

# ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.1 2011

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## SUMMARY & ASSESSMENT

Attacks against NGOs by armed opposition have remained stable and low throughout the Q1 (p.3), although the overall level of incidents, including criminal acts, has grown by 38%. The criminal sector saw an increase of 50% (p.4) with attacks by AOG increasing by a lower rate of 29% (or just four actual attacks). A total of seven persons have been killed, comparable to eight at Q1 2010, all by small arms fire either as a result of deliberate intent (mostly criminal), a personal dispute or collaterally in attacks on other targets (p.5). The percentage of total attacks occurring in the North East has jumped from 12% in 2010 to 22% this year with a spike of incidents (mostly criminal) recently in Badakhshan; notably one of the provinces slated for early 'transition'. The number of attacks occurring in the East has similarly jumped from 20% to 25%, mostly as a result of a sharply deteriorating Nangarhar province. Kinetic attacks against NGOs have included improvised explosive devices (5), rocket strikes (1), small arms fire (8) and armed robberies (6). In addition there have been four cases of abduction, involving seven actual persons, all but one of which have been resolved to date. Abduction rates also remain consistent with 2010, which, coincidentally, also saw eight in the Q1.

The data at this stage continues to support the conclusion that, despite an over all increase in the conflict rate (p.8), NGOs are not routinely targeted by the Taliban as a matter of policy but are being impacted, as a statistical inevitability, by an increase in ambient violence. ANSO currently ranks **collateral damage** and an **accidental strike with an IED** as the highest risk factors facing the NGO community (p.6). Mitigation strategies for these specific risks would include reduced proximity to likely targets, adoption of a low visibility movement profile and where possible, direct access negotiations with opposition forces to respect neutrality.

There have been no substantial changes in the strategic environment since the last report period. The IMF remain engaged in establishing the conditions for their exit, with data suggesting that their regular force interventions have not significantly impacted AOG fighting capacity at a strategic level. AOG attacks in Helmand province have increased by 76% over the Q1 of 2010 (p.9). As anticipated, irregular armed forces continue to develop (under the VSO/ALP rubric) well beyond the planned footprint (p.11) establishing potential obstacles to political cohesion and state stability. Preliminary "transition" areas have been announced, although it remains too early to judge the impact of this in the Q1 data period.

Countrywide, the number of attacks by armed opposition has already grown by 51% (p.8) on 2010, suggesting that AOG capacity was not significantly effected by last years IMF operations. We anticipate that 2011 will be the most violent year since we have been keeping records.

Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul, April 2011

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
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# Part 1.

# NGO TRENDS


## 1.1 AOG Attacks Against NGOs

**ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to AOG per month, 2006 - 2011**  
*(Includes all types of event such as kinetic, non-kinetic, threats and abductions)*




AOG attacks against NGOs remain within normally low ranges, seeing a moderate rise over the Q1 period of 2010 (up from 14 to 18, see below right). Just 35% of the total are assessed as being deliberately intended to cause harm or loss, although this count also includes many incidents which look more like AOGs settling personal scores than airing a grudge against the NGO. Accidents, most commonly with IED or RPG strikes, and information gathering exercises, most commonly through temporary detentions, continue to make up a large part of AOG interaction with NGOs. The data continues to provide no evidence of systematic or routine targeting of NGOs by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA).


**ANSO: Assessed cause/purpose of AOG attacks on NGOs, Q 1 2011**





**ANSO: AOG attacks against NGOs, Q1 only, 2008-2011**



## 1.2 General NGO Trends– Criminal Attacks




While still low in absolute terms, there has been a slight relative increase in the number of crimes against the NGO community, rising from 10 to 15 over the Q1 (below right). The rate does not exceed longer term norms however (above) and overall NGO exposure to crime appears to be dropping. The majority of recent attacks have been armed robberies, both at the office and at home, with vehicles, cash and valuable electronics being stolen. That the majority of crimes (47%) occur in the North and North Eastern regions is certainly reflective of NGO density there, but it could also suggest a general growth in criminality invoked by the widespread formation of irregular militias. It is in these regions particularly that locals have claimed irregular forces to be nothing more than sanctioned criminals.




### 1.3 NGO Incident Mapping—Q1 2011

ANSO: Province of serious NGO Incidents, Jan-Mar 2011



As usual, serious attacks have occurred in provinces assessed both as calm as well as insecure with no specific geographic concentration. That IED strikes have not, so far, occurred in the South, reflects the lack of road movement in those areas. A larger proportion of incidents occurred in the East as a result of a growing instability in Nangarhar, this will definitely be a province to watch in 2011. Of the seven NGO deaths occurring so far this year, five have been as a result of the small arms fire incidents, a change from last year when most were from IEDs. Most of these deaths have been assessed as being criminally (or personally) motivated. The percentage of all incidents occurring in the North and North East has risen from 40 to 44%.



### 1.3 Security Risk Assessment Matrix (SRAM)

RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX (Likelihood x Impact=Risk)		Impact					Risk Rating	
		Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High		
Likelihood	Very Low	1	1	2	3	3	1	Negligible Risk
	Low	1	2	3	3	3	2	Mild Risk
	Moderate	2	2	3	4	4	3	Moderate Risk
	High	3	3	3	4	5	4	Serious Risk
	Very High	3	3	4	5	5	5	Unacceptably High Risk

The Security Risk Assessment Matrix is a common tool to assist NGOs in visualizing and ranking risk. The below presents our current ranking of the primary risks to NGOs, per ANSO operational area, along with the recommended mitigation tactic. We currently consider **collateral damage** and **accidental IED strikes** to be the highest ranked risks to NGOs countrywide. NGOs might use the charts to further develop regionally specific mitigation.

COUNTRY WIDE				
Type of Incident	Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating	Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Collateral Damage	Moderate	High	4	Avoiding proximity to targets & hardening of facilities (protection)
Accidental IED	Moderate	High	4	Use a low profile vehilce (unless your logo is recognized) & travel off peak
Abduction for Interrogation	High	Low	3	Establish community legitimacy & deploy staff from local area only
Armed Robbery	Moderate	Moderate	3	Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines

EASTERN REGION				
Type of Incident	Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating	Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Collateral Damage	Low	High	3	Avoiding proximity to targets
Accidental IED	Low	V. High	3	Use a low profile vehilce & travel 'off peak'
Deliberate IED	V. Low	V.High	3	Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
Armed Robbery on Road	Moderate	Moderate	3	Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Deliberate AOG targeting	V. Low	V. High	3	Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance

NORTHERN & NORTH EAST REGIONS				
Type of Incident	Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating	Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Abduction at Illegal Checkpoint	Low	Moderate	3	Do not carry items linking you to an NGO (sanitized)
Direct Attack on Vehicle/Compound	Low	V. High	3	Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
Accidental IED	Low	V. High	3	Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'
Collateral Damage	Low	High	3	Avoiding proximity to targets
Armed Robbery on Road	Low	Moderate	2	Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines

WESTERN REGION				
Type of Incident	Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating	Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Targeted Abduction	Low	Moderate	3	Deploy staff from the local area only and establish community support
Armed Robbery on Road	Low	Moderate	3	Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Collateral Damage	Low	High	3	Avoiding proximity to targets
Accidental IED	Low	V. High	3	Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'
Deliberate AOG targeting	Low	V. High	3	Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance

SOUTHERN REGION				
Type of Incident	Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating	Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Accidental IED	High	V.High	5	Reduce road movements, travel low profile & "off peak"
Collateral Damage	High	V.High	5	Avoiding proximity to targets
Deliberate AOG targeting	Low	V.High	3	Avoid association to IMF/GIRoA, maintain neutrality in projects
Deliberate IED	Low	V.High	3	Remain neutral & outreach to AOG to promote acceptance

CENTRAL REGION				
Type of Incident	Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating	Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Accidental IED	Very Low	V.High	3	Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'
Accidental IDF strike	Low	Moderate	3	Avoiding proximity to targets
Collateral Damage	Moderate	V. High	4	Avoiding proximity to targets
Armed Robbery on Road	Moderate	Moderate	3	Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Home/Office Break-In	High	Low	3	Guards, perimeter fence & lighting

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
# **Part 2.**

# **State of the Conflict**

## 2.1 AOG Initiated Attacks—Countrywide


**ANSO: Total AOG initiated attacks per month, 2006-2011**

(Note: This is a clean count of AOG initiated kinetic attacks only, it does not include any criminal activity, kinetic or otherwise)



AOG initiated attacks have soared this quarter, up by 51% from last year. This ‘gain rate’ is also larger than the 38% seen between the Q1 of 09-10. March 2011 saw 1,102 attacks, an average of 35 per day, surpassing even the August 2009 summer peak during Presidential elections. The data suggests that the deep winter down turn (noted at Q4 2010) was simply an ordinary operational pause, and was not reflective of a permanently degraded capacity as some had suggested at the time. Considering the variety of

**ANSO: Total AOG attacks at Q1 stage only, 2007-2011**



IMF tactics and strengths that have been brought to bear against the opposition at different periods throughout the 5.2 years recorded here, it is remarkable how consistent the growth rate has been and suggests that we need to think beyond the linear logic that a stronger IMF equals a weaker AOG, as this is clearly not the case. Instead, it is likely that a more complex ‘co-evolutionary’ relationship exists within which the counter-insurgency actually strengthens and exacerbates the insurgency, through forced adaptation, rather than defeating it. The end result appears to be a **perpetually escalating stalemate** which could sustain itself indefinitely, or until one side, or the other, transitions out.

## 2.2 AOG Initiated Attacks—Per Province


This table provides a comparison of raw AOG attack rate data, per province, for the Q1 periods of 2010 and 2011. It shows the percentage change and the absolute figure. When using for independent analysis readers are reminded that a low attack volume can indicate AOG dominance and that a small absolute change can be large when stated as a percentage. The 'average' referred to is the 51% country rate. (p10)

PROVINCE	AOG Attacks Q1 2010	AOG Attacks Q1 2011	% Change	Absolute Change	
PAKTYA	14	140	900%	126	ABOVE AVERAGE GROWTH
NURISTAN	4	21	425%	17	
JAWZJAN	12	33	175%	21	
BADAKHSHAN	4	11	175%	7	
FARAH	22	58	164%	36	
PARWAN	6	15	150%	9	
KHOST	147	326	122%	179	
BALKH	14	31	121%	17	
HERAT	27	58	115%	31	
GHAZNI	71	152	114%	81	
URUZGAN	49	93	90%	44	
HELMAND	381	672	76%	291	
NANGARHAR	76	128	68%	52	
BADGHIS	65	97	49%	32	
FARYAB	38	55	45%	17	
LAGHMAN	26	32	23%	6	
WARDAK	38	43	13%	5	
PAKTIKA	43	48	12%	5	
KANDAHAR	228	249	9%	21	
KUNAR	312	338	8%	26	
ZABUL	52	55	6%	3	
SAMANGAN	0	2	0%	2	
LOGAR	23	23	0%	0	NEGATIVE GROWTH
GHOR	3	3	0%	0	
KABUL	24	22	-8%	-2	
SAR-E PUL	21	19	-10%	-2	
DAYKUNDI	8	7	-13%	-1	
NIMROZ	21	14	-33%	-7	
KUNDUZ	79	46	-42%	-33	
KAPISA	37	19	-49%	-18	
BAGHLAN	35	16	-54%	-19	
TAKHAR	19	5	-74%	-14	
BAMYAN	1	0	-100%	-1	

## 2.3 AOG Initiated Attacks—Insecurity Rating

### ANSO: Provincial Insecurity Rating, at Q1 2011



(Rating based on analytical assessment and not just incident rate. Total AOG attacks for 2011 indicated in map. A lack of AOG attacks can indicate uncontested AOG presence)



The most volatile area, again, has been Loya Paktia (P2K) plus Ghazni - which corresponds to some of ISAF RC-EAST and AOG Miramshah Shura - which has seen an averaged growth rate of 287% per province. All four provinces in this area are ranked as “extremely insecure” and are likely to remain so throughout 2011. The northern half of ISAF RC-EAST (Nuristan, Kunar) remains ranked as “extremely insecure”, with at least one district (Waygal) entirely under AOG command. In the south, Uruzgan and Helmand are seeing above average growth rates, as AOG counter ISAF offensives, while Kandahar and Zabul remain steady and Nimroz sees decline. We continue to rank four of the five as “highly insecure” or above, with just Nimroz being slightly more accessible. The four provinces of the west have seen an averaged growth rate of 82% and we rank Herat as “deteriorating” as it is slated for early transition while seeing a 115% increase in attacks. In the north west, Faryab is ranked as “moderate” having the regional highest attack rate in absolute terms. Jawzjan and Balkh rank as “deteriorating” due to them having the regions highest percentage growth rates (175% & 121% respectively). Sar-i-Pul’s Sayyad district causes it to also be ranked as “deteriorating”. In the north east all provinces but Badakhshan have seen lower attack rates than Q1 last year but continue to be ranked as “moderate” and “deteriorating” due to the very high likelihood of a fresh AOG campaign in Q2.

## 2.5 Irregular Armed Forces (IAF)

Irregular armed forces continue to be developed, as a component of the IMF exit strategy. To deflect criticism, all such forces are supposed to become enrolled in the MOI Afghan Local Police (ALP) program. However, as the mapping exercise below shows, irregular armed forces are in fact mobilizing and operating well beyond the reach of that program, mostly at the initiative of local political and ethnic leaders and generally with tacit knowledge and approval from IMF (US). The phenomenon presents only minor immediate threats to NGOs, but may lead to sub-national conflicts as “transition” progresses.



**Acronyms:**

**IEA** - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban)

**AOG**- Armed Opposition Groups (specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban); Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiH)

**IMF** - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF)

**ANSF** - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army)

**IED** - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb)

**IDF**—Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars)

**CAS** - Close Air Support (airstrike)

**EOF** - Escalation of Force (shooting a vehicle at a check post that fails to stop)

**SAF** - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK47)

# REPORT ENDS

For further information  
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