Haven't found what you are looking for? To further refine your search: Click on the 'advanced search' menu to filter by title, abstract, source, and/or publication date; to include or exclude multiple resource categories, regions or topics.
Abstract: Are violators of international human rights norms punished with lower levels of foreign aid?
Despite their abstract preferences, governments often lack the incentive to punish norm
violators bilaterally. Multilateral lending institutions, such as the World Bank, could fill the
void if they wanted to consider human rights abuses and could bypass restrictions on
evaluating the political character of recipients. This article argues that ‘shaming’ in the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights through resolutions that explicitly criticized
governments for their human rights records provided substantive information about rights
abuses and gave political cover for the World Bank and other liberal multilateral aid
institutions seeking to sanction human rights violators. Statistical analyses support these
theoretical claims. The adoption of a UNCHR resolution condemning a country’s human
rights record produced a sizeable reduction in multilateral, and especially World Bank, aid
but had no effect on the country’s aggregate bilateral aid receipts. The analyses also
support predictions that ‘objective’ measures of human rights have no independent effect on
multilateral aid allocations. The findings, which are robust to different model techniques
and specifications, suggest that punishment for violating international human rights norms is
selective, that international organizations play an important role in the selection process, and
thus that seemingly symbolic resolutions of a politically motivated IO can carry tangible
consequences.
Abstract: Theories of government–international court relations assume that judges
share an interest in expanding the reach of their court. Yet, casual observation suggests
that international judges vary in their activist orientations and that governments
selectively appoint judges. This article explores a new data set of dissents in
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to estimate the ideal points of judges.
The results show that activism-restraint is indeed the main dimension of contestation
among judges. Variation in judicial activism cannot be accounted for by different
legal cultures of judges or by levels of domestic human rights observance in the
judges’ countries of origins. Instead, aspiring European Union (EU) members and
governments more favorably disposed toward European integration appoint more activist
judges. These results imply that politics matters in the appointment of international
judges and that EU expansion was an important driving force behind the
ECHR’s increased activism. More generally, the analysis suggests that agent selection
is an important and understudied tool for influencing international organizations.
Abstract: At least since the Persian Gulf War, states have behaved “as if” it is costly to be unsuccessful in acquiring the legitimacy the UN Security Council confers on uses of force. This observation is puzzling for theories that seek the origins of modern institutional legitimacy in legalities or moral values. I argue that when governments and citizens look for an authority to legitimize the use of force, they generally do not seek an independent judgment on the appropriateness of an intervention but political reassurance about the consequences of proposed military adventures. Council decisions legitimize or delegitimize uses of force in the sense that they form widely accepted political judgments on whether uses of force transgress a limit that should be defended. These judgments become focal points in the collaboration and coordination dilemmas states face in enforcing limits to U.S. power while preserving mutually beneficial cooperation. The implications for the Council’s legitimacy and theories of international legitimacy are discussed.
Abstract: In February 2008, the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the Swiss based
organization, Interpeace, launched a project aimed at supporting reconciliation in Nimba
County in order to contribute to the process of sustaining peace in Liberia. During the years
of war in Liberia, Nimba County served as a major theatre of combat. Polarization and
violence led to the destruction not only of physical infrastructure - but of lives and the
entire social fabric. The effects of this period are still a source of tension, and stand in the
way of reconciliation between former rivals. In conducting research for this report,
extensive consultations were carried out in the County, and a broad range of people
participated in the process including members from all ethnic groups, local and traditional
authorities, religious leaders and youth and women’s groups. The findings presented in this
report reflect the views of these participants.
The project was conceived as an inclusive and participatory consultation process to be
implemented in three phases: Listening, Visioning, and Action Planning. As this report will
highlight, the project phases involved identifying key actors and issues, facilitating
discussions, recording areas of convergence and shared vision, and finally putting forward
recommendations for action. Over one thousand inhabitants from different settlements in
Nimba County participated in this six-month process. The project was implemented by a
fully Liberian project team, with three Research Teams being deployed in the six districts of
the County to implement the research strategy.
Results indicate that conflict in Nimba County is not exclusively due to tension between
Mandingo, and Mano and Gio over private property in urban settings as has been widely
reported. Conflict can be found across all districts, and is present in both urban and rural
communities. The causes of conflict are varied; most are about land, but there are other
important sources such as inter-ethnic disputes, poor governance practices, and
apprehension over the relationship between modernization and traditional practices.
Conflict in Nimba is therefore not defined by ethnicity – even though in some areas of the
County tensions between ethnic groups assume explosive and worrisome levels, in other
areas there are reports of successful inter-ethnic collaboration.
Abstract: Rebuilding a country after conflict is about far more than repairing damaged buildings and re-establishing public institutions. Fundamentally, it is about restoring the people’s trust and confidence in governance systems and the rule of law, rebuilding relationships at all levels, and providing the population with greater hope for the future. These processes are all critical to the consolidation of peace and security in fragile post-conflict situations. When they are neglected, the threat of conflict re-emerging is very real.
In this sense, state-building and peace-building are potentially contradictory processes – the former requiring the consolidation of governmental authority, the latter involving its moderation through compromise and consensus. The challenge for both national and international peacemakers is to situate reconciliation firmly within the context of state-building, while employing state-building as a platform for the development of mutual trust and lasting reconciliation. In Somali region, it goes without saying that neither of these processes can be possible without the broad and inclusive engagement of the Somali people.
WSP International – recently renamed the International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace) – launched its Somali Programme in the northeastern part of Somali region known as Puntland in 1996. It subsequently expanded its programme to Somaliland in 1999, and to south-central Somalia in 2000. Working with highly respected local peace-building institutions established with the programme’s support – the Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC) in Garowe, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Hargeysa, and the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) in Mogadishu – WSP has employed a highly successful ‘Participatory Action Research’ methodology to advance and support interlinked processes of peace-building and state formation. WSP’s experience in the Somali region over the past decade indicates that the understanding and trust developed through the PAR methodology can help to resolve conflicts directly, while at the same time building consensual approaches to address the social, economic and political issues necessary for a durable peace.
Abstract: In 2004, the German aid agency GTZ estimated there were more than 70,000 armed militia members operating in south-central Somalia. These armed groups generally comprise faction-based militias, which support senior political leaders, business militias, which provide security for commercial interests, Sharia court and clan-based militias, which may be mobilised to defend clan interests, and freelance militias.
There is a widespread perception among Somalis that demilitarisation will be a critical prerequisite for lasting peace. Most of the key players involved define demilitarisation as a slow, carefully thought-out process through which armed groups and individuals are disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated into their communities. Past experience suggests that successful demobilisation in Somalia will have to be locally driven and owned (Menkhaus, 2004) and will require a coherent strategic framework that engages all armed parties. In south-central Somalia, this issue remains one of the highest priorities for discussions on security and stabilisation. The civil war has produced a variety of armed groups with different interests, each of which has played a role in the conflict – and will have to play a role in consolidating peace and establishing governance.
In the absence of an enforceable rule of law, Somali citizens have increasingly reverted to traditional xeer law and Sharia law, as well as more brutal forms of justice such as revenge killings. Both the “divide and rule” tactics of the Barre regime and the long period of anarchy during the early and mid-1990s also served to erode traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, which had proved so important for resolving inter-clan conflicts in the country.
Abstract: The present report, which has been prepared pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1612 (2005), is presented to the Council and its Working Group on
Children and Armed Conflict as the first country report on the situation of children
and armed conflict in Afghanistan. The report covers the period from 1 July 2007 to
15 August 2008.
The report focuses on grave violations perpetrated against children in
Afghanistan and identifies parties to the conflict, both State and non-State actors,
who commit grave abuses against children. In particular, the report highlights the
fact that children have been recruited and utilized by State and non-State armed
groups and that non-State armed groups such as the Taliban continue to train and use
children as suicide bombers. The report sheds light on the detention of children
accused of association with armed groups by the Government of Afghanistan, and
international military forces in violation of Afghan law and international best
practice. The report also discusses the worrisome increase in the number of children
victims of attacks against schools and communities by non-State armed groups,
including the ever increasing number of children inadvertently killed during
engagements by international and Afghan forces. Finally, the report surveys the need
for greater attention to the problem of sexual violence against children, in particular
against boys, in the context of the ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan.
The report acknowledges the significant challenges in addressing child rights
violations in Afghanistan and outlines a series of recommendations to end the
recruitment and use of children as well as other grave violations of children’s rights.
It recommends that all parties to the conflict facilitate access to their areas of
operation and ensure the safety of staff for monitoring and reporting purposes. It asks
the United Nations, in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan and
international forces, to investigate ways and means of extending monitoring and
reporting to hitherto inaccessible conflict areas of Afghanistan.
Abstract: Le présent rapport, établi en application des dispositions de la résolution
1612 (2005) du Conseil de sécurité, est le premier rapport de pays sur la situation des
enfants et les conflits armés en Afghanistan présenté au Conseil et à son Groupe de
travail sur les enfants et les conflits armés. Il porte sur la période allant du 1er juillet
2007 au 15 août 2008.
Le présent rapport fait état des graves violations des droits de l’enfant en
Afghanistan et indique les parties au conflit – acteurs étatiques et non étatiques – qui
commettent de graves abus contre des enfants. Il signale en particulier que des
enfants ont été enrôlés et exploités par des groupes armés étatiques et non étatiques,
et que des groupes armés non étatiques tels que les Taliban continuent d’entraîner des
enfants dont ils se servent notamment pour des attentats-suicides. Il lève le voile sur
la détention, par les autorités afghanes et par les forces militaires internationales,
d’enfants accusés d’association avec des groupes armés, et ce, en violation du droit
afghan et des pratiques optimales acceptées au plan international. Il décrit la
situation préoccupante que créent les attaques menées par des groupes armés non
étatiques contre des écoles et des villages et dont les enfants sont de plus en plus
souvent victimes, et atteste que de plus en plus d’enfants sont tués par mégarde lors
d’opérations menées par les forces internationales et afghanes. Enfin, il préconise
d’accorder une plus grande attention au problème de la violence sexuelle à l’égard
des enfants, et particulièrement des garçons, dans le contexte du conflit armé en
Afghanistan.
Le présent rapport relève qu’il est difficile de s’attaquer aux violations des droits
de l’enfant en Afghanistan et il énonce une série de recommandations visant à mettre
un terme au recrutement et à l’exploitation d’enfants ainsi qu’à d’autres violations
graves de leurs droits. Il y est également recommandé à toutes les parties au conflit
de faciliter l’accès au théâtre des opérations des personnes chargées d’observer la
situation et de faire rapport à ce sujet et d’assurer leur sécurité. L’ONU y est invitée,
en consultation avec le Gouvernement afghan et les forces internationales, à
examiner la possibilité d’étendre les opérations d’observation à des zones de conflit
jusque-là inaccessibles afin de rendre compte de la situation qui y règne.
Abstract: Jean-Marie Fardeau, directeur de Human Rights Watch Paris, répond à nos questions :
- HRW dénonce la situation humanitaire alarmante des populations civiles dans le Nord Kivu. Qu’en est-il exactement?
- Vous appelez le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU à accroître le nombre de Casques bleus dans le Nord du pays. Pensez-vous qu’ils seront, même en plus grand nombre, en mesure de protéger les populations civiles?
- Au delà de la MONUC, quel rôle la communauté internationale doit-elle jouer pour améliorer la situation humanitaire en RDC? Pensez-vous que l’Union européenne devrait intervenir?
Abstract: The US-led military intervention in Afghanistan was originally intended to get rid of Al-Qaeda and eradicate its accomplice, the Taliban regime. Soon after, it was understood that political and societal stability could not prevail in Afghanistan without a comprehensive program of reconstruction and nation-building. The international community, notably NATO countries and the EU, were thus called to back that process by providing security guarantee to what would become the PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), as well as economic, financial and technical support. At first, the whole operation took place under a UN mandate, which was relatively easy to obtain since most nations recognised in the Taliban regime a threat to global security. UNSCR 1386 (December 2001) allowed the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with military assets and manpower borrowed from 18 countries. UNSCR 1510 (October 13, 2003) gave mandate to ISAF to operate everywhere in Afghanistan under the command of NATO. Initially ISAF comprised 9,000 personnel in a country the size of France plus the Benelux; in early 2008 they were about 43,0001. In its early days, ISAF was responsible for providing a secure umbrella upon reconstruction activities; it is being now growingly caught into combating the Taliban which cannot be seen merely as “terrorists” since they are an integral part of the Afghan society. At present, NATO officials are talking about maintaining a presence on Afghanistan for an indeterminate period of time. Something Western leaders would not have dared foresee at the time they started ISAF. When UK defence secretary John Reid sent additional British troops into Afghan province of Helmand, in April 2006, he did declare: “We would be perfectly happy to leave in three years and without firing one shot because our job is to protect the reconstruction”. Indeed, Western involvement in Afghan affairs has put into motion complex internal and external dynamics that are now significantly impacting on the duration, the nature and the scope of Western objectives. The rationale of the Western intervention can no longer be assessed merely in relation with the sole eradication of the Taliban and the gradual instauration of democracy in a country which never experienced it. Indeed, Western engagement now encompasses different types of concerns mixing up together. Put it differently, who, how and why are we fighting in Afghanistan?
Abstract: En l’espace de quarante ans, le dessalement est un mythe devenu réalité. Si les hommes ont toujours pensé dans leur imaginaire collectif pouvoir utiliser l’eau de mer pour épancher leur soif, la technologie a permis ce miracle à un coût devenu aujourd’hui acceptable. Sans entrer dans un plaidoyer technique sur le dessalement, il existe dans les faits deux familles de technologies de dessalement : la distillation et la filtration membranaire. La distillation utilise l’évaporation, via chauffage thermique, pour séparer l’eau des impuretés de sels. Son inconvénient majeur est la formidable énergie que consomme ce procédé. La filtration membranaire utilise, elle, le procédé d’osmose inverse pour retenir les sels contenus dans l’eau. L’eau salée pénètre ainsi à une extrémité de la membrane sous une pression de 80 bars, et après passage membranaire, l’eau ressort débarrassée de 99 % de son sel. La technologie de l’osmose inverse, qui constituait 20% des unités de production au début des années 1980, s’impose aujourd’hui, devant les procédés de distillation. Le coût de l’osmose inverse est devenu inférieur à celui de la distillation en 1995, avec l’apparition d’une nouvelle génération de membranes.
Abstract: The central government’s limited writ and perceived corruption are helping sustain
a Taliban insurgency and feeding pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort.
However, ethnic disputes have been confined to political debate and competition,
enabling Karzai to focus on improving governance, reversing security deterioration and
on his re-election bid in the fall of 2009. U.S. policy has been to extend the authority and encourage reform of Afghanistan’s
President Hamid Karzai and his central government, predicated on the observation that
weak and corrupt governance is causing some Afghans to turn to Taliban insurgents as
a source of stability and credible justice. At the same time, U.S. and Afghan officials are
supporting the development of local governing bodies in recognition that substantial local
autonomy is a typical pattern of Afghan governance. Karzai’s is the first fully elected
government in Afghan history, although there were parliamentary elections during the
reign of King Zahir Shah (the last were in 1969). Presidential, parliamentary, and
provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition
roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions
signed in Bonn, Germany on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”), after the Taliban
had fallen. (The political transition process is depicted in the table.) The elected Afghan
parliament integrates all the various ethnicities and sects, but the cabinet has come to be
dominated by ethnic Pashtuns (who are about 42% of the population and traditionally
have governed Afghanistan). The United States provides about 15,000 forces to a 44,000
troop NATO-led peacekeeping coalition there; another 19,000 U.S. troops are under direct
U.S. command.
Abstract: U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are
increasingly negative, to the point where top U.S. commanders say they are not sure
the effort is “winning.” U.S. and outside assessments emphasize a growing sense
of insecurity in areas around Kabul previously considered secure, and increased
numbers of civilian and military deaths. Both the official U.S. as well as outside
assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan’s failure to prevent Taliban and
other militant infiltration into Afghanistan as a cause of the security deterioration.
The Administration is conducting a review of U.S. strategy, reportedly with an eye
toward making actionable recommendations to the incoming Obama
Administration, which is expected to favor greater emphasis on Afghanistan.
Already planned or under way are steps including adding U.S. troops to the
Afghanistan theater, consolidating the command structure for U.S. and partner
forces, planning a major expansion of the Afghan National Army, and attempting to
accelerate development activities to increase support for the Afghan government.
The Administration also has increased direct U.S. action against militant
concentrations inside Pakistan.
The central government is relatively stable, but it is perceived as weak, corrupt,
and unresponsive to core needs, causing popular disillusionment. A key component
of U.S. strategy is to try to compel the Afghan government to redress these
deficiencies. Yet, Afghan officials point to completion of the post-Taliban political
transition with the convening of a parliament following parliamentary elections in
September 2005, presidential elections in October 2004, and adoption of a new
constitution in January 2004. The parliament has become an arena for formerly
armed factions to peacefully resolve differences, as well as a center of political
pressure on President Hamid Karzai. Major regional strongmen have been
marginalized. Afghan citizens are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the
Taliban, and women are participating in economic and political life. Presidential and
provincial elections are planned for mid-2009, with parliamentary and district
elections to follow one year later, although possibly subject to security conditions.
The United States and partner countries now deploy a 44,000 troop NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that commands peacekeeping
throughout Afghanistan. Of those, about 14,500 of the 33,600 U.S. forces in
Afghanistan are part of ISAF; the remainder (about 19,000) are under Operation
Enduring Freedom. U.S. and partner forces also run 26 regional enclaves to secure
reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan
National Army and National Police now numbering about 150,000. The United
States has given Afghanistan over $30 billion (appropriated, including FY2009 to
date) since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $15 billion was to equip and train
the security forces. Breakdowns are shown in the tables at the end. This paper will
be updated as warranted.
Abstract: The Administration is claiming success in significantly reducing violence in Iraq
as a result of the “troop surge” announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007
(“New Way Forward”). With the 28,500 “surge” forces withdrawn as of July 2008,
Defense Department reports assess that overall violence is down as much as 80%
since early 2007, to levels not seen since 2004. Small additional drawdowns are
planned for early 2009, but U.S. commanders say that progress is “fragile and
tenuous.” They recommend that measured, incremental “conditions-based”
reductions in U.S. forces, continued building of Iraq’s security forces, and likely
further political progress in Iraq are needed to produce a unified, democratic Iraq that
can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror.
While commanders remain cautious on further U.S. force drawdowns, the
Administration argues that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is increasingly recognized
as politically strong and capable, and that Iraqi legislative action in Iraq since the
beginning of 2008 represents a substantial measure of the progress on political
reconciliation that the surge was designed to facilitate. Provincial council elections,
originally planned for October 1, 2008, and considered crucial to further
reconciliation, are now planned for January 2009 under a newly passed election law.
Yet, there are growing tensions between the Shiite-dominated government and those
Sunni leaders and fighters who have been key to stabilizing large parts of Iraq, as
well as continued concerns over the degree to which the Shiite faction of Moqtada
Al Sadr will integrate into the political process. Maliki’s insistence on a timetable for
a U.S. withdrawal and other demands have held up finalizing a U.S.-Iraq agreement
that would govern the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq beyond December 2008.
Tensions are increasing significantly between the Iraqi Kurds and Iraq’s Arab leaders
over Kurdish demands for control of disputed areas and energy development in the
Kurdish areas.
The progress in 2008 comes after several years of frustration that Operation
Iraqi Freedom had overthrown Saddam Hussein’s regime, only to see Iraq wracked
by a violence Sunni Arab-led insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence,
competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq’s government to equitably
administer justice or deliver services. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs
— without clear movement toward national political reconciliation — stimulated
debate within the United States over whether a stable Iraq could ever be achieved,
and at what cost. There was not the required level of support in the 110th Congress
to compel a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal, but there is growing U.S. support for
compelling Iraq, which anticipates large surpluses attributed to high oil prices, to
fund key functions now funded by the United States.
This report is updated regularly.
Abstract: Iraq’s political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues
to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. The Administration is
optimistic that the passage of key laws in 2008, including a law to govern provincial
elections to be held in early 2009, will sustain recent reductions in violence. After about one year of occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an
appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. In line with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional
Administrative Law” (TAL), the first post-Saddam election was held on January 30, 2005,
for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an executive), four-year term
provincial councils in all 18 provinces (41 seats per council; 51 for Baghdad), and a
Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was proportional
representation/closed list: voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of
parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which nine were multiparty
coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17
Assembly seats, and only one seat on the Baghdad provincial council. Radical Shiite
cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction
under-represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting
government placed Shiites and Kurds in the most senior positions — Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was President and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader
Ibrahim al-Jafari was Prime Minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president,
a deputy prime minister, and six ministers, including defense.
Abstract: With a conventional military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat
from Saddam Hussein’s regime removed, Iran seeks to ensure that Iraq can never again
become a threat to Iran, either with or without U.S. forces present in Iraq. By supporting
armed Shiite factions, Iran’s influence in Iraq has at times hindered U.S. efforts to
stabilize Iraq, and has heightened the U.S. threat perception of Iran generally. However,
Iran faces difficult choices in Iraq now that its protege Shiite factions, formerly united,
are competing and often fighting each other. This report will be updated.
Abstract: The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a “profound threat to U.S.
national security interests,” a perception generated primarily by Iran’s nuclear
program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the
Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration’s
approach has been to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying
coordinated international economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential
cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its
enrichment of uranium. The incorporation of diplomacy and engagement into the
overall U.S. strategy led the Administration to approve the participation of a high-level
State Department official at multilateral nuclear talks with Iran on July 19,
2008, although that meeting, and subsequent discussions, have not resulted in Iran’s
acceptance of the international offer of incentives.
During 2006 and 2007, three U.N. Security Council resolutions (1737, 1747,
and 1803) imposed sanctions that ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related
trade with Iran; freeze the assets of Iran’s nuclear and related entities and
personalities; prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban or require
reporting on international travel by named Iranians; call for inspections of some
Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with
some Iranian banks. Further U.N. Security Council sanctions have been considered,
although progress was slowed by U.S.-Russia tensions over Georgia in August 2008.
In an attempt to show continued unity, the Council adopted U.N. Security Council
1835 on September 27, 2008, which stressed the need for Iran to comply but did not
impose any additional sanctions. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European
governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and to convince foreign
banks not to do business with Iran, are beginning to weaken Iran’s economy, by many
accounts, and might be causing debate among Iranian leaders over how to respond
to international demands.
To strengthen its approach, the Administration has maintained a substantial
naval presence in the Persian Gulf, which U.S. commanders insist would prevent any
Iranian attempts to close the crucial Strait of Hormuz for any extended period. The
Administration strongly denies that it is planning to take military action against Iran,
but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran’s uranium enrichment
program succeed. An alternate question is how the Administration would react to
any Israeli attempt to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Others believe that only a
change of Iran’s regime would end the threat posed by Iran, although regime change
is not currently a prominent feature of Administration policy toward Iran. Bills at
various stages of consideration in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 1400, S. 970,
S. 3227, S. 3445, H.R. 7112, H.Con.Res. 362, and S.Res. 580 would tighten U.S.
sanctions on Iran.
This report is updated regularly.
Abstract: * Yemen presents a potent combination of problems for policy-makers confronting the prospect of state failure in this strategically important Red Sea country. It is the poorest state in the Arab world, with high levels of unemployment, rapid population growth and dwindling water resources.
* President Saleh faces an intermittent civil war in the north, a southern separatist movement and resurgent terrorist groups. Yemen's jihadi networks appear to be growing as operating conditions in Iraq and Saudi Arabia become more difficult.
* The underlying drivers for future instability are economic. The state budget is heavily dependent on revenue from dwindling oil supplies. Yemen's window of opportunity to shape its own future and create a post-oil economy is narrowing.
* Western governments need to work towards an effective regional approach with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, in particular Saudi Arabia.
* Future instability in Yemen could expand a lawless zone stretching from northern Kenya, through Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, to Saudi Arabia. Piracy, organized crime and violent jihad would escalate, with implications for the security of shipping routes, the transit of oil through the Suez Canal and the internal security of Yemen's neighbours.
Abstract: Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Jordan has been a nation living in an uneasy relationship with the Sunni Islamist movement. With a population more than fifty-percent Palestinian, Jordan became an ever-more useful place for Palestinian radicals to hang their hats while preparing plans to destroy Israel. Under King Hussein, the radicals were allowed to be in Jordan, but the country’s pervasive and effective security services moderated the domestic problems they caused, save for flashes of admittedly intense violence. Over time – and after another war - King Hussein also became a central player in the Arab-Israeli peace process, earning the animosity of some of Jordan’s Palestinian guests, as well as those of Jordan’s domestic Islamist leaders, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamist organizations – most of whom enjoyed external funding from the Gulf. To say that Jordan was always one step ahead of Islamist trouble probably is fair, but King Hussein proved to be a deft political operator and managed both to keep the security lid on and maintain popularity among the people.
Then Hussein died, his son Abdullah took the throne, and the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, all of which yielded a significantly more dangerous internal security environment for Jordan. The new king, Abdullah, was not made of the same stern stuff and craftiness as his father and he seemed to exude a Westernized persona that did not sit well with the country’s Islamists. While this weakness might have been overcome in time, Abdullah soon encountered a situation in which he first aligned Jordan with Washington’s post-9/11 war on terrorism; then with its invasion of Iraq – for which it was rewarded by a doubling of U.S. aid in 2004 and continuing increases since; and finally with the West’s aid-boycott of the Hamas-led government in Gaza (Reuters, January 14). The Amman regime began running hospitals in Fallujah and Mazar-i-Sharif – the latter in NATO-occupied Afghanistan - and soon after paid the price for supporting U.S. policy in Iraq with attacks on its interests and personnel within Iraq. Most importantly, Jordan now faced a world in which the durable shield of Saddam’s Iraq – which had prevented the entry of large numbers of Sunni jihadis from the Gulf and South Asia – was shattered.
Of the Levant’s Arab states, Jordan suffered quickly and most severely from the U.S.-led coalition’s destruction of the anti-jihadi bulwark Saddam’s Iraq reliably provided on Jordan’s eastern border. The end of Saddam’s reign vastly increased Jordan’s domestic security problems.
Abstract: Turkey has recently intensified its international effort to limit the activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan - PKK) in the international arena. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has written a letter to European leaders, suggesting that merely recognizing the PKK as a terrorist organization is not enough. Those who recognize the PKK as a terror organization should take effective measures against the group’s structure and activities in Europe. Parallel to Erdogan’s letter, the Turkish Foreign Ministry asked its diplomats in Europe to initiate an active strategy to put emphasis on the PKK’s activities in Europe. (Hurriyet, November 14). In his address to the UN General Assembly on November 14, Erdogan once again called on world leaders to cooperate against terrorism without making distinctions between “good terrorists” and “bad terrorists.” Whatever the source may be, terrorism is a “crime against humanity,” said Erdogan (Aksam, November 14).
With this vision, Turkey began its international approach with Switzerland, one of the European countries where PKK activities are highly visible. Turkey has repeatedly criticized Switzerland for not taking enough steps to combat the PKK, whose members are accused of laundering money in Swiss banks. Unlike member states of the European Union, Switzerland does not list the PKK as a terrorist organization. In September, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan visited the Swiss capital of Bern, where he complained about the lack of Turkish-Swiss cooperation against the PKK. His Swiss counterpart, Micheline Calmy-Rey, assured Babacan that Switzerland was intent on fighting terrorism even if it does not have a list of designated terrorist organizations and individuals (Today's Zaman, November 7).
Abstract: On October 27 an open letter signed by a number of prominent Jordanian Salafists and warning of a new zealot takfiri group in Jordan circulated on jihadist web-forums (alhesbahweb.net, October 27; muslm.net, October 27). Following the takfiri practice of condemning fellow Muslims as apostates or infidels, the letter stated that several members of the new group consider Awqaf imams (religious leaders belonging to Jordan’s official religious body) to be “kafirs” (infidels). “One of them proudly announced that he has not prayed after any of those [sic] imams in the last five years, another one said that he has not in the last ten.” Other members of this group, based in the Jordanian town of Zarqa, go so far as to consider all government employees “infidels.” The open letter concluded with a warning to Muslims against listening to these extremists and a call to Islamic web-forums to deny this “wayward” group a platform to publish their writings.
The “Ministry of Awqaf Islamic Affairs and Holy Places” in Jordan is responsible for the appointment and supervision of all imams. Thus, some Salafi-Jihadis consider these imams government employees rather than religious clerics.
Abstract: A recent interview with the spokesman of the Jaysh al-Muslimin in Iraq elicited mixed reactions from jihadi forum participants, many of whom commented on the issue of nationalism vs. Islamism as the focus of the Iraqi resistance (yaqen.net, November 5; hanein.net, November 6).
The spokesman of the Jaysh al-Muslimin, Dr. Ahmad Azziddin, identifies the group as part of “The Jihad and Change Front” (JCF, formed in September 2007), operating within an Islamist and nationalist framework to expel U.S. forces, liberate Iraq and erect a just and patriotic Iraqi government. The Jaysh al-Muslimin is an Islamic-nationalist movement with no affiliation to any political party. According to the JCF website, Jaysh al-Muslimin has many military, political, media, administrative and weapons development units, all reporting to a general staff that runs military activities in coordination with an intelligence unit (jhadfront.com). The core of Jaysh al-Muslimin is composed of ex-Iraqi military officers and scientists involved in training and supervising Iraqi volunteers. Jaysh al-Muslimin releases almost daily communiqués describing successful attacks against Coalition forces and claims the destruction of hundreds of U.S. tanks and armored vehicles using roadside bombs.
Asked whether the Jaysh al-Muslimin has a political agenda parallel to its military objectives, Azziddin said the group has a political and military agenda in conformity with JCF programs, capable of prevailing over the enemy and winning the support of the populace. Although the JCF considers the tribal Awakening Councils an American apparatus aimed at confronting the growing Iraqi resistance to occupation, it doesn’t regard all members of the councils as national traitors, treating them instead as honest Iraqis manipulated into joining the councils. The JCF has, on many occasions, called on the Awakening fighters to return to the ranks of the nationalist resistance. Concerning the security pact between the Iraqi government and the United States that will allow the presence of U.S. occupation forces through 2011, Azziddin said the Shura council of the JCF obtained a copy of the agreement and, after thorough examination, rejected the agreement on the grounds that it mortgages Iraq to the United States by legitimizing the prolonged occupation of Iraq.
Abstract: This map shows all the piracy and armed robbery incidents reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre during 2008. If exact coordinates are not provided, estimated positions are shown based on information provided. Zoom-in and click on the pointers to view more information of an individual attack. Pointers may be superimposed on each other.
Abstract: Before 1992, shipmasters and ship operators had nowhere to turn to when their ships were attacked, robbed or hijacked either in port or out at sea. Local law enforcement either turned a deaf ear, or chose to ignore that there was a serious problem in their waters.
The International Maritime Bureau aware of the escalating level of piracy, wanted to provide a free service to the seafarer and established the 24 hour IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The main objective of the PRC is to be the first point of contact for the shipmaster to report an actual or attempted attack or even suspicious movements thus initiating the process of response.
The main aim of the PRC is to raise awareness within the shipping industry, which includes the shipmaster, ship-owner, insurance companies, traders, etc, of the areas of high risk associated with piratical attacks or specific ports and anchorages associated with armed robberies on board ships.
The PRC works closely with various governments and law enforcement agencies and is involved in information sharing in an attempt to reduce and ultimately eradicate this crime.
Abstract: The Security Council today authorized a temporary increase of more than 3,000 blue helmets serving with the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to deal with the violence in the country’s east, which has displaced an estimated 250,000 civilians in recent months.
The extra 2,785 troops and 300 police officers will buttress the 17,000 uniformed personnel already serving with the mission (known as MONUC), the largest UN force worldwide but one faced with the task of quelling unrest and protecting civilians in one of Africa’s largest countries.
Council members voted unanimously this morning for a resolution authorizing the extra numbers following a request from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon who, along with other senior UN officials, has said that existing troop numbers in MONUC are inadequate to deal with the scale of the fighting and unrest.
The resolution authorizes the extra troops and police officers until 31 December, adding that the duration of the stay depends on the security situation in DRC’s North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.
