp Lemonier, the U.S. military base in Djibouti in Fall 2003; He was one of 14 key al-Qaeda operatives and associates transferred from CIA custody to the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2006. 	   SOURCE: Globalsecurity.org</description>
	 <source>Globalsecurity.org</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:42:56 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=9777</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=9777</guid>
		 <description>Islam is the fastest growing religion on the African sub continent and has a significant presence in an array of states. While mystical and often syncretic variants of Sufi Islam are evident in much of East and West Africa, the austere, illiberal Wahabi sect, coming out of Saudi Arabia, has found a growing audience in these regions and in the Horn. The consequent battle for the heart of African Islam constitutes an important part of the African religious landscape, with implications for both internal African politics and relations with the United States.  	   SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace</description>
	 <source>United States Institute of Peace</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:42:10 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Terrorism in the Horn of Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=7994</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=7994</guid>
		 <description>This report presents the views shared by six regional experts at a U.S. Institute of Peace workshop, &quot;Assessing Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: Threats and Responses,&quot; held on May 28. The meeting was organized by the Institute's Research and Studies Program as a half-day forum for leading specialists on terrorism, the Horn of Africa, and American foreign

policy toward Africa. This Special Report presents case studies on Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan. The workshop was organized and chaired by Tim Docking, African affairs specialist in the Research and Studies Program at the Institute, with the help of Ken Menkhaus. 	   SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace</description>
	 <source>United States Institute of Peace</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:42:05 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=7481</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=7481</guid>
		 <description>The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report on July 19, 2004. A major recommendation in the report was that the U.S. government should identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and, for each, to employ a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. The rationale given for devoting special attention to denial of sanctuaries was the belief that &quot;a complex international terrorist operation to carry out a catastrophic attack would be difficult to mount without a secure place from which to plan, recruit, train, rehearse, and launch the operation. To find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed, most lawless places in the world, according to the Commission. The Commission stressed the value to Al Qaeda of the Afghan sanctuary and its logistical networks, running through Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates in preparing the 9/11 attack and other operations, as well as the advantages the terrorists derived from the lax internal security environments in Western countries, including the United States. 	   SOURCE: Congressional Research Service</description>
	 <source>Congressional Research Service</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:42:04 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=7452</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=7452</guid>
		 <description>The small country of Djibouti has become an important military hub in the Horn of Africa for the United States over the past several months. Djibouti has allowed the US to build a new command center, as thousands of US troops gather there for the war on terrorism. For this operation, the US is defining the Horn of Africa r#egion as the total airspace and land areas out to the high-water mark of Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Yemen. 	   SOURCE: Globalsecurity.org</description>
	 <source>Globalsecurity.org</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:42:04 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Horn of Africa Complex Emergency Situation Report #5, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=7476</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=7476</guid>
		 <description>Successive seasons of failed rains, including the critical October to December 2005 deyr season, have contributed to a humanitarian emergency across pastoralist areas of the Horn of Africa. Poverty, weak governance, and in some cases political marginalization of local populations has compounded chronic food insecurity in this area. According to the U.N. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for the Horn of Africa, the current drought has affected more than 8 million people, with the largest numbers affected in the region spanning southern Somalia, northern Kenya, and southern and southeastern Ethiopia. Insecurity, which is limiting humanitarian access throughout Somalia and parts of Somali and Oromiya regions in Ethiopia, has hampered relief efforts. Resource-based conflictxe2x80x94inter-clan and cross-borderxe2x80x94has risen in Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, due to the depletion of water, food, and forage supplies during the long dry season. A U. S. Government (USG) assessment team is currently in the region to evaluate levels of food insecurity and make recommendations for future programming. 	   SOURCE: United States Agency For International Development</description>
	 <source>United States Agency For International Development</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:41:34 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Horn of Africa Complex Emergency Situation Report #4, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=5085</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=5085</guid>
		 <description>Successive seasons of failed rains, including the critical October to December 2005 deyr season, have contributed to a humanitarian emergency across pastoralist areas of the Horn of Africa. Chronic food insecurity, which stems from poverty, weak governance, and in some cases political marginalization of local populations, has compounded the situation. USAID's Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) estimates that more than 7 million people currently face crisis conditions, with the largest numbers affected in the region spanning southern Somalia, northern Kenya, and southern and southeastern Ethiopia. Relief efforts have been hampered by insecurity, which is limiting humanitarian access throughout Somalia and parts of Somali and Oromiya regions in Ethiopia. Resource-based conflictxe2x80x94inter-clan and cross-borderxe2x80x94has also reportedly risen in Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, as water, food, and forage supplies became depleted during the long dry season. A USAID assessment team is currently in the region to assess levels of food insecurity and make recommendations for future programming. 	   SOURCE: United States Agency For International Development</description>
	 <source>United States Agency For International Development</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:41:32 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=4737</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=4737</guid>
		 <description>U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia

are part of the U.S.-initiated Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These operations

cover a wide variety of combat and non-combat missions ranging from fighting

insurgents, to civil affairs and reconstruction operations, to training military forces

of other nations in counternarcotics, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics.

Numbers of U.S. forces involved in these operations range from 18,000 to just a few

hundred. Some have argued that U.S. military operations in these countries are

achieving a degree of success and suggest that they may offer some lessons that

might be applied in Iraq as well as for future GWOT operations. Potential issues for

Congress include the long-term U.S. military strategy in Southeast Asia and Africa,

proposals for NATO to assume command of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in

Afghanistan, and how counternarcotics operations in that country should be

conducted. This report will not discuss the provision of equipment and weapons to

countries where the U.S. military is conducting counterterrorism operations nor will

it address Foreign Military Sales (FMS) which are also aspects of the

Administration's GWOT military strategy. This report will be updated on a periodic

basis. 	   SOURCE: Congressional Research Service</description>
	 <source>Congressional Research Service</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2007 03:41:30 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Religion and Conflict in Africa: With a Special Focus on East Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=4647</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=4647</guid>
		 <description>The report provides a brief overview of the religious landscape of Africa with a special focus on the role of religion in the continent's several conflicts. It then proceeds to look at East Africa, where the three religious &quot;families&quot; of traditional

religion, Islam and Christianity are all present in large numbers. It does not find any significant correlation between conflict propensity or terrorism and religion, neither in the sense that religious diversity gives rise to any &quot;clash of civilizations&quot; nor in the sense that the predominance of any one religion (e.g. Islam) make a country more prone to conflict or terrorism. It then proceeds to country case studies of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and

Uganda, providing a brief overview of the history of religion and conflict and an assessment of the present situation and the prospects for the future. 	   SOURCE: Danish Institute for International Studies</description>
	 <source>Danish Institute for International Studies</source>
		 </item>
	

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