

Chapter 16

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COUNTERING TERRORISM: HUMAN SECURITY SOLUTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA²

INTRODUCTION

Examining war and terror in the Horn of Africa, we find that Somalia is the epicenter of terrorism, generating aftershocks throughout the region, entangled by the George W. Bush Administration's Global "War on Terror" (War on Terror) and Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda's "Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders."³ The realization of regional war and terrorism has prompted the Bush Administration to make it very clear that the Horn of Africa finds itself involved in the Global War on Terror, and Somalia is a critical element of our broader efforts to fight global terrorism,⁴ with international, regional and humanitarian consequences.⁵ The clear and present dangers are so stark, Guillermo Bettocchi, UN country representative for the refugee commission, said he has "never seen anything like Somalia before," asserting "It is the most pressing humanitarian emergency in the world today - even worse than Darfur."⁶ As such, the international, regional and humanitarian interests in the War on Terror in the Horn of Africa, radiating from Somalia, will be assessed in this chapter, to ascertain how the problem of terrorism can be countered to develop some solutions in the region, as portrayed by the emergent Human Security discourse.

THE WAR ON TERROR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

There is instability in Somalia. The first concern, of course, would be to make sure that Somalia does not become an al Qaeda safe haven. [That] It doesn't become a place from which terrorists can plot and plan. And, so, we're watching very carefully the developments there and we will strategize more.

George W. Bush⁷

We will fight its [U.S.] soldiers on the land of Somalia ... and we reserve the right to punish it on its land and anywhere possible... We warn all of the countries in the world not to respond to America by sending international troops to Somalia.

Osama bin Laden⁸

International Interests

Reviewing the primary international interests, the Bush Administration has short-term and long-term interests in the Horn of Africa. In the short-term, President Bush put the world on notice: “You are either with us or you are against us in the fight against terror.”⁹ In the Horn of Africa, the Bush Administration has been attempting to protect its citizens, assets, allies and strategic-interests, like the oil routes through the straights of Bab el Mandeb, from the threat of al-Qaeda (“The Base” to wage jihad: struggle), and what is framed as “extremist” Islamists in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Other interventions include, freezing the financial assets of alleged terrorist entities, like the contested closing of the al-Barakaat remittance services in Somalia. The \$100 million East African Counterterrorism Initiative, alongside the U.S. Central Command's Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, with about 2,000 troops, has been deployed. The CIA is operative, in partnership with warlords (resembling the “Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism”) and the intelligence services in the region.¹⁰ Regional States are aligning, supported by the opening of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia. The Bush Administration sponsored the fall 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1725, sanctioning the contested African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Preemptive war is sanctioned, as the “US Defends Ethiopian Action in Somalia, But Urges Restraint.”¹¹ U.S. military-intervention, utilizing air, land and sea resources have been deployed—demonstrated by the Bush Administration’s military attacks in Somalia, producing operational benefits and humanitarian costs.¹² And, as of May 17, 2007, Ambassador John M. Yates was appointed as special envoy to Somalia, based in the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, to address the conflict radiating from Somalia.

In the long-term, President Bush made his *tough* strategic vision clear, asserting he intends to “rid the world of the evil-doers,” believing he can “rout terrorism out of the world,” cautioning “This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.”¹³ For President Bush, “This crusade, this war on terrorism” has been framed as *The Freedom Agenda*,¹⁴ dispensing \$508,284,778 in “Humanitarian Assistance to the Horn of Africa.”¹⁵ Other interventions include, working with the International Somalia Contact Group and the International Advisory Committee for the National Reconciliation Congress—urging reconciliation between the Transitional Federal Institutions and Islamic Courts Union-elements, bound by the framework of “The Transitional Federal Charter and Transitional Federal Institutions,” towards a program for democratic elections in 2009.¹⁶ The Bush Administration has authorized a continental military base for Africa, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), to effectively address the U.S.’s more than humanitarian, strategic interests in Africa: counterterrorism, oil-security, opening up markets for U.S. firms and to pose as a counter to the enlarging influence of India and China in Africa.¹⁷

The other primary international actor in the region is al-Qaeda.¹⁸ Foundationally, it can be said al-Qaeda’s ideology has three pillars, from the words attributed to Osama bin Laden himself:

1. The Sovereignty of Allah and Sharia (Islamic Law¹⁹): “We seek to instigate the [Islamic] nation to get up and liberate its land, to fight for the sake of God and to make Islamic law the highest law and the word of God the highest word of all;”²⁰
2. The Liberation of Muslims Land from Occupation: “We want our land to be freed of the enemies, we want our land[s] to be free of the Americans [the Zionists and Apostates].” Further, “We believe that it is our religious duty to resist this occupation with all the power that we have and to punish it using the same means [“reciprocally” killing civilians as] it is pursuing against us.”²¹

3. The Centrality of Jihad: "Jihad is the sixth undeclared element of Islam. Every anti-Islamic element is afraid of it, Al Qaeda wants to keep this element alive and active and make it part of the daily lives of Muslims. It wants to give it the status of worship."²²

Consistent with Roger A. Pape's comprehensive database of all suicide terrorism from 1980 – 2005, we find a *rational*, strategic logic: "The specific goal sought in almost all suicide terrorist campaigns in modern history [whether secular and/or religious] is the same: to compel a democratic state to withdraw combat forces from territory prized by the terrorists."²³ In this stream, al-Qaeda has enduring interests in the Horn of Africa,²⁴ as was the case in 1993 (the "Black Hawk Down" conflict in Somalia), 1998 (the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania), 2002 (the Hotel and Airline attacks on Israeli-interests in Kenya) and presently, as al-Qaeda provides "virtual,"²⁵ and what the Bush Administration sees as operational support to Islamic Courts Union-elements in Somalia.²⁶

Regional Interests

Somalia, a "failed state," seemingly engaged in two decades of *civil war*, is the frontline of the War on Terror in Africa, with the contest between the Transitional Federal Institutions and associated Islamic Courts Union-elements at the center of the problem.²⁷ Upon the Islamic Courts Union's seizure of power, in the summer of 2006, they attempted to bring order to southern Somalia for the first time in 16 years, through the imposition of their Salfist interpretation of Sharia, before being deposed by Ethiopia, backed by the U.S. Addressing the possibility for conflict transformation, the interests of insurgent Islamic Courts Union-elements are accessible, and consequential, with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, former head of the Islamic Courts Union Shura (Consultative/Legislative) Council and suspected al-Qaeda associate, *reasoning* that (1) "Somalia is a Muslim nation and its people are also Muslim, 100% - therefore any government we agree on would be based on the holy Quran and the teachings of our Prophet Muhammad,"²⁸ such that (2)

“We are going to liberate Somalia from Ethiopia. Then we will form a government of national unity.”²⁹ Accordingly, the Islamic Courts Union-elements, alongside suspected al-Qaeda operatives from the U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998 (Fazul Abdullah Mohammed), and the 2002 attacks in Kenya (Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and Issa Osman Issa), have had the greatest War on Terror value for the U.S., since key Islamic Courts Union-elements (Mukhtar Robow, Ahmed Abdi Godane, Ibrahim Haji Jama and Hassan Abdullah al-Turki) are reported to have operational links to al-Qaeda.³⁰

Ethiopia and Eritrea are interminable combatants—with other reports of conflict in Ethiopia’s ethnic Somali Ogaden region, and border clashes between Eritrea and Djibouti, leading Djibouti’s President to declare war against Eritrea.³¹ Initially, Ethiopia was committed to challenging the “threat” of Islamic Courts Union terrorism and irredentism, in support of the Transitional Federal Institutions.³² Presently, many are arguing that, in effect, Ethiopia is serving as a proxy for the U.S.’s revised counterterrorism policy.³³ Presently, Eritrea has been hosting Islamic Courts Union-elements. Reports suggest that Ethiopia and Eritrea have been supporting their own allies with troops and arms, motivated by their war of 1998 – 2000 (claiming 80,000 lives), their unresolved Badme border-dispute, and a history of supporting each others’ oppositional factions.³⁴

Sudan it thought to be cooperating with the U.S. in Somalia and abroad, providing actionable intelligence. Apparently, this has helped to curtail substantive U.S. pressure on what the U.S. has maintained is a genocide in Darfur.³⁵ Also, we find that Sudan has been giving tacit support, if not more, to Islamic Courts Union-elements as it vacillated on the (initial) deployment of AMISOM.³⁶ Kenya is active, as it chairs the Intergovernmental Authority on Development; participates in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; is engaged with the International Contact Group; and has consistently worked to create a functional, secular government in Somalia. Kenya is faced with many challenges as it tries to resolve its own problems from the tragic

Presidential elections of 2007; address the influx of refugees fleeing conflict in Somalia; resolve the problems with its own dispossessed, coastal Muslim population; while providing basing and port access to the U.S. Also, Djibouti is in a quandary. On the one hand, Djibouti allows the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, military base in the country; has helped to establish a number of reconciliation conferences; and is at “war” with Eritrea. On the other hand, Djibouti’s President has stated that he supports the territorial integrity of Somalia, while publicly voicing his displeasure with reports of U.S. military attacks in Somalia, being launched from Djibouti. This orientation is consistent with the will of many Somalis who were in support of the Islamic Court Union’s rule,³⁷ who view Ethiopia as an “occupation” force and have publicly demonstrated against the U.S. attacks in Somalia.³⁸

Humanitarian Interests

Human Security is an abstraction in the Horn of Africa, whether we address the freedom from fear or the freedom from want. Addressing the freedom from fear, we find that “about 8,000 Muslim fighters were killed in the brief war, while the Ethiopians lost just 225, with 500 wounded” in Somalia, after the U.S.-backed, Ethiopian-Transitional Federal Institutions intervention.³⁹ There are reports that 3,000 civilians have been killed and up to 700,000 newly displaced people in Somalia,⁴⁰ with “some 315,000 of them in neighbouring [sic] countries, including Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia and Djibouti.”⁴¹ The United Nations Secretary-General has been focused on the consequences of armed conflict on children in Somalia, reporting “a number of parties to the conflict [are] responsible for recruiting and using child soldiers” where “children are being killed and maimed as a result of military actions by Ethiopian forces in the course of confrontations with anti-Government forces and civilian demonstrators.” In addition, there has been an “increase in reported cases of rape and other grave sexual violence against children.”⁴²

In Ethiopia, there are reports of unaccountable, Guantanamo Bay-like prison-interrogation facilities, implicating Kenya and U.S. intelligence services.⁴³ In Ethiopia's ethnic Somali Ogaden region, the Ogaden Liberation Front, with alleged links with Oromo Liberation Front, has attacked an oil installation claiming the lives of nine Chinese and 77 Ethiopians. This has prompted Georgette Gagnon, from Human Rights Watch, to report that "The Ethiopian army's answer to the rebels has been to viciously attack civilians in Ogaden," alleging war crimes.⁴⁴ In Sudan, the conflict in Darfur is unresolved, with reports of some 10,000 to 300,000 civilian deaths and 2.5 million people displaced, since 2003.⁴⁵ And the 2005 peace agreement between the Northern and Southern regions of Sudan are tenuous, reminding people of the two-decade civil war that killed over 1.5 million people and displaced over 200,000.⁴⁶

Addressing the freedom from want in the Horn of Africa, this is a region with the worst Human Development Indexes in the world,⁴⁷ presently facing what the USAID characterizes as a "Complex Emergency." In light of poor governance and underdevelopment, it is apparent many of the challenges in the Horn of Africa have been compounded by irregular rainfall, drought, conflict over natural resources, rising food prices and restricted humanitarian relief access.⁴⁸ The emergencies in the region are complex, with 80,000 people negatively affected by drought in Djibouti; 1.7 million people in need of emergency assistance in Eritrea; 4.5 million people in need of emergency assistance in Ethiopia; 291,454 people displaced by the post-election crisis in Kenya; 2.6 million people in need of emergency assistance in Somalia; and UNICEF warns that the health and lives of six (6) million children, alongside the lives of the often marginalized, pastoralist and agricultural populations in the region are also threatened, at the time of publication.⁴⁹

HUMAN SECURITY MATTERS

Reviewing Human Security matters, before critically reviewing some Human Security solutions in the Horn of Africa, we find that the Human Security discourse grew out of an

assessment of the “human” consequences of development economics in the early 1990’s. This shift in orientation was informed by the data that there was no automatic correlation between national growth and development, when marginalized communities were accounted. This paradigm shift was initiated by economists like Mahbub ul Huq and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen and the creation of the annual *Human Development Reports*, sponsored by the UNDP. Foundationally, this perspective focused on developing human capabilities and enlarging people’s freedoms,⁵⁰ complimented by the Human Development Index, to be read alongside traditional economic metrics. This paradigm shift, from national aggregates to individual human life-worlds, fostered the conditions for the “democratization” of the national security discourse, and the two primary trends in the Human Security discourse that have emerged, attempting to: (1) secure “the freedom from want” and (2) secure “the freedom from fear”—though “the freedom from want” was seemingly privileged, based on the comparative advantages of many of those who initiated the discourse, economists.

As the discourse developed, the reorientations that were introduced by the *Human Development Reports* influenced the convergence between human development and security studies, as portrayed by the foundational texts in the discourse.⁵¹ Surveying the discourse, we find an enlarging debate on how to operationally define Human Security. On the one hand, we have those that favor the original, more “comprehensive” approach, which the researcher is calling “Revolutionary Human Security,”⁵² and on the other hand, we have those that are in favor of a more “narrow” approach, which the researcher is calling “Reformist Human Security.”

Revolutionary Human Security

Addressing the scope of the original framework, Human Security is essentially “aimed at mitigating threats to the insecurity of individuals” and not just States, enabling people to enlarge their capabilities and freedoms.⁵³ At its best, the Human Security *attitude* is dialogic and deeply

democratic, consistent with the Human Security “methodology” introduced by the research of Richard Jolly and Deepayan Basu Ray.⁵⁴ It is dialogic in that it is a participatory framework that focuses on the interactions between civil society, the State and the International Society, informed by the “democratically” expressed will and/or public-opinions of a given population. Once this will is determined, it is used to prioritize policy objectives, to the degree that it is a comprehensive framework that can help secure the foundations of human development, for conflict transformation.⁵⁵

Assessing the core values of Human Security, we can find empathy and responsibility.⁵⁶ These values challenge people to identify with the human dignity of “the suffering other,” taking personal responsibility to help people become self-reliant. This framework recognizes that we all want security and freedom, no matter our culturally-informed, ontological-referent, whether Allah, or The Enlightenment’s God of Nature, “Reason,”⁵⁷ conscious that there are other ways of being-in-the-world, even in “democracies.” Human Security has four core elements. It is (1) people-centered: focused on the diverse lives that people have reason to secure; (2) multi-dimensional: as it seeks to address the complex issues that inform contemporary insecurities; (3) interconnected: recognizing that a threat to one can pose as a threat to all, be it a social, religious, political, economic, environmental or health-related threat; and (4) universal: to the degree that this orientation values the disparate interests of the globe’s citizens, as we all want (culturally-circumscribed) liberty.⁵⁸

Furthermore, Jolly and Ray developed an essential set of Human Security questions, challenging analysts to ask: (1) does a given policy enable “the capacity of people to exercise agency over choices and strengthens their capabilities”? (2) do the policy “measures in one country weaken the conditions of human security in another country”? and (3) does a given State’s policies “make military weapons and overwhelming military force the main mechanisms for achieving

human security”?⁵⁹ If any answer does not value Human Security matters, we are faced with what the researcher is calling a “Human Security-deficit.”

Reformist Human Security

Addressing a narrower concept of Human Security, the research of S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong helps to inform the growing debate that is more in line with the valuations in *Human Security Brief 2007*.⁶⁰ For MacFarlane and Khong, Human Security is defined as securing the “freedom from organized [political] violence.” This definition supposes that “humans are insecure insofar as they are in danger of being injured, maimed, or killed by those who organize to harm them.” Thus, threats to Human Security would include “genocide, internal/civil wars, terrorist attacks, interstate war, ethnic cleaning policies, organized rape, torture and the laying of land mines.” This interpretation is deemed feasible since “it seems possible to respond to such security threats by going to the source.”⁶¹

Critically reviewing the research of MacFarlane and Khong, we are presented with a conscious attempt to make the Human Security discourse more “mainstream,” so that there is buy-in, in various academic and policy circles, informing the narrower definition of Human Security.⁶² Yet, the data suggests that more humans suffer from threats addressed under the more comprehensive framework of Human Security, than those who are threatened by organized (political) violence.⁶³ Effectively, the “Human” in *Human Security* loses its value. Beyond MacFarlane and Khong’s assessment of the noteworthy “Promises and Achievements” of Human Security praxis, their criticism of what they see as “Conceptual Overstretch,” by those who advocate for a more comprehensive valuation is remarkable, focused on what they see as:

1. False Priorities and Hopes: Too much is covered by the Revolutionaries, where “the concept loses all its meaning and coherence.” One might first ask “for whom?” since we can assume, by their text alone, that they were able to ascertain the concept’s “meaning

and coherence.” Maybe others can construct “meaning and coherence” too? Also, the authors found problems with re-labeling issues Human Security concerns, since it leads to “an inability to prioritize, or the creation of false priorities.” However, since choosing priorities is an inherently inter-subjective process, it is hoped that the authors are not proposing a new form of “benevolent hegemony,” presupposing their singular-access to *True Priorities and Hopes*.

2. Causal Confusion: The authors suppose, “if military, economic, environmental, health, and gender-related threats to the individual are all lumped as threats to human security,” then “the task of isolating the causes of these threats are all the more difficult.” Yes, but unless the authors are appealing to a metaphysics, where all problems are reducible to *one* solution, we might want to proceed more carefully. At worst, all we can do is help to foster the conditions that enlarge people’s capabilities and freedoms, which cannot be reasonably denied, even if we “save” someone from organized violence. In this stream, it appears that complex problems, require complex solutions, assuming that we are not circumscribed by powerful interests and are focused on addressing the security fears of as many *Humans* as possible, despite inherent difficulties; and
3. Securitization and Military Remedies: The authors contend, “Because states already have a tendency to associate issues with the concept of security so that they can bring force to bear, the human security approach, by introducing and legitimizing a whole new set of issues... that can be securitized [,] may unwittingly lead to military solutions to political or socioeconomic problems.” Albeit relevant, the authors are shifting the burden of proof. It is not the fault of Human Security analysts if States try to apply “military solutions to political or socioeconomic problems.” Moreover, it appears that powerful States will trample over nations, people and *surely concepts* in pursuit of their National Security

Interests, as has been evidenced by the Bush Administration's contested invasion and occupation of Iraq,⁶⁴ even in the name of Freedom, as *Operation Iraqi Freedom*.⁶⁵

Human Security is a contested concept. The Revolutionary or Reformist aspect of Human Security will be used and/or completely discarded, due to the values, choices, experiences—contingencies—of a given researcher and the scope of one's research problem. Realistically, maybe all *Human Security* can encourage is a change in attitude and focus, as in, a focus on the short and long-term consequences of policies on people, not just states?

HUMAN SECURITY SOLUTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Upon the winter 2006, U.S.-backed, Ethiopian-Transitional Federal Institutions overthrow of the Islamic Courts Union, the evidence suggests that the Human Security realities in the Horn of Africa are clear, present, dangerous and escalating. Utilizing the Human Security questions developed by Jolly and Ray, to judge the practical consequences of the War on Terror, it is also clear there is a "Human Security-deficit" in the Horn of Africa. The War on Terror has been focused on State security (e.g. securing U.S. counterterrorism interests and privileging the contested interests of Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal Institutions); is ruled by seemingly zero-sum calculations that appear to privilege the U.S. and allies no matter the likely effects of the War on Terror on civilian populations, despite monetary aid (e.g. the 3,000 civilians that have been killed, the 700,000 people that have been displaced in need of aid, and the proliferation of child soldiers, following the U.S.-backed, Ethiopian-Transitional Federal Institutions overthrow of the Islamic Courts Union); and the intervention is heavily focused on procuring the resources and energy for war (e.g. securing military-centric counterterrorism initiatives, a regional military base in Djibouti, contested CIA operations, diplomatic efforts in support of military initiatives like the Ethiopian "occupation" of Somalia, the deployment of AMISOM forces, and the development of a continental military base, AFRICOM).

In light of the above, it can be said that the lives and securities of ordinary Somalis have been marginal, at best, and expendable, at worst, producing aftershocks throughout the region, when it comes to the War on Terror. If the costs outweigh the benefits when read against the War on Terror, then the literature on containing the threat from organized political violence matters, as a realistic Human Security matter.

Containing the Threat of Organized Political Violence

Consistent with the historically responsible, six-part counterterrorism framework proposed by Louise Richardson,⁶⁶ integrating the problems in the Horn of Africa, the following Human Security solutions are recommended:

1. Have a Defensible and Achievable Goal

The “war on terror” metaphor would be replaced with the objective of *containing* the threat of war and terrorism. An “emotion,” terror, and a “tactic,” terrorism, cannot be “defeated” by war. It is logically impossible, as war produces more “terror” (i.e. “shock and awe”). And based on the data, terrorism has increased sevenfold (globally “607 percent”),⁶⁷ since President Bush began what he called “This crusade, this war on terrorism” in Iraq. Beyond the historical allusions and strategic miscalculations of framing “This crusade,” as a “war on terrorism,” alienating national and international publics,⁶⁸ confirming the global Muslim suspicion that the War on Terror is a “War on Islam,”⁶⁹ playing into the frame of al-Qaeda, we have to be honest with ourselves: President Bush can neither “rid the world of the evil-doers,” nor “rout terrorism out of the world.” And even if it was possible, genocide and war crimes would follow, since non-state terrorists tactically blend into civilian populations. Reframing the goal, as containment, is more likely to allow the International Society to counter the terrorist threat, simultaneously undermining the consequential rhetoric of al-Qaeda.⁷⁰

In the Horn of Africa, this would entail the strategic redistribution of defensive-assets (*in* and) around the Somalia border, rather than support the “occupation” of Somalia by Ethiopian, AMISOM or UN forces—given the perceptions of the “occupation.”⁷¹ Though this recommendation might cost the viability of the Transitional Federal Institutions, alongside the 14 other failed attempts at nation building post 1991, it has some benefits: it privileges the “Transitional” nature of the Institutions; it undermines any notion of U.S.-Ethiopian-backed “Christian” *occupation* or *Holy War*; it fosters the conditions for an “organic” Somali State to rise, based on “the will of the people,” acknowledging the realities of self-declared Somaliland and Puntland;⁷² and it helps to defend the surrounding States against the terrorist threat. Any order that would emerge would have normative responsibilities. Aggression, terrorism and human rights abuses are not options, and there are inter/national statutes to deal with said occurrences.⁷³

2. Live by Your Principles

To effectively counter terrorism, there is no room for any kind of “Freedom Agenda” that leaves civilian populations dead by the hundreds of thousands, people displaced by the millions, people un-free from “occupations” despite the will of the people,⁷⁴ and “Enemy Non-combatants” stripped of their human rights/dignity, as we are seeing in the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. In this case, the War on Terror agenda can too easily be seen as antithetical to the best of democratic values and the rule of law. This is being supposed since it is reasonable to assume that people would rather have the freedom from death, displacement, “occupations,” “enhanced interrogation techniques” (with Retired U.S. Major General Antonio Taguba, the Army general who first investigated the abuse at Abu Ghraib, asserting that “The commander in chief and those under him authorized a systematic regime of torture”⁷⁵) and “unlawful” detentions (whether in Guantanamo Bay or suspected sites in the Horn of Africa), instead of *The Freedom Agenda*, as such. Here we are talking about realizing Human Security

and international accountability, negotiating the possibilities of bringing alleged terrorists and war criminals to justice within a regime that is true to U.S., and International principles. Reframed, the agenda is about the rule of law, undermining any notion that “Might Makes Right” born of fallacious special pleading.

3. Know Your Enemy

We have to know what “the enemy” wants, to undermine the threat, effectively utilizing all source intelligence, in the pursuit of justice. The insecurities of those who resort to the tactic of terrorism, or insurgency, appealing to the rhetoric and/or realities of “popular” notions of injustice must be recognized.⁷⁶ In other words, the appeals of the adversary, whether al-Qaeda or Islamic Courts Union-elements—“to end occupations”—and the counterterrorist literature suggests that President Bush is misguided when he simply contends that “They hate our freedoms.”⁷⁷ Al-Qaeda, the Islamic Courts Union-elements and the Muslim public opinions that are appealed to, shows that they want freedom, security and autonomy too.⁷⁸ Additionally, terrorists are “normal” and *Human*. They are not just “evil,” according to the research of forensic psychiatrist and former CIA operations officer Marc Sageman.⁷⁹ To realistically counter the threat, we are forced to renegotiate the “occupations” and “injustices” that exist in the “Muslim World” and engage the enemy—unless it is still believed that anyone can “rout out terrorism from the world,” and miss civilian populations.

4. Separate the Terrorists from Their Communities

We have to win the battle of “hearts and minds.” This is more likely to be the case to the degree that more people have the capabilities to enlarge their freedoms, before and after any counterterrorism intervention. So long as civilian populations in the War on Terror are killed, displaced, believe that Muslim men are being detained indefinitely, and feel like they are being “occupied” by foreign forces, this “ideological” battle will be ceded to the terrorists. Terrorists will not be isolated, and containing the enemy will become more difficult. The idea that we have baser

motives in the “Muslim World” (e.g. oil control and unconditional support of Israeli policies) will simply be confirmed. Consequently, the mujahideen (Holy Warriors), in Somalia (and beyond), will continue to be viewed as the protectors of their communities and defenders of the faith/ful. Even more, the enlarging and powerful critics of al-Qaeda, from former members and respected clerics,⁸⁰ and from various insurgent groups in Somalia,⁸¹ will be undermined.

5. Engage Others in Countering Terrorists with You

If realistic, President Bush’s declaration to the world that “You are either with us or you are against us in the fight against terror” will be looked at as a false dilemma and unproductive when trying to engage others. One can reasonably be against the framework of the Bush Administration’s “War on Terror” and Osama bin Laden’s “Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.” Moreover, regimes would be less inclined to act unilaterally in war when an attack is not proven to be imminent, and would work with others in the International Society based on each other’s comparative advantages. A global challenge needs global engagement, one cannot “go it alone” as we are seeing in (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and) the Horn of Africa. In theaters of insecurity, responsible actors would be required to work cooperatively with international, regional, and individual constituents (especially “the Enemy” to secure a negotiated peace) at (post) nation building, recognizing that doing otherwise will continue to cost, in blood, treasure and legitimacy.

In Somalia, this would require a realistic peace-agreement and power-sharing arrangement, without “sectarian” conditions—taking seriously the problems of “occupations” when trying to counter terrorism. And there are few good options. In one respect, we can follow the pacts that privilege “occupations” (where Ethiopian and AMISOM forces stay, until UN forces are re-deployed—recall “Black Hawk Down”?) or take seriously the possibility of redeploying defensive assets (*in, and*) around Somalia, strategically engaging the more constructive elements of the

“Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia” who have signed peace accords and publicly rejected al-Qaeda,⁸² to let a “post-Imperial” entity emerge.

In the broader Horn of Africa, the problems need to be disaggregated so that regional States do not continue to inflame the insecurities in Somalia. The “Greater Horn peace initiative” that was proposed by John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen can be viable. They urge a diplomatic surge to create “a comprehensive approach to the two main clusters of conflicts surrounding Sudan and Somalia” to address other regional conflicts. It is thought that this effort can “broker a power-sharing arrangement in Somalia; and settle the ongoing disputes in southern Sudan and between Ethiopia and Eritrea.”⁸³

6. Have Patience and Keep Your Perspective

This orientation challenges those that want to effectively counter terrorism to shift the frame from being committed to “the long-war,” to being committed to securing “the long-peace,” for human development, towards conflict transformation—or submit to present realities. This frame recognizes that realizing Human Security takes time, and that it is quite humbling when we find out that we do not have the monopoly on virtue.

CONCLUSION

In light of the War on Terror’s Human Security-deficit in the Horn of Africa, it is being supposed that pragmatism should trump ideology when it comes to countering terrorism. We are seeking to evaluate and potentially apply what works and what is effective, beyond the rhetoric of being “tough” on terrorism, in light of (Human) Security consequences. As the War on Terror has demonstrated, being “tough” on terror does not logically/experientially entail effectiveness. If reasonable, most people in the International Society would choose effectiveness over security dilemmas. As such, it is contended by Richardson that “if we have a more modest agenda—if our goal is to contain the threat from terrorism and if in doing so we play to our strengths and abide by

our principles—then we can definitely succeed.”⁸⁴ Looking at the consequences of the War on Terror in the Horn of Africa, and beyond, the six-part counterterrorism framework proposed by Louise Richardson, rooted in the valuations of Human Security matters, are appearing more reasonable, than not, in the attempt to realistically counter terrorism.

NOTES

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- ¹ For comments or queries, Dr. Taylor can be reached at attaylor@bowiestate.edu.
- ² This text was completed, June 2008, and developed for the text, edited by Dr. John Davis, *Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on Terrorism (Summer, 2009)*.
- ³ Dr. John Davis, editor, *Africa and the War on Terrorism* (Virginia: Ashgate Publishing, 2007).
- ⁴ Jendayi Frazer, Congressional testimony on “Somalia: Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa” (U.S. Department of State, June 29, 2006).
- ⁵ *Shell-Shocked: Civilians Under Siege* (Human Rights Watch, April 13, 2007).
- ⁶ Emma Batha, “Somalia is worst humanitarian crisis, UN official” (Reuters Foundation, AlertNet, January 30, 2008).
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